Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[SpitfireIX]

There is an academic assessment of the Czech military situation in 1938 at this website which will probably please Klimax:

https://www.scribd.com/document/940...tary-factor-in-British-considerations-of-1938

This bolsters the "Chamberlain received bad advice" case slightly, but other than that it's bad news for appeasement.

Personally, I think Chamberlain was right.

Yes, we're quite aware of that. Now how about presenting some real evidence to support your opinion?

He wrote in his diary that he had no intention of giving the Czechs a guarantee after Hitler marched into Austria.

Which just shows that he was all in on appeasement.

There is hard documentary evidence that Chamberlain was getting very pessimistic reports from his military advisers about British military weakness at the time . . .

First, "very pessimistic" is an exaggeration. Second, you keep pretending that British military strength was the only consideration, when French, Czech, Soviet, and German strength were also important. Third, as I've pointed out, even the appeasers knew they could beat Germany eventually had the war started in 1938. Fourth, as has also been pointed out to you, appeasement was a political disaster, in addition to a military one.

. . . however cheery Churchill might have been about weak little Germany.

As has been explained to you, ad nauseam, Germany was far weaker, both militarily and economically, in 1938 than in 1939, and the strength gained during that year was due in no small measure to the fact that they were able to loot Czechoslovakia without firing a shot, and that they started receiving resources from the Soviet Union, both of which were direct consequences of Chamberlain's appeasement policy.

Further, although you continually insinuate that Churchill wanted to go to war "on a wing and a prayer," the fact is that he had been calling for large increases in military spending ever since Hitler had come to power, but those calls were rejected, by and large, by Chancellor, and later PM, Neville Chamberlain, until the late 1930s.

Hardly any British troops could have been landed on continental Europe in 1938.

As Tolls wrote, this is irrelevant.

I still maintain there was a danger from German bombers in 1938.

For certain values of "danger." Please explain how this wasn't trivial compared with the Blitz.

Australia and Canada and New Zealand and America and Ireland didn't want to know in 1938.

No. As I stated, and you ignored, Australian and New Zealand would have automatically been at war in 1938, and the government of New Zealand was extremely anti-appeasement in any case. And, as I've also shown, Canada would unquestionably have declared war in support of Britain, had it been necessary.

I don't know why you keep bringing up Ireland, as that country was neutral throughout the war. And America didn't just suddenly reject isolationism between 1938 and 1939.

 

[njslim]

My take on the situation is whether the Czechs could import high performance aircraft to give them a credible defense against the Luftwaffe

As noted earlier the 2 contenders were British Mark I Hurricane and US Hawk 75 (export
model of US AAC P 36A)

The Hurricane MK I was still using a 2 blade fixed wood prop which gave it somewhat lackluster performance

Hawk 75 had some initial teething problems, but used a air cooled radial engine and
could absorb considerable damage . It was also more expensive than European models

Question is could Czechs procure sufficient high performance aircraft to supplement own
aircraft in time . They had over 300 fighter aircraft in different variants of the biplane
B 234 model - max speed of 254 mph

The high performance monoplanes functioning like the Spitfire in Battle Britain - aircraft
capable of handling the ME 109 (B, C, D mods) E did not begin production until late in 1938 for lack of DB 601 engines

One problem is Czechoslovakia small size (lack of strategic depth) which gave little time for fighters to scramble and gain altitude

Made worse by Hitler's annexation of Austria in March 1938, which meant most of Czechoslovakia was bordered by enemy territory

Could the Czech had adopted a form of the British Observer Corps using ground based
spotters telephoning sighting into to HQ for analysis ?

One thing is Hawk 75 had very high rate of climb - initial climb rate of over 3000 ft minute - even a warning of few minutes could have given enough time to gain altitude


Again would the Czechs have enough to create casualties against Luftwaffe to get them to quit??

French and Britain participation would probably (if war declared) be limited to small
forays against German territory, ie Saar . Britain would have used Royal Navy to blockade
Germany and cut off foreign imports particularly oil

 

[SpitfireIX]

I just think that's just an opinion and not based on reality . . .

Presumably you're referring to Tolls's comment that there would have been no invasion of France in the fall of 1938. Tell us, Henri, what forces was the Wehrmacht going to use, and what would their strategy have been? Remember, they're already deployed to attack Czechoslovakia. Further, as has been discussed, unless they were going to frontally assault the Maginot Line, the Germans would have also needed to have attacked Belgium and Luxembourg, and possibly the Netherlands as well. And we've already discussed the extreme weakness of the panzer formations at this time.

. . . a bit like Churchill and his Gallipoli campaign in the First World War . . .

The Gallipoli campaign had a much better chance of success than a German invasion of France in 1938 would have.

. . . or Eisenhower proposing a cross-channel invasion in 1942.

Operation Sledgehammer^WP was conceived as a desperate action to aid the Soviets if they were close to collapse. That was certainly based in reality.

There is rather a simple-minded website about all this, but in a way true at:

http://www.johndclare.net/EII6.htm

Written by a secondary school teacher as a study guide for secondary school students. Fail.

 

[lobosrul5]

French and Britain participation would probably (if war declared) be limited to small
forays against German territory, ie Saar . Britain would have used Royal Navy to blockade
Germany and cut off foreign imports particularly oil

Germany would border several neutral countries in such scenario making a blockade ineffective.

 

[Hans]

Germany would border several neutral countries in such scenario making a blockade ineffective.

Yeah Italy would have been able to supply oil by way of Trieste (tanker trains). and of course oil would have continued to come to German by way of Romania by Danube, train or by sea to said Trieste, plus there own limited domestic production. If the Dutch were not bothered they too could have continued trade as they had in WW1 as would Belgium too if not attacked. The Danes, Swedes, Norwegian and Finland would have continued trade as might the Baltic states if they were still free from Soviet domination.

 

[Henri McPhee]

No. As I stated, and you ignored, Australian and New Zealand would have automatically been at war in 1938, and the government of New Zealand was extremely anti-appeasement in any case. And, as I've also shown, Canada would unquestionably have declared war in support of Britain, had it been necessary.

I don't know why you keep bringing up Ireland, as that country was neutral throughout the war. And America didn't just suddenly reject isolationism between 1938 and 1939.

I don't think that's the historical truth. Chamberlain would have been going to war with no allies in 1938, apart from the French and Czechs who were pretty useless:

https://erenow.com/ww/empire-lost-britain-the-dominions-and-the-second-world-war/3.html

Germany's claim to Czechoslovakia's Sudeten areas later that year, and the crisis it provoked, brought still more distraction. The role played by the Dominions in helping shape British policy during this period has been well-explored.

14 According to some contemporary commentators this was the nearest they had come since 1919 to sharing a common foreign policy with Britain. Reviewing the evidence as the war drew to an end, the renowned Cambridge Don Professor E. L. Woodward, in preparing the wartime diplomatic history, concluded that the Dominions' attitude had, in fact, rarely proved decisive in helping sway the policy of the London government.

15 Certainly at the time the key DO staff concluded that only New Zealand still clung to the idea of the League of Nation's 'collective security' banner and it alone could be counted on for military support. For the others it was a policy based upon the offer of concessions to the German leadership. Australia would probably have fought, but only reluctantly, Canada after some consideration would have decided not to, the Union of South Africa would have almost certainly remained neutral.

 

[Garrison]

I don't think that's the historical truth.

Well you are, as so often, wrong. There is no point in dissecting you post further because it's yet another rejection of facts in favour of you scrambling to find another anonymous online source who happens to say something that might agree with you, assuming you didn't yet again fail to read it properly and it actually contradicts you.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I don't think that's the historical truth.

You don't think what is the historical truth? That New Zealand was extremely anti-appeasement? That Australia would have fought despite the fact that Lyons and Menzies were appeasers? Those facts are supported by your quotation.

Chamberlain would have been going to war with no allies in 1938, apart from the French and Czechs who were pretty useless:

The source you posted earlier contradicts your assertion that the Czechs were "pretty useless." Further, are you seriously suggesting that Poland in 1939 was stronger than Czechoslovakia in 1938?

As for the French, even granting, arguendo, that your frankly silly claim that they were "pretty useless" is substantially accurate, did France just suddenly become "useful" in the year between Munich and the start of the war?

https://erenow.com/ww/empire-lost-britain-the-dominions-and-the-second-world-war/3.html

You've improperly formatted the passage you quoted; it's all part of a single paragraph. Each number is actually the end note for the previous passage. There is no end note for the last "paragraph," so there's no convenient way to know the source for that. Even if it's accurate, however, I've already demonstrated that MacKenzie King had stated in the 1920s that Canada would support Britain in a future war, if necessary, and he reiterated that position in September 1938. Do you think that the officials in the Dominions Office somehow knew something he didn't?

 

[SpitfireIX]

Interestingly it doesn't discuss problem air bombing of infrastructure and of factories had. Each destroyed or damaged factory means damage or destruction of strategic objective. Germany didn't want just land, but also our factories transport. With destroyed factories, they would have harder time replacing expended material and adding new one for further military campaign.

Exactly. And it would have also made it harder for the Wehrmacht to repair and reuse, or pass on to their minor allies, such weapons as they were able to capture from Czechoslovakia.

Also I wonder how well would Czech AA work against early German planes that apparently lacked some of protections later model had that increased survivability against AA.

Against high-level bombing it probably wouldn't have mattered that much. As Captain_Swoop mentioned, heavy flak wasn't very effective until it was combined with fire-control radar and proximity fuses. Also, the point I made about how even a minor hit on a non-self-sealing fuel tank was likely to cause the loss of the aircraft and crew applies mainly to extreme-range missions with little or no reserve fuel. Against Czechoslovakia, a bomber with a fuel leak could probably have made it back to a Luftwaffe emergency field, or at least far enough to allow the crew to bail out over friendly territory. Such a bomber returning from London, however, would probably have crashed in the North Sea, or, in the best case, been forced to land in Belgium or the Netherlands and been interned.

Against ground-attack aircraft, however, light flak was relatively effective, and the lack of armor and self-sealing tanks on the Hs-123 and the Ju-87A would have made them significantly more vulnerable.

BTW: How well would several British battleships and a carrier or two work if stationed near Hamburg (or other German harbor)?

Anything other than a Taranto-style surprise attack would have been unlikely to have been effective, and probably would have resulted in significant damage (or worse) to the attacking capital ships. The Luftwaffe had over 100 He 59 torpedo bombers based in the area, and although their training and operational readiness were probably at best average by the abysmal standards of the time, they could still have caused significant damage to any RN capital ships they encountered, especially as at the time none of the British carriers had radar to direct their Sea Gladiators (only HMS Sheffield did).

My question, though, would be what would have been gained by such an operation that would have justified the risk? There weren't that many targets available.

 

[SpitfireIX]

As noted earlier the 2 contenders were British Mark I Hurricane and US Hawk 75 (export
model of US AAC P 36A)

I thought the Hurricane would be a good candidate because it was easy to construct using established techniques and materials. Also, you were correct that Merlin engines would have been unlikely to have been available; I should have mentioned in my earlier post that the Czechs would most likely have had to have used a different engine.

The Hurricane MK I was still using a 2 blade fixed wood prop which gave it somewhat lackluster performance

That's a good point; it would still have easily outperformed any biplane fighter, though, and probably the early Bf 109s as well.

Hawk 75 had some initial teething problems, but used a air cooled radial engine and
could absorb considerable damage . It was also more expensive than European models

Question is could Czechs procure sufficient high performance aircraft to supplement own
aircraft in time .

Upon further consideration, it seems to me that had they been willing to throw sufficient money at the problem (say, by selling off part of their gold reserves and ordering the aircraft "off the drawing board") they probably could have.

One problem is Czechoslovakia small size (lack of strategic depth) which gave little time for fighters to scramble and gain altitude

Made worse by Hitler's annexation of Austria in March 1938, which meant most of Czechoslovakia was bordered by enemy territory

Could the Czech had adopted a form of the British Observer Corps using ground based
spotters telephoning sighting into to HQ for analysis ?

It's certainly possible, if they'd thought of it in 1937.

One thing is Hawk 75 had very high rate of climb - initial climb rate of over 3000 ft minute - even a warning of few minutes could have given enough time to gain altitude

I think this would have depended both upon the target, and the attacking aircraft. For example, the Ju 86 and the Do 17 had low cruise speeds, and would have required several minutes more than He 111s without external bomb loads (which would have been most of the ones available in 1938) to reach Prague from the German border.

Again would the Czechs have enough to create casualties against Luftwaffe to get them to quit??

Hitler wouldn't have let them quit. And eventually the Czech air force would have been ground down by the Luftwaffe due to sheer weight of numbers.

 

[Andy_Ross]

BTW: How well would several British battleships and a carrier or two work if stationed near Hamburg (or other German harbor)?

Why would they want to do that? It would go against usual blockade tactics, Capital Ships and Carriers would stand off and use Cruisers and Destroyers as a closer screen to warn of any emerging merchantmen or warships. Merchant ships wouldn't need the intervention of a Capital Ship and any warships below Cruiser size could be handled by the screening Destroyers and Cruisers.

A Submarine screen would also be used as part of the screen and wait to ambush any ships encountered.

Fast Minelayers, either Destroyers with Mine Rails fitted at the stern or dedicated ships like the Abdiel Class would also be used to sew mines to restrict enemy movement and navigation.

 

[Klimax]

Exactly. And it would have also made it harder for the Wehrmacht to repair and reuse, or pass on to their minor allies, such weapons as they were able to capture from Czechoslovakia.




Against high-level bombing it probably wouldn't have mattered that much. As Captain_Swoop mentioned, heavy flak wasn't very effective until it was combined with fire-control radar and proximity fuses. Also, the point I made about how even a minor hit on a non-self-sealing fuel tank was likely to cause the loss of the aircraft and crew applies mainly to extreme-range missions with little or no reserve fuel. Against Czechoslovakia, a bomber with a fuel leak could probably have made it back to a Luftwaffe emergency field, or at least far enough to allow the crew to bail out over friendly territory. Such a bomber returning from London, however, would probably have crashed in the North Sea, or, in the best case, been forced to land in Belgium or the Netherlands and been interned.

Against ground-attack aircraft, however, light flak was relatively effective, and the lack of armor and self-sealing tanks on the Hs-123 and the Ju-87A would have made them significantly more vulnerable.

Understood. On the other hand, not sure how strategic bombing offensive would be useful considering strategic objectives. maybe they'd mostly bomb infrastructure since that is bit easier to replace. And I think strategic bombing of bunkers would be extremely ineffective. (too small targets and even near miss would be totally ineffective)

And we had fairly large number of AA guns (hundreds) so it could be used to limit severely GA planes effectivity.

Anything other than a Taranto-style surprise attack would have been unlikely to have been effective, and probably would have resulted in significant damage (or worse) to the attacking capital ships. The Luftwaffe had over 100 He 59 torpedo bombers based in the area, and although their training and operational readiness were probably at best average by the abysmal standards of the time, they could still have caused significant damage to any RN capital ships they encountered, especially as at the time none of the British carriers had radar to direct their Sea Gladiators (only HMS Sheffield did).

My question, though, would be what would have been gained by such an operation that would have justified the risk? There weren't that many targets available.

Understood. As for targets, harbor, and maybe some air strikes on other possible targets, but I suspect it would be of fairly limited effectivity in any case.

Just was wondering about that...

 

[njslim]

BTW: How well would several British battleships and a carrier or two work if stationed near Hamburg (or other German harbor)?

December 24, 1938 - North Sea

The Carrier GLORIOUS and her escorts have reached a point 150 miles north of the mouth of Kiel Canal

After leaving main fleet base at Scapa Flow had observed radio silence, then conducted a high speed dash south.

The weather was stormy, the carrier deck pitching up and down . Despite the bad weather 12 Swordfish torpedo bombers are spotted for launch on the flight deck

6 are carrying torpedoes set for shallow running, the other 6 armed with 500 lb bombs

Following failure of Munich conference, the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, FALL GRUEN (CASE GREEN), commenced on October 1.

The Czechs, contrary to prevailing opinion, had held their own, fighting the Germans to a standstill on land. In the air were able to resist the Luftwaffe raids using newly arrived Curtiss fighters from America.

The spirited Czech resistance forced the French to honor their treaty. The British after
furious debates in Parliament had joined the French.

On declaration of war Winston Churchill, despite many misgivings, was appointed Lord of the Admiralty, a position he held in World War I.

French efforts had been limited to few forays into the Saar and some minor bombing raids

Britain had resorted to economic warfare slapping sanctions on German imports and using Royal Navy to run down German vessels, either capturing, forcing them to scuttle or be interned in neutral ports. Neutral vessels believed headed for Germany were boarded and searched, prompting complaints from their home countries.

Churchill believing the efforts were too little had asked for ideas to inflict maximum
damage at minimal risk

A Royal Navy reservist, a merchant marine officer, had come up the plan to bomb the lock gates to the Kiel canal .

The GLORIOUS reaching her launch point flew off the dozen Swordfish. The torpedo armed aircraft were to attempt to torpedo the lock gates at the western terminus of the
canal at Brunsbuttel. The bomb equipped aircraft to attack a nearby bridge with
hopes to drop the span into the canal.

Flying into the murk in a loose formation the Swordfish reached the canal in late afternoon. Lining up on the mouth of the canal the Swordfish made their runs

Catching the Germans by surprise were able to smash the lock gates allowing the North Sea to flood in . The bomber aircraft were able to damage the bridge over the canal

2 Swordfish were lost, one to belated barrage of flak from 20 mm and machine guns
The second is believed to have lost its way back to the carrier and crashed into the sea,

Recovering the remaining Swordfish, Glorious and her escorting destroyers "hauled ass"
and beat a quick withdrawal back to Scapa Flow.

Hitler, on hearing the news, flew into one of his rages, demanding that London be razed to the ground.

Goring, already under pressure from failure to subdue Czech air force launched a raid by 3 dozen He 111 escorted by Me 110 long range fighters. Alerted by newly erected Chain Home radar on south coast of England the RAF were able to intercept the incoming
raid. Several bombers and Me 110 fell to the Hurricanes of the RAF . Bombs being widely scattered across eastern suburbs of London

Churchill, speaking in Parliament, stated that this was only a small victory in the war
against Hitler and the Nazis.

 

[Klimax]

I thought the Hurricane would be a good candidate because it was easy to construct using established techniques and materials. Also, you were correct that Merlin engines would have been unlikely to have been available; I should have mentioned in my earlier post that the Czechs would most likely have had to have used a different engine.

Like we did with Soviet bomber Tupolev SB.

Upon further consideration, it seems to me that had they been willing to throw sufficient money at the problem (say, by selling off part of their gold reserves and ordering the aircraft "off the drawing board") they probably could have.

We were investing large percentage of GDP into defense. And we did buy and license of production of Tupolev SB.

It's certainly possible, if they'd thought of it in 1937.

Unknown to me. But its possible it was implemented.

Hitler wouldn't have let them quit. And eventually the Czech air force would have been ground down by the Luftwaffe due to sheer weight of numbers.

Or airfields destroyed/overran. Not sure what would be earlier even with strategic withdrawal to Slovakia.

Also it would depend on scale of airforce help from SSSR.

 

[Henri McPhee]

This is an example of having no strategic ability, and where appeasement would have been a better policy. Chamberlain was not alive at the time:

https://www.express.co.uk/expressyourself/340739/The-wartime-raid-that-shamed-Mountbatten

It was the old First World War story of lions led by donkeys, the donkey-in-chief being Churchill’s darling Admiral Louis Mountbatten, who as Director of Combined Operations was fully responsible for the fiasco.

Mountbatten had put in charge of the raid’s military intelligence a racing driver playboy chum, the Marquis de Casa Maury, a totally unqualified amateur from Cuba.

The blame, however, was shifted on to the Canadian task force commander Major-General John Roberts, who himself was the victim of poor information and the communications breakdown that characterised the day’s events.

Partly thanks to Dieppe, there has been a major shift in the perception of Mountbatten’s character in recent years.

Historian Andrew Roberts has dealt the hardest hammer blow to his reputation.

He has convincingly depicted “Dickie” Mountbatten as a psychopathically ambitious, vain, disingenuous, manipulative adrenaline junkie and a man who was utterly careless of other people’s lives.
Whether this view is fully justified is debatable but even at the time of Dieppe many military people were wary of Dickie’s cronyism and mad gung-ho schemes.

At the Admiralty he was known as the “Master of Disaster”.

 

[Garrison]

This is an example of having no strategic ability, and where appeasement would have been a better policy. Chamberlain was not alive at the time:

So a newspaper opinion piece about a battle from 1942. Not only is the article irrelevant but it even manages to contradict your suggestion about appeasement being a better strategy:

It was a political gesture as much as anything, designed to appease the Russians fighting in the east and to show that the Allies could take a German-occupied French port if they wanted to.

Unless you are trying to suggest that Britain should simply have thrown in the towel and recognized Hitler as master of Europe? Bit rough on the Jews amongst others, but you've made it clear how you feel about them...

 

[SpitfireIX]

This is an example of having no strategic ability, and where appeasement would have been a better policy. Chamberlain was not alive at the time:

https://www.express.co.uk/expressyourself/340739/The-wartime-raid-that-shamed-Mountbatten

Continuing evasion noted. What the does this have to do with the appeasement of Germany in 1938??

 

[Henri McPhee]

Continuing evasion noted. What the does this have to do with the appeasement of Germany in 1938??

The title of this thread is WW11 and appeasement. What I posted about the Dieppe raid is completely relevant to this thread. It doesn't just include 1938.

Personally, I think Churchill was another Master of Disaster, a bit like Mountbatten and Eden but I suppose there is still disagreement among historians about all that. Churchill was good at talking a lot of hot air and empty waffle.

 

[SpitfireIX]

December 24, 1938 - North Sea . . .

Pretty good, except:

On declaration of war Winston Churchill, despite many misgivings, was appointed Lord of the Admiralty, a position he held in World War I.

Had war broken out in 1938, Churchill would most likely have been appointed either Minister of War, replacing the unpopular Leslie Hore-Belisha^WP, or, more likely, Minister for Coordination of Defence, replacing the controversial Thomas Inskip^WP. When Baldwin had created the latter office in 1937, many had expected the job to go to Churchill. In September 1938 the First Lord of the Admiralty was Duff Cooper^WP, whose tenure was regarded as "an unqualified success," and who resigned in protest over the Munich Agreement.

Having said that, it's not totally inconceivable that Chamberlain might have moved Cooper to a different post in order to make room for Churchill; Cooper had previously served as Secretary of State for War.

Goring, already under pressure from failure to subdue Czech air force launched a raid by 3 dozen He 111 escorted by Me 110 long range fighters.

The first model of the Bf 110 with sufficient endurance to reach England from Germany was the D-1, which didn't enter service until May, 1940, just in time for its long range to prove useful in Norway.

 

[SpitfireIX]

The title of this thread is WW11 and appeasement. What I posted about the Dieppe raid is completely relevant to this thread. It doesn't just include 1938.

Then explain what Dieppe has to do with appeasement. Are you trying to equivocate by claiming that anything about World War II or anything about appeasement is relevant? Or are you equivocating about the fact that, as Garrison pointed out, the word "appease" appears in the article, despite it's having nothing to do with allowing dictators to take over all or parts of weaker countries, in the hopes of avoiding a larger war, which is what is universally understood to be meant by the word "appeasement" in the context of discussions about World War II?

Personally, I think Churchill was another Master of Disaster, a bit like Mountbatten and Eden but I suppose there is still disagreement among historians about all that.

Yes, we get it; you hate Churchill, and you never miss an opportunity to take a shot at him. But we're talking about what Chamberlain should have done in 1938.

Churchill was good at talking a lot of hot air and empty waffle.