Jabba
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2012
- Messages
- 5,613
Where does the 10-100 come from?
Given H, what is the likelihood of your brain existing? Is it 10-100?
- Yes.
- Yes.Is it also 10-100 given ~H?
Where does the 10-100 come from?
Given H, what is the likelihood of your brain existing? Is it 10-100?
- Yes.
- Yes.Is it also 10-100 given ~H?
Mojo,
- What do you think is the likelihood of the current existence of your body --given OOFLam?
How would you determine that?
- Yes.
- Yes.
Mojo,
- The brain is a given in both H and ~H. I equated that to P(E) = 1 in both cases, trying to explain why the conjunction fallacy did not apply to our situation -- multiplying a probability by 1 doesn't make it smaller.
- I'm not sure that P(E) = 1 is appropriate terminology, and seems like I just created more confusion by using it... - 10-100 expresses how likely you are to currently exist if you have only one finite life to live at most -- and, you don't have to ever exist...
jt,Actually, you created more certainty, since it is now obvious that your argument is mathematically inconsistent.
How is that?
Mojo,
- What do you think is the likelihood of the current existence of your body --given OOFLam?
How would you determine that?
jt,
- How is that?
- Yes.
jt,
- How is that?
- Yes.
js,
- Bayes (basic?) Theorem does not involve any hypotheses. It involves only events. Your formula hilited above should be P(A|B) = P(A|B)(P(B) / P(A).
P(H|E) = P(E|H)(P(H) / (P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|~H)P(~H)) is the theorem as it applies to complementary hypotheses.
Where does the 10-100 come from?
Given H, what is the likelihood of your brain existing? Is it 10-100?
- Yes.
Is it also 10-100 given ~H?
- Yes.
Mojo,
- I'm not sure that P(E) = 1 is appropriate terminology, and seems like I just created more confusion by using it...
Actually, you created more certainty, since it is now obvious that your argument is mathematically inconsistent.
jt,
- How is that?
How did you calculate 10-100?
I think were on to something basic here.
Do you mean that while your self is perceived through your current brain, it could be perceived through any brain, and thus whichever physical appearance you might be in, you would somehow be YOU?
In that case I think we are at a more basic caveat:
Just because one hypothesis has a higher likelihood than another it needs not be the true one.
An example: I give you a nice, fresh ripe apple. I inform you that it comes from a tree in my garden.
Now, we can make two hypoteses:
H : Apples grow seasonally on the three and it carries fresh ripe apples for a period of about five weeks every year.
~H : Apples do not grow seasonally but are available any time of the year.
The likelihood of getting a ripe apple under H is about 1/10.
Under ~H it is 1.
However, apples still grow seasonally on my tree.
Hans
Hans,
- I think that you left out a couple of important words.
- H : Apples grow seasonally on my tree and it carries fresh ripe apples for a period of about five weeks every year.
- ~H : Apples do not grow seasonally on my tree but are available any time of the year.
- The likelihood of getting a ripe apple from my tree under H is about 1/10. Under ~H it is 1.
- I got a fresh apple from my tree. - The likelihood of getting a fresh apple from my tree is greater Under ~H than under H -- but the prior probability of H is much greater than the prior probability of ~H.
- I don't know much about the prior probabilities here, but my best guess is that the Bayes formula would include the following numbers:
- P(H|E) = .10*1/((.10*1) + (1*.01)) or .10/.11 or 91%.
- In other words, the posterior probability that your tree is seasonal is 91%.
Hans,It doesn't matter who owns the tree. Just as it doesn't matter which self we are discussing here.
In my example, we can indeed infer that the tree is likely to be seasonal, because most apple trees are. None of us know exactly how likely, so putting in numbers in a formula is silly (and a bad habit from your side), but you are, from what data you do have, obviously mistaken: I'm in Denmark and the month is march. If I have apples on a tree, it is most certainly not seasonal!
The point in this is that the most likely event needs not be true. Unless you have extensive data to work from, you cannot generate mathematical evidence for anything, and actually disproving something is virtually impossible.
Hans
- I think you're agreeing with me.
Likelihood is just two pieces of the Posterior Probability pie.
- No. We're accepting, in ~H, that the brain currently exists -- and consequently, we don't need to multiply the prior probability of there being something spiritual here by the likelihood of there being a brain here.Then you must understand that your likelihood under ~H (where you add a soul) is much less than under H (where the only thing you have is your brain).
- No. We're accepting, in ~H, that the brain currently exists -- and consequently, we don't need to multiply the prior probability of there being something spiritual here by the likelihood of there being a brain here.
- No. We're accepting, in ~H, that the brain currently exists -- and consequently, we don't need to multiply the prior probability of there being something spiritual here by the likelihood of there being a brain here.
I think you're agreeing with me.
Likelihood is just two pieces of the Posterior Probability pie.