Cont: Proof of Immortality VIII

Likelihood isn't based upon actuality; it's based upon the hypothesis being evaluated. Something happens and you wonder how that affects the probability of a particular (and, relevant) hypothesis.

No. You don't "wonder" how one event affects the probability of another event. You know it. Or you compute it. Instead you just make stuff up. Of course likelihood is based on actuality in the sense that what actually happens or would happen describes how the events A and B should convolve. As I've said now for years, you're literally just making up numbers, applying some poorly-recalled algebra, and pretending you've proven something by it.
 
- In H, your self is produced by your brain -- which is exactly why the likelihood that your self would currently exist -- given H -- is so small.

You told us that the brain was a given. P(B) = 1. And so P(E | H) must equal 1.
 
- In H, your self is produced by your brain -- which is exactly why the likelihood that your self would currently exist -- given H -- is so small.

How can a likelihood of 1 be considered small? You seem to have reverted to gibber, Jabba.
 
Mojo,
- The latter.
- But, if you only have a brain -- which produces your self -- and no immaterial soul, the likelihood of you currently existing is less than 10-100, even though you currently exist. Likelihood isn't based upon actuality; it's based upon the hypothesis being evaluated. Something happens and you wonder how that affects the probability of a particular (and, relevant) hypothesis.


According to you, "the brain is a given". That means that the likelihood that you exist under a hypothesis in which consciousness is produced by, and therefore entirely determined by, the brain is 1.

Are you claiming that the brain is a given under your favoured hypothesis, but extremely unlikely under "OOFLam"?
 
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The "H" in Jabba's P(E|H) is not materialism. It is a straw"H" believed by nobody invented out of whole cloth for no purpose other than for Jabba to argue. In Jabba's argument, materialism rightly belongs in the set of "~H" because Jabba has specifically excluded materialism from "H".

The argument gets so involved that people forget that Jabba's OOFLAM is not materialism, it is something else that Jabba simply made up.

Thus, in the Jabbaverse, materialism is far more likely than his concocted "H".

Fine by me, but possibly an unintended consequence for Jabba.

I counter propose that Jabba's "H" should be OFF(one finite function).

Jabba wont like this but he can head right OFF because under OFF he is going to die. As are we all.
 
Mojo,
- Yeah. I accept that the evidence is weak -- but strong enough to give a prior probability of at least .01.
- And even if you figure that the prior probability is only .0000000001 (but my formula is otherwise correct) the posterior probability of ~OOFLam -- given the current existence of my self --is much greater than the posterior probability of OOFLam -- given the current existence of my self.

This remains false, no matter how many times you assert it.

Hans
 
Mojo,
- The latter.
- But, if you only have a brain -- which produces your self -- and no immaterial soul, the likelihood of you currently existing is less than 10-100, even though you currently exist. Likelihood isn't based upon actuality; it's based upon the hypothesis being evaluated. Something happens and you wonder how that affects the probability of a particular (and, relevant) hypothesis.

This is an extraordinary piece of nonsense. If you currently exist, the likelihood of your current existence is 1.

Hans
 
- In H, your self is produced by your brain -- which is exactly why the likelihood that your self would currently exist -- given H -- is so small.

No. Texas sharpshooter again. You decide to contemplate some specific self, but it could be any self.

The H hypothesis is not that YOU exist and have a self. It is that somebody exists and has a self. You then point to some specific existing self ("you") and draw the target around it.

Hans
 
You told us that the brain was a given. P(B) = 1. And so P(E | H) must equal 1.
js,
- It's certainly a confusing element -- but, in P(E|H), H is the given and we're asking how likely is E, if H is true. And, we can ask that even if E has not occurred.
 
It's certainly a confusing element

The gaslighting doesn't help, Jabba. It's actually a very simple element. The Texas sharpshooter fallacy is one of the most intuitively obvious of all the logical fallacies. Would you care to explain in your own words why it's a fallacy?

but, in P(E|H), H is the given and we're asking how likely is E, if H is true. And, we can ask that even if E has not occurred.

Your choice of what E is in your proof depends entirely on its having actually occurred. You're trying to give it significance in retrospect.
 
According to you, "the brain is a given". That means that the likelihood that you exist under a hypothesis in which consciousness is produced by, and therefore entirely determined by, the brain is 1.

Are you claiming that the brain is a given under your favoured hypothesis, but extremely unlikely under "OOFLam"?
- No.
- I'm claiming that my brain is a given in both hypotheses, and the probability of my brain is, therefore, 1 in both.
- Consequently, when I multiply the probability of my brain times the likelihood of the current existence of my self -- given the two different hypotheses -- I'm effectively left with only the likelihoods of each -- i.e., 10-100 for H, and .0062 for ~H.
 
- In H, your self is produced by your brain -- which is exactly why the likelihood that your self would currently exist -- given H -- is so small.

OK so the likelilhood of my brain existing under H is very small, and not a given as you said earlier.

What's the likelihood of my brain existing under ~H?
 
- No.
- I'm claiming that my brain is a given in both hypotheses, and the probability of my brain is, therefore, 1 in both.
- Consequently, when I multiply the probability of my brain times the likelihood of the current existence of my self -- given the two different hypotheses -- I'm effectively left with only the likelihoods of each -- i.e., 10-100 for H, and .0062 for ~H.

The "self", as you're calling it, is a process of the brain in the materialist hypothesis. So with the brain being a given, the probability of your "self" is 1.

(Materialism) 1 > .0062 (Jabba's made up number for his made up nonsense)

You've proven materialism. Well done.
 
js,
- It's certainly a confusing element -- but, in P(E|H), H is the given and we're asking how likely is E, if H is true. And, we can ask that even if E has not occurred.
No, you are not. What you are asking is how likely is E given a completely ****** up H.
 

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