Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Hans]

I flatly disagree.

Then you are wrong again - you do know all your posts are still there for us to see? Yep they are just sitting there dripping ignorance, wilful disregard for facts and general ineptitude all over everything.......shall we go over them again?

 

[Henri McPhee]

Ismay reported, incorrectly, that "from a military point of view" it would be better to delay fighting Germany for six months or a year.

Ismay was a professional, not some kind of amateur lawyer, or amateur dentist. You listen to the experts.

 

[Garrison]

Ismay was a professional, not some kind of amateur lawyer, or amateur dentist. You listen to the experts.

And yet when we point out the German experts believed that Germany would lose a war in 1938 you choose to ignore them, how do you justify that?

Ismay said a delay was preferable, he also claimed later that he thought Britain should have gone to war at Munich instead of waiting, which has also been mentioned before. Why do you advocate accepting one of his statements and not the other?

Your posts smack of double-standards Henri.

 

[Border Reiver]

Ismay recorded that he disagreed with the decision for appeasement, but did not voice his position to Chamberlain. It should also be noted that while Chamberlain was in Munich, Ismay was directing the fortification of southern England....

Now, what about the professional opinion of the Luftwaffe generals or the Heer generals who felt that a war with Britain, France and Czechoslovakia would have been disastrous for Nazi Germany?

 

[Garrison]

Ismay recorded that he disagreed with the decision for appeasement, but did not voice his position to Chamberlain. It should also be noted that while Chamberlain was in Munich, Ismay was directing the fortification of southern England....

Indeed, there's a big difference between thinking another 6 months or year would be useful and being sanguine about throwing the Czechs under the bus...

Now, what about the professional opinion of the Luftwaffe generals or the Heer generals who felt that a war with Britain, France and Czechoslovakia would have been disastrous for Nazi Germany?

Clearly the wrong sort of expert...

 

[Henri McPhee]

Indeed, there's a big difference between thinking another 6 months or year would be useful and being sanguine about throwing the Czechs under the bus...

Clearly the wrong sort of expert...

It's not just me who disagrees with you:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...battered-punching-bag/?utm_term=.02ef94fa919b

Here's Dutton once more on some of the underlying realities guiding Chamberlain's actions:
Chamberlain was no fool. But no individual could change the basic facts of the international scene, which made fighting Germany almost unthinkable for most of the decade. Like all his generation, Chamberlain had been deeply scarred by the memory of the First World War.

Expert opinion predicted that any future war would be even worse: to the slaughter of the battlefield would be added unspeakable destruction from the air. Extrapolating from the Spanish Civil War, it was estimated that the first few weeks of a German air assault would bring half a million casualties: Britain was defenceless in the face of the bomber.

Moreover, there were fears overall about Britain’s military preparedness in 1938, as Nick Baumann, now an editor at the Huffington Post, detailed in a 2013 article in Slate:

In March 1938 the British military chiefs of staff produced a report that concluded that Britain could not possibly stop Germany from taking Czechoslovakia. In general, British generals believed the military and the nation were not ready for war. On Sept. 20, 1938, then-Col.Hastings Ismay, secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defense, sent a note to Thomas Inskip, the minister for the coordination of defense, and Sir Horace Wilson, a civil servant.

Time was on Britain’s side, Ismay argued, writing that delaying the outbreak of war would give the Royal Air Force time to acquire airplanes that could counter the Luftwaffe, which he considered the only chance for defeating Hitler. British strategists, including Ismay, believed their country could win a long war (so long as they had time to prepare for it). This was a common belief, and doubtless factored into Chamberlain's calculations.

 

[Garrison]

It's not just me who disagrees with you:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...battered-punching-bag/?utm_term=.02ef94fa919b

You weren't asked for another op-ed piece(one that seems to be more about defending President Obama than anything else), you were asked for evidence to back up your claims.
How was Britain going to be defeated in a week? How would the Luftwaffe mount a bombing campaign the Luftwaffe itself said was impossible? When did Chamberlain state he expected Hitler to break the Munich agreement, prior to Hitler doing so? Who gained the most from the delay offered by Munich(Hint; it wasn't Britain). Oh and of course the one that comment you responded to with your latest evasion was actually about, why do you ignore the German leaders who were of the opinion Germany would lose catastrophically in 1938, but accept uncritically the opinions of British officers who happen to shore up your 'defence' of Chamberlain?

if you cannot address these questions then say so and spare us any further unsubstantiated nonsense.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I have explained all that in previous postings but nobody seems to believe me.

You haven't "explained" anything; you've simply made several unsupported or demonstrably incorrect claims, most of which rely on handwaving and/or wishful thinking. For example:

I just think Hitler would have used the same strategy in 1938 to reach Northern France but it would have been a year earlier with Britain unprepared for war.

You have utterly failed to explain how "Hitler" was going to use "the same strategy" with at most five panzer divisions that were significantly weaker than they were in the spring of 1940, and (correcting the source you quoted earlier) about 40 fewer infantry divisions. Here's a starting point for you: Read a good history of the fall of France, and note all of the victories won by the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th^* Panzer divisions. Then tell us how those victories were going to be won without panzers, especially with forty fewer infantry divisions, and a significantly weaker Luftwaffe.

This business of Ireland was a complicated diplomatic business then, and is still a complicated business now with the IRA involved. In his heart Churchill would have liked to have invaded Ireland, but that would not have been good public relations with the Irish and Italian Americans, or the Irish Catholics living in Britain. Our secret service was active in Ireland at the time, and the poet John Betjeman, and somebody called Ryan of the Irish political secret police were involved in that. From a Wikipedia about Betjeman:

Evasion noted. I renew the question. If, as you have repeatedly claimed, Chamberlain knew that war with Germany was inevitable, why did he cede the so-called Treaty Ports back to Ireland in 1938?

Additionally, as has repeatedly been mentioned, your comments about Churchill are utterly irrelevant.
____________
^*I forgot to include the 10th in my earlier list.

 

[lobosrul5]

It's not just me who disagrees with you:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...battered-punching-bag/?utm_term=.02ef94fa919b
Expert opinion predicted that any future war would be even worse: to the slaughter of the battlefield would be added unspeakable destruction from the air. Extrapolating from the Spanish Civil War, it was estimated that the first few weeks of a German air assault would bring half a million casualties: Britain was defenceless in the face of the bomber.

That is one hell of an extrapolation. I'm seeing 10,000 civilians killed from bombing as the high estimate during the entirety of the nearly 3 year long Spanish Civil War. This from bombers that could be based literally in the country they were bombing.

 

[Garrison]

That is one hell of an extrapolation. I'm seeing 10,000 civilians killed from bombing as the high estimate during the entirety of the nearly 3 year long Spanish Civil War. This from bombers that could be based literally in the country they were bombing.

It's another example of Henri's double standards, cheerily quotes these spurious estimates, ignores the fact that they were based on a massive overestimation of the strength/capabilities of the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe knew they could not carry out a strategic bombing campaign against the UK in 1938 and they still could not in 1939. It was not until they had airbases on the channel coast that they could mount a campaign, and it became painfully clear they were not well equipped to do so even in the summer of 1940.

On another note, with all due respect to Klimax, whether Britain and France could save Czechslovakia is not the central issue to me, it's whether they could have defeated Germany sooner and with far fewer military and civilian casualties in a war that started in 1938? Based on everything we know I would say yes, it would have been a shorter less bloody war. Assuming that Hitler wasn't overthrown before it even started, which is probably the best case all round.

 

[SpitfireIX]

There is some background information to that Irish port business at this website:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_Ports_(Ireland)

It seems to have been some long running sore in Ireland dating back to the establishment of the Irish republic in the 1920s.

Which, again, has nothing of consequence to do with the question I asked. Of course the Irish wanted the British military completely out of Ireland, but the British had every right to stay, based on Ireland's treaty obligations. Chamberlain gave up that right because of Irish economic pressure, which turned out to be trivial compared with the economic pressure from the U-boat campaign.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Ismay was a professional, not some kind of amateur lawyer, or amateur dentist. You listen to the experts.

Appeal to authority fallacy. Being an expert doesn't automatically make one right. For example, Douhet's famous assertion that "the bomber will always get through" is demonstrably wrong.

First, as noted, Ismay later disavowed his statements on delaying fighting Germany. Now assuming his disavowal was sincere, we can safely conclude that his reason for writing what he wrote in 1938 was that he didn't want to tell Chamberlain something he didn't want to hear. Second, even if Ismay meant what he said at the time, we have the benefit both of hindsight, and of realistic estimates of German military strength in 1938.

However, this is all beside the point, because, as I mentioned, the political consequences of not backing Czechoslovakia were an even worse disaster than the military consequences.

Finally, I'll repeat the question others have asked, though I suppose you'll continue to ignore it: Why are you willing to accept Ismay's opinions uncritically, but reject or ignore those of German military leaders who stated that Germany could not win a war in 1938?

 

[SpitfireIX]

It's not just me who disagrees with you:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...battered-punching-bag/?utm_term=.02ef94fa919b

First, this was written by a journalist, and not a historian. Second, the purpose of the article, and the linked article from Huffington Post, is to rehabilitate Chamberlain in order to attempt to prevent perceived warmongers from using the cry of "Appeasement!" to attack the Iran nuclear deal, a point to which Garrison alluded above.

Further, this is a continuation of your attempt to change horses. Your original claim was that Britain would have suffered a disastrous defeat if the Allies hadn't appeased Hitler at Munich. That argument has been utterly shredded, so now you're trying a different tack: Claiming that Chamberlain made the best decision he could have in the circumstances, considering the political situation and the grossly inflated estimates of German military capabilities at the time. This is also wrong, but at least it's not laughably absurd, like your "Britain would have been defeated in a week in 1938" assertion.

However, for whatever reason, you are apparently unwilling or unable to admit that your original claim has been destroyed, so you merely ignore the refutations and continue ducking questions you can't answer.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Read a good history of the fall of France, and note all of the victories won by the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th* Panzer divisions. Then tell us how those victories were going to be won without panzers, especially with forty fewer infantry divisions, and a significantly weaker Luftwaffe.

If you can find it a good concise history is 'Blitzkreig' by Len Deighton.

 

[dudalb]

If you can find it a good concise history is 'Blitzkreig' by Len Deighton.

"Blitzkrieg" is a good book, but Alstaire Horne's "To Lose A Battle" is an even better book on the 1940 campaign in France.

 

[dudalb]

First, this was written by a journalist, and not a historian. Second, the purpose of the article, and the linked article from Huffington Post, is to rehabilitate Chamberlain in order to attempt to prevent perceived warmongers from using the cry of "Appeasement!" to attack the Iran nuclear deal, a point to which Garrison alluded above.

Further, this is a continuation of your attempt to change horses. Your original claim was that Britain would have suffered a disastrous defeat if the Allies hadn't appeased Hitler at Munich. That argument has been utterly shredded, so now you're trying a different tack: Claiming that Chamberlain made the best decision he could have in the circumstances, considering the political situation and the grossly inflated estimates of German military capabilities at the time. This is also wrong, but at least it's not laughably absurd, like your "Britain would have been defeated in a week in 1938" assertion.

However, for whatever reason, you are apparently unwilling or unable to admit that your original claim has been destroyed, so you merely ignore the refutations and continue ducking questions you can't answer.

Generally agree with a couple of quibbles:

Some Professional Journalists have become superb historians,even if they did not have advanced degrees in history.
Barbara Tuchman and William Shirer come to mind.


As for rehabbing Chamberlain and appeasement, that is nothing new. First real attempt at that was made by A.J.P. Taylor with his "The Origins Of The Second World War' in 1960.

 

[jimbob]

Generally agree with a couple of quibbles:

Some Professional Journalists have become superb historians,even if they did not have advanced degrees in history.
Barbara Tuchman and William Shirer come to mind.


As for rehabbing Chamberlain and appeasement, that is nothing new. First real attempt at that was made by A.J.P. Taylor with his "The Origins Of The Second World War' in 1960.

Yes, but AJP Taylor is a bit newfangled waffle for some of us.

 

[Andy_Ross]

"Blitzkrieg" is a good book, but Alstaire Horne's "To Lose A Battle" is an even better book on the 1940 campaign in France.

I was offering a 'concise' book as suggested in the post

 

[Henri McPhee]

Finally, I'll repeat the question others have asked, though I suppose you'll continue to ignore it: Why are you willing to accept Ismay's opinions uncritically, but reject or ignore those of German military leaders who stated that Germany could not win a war in 1938?

It wasn't just Ismay who was giving Chamberlain military advice. There were German generals who were in disagreement with Hitler, but they didn't do anything about it, partly because of Hitler's military success in occupying the Rhineland and Austria, which was popular with the German public.

There is some background information to Hitler's generals at:

https://www.quora.com/How-would-the...erals-to-conduct-the-war-without-interference

Although Halder was no Nazi, having even kept a pistol in his uniform pocket and contemplated shooting Hitler for several weeks in late 1938, he had too much of a nervous disposition to mount real opposition to Hitler’s plans, and he lacked the genius and vision of Fritsch, Beck and Manstein. On the eve of the war with Poland, he had planned, with his Oberquartiermeister I, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, a coup against Hitler, quietly assembling troops near Berlin with which to seize the Chancellery and arrest Hitler and his key assistants. However, when Hitler made a casual comment to Brauchitsch about being ‘aware of the spirit of Zossen’ and being determined to ‘stamp it out’ [8], Halder lost his nerve. Zossen was where the main General Staff offices were located, and also the location of all discussions and planning of the coup. Thinking that the SS were on to him, Halder scrapped all his plans,and never had gathered the nerve to act again.

 

[Garrison]

It wasn't just Ismay who was giving Chamberlain military advice. There were German generals who were in disagreement with Hitler, but they didn't do anything about it, partly because of Hitler's military success in occupying the Rhineland and Austria, which was popular with the German public.

There is some background information to Hitler's generals at:

Why do you repeat back things you've been told by others posters here as if you had just discovered them? And again this is a transparent attempt at evasion. are you going to back your claims with evidence and address the questions asked of you or not?

You also ignore the fact that one major reason for the coup failing to take place was Chamberlain's capitulation at Munich, more cherry-picking on your part. You are fooling no one and convincing no one Henri, either provide evidence for your claims or admit you can't, which will it be?