Cont: Proof of Immortality VIII

....
DUN DUN DUNNNN! (Cue the scary music)

Time itself may not be what we think it is therefore souls exist and I'm immortal? :rolleyes:

You know he's cornered when the line..."time isnt what we think...", or "quantum...WOW" comes out. It is his ultimate escape hatch. Throw a post with 300 things wrong with it. We sigh, throw our hands up and give up. He tells himself he "won".
 
- But in ~H, my "self" does not depend upon the brain...


Irrelevant. If the existence of your brain is, as you have stated, a given, then the likelihood of your existence under H is 1. The likelihood of your existence under ~H cannot be greater than this.
 
js,
- P(E) is also 1. But, P(E|H) is still 10-100. By P(B)=1, I just meant that the brain is a given. By P(E)=1, I meant that the self is also a given. I don't know if that's official terminology...
- Whatever, B and E are both givens, whereas in P(E|H) H is a given, but E is not.
- This is confusing stuff, and some of my terminology probably makes it more confusing.

Why on earth not? Under H, the brain generates the sense of self, you have agreed to this. It is one and the same with the brain. If the brain is a given so is the self, it’s what brains do!
jond,
- Because both the brain and the self are givens, but the likelihood of either under H is not. And, both likelihoods are very small (less than 10-100).
 
jond,
- Because both the brain and the self are givens, but the likelihood of either under H is not. And, both likelihoods are very small (less than 10-100).

The likelihood of the self and the brain under H, is the same. Whatever number you want to use. If the brain is a given (1) the likelihood of the self is also a given (1). If you are back to saying the brain is unlikely, you also need to accept that your brain is equally unlikely under ~H. Which have agreed to. So, P(B)= P(E), or your current existence.

In your ~H, you need a soul in addition to your brain to get your current existence. This means that you have to multiply P(B) x P(S) to get P(E). It will not be more likely than P(B).
 
- However, since the existence of my brain is a given, and in effect has a probability of 1, the posterior probability of H-- given H -- is simply (10-100),
I think you agree with me that that's idiotic nonsense. The probability of H is 1, as you've shown. You don't get to make up a small number for H.

whereas the posterior probability of ~H is 1 X .0062, or .0062.
1 > .0062 or whatever nonsense number you've made up for a probability for the nonsense you've made up.
 
jond,
- Because both the brain and the self are givens, but the likelihood of either under H is not. And, both likelihoods are very small (less than 10-100).


The likelihood of the "self" is only an issue under hypotheses in which "selves" exist. As far as H is concerned, the likelihood that you exist is equal to the likelihood that your body exists. The series of events leading to the existence of your body is the same in H as it is in ~H.

On the figures you have provided (wherever you pulled them from) the likelihood of your existence under H is 10-100; under ~H it is 6.2 X 10-103.
 
Jabba, your estimated number of 10-100. How did you come to that figure? What maths did you use to arrive at such a precise sum?
 
Next time you want to whine about having to deal with so many 'different' questions, remember this point Jabba. Everyone keeps asking the same question. Validate your number of 10 to the -100. Tons of people are asking. We all are noticing you are ignoring it, and instead spending the time on restating your argument over and over again.

You are fooling no one.
 
Next time you want to whine about having to deal with so many 'different' questions, remember this point Jabba. Everyone keeps asking the same question. Validate your number of 10 to the -100. Tons of people are asking. We all are noticing you are ignoring it, and instead spending the time on restating your argument over and over again.


But even if he stops whining about being asked too many questions he still won't be able to answer them because all his available time will be taken up by the search for new excuses.
 
- Under ~H, there could be a spiritual plane, so even if I didn't exist on an earthly plane, I still might exist on a spiritual plane.

But you wouldn't be able to post your "proof" on ISF from a spiritual plane. And since the whole of your argument is based on the unlikelihood that you're able to post this proof now rather than at some other time or never, if you weren't able to post your argument then it wouldn't be valid.

The converse, however, is not true either, how ever much you beg it to be.

Dave
 
You told us that the brain was a given. P(B) = 1. And so P(E | H) must equal 1.

js,
- It's certainly a confusing element -- but, in P(E|H), H is the given and we're asking how likely is E, if H is true. And, we can ask that even if E has not occurred.

No. Given either H or ~H, you can only ask if E occurred if E had occurred, becasue E is you. That is the fundamental flaw in your argument.

jt,
- In regard to this particular issue, I think that I see your point. In this particular case E happens to be me -- but, in every(?) other issue E is not me, and could have not occurred.

That's the case of E you have been using. So, you have now conceded that your argument has been incorrect (that's a huge step). Your observing E cannot be evidence for H over ~H or vice versa...
jt,
- So far, I don't see how that makes any difference.
 
jabba, you never responded to this:

P(E) is the probability of event E (your sense of self in this case). P(E) = 1 means event E is a certainty.

P(B) is the probability of event B (the existence of your brain in this case). P(B) = 1 means event B is a certainty.

If that is not what you meant, you need to try again.


A point being that if P(E) = 1, then of necessity P(E|H) = 1 for all H.
 
js,
- P(E) is also 1. But, P(E|H) is still 10-100. By P(B)=1, I just meant that the brain is a given. By P(E)=1, I meant that the self is also a given. I don't know if that's official terminology...
- Whatever, B and E are both givens, whereas in P(E|H) H is a given, but E is not.
- This is confusing stuff, and some of my terminology probably makes it more confusing.

P(E) = P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|~H)P(~H). Since you claim that both P(H) and P(~H) are nonzero, then P(E) = 1 implies that P(E|H) = P(E|~H) = 1, and thus E does [not*] provide evidence for H over ~H or vice versa. So this is another way to see that your argument is false.
*provided by #404
jt,
- Why does P(E) = P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|~H)P(~H)?
 

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