Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

The trouble is Hitler was half-mad, and Stalin was not much better. It's a bit like Netanyahu and John Bolton nowadays dragging, and drawing us into a war with Iran for no good reason. It's want of judgment.

Germany was in no shape to attack Britain in 1938. Germany was very likely in no shape to attack even Czechoslovakia in 1938, had Britain and France joined forces with the Czechs. If Chamberlain had made a credible threat at Munich (and given Germany's military readiness in 1938, any threat would have been credible), it's possible that WW2 would never have happened, and the Nazi experiment would have fizzled out within a few years.
 
The trouble is Hitler was half-mad, and Stalin was not much better. It's a bit like Netanyahu and John Bolton nowadays dragging, and drawing us into a war with Iran for no good reason. It's want of judgment.

No the trouble is that you refuse to do any real research and keep dragging irrelevances into the thread. I second SpitfireIX's post, please explain how Germany was going to win a war against Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR in 1938?
 
The trouble is Hitler was half-mad, and Stalin was not much better. It's a bit like (((Netanyahu))) and John Bolton nowadays dragging, and drawing us into a war with Iran for no good reason. It's want of judgment.

Fixed it for you.

Meanwhile on a different thread, HansMunstermann is arguing against the myth of German military superiority at a strategic level.

Henri, note how he backs up his assertions with reasoning and evidence.



Well, I'll revive this mainly since I'm bored, and look at the myth of super-competent German generals and their success in Barbarossa. Warning: lots of text. No way around it, if we want to avoid the over-simplifications.

The thing about Barbarossa is, Hitler's explicit order was to go south and take the Ukrainian farmland and the oil fields of Caucasus first. Not only that would cover Germany's massive food and oil deficit (even the addition of Romanian oil barely halved that defficit, but it still was massive, and it was crippling both tanks and logistics) and allow it to wage war better, but it should have in theory crippled the Soviet ability to wage war too.

Basically Barbarossa was supposed to START with what would later become Fall Blau.

Which makes sense strategically.

THAT was why they gambled doing the attack anyway, even after quartermaster general Wagner already warned them that their logistics leash would only go as far as 500 to 800 km from the border. Because if they managed to pull THAT stunt, the win would be massive and give them a chance to win anyway.

Problem is, if you take a ruler to a map, Caucasus is a LOT farther away than that. They'd have to go between 3 times that (if Wagner's maximum estimate was correct), and 5 times that (if the lower one was correct.) And normally you go with the lower one, better to be safe than sorry.

Mother Russia is big, comrade ;)

Halder doesn't tell Hitler that. He just makes his own plans that are a rehash of France. Just encircle their army, drive for the capital, and *bam* they surrender. (Never mind that they didn't when Napoleon does it.) The army group that was supposed to go after the oil fields is actually given the lowest priority for supplies and reinforcements, and are now only expected to advance a short way to an arbitrary line on the map and keep the Russians busy. And by arbitrary, I mean not even defined by any geographic features. It's literally just an arbitrary slanted line on the map.

Now while you could argue that that's the least unrealistic plan, given the logistical constraints, the fact is he never tells Hitler that the initial plan is impossible, which might have avoided the whole idiocy. He just makes a different plan that completely misses the strategic objectives, but Hitler doesn't know that. Hitler only learns what's ACTUALLY happening when he starts getting reports of the thrust to Moscow.

(And incidentally, stuff like this, where his generals lied to him and did something that missed the strategic point, may well be why Hitler starts to distrust and ignore generals later in the war. At the very least it IS why he has someone check Halder's plans for Fall Blau, and correct them. Because, surprise, Halder was AGAIN ignoring an order from Hitler.)

What Halder doesn't get, though, is that Russia isn't France. The distances are much higher, and there is no sea to pin the enemy against. Instead of adapting it to do the smaller pincers of Fall Blau (never mind that those didn't work either), the idea is to encircle a whole front or two by making one big push to... WHAT EXACTLY? But the infantry can't keep up, so essentially instead of one big encirclement, they had just created a giant bulge that the Soviets could just walk out of if they wanted. That's why they have to stop the drive to Moscow and turn south to actually complete the encirclement.

The plan is so incompetent, it's slapstick comedy. Well, it would be if it didn't involve hundreds of thousand dead.


But wait, some will say, it worked great, didn't it? They took a lot of ground, they took UNBELIEVABLE numbers of prisoners, etc. Surely it was a good plan, if it worked so well? Well... thing is, Stalin was worse at military stuff than Halder and Hitler put together, that's why it worked.


1. Stalin correctly guesses that the only sane thing to do if you were going to attack the USSR is to go south. So that sector of the front is the most heavily manned, and the northern sector is given the lowest priority for material and reinforcements.

Remember when I said before that a lot of nominally tank or motorized divisions were actually lacking parts, ammo and trucks? How that made them less mobile than non-motorized divisions, because the latter at least had horses to pull their artillery? Yeah, the effort to fix that is concentrated in the south. The northern ones remain hamstrung.

Even with evidence suggesting otherwise, as reports of German forces massing on the border start coming in and painting a different picture, Stalin actually is convinced that that's just a diversion and the main attack will go south. (Strangely foreshadowing what the Germans will believe about Normandy and Calais a couple of years later.)

Stalin actually moves MORE of the northern divisions south, to counter that supposed main thrust. When Barbarossa starts, some divisions are caught disorganized because they're in the middle of moving south.

So when the main thrust goes center instead of south, they meet by far not enough resistance there. Germany is outnumbering the USSR by more than 2 to 1 on the whole front anyway, but that situation is far worse for the USSR in the centre and northern sectors. Those guys get completely overwhelmed by the German thrust.


2. Stalin does do something smart, and that is take the time to dismantle the factories in the west and move them into the Urals. Pretty much an order of magnitude beyond what the German logistics could possibly allow reaching.

But that is going to take time. Most of those won't be producing tanks or some even trucks until 1942. He deliberately trades more land and human lives in the short term, for a better fighting chance in 1942 and beyond.

Now this isn't bad strategy, but it makes the German wins look bigger, when it's really only a loan of territory, and it will come to bite them in the ass later. Hard.


3. Stalin has to do one more dumb thing, and this one tops it all. It's so idiotic, that even just a little more idiocy would cause it to collapse into a singularity of human stupidity, and the shockwave would leave the whole galaxy running around with pencils up the nose and underpants on the head ;)

By his orders, and enforced by the NKVD commissars, there is only one allowed course of action: keep frontally counter-attacking to drive the Germans out. There is no strategic retreat, no regrouping, no reinforcing flanks or lines of supply. You can only order a frontal attack towards the west, or the commissars will override you. And shoot you.

Remember how I said that Germany didn't create as much encirclements for a while, as bulges that you could leisurely walk out of, if you wanted? Remember how they took ridiculous numbers of prisoners anyway?

Yeah, the Russians counter-attacked themselves into encirclements :p

Halder's plan was crap, but by Jove, Stalin worked hard to make it work anyway :p
 
No the trouble is that you refuse to do any real research and keep dragging irrelevances into the thread. I second SpitfireIX's post, please explain how Germany was going to win a war against Britain, France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR in 1938?

Chamberlain had examined a possibility of an alliance with Soviet Russia and he concluded that it was not practical at the time. There was military weakness in France , Britain and Czechoslovakia at the time even though you people keep saying there is no possibility of any of those countries ever being invaded.

Hitler's favourite general von Reichenau died for some reason in January 1942 and the German march on Moscow then was put into the hands of people with no strategic ability, like Hitler himself.

There are some sensible opinions about all this at:

https://www.sffchronicles.com/threads/561445/

What would have happened? Well, we (the English that is, not necessarily the people here who may never have existed) would be speaking German and I would never have been born - my great-grandfather was Jewish.

Why? In 1938, Britain was hopelessly unprepared. The radar stations and fighter direction network weren't finished and the Spitfire was present in handfuls - not to mention an even worse lack of pilots than we had in the real timeline. And the Army was even shorter of equipment then than it was in 1939.

Chamberlain is unfairly maligned, IMHO.
 
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Chamberlain had examined a possibility of an alliance with Soviet Russia and he concluded that it was not practical at the time. There was military weakness in France , Britain and Czechoslovakia at the time even though you people keep saying there is no possibility of any of those countries ever being invaded.

Hitler's favourite general von Reichenau died for some reason in January 1942 and the German march on Moscow then was put into the hands of people with no strategic ability, like Hitler himself.

There are some sensible opinions about all this at:

https://www.sffchronicles.com/threads/561445/

No Henri, just Britain.
 
Chamberlain had examined a possibility of an alliance with Soviet Russia and he concluded that it was not practical at the time. There was military weakness in France , Britain and Czechoslovakia at the time even though you people keep saying there is no possibility of any of those countries ever being invaded.

So you invent another phoney claim to dispute so you can avoid having to support your discredited claims? Britain didn't need to conclude an alliance with the USSR because they were already allied with the Czechs. And since you seem to having a hard time understanding this despite it being explained to you repeatedly I'll explain it again. Britain had military weaknesses, but they were nothing like as bad as those facing the Germans and the Germans gained far more than the British from Munich.
 
Chamberlain had examined a possibility of an alliance with Soviet Russia and he concluded that it was not practical at the time.


Continuing evasion noted. And even if this is true, it's irrelevant to the Sudetenland crisis; the Soviet Union was already allied with Czechoslovakia in September 1938.

There was military weakness in France , Britain and Czechoslovakia at the time . . .


And, as we have demonstrated, and you have continually ignored, there was also tremendous military weakness in Germany.

. . . even though you people keep saying there is no possibility of any of those countries ever being invaded.


Straw man. Link to a post where anyone said that. Also, how'd that year's delay in starting the war work out in stopping Hitler from invading France, and what was left of Czechoslovakia?

Hitler's favourite general von Reichenau died for some reason in January 1942 and the German march on Moscow then was put into the hands of people with no strategic ability, like Hitler himself.


Irrelevant. Furthermore, Reichenau was only an army commander until November 1941, at which point he was promoted to the command of Army Group South, which was not involved in the attack on Moscow.

There are some sensible opinions about all this at:


"You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means."



And, yet again, you quote the opinion of some anonymous Internet poster who happens to agree with you. Fail.
 
There was military weakness in France , Britain and Czechoslovakia at the time even though you people keep saying there is no possibility of any of those countries ever being invaded.

I don't think anyone here has implied that. Only that Britain was not going to be invaded.

Personally, using the events from September 1939 as a guide, I doubt the Czechs would have held out to the end of the year. Chiefly because I can't see the French being anymore proactive than they were the following year.

There would have been no invasion of France in '38...weather and manpower would have precluded it, much as it did the following year, especially since the war would have been kicking off a month later.

That leaves events in '39. I don't see a successful invasion of Norway, if only because I'm not sure what with. The paras, who were a major element of that, were a shadow at that point. Low countries and France? Well, all the discussion about what the Germans wouldn't have in May '39 pretty much point to an attack grinding to a halt due to lack of suitable tanks. After all, May '40 was a hell of a gamble as it was.

After that, it's anyone's guess...even that lot is pushing the "what if" further than I'm comfrotable with.
 
There is an academic assessment of the Czech military situation in 1938 at this website which will probably please Klimax:

https://www.scribd.com/document/940...tary-factor-in-British-considerations-of-1938

Personally, I think Chamberlain was right. He wrote in his diary that he had no intention of giving the Czechs a guarantee after Hitler marched into Austria. There is hard documentary evidence that Chamberlain was getting very pessimistic reports from his military advisers about British military weakness at the time, however cheery Churchill might have been about weak little Germany.

Hardly any British troops could have been landed on continental Europe in 1938. I still maintain there was a danger from German bombers in 1938. Australia and Canada and New Zealand and America and Ireland didn't want to know in 1938.
 
As with 1939, it doesn't really matter how many British troops landed in France in the first couple of months of a war. The Germans would be in no position to attack anyway.
 
There is an academic assessment of the Czech military situation in 1938 at this website which will probably please Klimax:

https://www.scribd.com/document/940...tary-factor-in-British-considerations-of-1938

Personally, I think Chamberlain was right. He wrote in his diary that he had no intention of giving the Czechs a guarantee after Hitler marched into Austria. There is hard documentary evidence that Chamberlain was getting very pessimistic reports from his military advisers about British military weakness at the time, however cheery Churchill might have been about weak little Germany.

Hardly any British troops could have been landed on continental Europe in 1938. I still maintain there was a danger from German bombers in 1938. Australia and Canada and New Zealand and America and Ireland didn't want to know in 1938.

Henri, this is a serious question - Do you ever read what you link to?

The article indicates that Chamberlain's assessment of the Czechoslovakian forces was based the Imperial Staff's memos, which were based on a 1935 assessment. The article then went on to note that the Czechoslvakians had undergone a major increase in their defence posture in 1936 and 37. that assessment minimized the military strength of Czechoslovakia (the report estimated that they could field 22 Divisions - in 1938 they actually mobilized and equipped almost twice as many, so that estimate was just a wee bit off (German Intelligence would repeat this error when they calculated the number of units that the Soviets would be able to raise for Barbarossa). And then the IGS inflated German strength.

To translate - Chamberlain based his decision on out of date information where the British staff had lowballed the ability of the potential ally (Czechoslovakia) and grossly inflated the ability of the potential opponent. That shows want of judgement on Chamberlain's part.

You are also ignoring the assessment of Beck, who felt that the Czechs would not be the pushover Hitler felt they would be, that France was likely to intervene and that Germany could NOT win a two front war.

Especially since if you look at the table in your article that shows only a marginal numerical superiority of German forces over Czechoslovakian forces, with an actual inferior number of artillery pieces available. Given that it would be the German forces that needed to attack - the ratio of forces would not be in their favour, and would have been even less so with a French military threatening the Rhineland....

Essentially, Chamberlain did not base his decision for appeasement based on a rational appreciation of the respective military situations of any of the potential powers. He displayed a lack of judgement in ignoring the advice of the military attaches in Germany and Czechoslovakia re the military strengths of the two nations, and he allowed his own staff to present him with out of date assessments - because believing those assessments reinforced his own pre-determined conclusion that peace at any price was better than war.

That we later had to pay a greatly inflated price is on Chamberlain.
 
Especially since if you look at the table in your article that shows only a marginal numerical superiority of German forces over Czechoslovakian forces, with an actual inferior number of artillery pieces available. Given that it would be the German forces that needed to attack - the ratio of forces would not be in their favour, and would have been even less so with a French military threatening the Rhineland....

Obviously the Germans didn't know this, but the bolded bit is unlikely to have actually materialised, anymore than it did the following year. Indeed, the Germans ignored the self-same threat the following year anyway.
 
Interesting article. Haven't seen such comprehensive treatment on subject.

It's interesting that French were so invested in our defense. Seems they were more ready in 1938 then in 1939. And their plan was far cry from their actions in 1939. Pity Brits managed to convince them.

Further observation: Hitler was scared of heavy fortifications north of Ostrava. (Can't balme him) So he pushed south attack from Austria. (Only light fortifications present at the time.)

Interestingly it doesn't discuss problem air bombing of infrastructure and of factories had. Each destroyed or damaged factory means damage or destruction of strategic objective. Germany didn't want just land, but also our factories transport. With destroyed factories, they would have harder time replacing expended material and adding new one for further military campaign.

Also I wonder how well would Czech AA work against early German planes that apparently lacked some of protections later model had that increased survivability against AA.

BTW: How well would several British battleships and a carrier or two work if stationed near Hamburg (or other German harbor)?
 
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I don't think anyone here has implied that. Only that Britain was not going to be invaded.

Personally, using the events from September 1939 as a guide, I doubt the Czechs would have held out to the end of the year. Chiefly because I can't see the French being anymore proactive than they were the following year.

There would have been no invasion of France in '38...weather and manpower would have precluded it, much as it did the following year, especially since the war would have been kicking off a month later.

I just think that's just an opinion and not based on reality, a bit like Churchill and his Gallipoli campaign in the First World War or Eisenhower proposing a cross-channel invasion in 1942.

There is rather a simple-minded website about all this, but in a way true at:

http://www.johndclare.net/EII6.htm

Finally, at Munich, Britain had not been strong enough to go to war – it is arguable that Chamberlain was just buying time for Britain to rearm. In January 1939, the navy had been strengthened and production of planes had been increased; in February, defence spending was increased to £580 million and free air-raid shelters were given to ¼ million Londoners. Chamberlain was able to change his policy in March 1939 because Britain had the military capacity to go to war.
 
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I bow to your expertise in opinions unaffected by reality

And of course the simple minded
 
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