Cont: Proof of Immortality VIII

[JayUtah]

- No. We're accepting, in ~H, that the brain currently exists...

And you have to accept that under H the brain also currently exists. And there is no difference in that existence between the two hypotheses. It's a given in both cases. And since under H all that's needed is the brain, H is vastly more likely than a hypothesis that needs more than a brain. You're trying to equivocate up a difference between the "existence of the brain" under each hypothesis so that it's somehow less likely in one case than in the other. No, you can't do that and still have a valid proof. Keep reading jt512's and jsfisher's posts until you understand this.

 

[jond]

- No. We're accepting, in ~H, that the brain currently exists -- and consequently, we don't need to multiply the prior probability of there being something spiritual here by the likelihood of there being a brain here.

Then why is the brain so unlikely given H? The brain exists in both H and ~H. In ~H, you then add another entity (soul) which does not exist in H. The brain, under H, and the self are one and the same. There is no other entity.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Hans,
- I think you're agreeing with me. Likelihood is just two pieces of the Posterior Probability pie.

Jabba, are there two Thursdays in this week? If not, I'm not agreeing with you.

Hans

PS: Make that three Thursdays.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba has disproven his own argument, so I'm wondering why anyone is still arguing with him about anything else. It just gives him room to avoid addressing his own disproof. Here it is in more detail.

Jabba has stated that P(H) > 0, P(~H) > 0 and P(E) = 1. Now, the denominator in Bayes' Theorem is

P(E) = P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|~H)P(~H) .

Now, one can see by inspection that for P(E) to be 1 and P(H) and P(~H) to both be non-zero, P(E|H) and P(E|H) must both be 1 (which I've been saying all along).

Plugging these values into Bayes' Theorem,

P(H|E) = P(E|H)P(H) / P(E)
P(H|E) = (1)P(H) / 1
P(H|E) = P(H) .

Likewise, (P~H|E) = P(~H) .

That is, the posterior probabilities of H and ~H just equal their prior probabilities. Jabba's "evidence" E is not evidence for ~H over H, or H over ~H. It doesn't discriminate between H and ~H at all.

So, as long as he maintains that P(E) = 1 and that both H and ~H are non-zero, his Bayes argument is mathematically wrong. So, it seems to me, to be counterproductive to argue with him about any other aspect of his argument, unless and until he can fix this problem or finally admits that he's been wrong and gives up.

jt,
- Why do you refer to P(E|H) as "both"?

 

[JoeMorgue]

jt,
- Why do you refer to P(E|H) as "both"?

So you agree with me that you keep taking one sentence out of a long post and asking again for answers you've already been given while continuing to rudely ignore the mountains of fatal flaws in your arguments you have once addressed?

 

[Belz...]

jt,
- Why do you refer to P(E|H) as "both"?

Please stop being rude. You know what he meant.

How did you calculate 10^-100?

 

[Dave Rogers]

jt,
- Why do you refer to P(E|H) as "both"?

Probably for the exact same reason you recently claimed that P(A|B) = P(A|B)(P(B) / P(A).

Dave

 

[Jabba]

If the likelihood of your body existing is the same in H and ~H, and in both models your current existence depends on your body existing, how can P(E|~H) be greater than P(E|H)?

- Two points:
- The current existence of my self (even if my spiritual existence depends upon the existence of a physical body to "produce," or receive it) is much more likely in ~H than in H. In ~H, the existence of my spiritual self does not depend upon a particular body.
- In ~H, my spiritual existence may not require any body.
-

 

[JoeMorgue]

My spiritual existence may not require any body.

*Knowing full well I won't get anything resembling a straight, honest answer.*

Jabba... what does your body do then? What's its purpose? Why aren't we just 100% spiritual beings?

If everything physical and... you know actually real and actually exists about you isn't required to sustain you... why do we even have physical bodies?

If we are these perfect spiritual beings why are we bound to these meat sacks that break down over time, need food and water and rest, and can get cancer and stub their toes?

 

[godless dave]

- Two points:
- The current existence of my self (even if my spiritual existence depends upon the existence of a physical body to "produce," or receive it) is much more likely in ~H than in H.
In ~H, the existence of my spiritual self does not depend upon a particular body.

It doesn't? Why not?

- In ~H, my spiritual existence may not require any body.
-

But E isn't your spiritual existence.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- Two points:
- The current existence of my self (even if my spiritual existence depends upon the existence of a physical body to "produce," or receive it) is much more likely in ~H than in H.

If the brain is a given, and you've admitted that in the materialist model that the "self" as you call it is a function of the brain, then the "self" is also a given. The likelihood is 1.

In ~H, the existence of my spiritual self does not depend upon a [U]particular[/U] body.
- In ~H, my spiritual existence may not require [U]any[/U] body.
-

No, you said that the brain was a given. You agree with me that a brain needs a body.

Maybe it would be easier if your spiritual self were to engage in the discussion without your brain.

 

[Belz...]

- The current existence of my self (even if my spiritual existence depends upon the existence of a physical body to "produce," or receive it) is much more likely in ~H than in H. In ~H, the existence of my spiritual self does not depend upon a particular body.

Of course it does! CURRENT. CURRENT existence. You've admitted that you don't have awareness or memories without a body even under ~H. That means that the body MUST exist. You've been told this time and time again.

 

[jond]

- Two points:
- The current existence of my self (even if my spiritual existence depends upon the existence of a physical body to "produce," or receive it) is much more likely in ~H than in H. In ~H, the existence of my spiritual self does not depend upon a particular body.
- In ~H, my spiritual existence may not require any body.
-

- Under H, your physical body and your “self” are the same thing. There is no separate entity. Thus, your current existence is the same as the existence of your body.

- Under your ~H, your current existence includes your body, and you have to add another entity (soul) to get to reincarnation or immortality.

- This means that your current existence is much more likely under H.

 

[Jabba]

js,
- Bayes (basic?) Theorem does not involve any hypotheses. It involves only events. Your formula hilited above should be P(A|B) = P(A|B)(P(B) / P(A).
P(H|E) = P(E|H)(P(H) / (P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|~H)P(~H)) is the theorem as it applies to complementary hypotheses.

.

Bayes is mostly neutral on hypotheses versus events. My presentation of Bayes Theorem was correct. (Yours, however, has a typographic error in the first term.)...

- You're right. Sorry about that. My first element should have been P(B|A).

 

[Belz...]

Jabba, how did you calculate 10^-100?

 

[JoeMorgue]

You've admitted that you don't have awareness or memories without a body even under ~H. That means that the body MUST exist. You've been told this time and time again.

Because let's be honest we know Jabba doesn't actually think that.

I'll put my mortgage payment for the month on the table that Jabba (or the character he's currently playing) has some version of the "past life memories" argument ready to play sooner or later. Jabba's got the whole Bridey Murphy routine waiting in the wings. Probably somebody famous who's a renowned thinker/debater.

It's just more dishonesty from the Master of Debate. He's removed all context and meaning from his concept of a "soul" hoping that will trick us into making the most meaningless of surface level agreement to any version of his argument.

 

[JayUtah]

The current existence of my self (even if my spiritual existence depends upon the existence of a physical body to "produce," or receive it) is much more likely in ~H than in H.

No, that's not a "point." That's the proposition you have to prove in your model in order to conclude that your model favors immortality. You have never proved this; you've just assumed it over and over. Now, rightly so, people are asking you where you got this magic number 10^-100 that makes your existence under reincarnation so much more likely. You've avoided this question like the plague, which means we know you don't want to talk about it. You owe your critics some honesty.

In ~H, the existence of my spiritual self does not depend upon a particular body.

It must. Your soul has no attributes of its own in your model. Any criteria that would differentiate one self from another must therefore come, at best, from the body. In any case, in your proof, your "current existence" consists of your soul and your body. The evidence you use for your proof may not be what you speculate it might look like if you had any other evidence. Specifically you don't get to say "current existence" means just any old body in your case, and then turn around and say "current existence" must mean an exact body under materialism. You're changing the evidence between one hypothesis and the other.

In ~H, my spiritual existence may not require any body.

False. You have frankly admitted that the disembodied soul in your model has no attributes and no consciousness, sensation, or memory -- and in fact does not detectably carry anything from incarnation to incarnation. It does not exist, by your admission, in any meaningful way except when incarnated. But the fact remains for your model that your "current existence" does require a body, because you in fact do exist in corporeal form, and that's the observation you're trying to explain.

As I've said many times, you change the definitions of the terms in your proof depending on whether you're talking about reincarnation or materialism. You can't do that and still have a valid proof.

 

[Belz...]

I'll put my mortgage payment for the month on the table that Jabba (or the character he's currently playing) has some version of the "past life memories" argument ready to play sooner or later. Jabba's

Of course he does. That much is obvious and has been for a while, especially when he said that "most" people didn't have memories of past lives. But it's irrelevant: he can't demonstrate that he has actual memories of another life, nor does any of this changes the dozens of fatal flaws in his arguments.

 

[jt512]

jt,
- Why do you refer to P(E|H) as "both"?

Are you serious? It was obviously a typo.

 

[Belz...]

You're changing the evidence between one hypothesis and the other.

And how. The things he's using to prove that ~H is more likely than H aren't even the same thing across both hypotheses.

He's basically comparing the speed of a Volkswagen and the height of mount Rainier and declaring that the latter is therefore more likely.