New POM? Mill: Discussing Science & Pragmatics...

[stamenflicker]

http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlUQP5.html

This might make a good jumping off point for a new thread. It could in many ways address a few threads that are occuring on both the science page, and here on the philosophy page.

Mill probably spends a little too much time in trying to pin down an accurate definition of political economy. Feel free to skim that, unless you'd like to make this thread about whether the economy is "real" outside its ideological framework. That would be equally interesting to me.

But I thought we could focus on his views of what makes science, and his views of arriving at (and working out of) general principals of science.

Here's some jumping off points:

And, in truth, there is scarcely any investigation in the whole body of a science requiring so high a degree of analysis and abstraction, as the inquiry, what the science itself is; in other words, what are the properties common to all the truths composing it, and distinguishing them from all other truths.

Personally, I agree with Mill. However I recognize that others might disagree.

Why is the admitted certainty of the results of those sciences in no way prejudiced by the want of solidity in their premises? How happens it that a firm superstructure has been erected upon an unstable foundation? The solution of the paradox is, that what are called first principles, are, in truth, last principles.

Is Mill justifying an "end justifies the means" approach to finding knowledge? In other words, so long as the last principles are products of experiment and analysis, can the first principles reamain a bit epistimologically shaky?

Now, in whatever science there are systematic differences of opinion—which is as much as to say, in all the moral or mental sciences, and in Political Economy among the rest; in whatever science there exist, among those who have attended to the subject, what are commonly called differences of principle, as distinguished from differences of matter-of-fact or detail,—the cause will be found to be, a difference in their conceptions of the philosophic method of the science. The parties who differ are guided, either knowingly or unconsciously, by different views concerning the nature of the evidence appropriate to the subject. They differ not solely in what they believe themselves to see, but in the quarter whence they obtained the light by which they think they see it.

Hence two equally reputable scientists are capable of looking at the same piece of evidence and drawing different conclusions... the way out is detailed by Mill in the paragraphs that follow.

My pulls from Mill should not discourage anyone from reading the whole page, in fact, it will be difficult to have a meaningful discussion about his contributions without reading the whole essay.

Flick

ETA : Mill, not Hume duh... too much reading

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick
This sounds interesting
I like the way he describes how the definition/partition of science is formulated

quote:

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Originally posted by Mill, John Stuart
Mankind did not measure out the ground for intellectual cultivation before they began to plant it; they did not divide the field of human investigation into regular compartments first, and then begin to collect truths for the purpose of being therein deposited; they proceeded in a less systematic manner.

[...] It was in a more advanced stage of the progress of knowledge that mankind became sensible of the advantage of ascertaining whether the facts which they had thus grouped together were distinguished from all other facts by any common properties, and what these were.

---

Here's one of your snippets:

quote:

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Originally posted by Mill, John Stuart
How happens it that a firm superstructure has been erected upon an unstable foundation? The solution of the paradox is, that what are called first principles, are, in truth, last principles. Instead of being the fixed point from whence the chain of proof which supports all the rest of the science hangs suspended, they are themselves the remotest link of the chain.

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That question is unfair, even if the following statement is historically accurate. Perhaps the error is in seeing knowledge as a building. Perhaps it is a 3D object like a cube, that can be made to stand equally firmly on any of 6 sides. That we have chosen one side to be the "foundation" does not make it unstable. It is a point of view that experts in the field have decided is useful -- either for teaching or research.

Quantum Mechanics is actually taught in two ways. In one the Uncertainty Principle is an axiom, in others it is a theorem. Even Euclid's geometry has been reconstructed with different axioms. The list of equivalents to his fifth postulate, all leading to the exact same conclusions, is almost endless. That doesn't make any of those foundations "unstable." They are points of view from which a body of knowledge can be investigated.

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
Is Mill justifying an "end justifies the means" approach to finding knowledge? In other words, so long as the last principles are products of experiment and analysis, can the first principles reamain a bit epistimologically shaky?

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I don't think he is trying to justify anything. He is simply pointing out that when you read a maths text, the first thing you are presented with are "facts" without foundation. You would be inclined to ask "Where does all this come from?" Especially when you see the detail of proof in the things that follow. The thing to bear in mind is that knowledge is not taught in the order in which it was gained. In some sense, for an observation to become an axiom is a promotion. It is moving up the hierarchy to become the base! Because its importance has been recognised.

quote:

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Originally posted by flick
Hence two equally reputable scientists are capable of looking at the same piece of evidence and drawing different conclusions... the way out is detailed by Mill in the paragraphs that follow.

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One way out is a decisive experiment. EG:

quote:

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Originally posted by Mill, John Stuart
Call the effect B, and let the question be whether the cause A in any way contributes to it. We try an experiment in which all the surrounding circumstances are altered, except A alone: if the effect B is nevertheless produced, A is the cause of it. Or, instead of leaving A, and changing the other circumstances, we leave all the other circumstances and change A: if the effect B in that case does not take place, then again A is a necessary condition of its existence.

---

But this isn't available in Ethics/Economics etc.
"Economists, etc, have formed their point of view, by deciding what their axioms are. They must then build their theories from that base. There is no other way," says Mill.

But the lack of decisive experiments, in the sense Mill described, also applies to weather prediction. We seem to be getting better at that. We build up lots of mathematical models based on the limited infomation we have (the natural experiments we can't set up, but merely observer). They can all be based on different axioms, IE:different POVs. We run all the models as simulations on super-computers. We check with the real world to see which models are most accurate. We modify those models, and repeat. It becomes like a process of evolution. Objective observations are still judging the accuracy of the models. In that way, the theories become more than a POV.

I've not finished reading Mill's essay, yet. I probably will at some point. Do you know how influential it was?

BTW,
I like the return of Evil Bert and his underling!

 

[stamenflicker]

FG,

Thanks for being the only taker to the Philosopher of the Month thread!

I very much enjoyed your responses, and I'd like to detail a bunch of them later tonight because I think they are significant if thats ok with you. Re-articulating what you've written also helps me better articulate in the future.

Also, I don't want to get ahead of your reading, but there are a few more really interesting things laid out by Mill toward the bottom.

This thread originally arose from my complaints regarding what gets qualified as science and by whom... particularly when working from axioms or "general principles" as Mill calls them back down to the evidence rather than moving from the evidence up. Mill addresses this later in the essay.

As to whether or not this essay of Mill is very popular, I don't know. But I like it as much as any other I've read by him because it is fairly concise and it takes a single soft "science" and grinds it up, spits it out, and attempts a sound re-verification of it at the epistimological level.

It is pure philosophy of science, and I loved it.

More later tonight... thanks for the responses.

Flick

 

[stamenflicker]

That question is unfair, even if the following statement is historically accurate. Perhaps the error is in seeing knowledge as a building. Perhaps it is a 3D object like a cube, that can be made to stand equally firmly on any of 6 sides. That we have chosen one side to be the "foundation" does not make it unstable. It is a point of view that experts in the field have decided is useful -- either for teaching or research.

In Mill's defense, he pretty much ends up here, but you put it quite well. It really bugged him that political science and the economy were unempirical at their root, or on their "foundation." He felt like this contradicted his views of reality, thus he wrote this essay to clarify and attempt to justify scientific claims in these fields. From all I can tell, his view (while still somewhat controversial) is sort of a standard in the field.

They are points of view from which a body of knowledge can be investigated.

So then I suppose what I'm really asking then is another POV acceptable provided it meshes with the experimental data? Or how do we determine who has the best POV?

I don't think he is trying to justify anything. He is simply pointing out that when you read a maths text, the first thing you are presented with are "facts" without foundation. You would be inclined to ask "Where does all this come from?" Especially when you see the detail of proof in the things that follow. The thing to bear in mind is that knowledge is not taught in the order in which it was gained. In some sense, for an observation to become an axiom is a promotion. It is moving up the hierarchy to become the base! Because its importance has been recognised.

He was trying to make his radical empiricism fit a soft science. That's going to be hard no matter what tack you use to pin something down. Does an axiom remain until falsified? Is that sort of the true order of something scientific?

But this isn't available in Ethics/Economics etc.
"Economists, etc, have formed their point of view, by deciding what their axioms are. They must then build their theories from that base. There is no other way," says Mill.

Hence economic assumptions are a priori? Is that true?

But the lack of decisive experiments, in the sense Mill described, also applies to weather prediction. We seem to be getting better at that. We build up lots of mathematical models based on the limited infomation we have (the natural experiments we can't set up, but merely observer). They can all be based on different axioms, IE:different POVs. We run all the models as simulations on super-computers. We check with the real world to see which models are most accurate. We modify those models, and repeat. It becomes like a process of evolution. Objective observations are still judging the accuracy of the models. In that way, the theories become more than a POV.

So then in the case of weather, is the falsification principle merely a matter of degrees? Example: "To what degree did reality differ from our prediction?" Rather than, "Did reality differ from our prediction?"

I've not finished reading Mill's essay, yet. I probably will at some point. Do you know how influential it was?

I don't really. Most of the stuff I'm reading these days are things that my philosophy teachers never got around to in either of my degrees. I will say that this essay is as good as any Mill I ever read, maybe even better.

BTW,
I like the return of Evil Bert and his underling!

Haha... I had to dig that one back out of an old hard drive. Thanks...

More later,

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
is another POV acceptable provided it meshes with the experimental data? Or how do we determine who has the best POV?

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I would say so.

For one POV to be better than another, there would have to be some testable difference between them. (POVs can be equivalent. See below. I've been a bit slapdash in the way I used the term! )

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
Does an axiom remain until falsified? Is that sort of the true order of something scientific?

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Not quite. If your system is explaining the data, then why fix what isn't broken? Because it might be useful to see the same system of theorems from a different POV. To achieve that, you can change an axiom for one that supports the same system, but from a different angle.

Look at it this way.
If A implies B, and B implies A then...
If you have a set of axioms that includes A, you will get the same system of theorems if you replace A with B in that set of axioms.

How could you not?
With B you can prove A and then deduce everything that required A in the first system. Whether you call A or B your axiom is a choice. Depending on how complex the relationship between A and B is, it might be more convenient to make one choice over another. But you would have the same world view, from a different POV -- if that makes sense!

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
Hence economic assumptions are a priori? Is that true?

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How can it be said that economics is based on theory alone if economists allow observations to modify their world view?

quote:

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Originally posted by flick
So then in the case of weather, is the falsification principle merely a matter of degrees? Example: "To what degree did reality differ from our prediction?" Rather than, "Did reality differ from our prediction?"

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Isn't that always the case?
The error noted in the orbit of Mercury was not recognised as being decisive until there were competing systems to choose between. So even in physics, it's not always the case that scientists can conduct the sort of ideal experiment Mill described.

I like the distinction Mill makes between scientists and prophets. Their predictions are not perfect, but who comes closer than scientists to being prophets?

 

[stamenflicker]

How can it be said that economics is based on theory alone if economists allow observations to modify their world view?

I'm curious as to how you see this as different than saying "How can it be said that god is based on theory alone if theists allow observations to modify their world view.

I like the distinction Mill makes between scientists and prophets. Their predictions are not perfect, but who comes closer than scientists to being prophets?

I like that too.

Flick

 

[Dr Adequate]

So then I suppose what I'm really asking then is another POV acceptable provided it meshes with the experimental data?

Yes. For example, quantum mechanics was axiomatized in two different ways almost simultaneously --- "waves mechanics" and "matrix mechanics". And someone --- I think it was Paul Dirac --- showed that they both made exactly the same predictions.

We can't ask: "Which one is true?" Both are useful. What's true are the predictions they make.

So then in the case of weather, is the falsification principle merely a matter of degrees? Example: "To what degree did reality differ from our prediction?" Rather than, "Did reality differ from our prediction?"

I think I mentioned weather prediction in an earlier thread as a case where the theory sets a limit on the accuracy of its own prediction. That is, if the theory is absolutely correct, then we can deduce from that that the weather is a chaotic dynamic system and that the accuracy of our predictions will degrade rapidly over time.

Of course, anyone could say that as an excuse for their difficulties in predicting the weather, but it is possible to check out the laws of aerodynamics in a more rigorous setting than watching the weather, and they seem to be true.

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
I'm curious as to how you see this as different than saying "How can it be said that god is based on theory alone if theists allow observations to modify their world view."

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Because I don't see theists modifying theology based on observations.

This goes back to the POM on Hume, where you can see all sorts of examples to indicate there is no natural religion -- IE: a religion based on observation. My favorite is the "God is perfect" idea that (most) theists believe. I paraphrase Philo saying "A badly built house will always earn its architect condemnation. It may still be consistent, though not inspired by circumstances, to call the architect 'the best architect' - but you'd condemn him none the less."

How many arguments on the problem of evil boil down to "God knows best" or "God works in mysterious ways"? It would be more objective to change their perception of God. That's not to say it is impossible for God to be benevolent, just that it isn't the most natural conclusion.

There may be theists out there that do follow a natural religion. But I'm not aware of them.

quote:

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Originally posted by Dr A
I think I mentioned weather prediction in an earlier thread as a case where the theory sets a limit on the accuracy of its own prediction.

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That won't be helpful when considering the orbit of Mercury. "Reality differed from our prediction," as Flick says, but that wasn't enough to abandon a successful theory. People thought they needed new data (a new planet), not that they needed new theories.

Encarta98 says it was Schrodinger that showed Wave and Matrix mechanics were the same.

 

[Dr Adequate]

That won't be helpful when considering the orbit of Mercury.

It's quite hard to see what remarks I could make about predicting the weather that would be relevant to the orbit of Mercury.

 

[stamenflicker]

Because I don't see theists modifying theology based on observations.

I think they do modify theology all the time. They may not modify it to the point of rejection of the god ideology, but neither do economists reject the ideology of economy after every stock market crash.

My favorite is the "God is perfect" idea that (most) theists believe. I paraphrase Philo saying "A badly built house will always earn its architect condemnation. It may still be consistent, though not inspired by circumstances, to call the architect 'the best architect' - but you'd condemn him none the less."

But "perfect" is a POV-- at least where ideologies are concerned, which takes us back to the above. If the "house standing upright" is pretty much a metaphor for the building's functionality, then the case truly has to be made that the theist's house doesn't stand up. If it were in fact clearly demonstrated that it didn't stand (like a house), no one would be occupying it for very long. But as evidenced by human majority and cultural durability (both of which are observations) it clearly hasn't fallen over.

The construction of capitalism and communism are both sturdy only to degrees, yet no one that I'm aware of is abandoning the concept of trade due to what each economic theory can't do. Instead, the economy is functional to the degrees in which its subscribers choose to participate in trade for what it can do.

In the same way, we don't abandon weather prediction because of what it can't do, but we utilize as best we can what it does.

My question is merely why the same method of functionality is not applied to the ideologies of religion.

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Dr A
I meant "the theory sets a limit on the accuracy of its own prediction," is not helpful when considering the way theories were treated when the orbit of mercury did not fit predictions.


Hi, Flick

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
I think they do modify theology all the time. They may not modify it to the point of rejection of the god ideology,

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Perhaps you could give some examples.
"God helps those who help themselves" is not Biblical in origin (so I've heard). That could be a rethink by theologians. Gods weren't always thought of as all-knowing, so there must have been a change a some time or other. What inspired that change?

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
we don't abandon weather prediction because of what it can't do, but we utilize as best we can what it does.

My question is merely why the same method of functionality is not applied to the ideologies of religion.

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Do you mean to imply that the bar is set unfairly high for religion?

I'm sure people use religion for things it can do. I believe the stories you tell about religion being an effective, functional thing in people's lives. It works for my parents. But if you treat religion this way, doesn't it becomes a branch of psychology or sociology? -- IE: not theology?

 

[drkitten]

I think they do modify theology all the time. They may not modify it to the point of rejection of the god ideology, but neither do economists reject the ideology of economy after every stock market crash.

This is actually quite an interesting observation, because it may help shed light on exactly what the perceived problem is.

You are, of course, exactly correct that theologians modify theology all the time. I work just down the hall from the theology department, and I assure you that their paper mills are turning all the time, producing more and more works of scholarship, most of which will die unread and unlamented (except by the author), but some of which will go on to influence further scholarship. I think it's quite reasonable to consider how, for example, the works of Thomas Aquinas (or more recently CS Lewis) have changed the theological landscape.

What theologians don't do, broadly speaking, is learn from their mistakes.

Scientists -- and here I'm taking a rather strict "hard-science" stance -- progresses over the bodies of dead theories; beautiful theories harshly bludgeoned to dead in a dark test tube by an ugly fact. The "plum pudding model" of the atom is no longer taught, not simply because it's out of fashion, but because Rutherford and his colleagues destroyed it with simple, credible, convincing, hard evidence. And scientists are always looking for evidence -- even potential evidence -- that could destroy a theory. A single failed prediction can be enough to overthrow a theory that has held for centuries.

Theology does not seem to progress in this fashion. There are no criteria for the complete and outright dismissal of a previously-held theory. It is still possible to be an intellectually fulfilled and respectable Thomist -- or, heck, Aristotelian or Platonist (although probably not all three at the same time). It is simply not possible to be a Newtonian physicist or a Lamarkian biologist -- those theories are dead. (Even the physicists who use Newton's equations acknowledge that they are simplifying cases of the "real," aka Einsteinian, world.) Ten years from now, someone may have found evidence that overthrows Einstein, and there will be no Einsteinians any more, only Vorpilarians, after Samuel Vorpilar, the 2014 Nobel laureate.

The key difference -- science modifies theories "based on observations." There's generally a (near) universally accessible and accepted body of "facts" that theories are called upon to explain; if the facts fail to match the theory, the theory is dead.... but except at the very cutting edge of science, the facts themselves are not usually in dispute or controversial.

Theology, like its cousin philosophy, modifies its theories based on arguments. But there is no accepted body of "facts" that needs to be explained, and as a result, no theory can ever be conclusively dismissed. Instead, people pick holes in other people's arguments, and then pick holes in the picking-of-holes, and then pick holes in .... As a result, nothing is ever dead.

 

[stamenflicker]

Perhaps you could give some examples.

Well, Christianity is much more familar to me than other religions, but in general theists do reformulate. The transition from OT to NT is one of those-- its emphasis moving from law (good cause I have to) to relationship (good cause I want to). This transition is sometimes viewed as god's atoning for his own mistakes via the cross (Miles and others), as well as moving the goalposts of acceptance of man from perfection (I accept you because you have done X, Y, Z) to grace (I accept you regardless of X, Y, Z). Several others remain controversial but are shifting, including transitions on the role of women, or positions on race.

Do you mean to imply that the bar is set unfairly high for religion?

Not really, only that empistimologically it is a different bar altogether.

But if you treat religion this way, doesn't it becomes a branch of psychology or sociology? -- IE: not theology?

I would suggest that even that is better than it gets treated now in both academia and in skeptical thought. For a few good examples on how it could be treated see James' "Varieties of Religious Experience" or Fowler's "Stages of Faith." Hood, et. al also wrote a great book in the 1980's called "The psychology of religion: an empirical approach."

Flick

 

[stamenflicker]

Dr. Kitten,

Is it safe to say then that science utilizes a falsification principle from its observations to make modifications whereas perhaps religion has no definite falsification principle, and therefore by scientific standards fails under its scrutiny?

This sounds reasonable to me, but then we are left with things like "economy," which unlike the hard sciences, are more ideological in nature than say, chemistry.

It's these standards that I am sorting through personally atm. I found Mill's essay to be a helpful tool for at least thinking it through.

Flick

 

[FireGarden]

Hi, Flick
I remember you mentioning Miles' book some years back! I found the quote in John, where Jesus says to Pilate, "You would have no power over me if it were not given to you from above. Therefore the one who handed me over to you is guilty of a greater sin." Miles' theory, that God atoned for his own mistakes (crimes/sins?) via the cross, sounds revolutionary. It's not simply that God changed the rules, but that he admits mistakes! But in what way is Miles' theory different to re-interpreting Shakespeare? What non-literary observation backs up Miles' theory?

The role of women is a better example of what you need. Because it may well be based on observations like "Women are just as capable as men when it comes to being a priest, etc."

Compare that to the perfection/grace distinction, which doesn't seem grounded in appropriate observations. Nobody looked into Heaven and said, "That's strange! Some of the people who get into Heaven aren't perfect. Our theories are wrong. People must get into Heaven on grace."

quote:

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Originally posted by Flick
but then we are left with things like "economy," which unlike the hard sciences, are more ideological in nature than say, chemistry.

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Chemists can conduct carefully controlled experiments, but economists cannot. That doesn't mean economists cannot find their theories falsified. They just have to make do with events out of their complete control. However, I can't think of an economic principle that is dead in the sense drkitten described Newton's ideas being dead. But then I know very little about economics!

 

[Dr Adequate]

I can't think of an economic principle that is dead in the sense drkitten described Newton's ideas being dead. But then I know very little about economics!

Well, Newton's ideas aren't really dead. You can catch a train as a Newtonian. You can fall off a log as a Galean. You can measure your front room for carpets as a flat earther. You can bake a cake without the atomic theory of matter. You can do almost anything you please without thinking of quantum mechanics even once. You can anticipate dawn and dusk as a Ptolomean. You can explain why a fish is streamlined as a teleologist.

All the old paradigms were useful and are useful. In day to day life they're usually more useful. People don't just believe rubbish for no reason: they believed excellent approximations to the truth for excellent empirical reasons.

In economics, on the other hand, crank ideas can have great vogue and flourish and have nothing at all going for them. Think of Marxism. Or monetarism. Or the Laffer curve. These three theories seemed, to various people in power, respectable enough to carry out in practice.

But this is where every crank theory must meet its downfall. They all failed the test of practice --- and that's empiricism for you. The hard way.

Who was it called economics "the dismal science"?

John Stuart Mill
By a mighty effort of will
Overcame his natural bonhommie
And wrote "Principles of Political Economy".

--- E C Bentley.

 

[drkitten]

Is it safe to say then that science utilizes a falsification principle from its observations to make modifications whereas perhaps religion has no definite falsification principle, and therefore by scientific standards fails under its scrutiny?

Safe but limited. Specifically, science has a falsification principle from its observations to make modifications, and a well-established philosophical theory (empiricism) under which both the modifications and the falsification principle itself can be justified.

Religion has not only no falsiification principle, but no well-defined principles at all to define which modifications are appropriate and justified, or even to evaluate whether or not a proposed modification is justified. There is no independent framework under which a proposed religion theory can be compared with another.

That's basically what I mean by "theology does not learn from its mistakes." The modifications are ad-hoc and without structure, and there's no rhyme nor reason to their acceptance and/or rejection beyond the whims of the Strumpet Fortune and the political tides du jour. No one can tell me why Thomism is an improvement on what came before, or how it has been superceded in the past eight hundred years. Or, more accurately, many people can, but their stories don't mesh and contradict each other, and there are an equal number of people arguing that, no, Thomism is actually an improvement on the twisted interpretations that came after.

When a scientist modifies his theory, he does so on a broadly-accepted philosophical basis (empricism), based on an accepted methodological framework (falsificationism) and an accepted set of epistemologically well-grounded primitives (observations).

When a theologian modifies his theory, he does so on the basis of ..... what?

 

[drkitten]

Chemists can conduct carefully controlled experiments, but economists cannot. That doesn't mean economists cannot find their theories falsified. They just have to make do with events out of their complete control. However, I can't think of an economic principle that is dead in the sense drkitten described Newton's ideas being dead. But then I know very little about economics!

Part of the reason for that is that economics is not as widely or as broadly taught as biology or physics, and most of the dead principles are dead simply by having been replaced by something that is observationally more correct. For example, prior to 1970, opinion on option pricing was wildly divergent and no one had a clue how to do it. The development of the Black-Scholes model more or less killed all the models that had gone before (Bachelier, Samuelson, Boness, et cetera). But most people simply aren't that familiar with the minutiae of option pricing models.

For a more general principle of economics that is dead, dead, dead, dead, dead -- consider mercantilism. In Wikipedia's words:

Mercantilism is the economic theory holding that the prosperity of a nation depends upon its supply of capital and that the global volume of trade is unchangeable.

The amount of capital, represented by bullion (amount of precious metal held by the state), is best increased through a balance of trade with large exports and low imports. Mercantilism suggests that the government should advance these goals by playing an active, protectionist role in the economy by encouraging exports and discouraging imports, especially through the use of tariffs. The economic policy based on these ideas is often called the mercantile system.

Mercantilism was the dominant school of economics throughout the early modern period (from the 16th to the 18th century). Domestically, this led to some of the first instances of significant government intervention and control over the economy, and it was during this period that much of the modern capitalist system was established. Internationally, mercantilism encouraged the many European wars of the period and fueled European imperialism. Belief in mercantilism began to fade in the late 18th century, as the arguments of Adam Smith and the other classical economists won out. Today, mercantilism as a whole is rejected by all serious economists, though some elements are looked upon favourably.

There's a lot of empirical evidence against mercantilism, which is why it's more or less abandoned today. One of the obvious arguments, of course, was the decline and fall of the Spanish empire due in part to runaway inflation from the New World specie mines. The statement that "capital [is] represented by bullion (amount of precious metal held by the state)" is widely recognized to be ludicrous today.