Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Garrison]

You then assume that a German blitzkrieg would not have engulfed Holland and Belgium or France in 1938 because of weak little Germany

Ignoring the rest of the nonsense in your post it was men like Major General Georg Thomas head of the Defence Economy and Armament Office, who warned Hitler that war in 1938 would be disastrous for Germany. The navy was pathetic, the army deficient in equipment, armour and supplies. Only the Luftwaffe had any advantage and as previously pointed out they were of the opinion that a strategic bombing offensive was impossible without bases on the Channel coast, which flatly contradicts your earlier claims. It's really past time for you to deal with facts rather than responding to your own strawman assertions.

 

[ddt]

You people ignore the fact that if Chamberlain had been 'honourable and gone to war over the Sudetenland in 1938 there would have been a state of war with Germany, which is a fearful thing, and it would have involved France and the Czechs as well as Britain.

You're forgetting the Soviet Union which was also an ally of Czechoslovakia, and had pormised to come to their assistance of France did so.

If Chamberlain hadn't been so weak at Munich, but had threatened war over Czechoslovakia, Germany would have been faced with three major powers coming to CS' aid at the same time, at a time when it was wholly unprepared for that.

 

[SpitfireIX]

You people ignore the fact that if Chamberlain had been 'honourable and gone to war over the Sudetenland in 1938 there would have been a state of war with Germany, which is a fearful thing, and it would have involved France and the Czechs as well as Britain.

No one is ignoring that. And going to war in 1939 wasn't a fearful thing?

You then assume that a German blitzkrieg would not have engulfed Holland and Belgium or France in 1938 because of weak little Germany . . .

Yes, because it wouldn't have. First, as has been pointed out to you, Germany had only three panzer divisions at the time of the Munich crisis. Second, and more to the point, there is no way that Germany could have gone on the offensive against France while fighting Czechoslovakia.

. . . and that the Czechs would have lasted more than three months . . .

Straw man. No one is assuming that. But even if they had only lasted three months, first, the Czechs would have held out until December, making it far too late for Germany to launch any kind of an offensive against France before winter, and second, considerable quantities of both German and Czech war materiel would have been expended in the fighting, and would thus have been unavailable for use against the Allies in 1939.

. . . and that there were no deficiencies in the British army or air force at the time.

Straw man. Again, no one has said that. The year's delay unquestionably allowed for the strengthening of the RAF. The point you seem unable (or unwilling) to grasp is that the year's delay, combined with the virtually bloodless conquest of Czechoslovakia and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, strengthened Germany far more than it strengthened Britain and France. Further, as I've pointed out, and you've ignored, Chamberlain neglected the Army in favor of the RAF.

Churchill's attitude seemed to be to have a 'with what strategy' and to try to involve the Americans at the time, which was pie in the sky because of political and military problems in America then.

Churchill's "attitude" was presumably that the Allies would have to fight Germany eventually, and that it was better to fight sooner rather than later, which, as has been demonstrated, were absolutely correct. And Churchill had been in government during World War I; he was undoubtedly aware that it would take time for the US to build up and deploy significant land and air forces in Europe.

Chamberlain declared war on Germany. That's not appeasement.

Irrelevant. He clearly pursued a policy of appeasement prior to 1939.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Yes, because it wouldn't have. First, as has been pointed out to you, Germany had only three panzer divisions at the time of the Munich crisis. Second, and more to the point, there is no way that Germany could have gone on the offensive against France while fighting Czechoslovakia.

There are lies, damned lies, and statistics:

http://spartacus-educational.com/2WWgermanA.htm

Whereas the SA now lost its power, Hitler allowed the German Army to grow rapidly. In 1935 he introduced military conscription. This enabled the German Army to train 300,000 conscripts a year. By 1938 it had 36 infantry divisions of 600,000 men.
In 1939 the German Army had 98 divisions available for the invasion of Poland. Although some were ill-equipped veteran reservists, they still had 1.5 million well-trained men available for action. It also had 9 panzer divisions. Each one had 328 tanks, 8 support battalions and 6 artillery batteries.

 

[Henri McPhee]

You're forgetting the Soviet Union which was also an ally of Czechoslovakia, and had pormised to come to their assistance of France did so.

If Chamberlain hadn't been so weak at Munich, but had threatened war over Czechoslovakia, Germany would have been faced with three major powers coming to CS' aid at the same time, at a time when it was wholly unprepared for that.

It's not as simple as that. What is a fact is that Stalin signed a pact with Hitler in 1939 whereby he could have a land grab of Eastern Poland. He didn't seem all that interested in helping out the Czechs, even in 1938:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592299908406124?src=recsys

 

[Andy_Ross]

There are lies, damned lies, and statistics:

http://spartacus-educational.com/2WWgermanA.htm

You quote the availability in 1939 to support your 1938 contention?

 

[Andy_Ross]

Here is a good timeline of the formation and strength of the various panzer units in the 1930s.

It wasn't until November 1938 that the 4th Division was even formed.

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/german-panzer-divisions-1935-1939.htm

 

[Major Major]

There are lies, damned lies, and statistics:

http://spartacus-educational.com/2WWgermanA.htm

You quote the availability in 1939 to support your 1938 contention?

And in fact the expansion of the panzer divisions was possible because of the availability of the Czech industrial plant, the AFV (the 6th Panzerdivision was equipped with the Czech LT-35, designated the Pz.Kpfw. 35(t)], and the Czech financial resources.

None of which would have been available in the case of a war with Czechoslovakia.

 

[Major Major]

Yes and I remember also that there were a limited number of concrete airbases and facilities in the western part of Germany (not near the Benelux border) that would allow flights around those neutral nations and having a more direct line to eastern UK.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a2/Nseamap.gif

Hans has thoughtfully posted a map of the relevant area. What route would the German bombers have had to take to fly from their bases in Germany to bomb London?

 

[SpitfireIX]

There are lies, damned lies, and statistics:

http://spartacus-educational.com/2WWgermanA.htm

By 1938 [the German Army] had 36 infantry divisions of 600,000 men.

In 1939 the German Army had 98 divisions available for the invasion of Poland. Although some were ill-equipped veteran reservists, they still had 1.5 million well-trained men available for action. It also had 9 panzer divisions. Each one had 328 tanks, 8 support battalions and 6 artillery batteries.

So according to your own source, between Munich and the invasion of Poland, the German Army added about 60 infantry divisions, and six panzer divisions. Kindly explain how this bolsters your argument that Chamberlain was right to appease Hitler in 1938.

 

[Hans]

Henri is doing a kind of inept circling Gish Gallop he is making wild statements then abandons them when he cannot find any support. You'll note he has abandoned his 'seven day' laugh now and is trying his present strategy. After a while he'll wander back to some of his original claims and pretend he never saw they were debunked.

Yawn just typical Henri always trying to talk his way out of the hole he dug himself.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

And in fact the expansion of the panzer divisions was possible because of the availability of the Czech industrial plant, the AFV (the 6th Panzerdivision was equipped with the Czech LT-35, designated the Pz.Kpfw. 35(t)], and the Czech financial resources.

None of which would have been available in the case of a war with Czechoslovakia.

I made this point back in post #448

Czech tanks made up just about all of the 6th Panzer Division, and all of the medium tanks the 7th Panzer and 8th Divisions.

Taking these away would leave Hoth's Corp with only 1 Panzer Division (not much of a Corp then) and deleting Kliest's XXXI Corps while only slightly bolstering the remaining Panzer Divisions with the left-overs.

 

[Garrison]

Henri is doing a kind of inept circling Gish Gallop he is making wild statements then abandons them when he cannot find any support. You'll note he has abandoned his 'seven day' laugh now and is trying his present strategy. After a while he'll wander back to some of his original claims and pretend he never saw they were debunked.

Yawn just typical Henri always trying to talk his way out of the hole he dug himself.

And his latest 'idea' is that the USSR signing the M-R pact in 1939 is somehow an argument in favour of Munich is bizarre to say the least. That the British and French sold out the Czechs, and then did nothing when Hitler reneged on the deal and marched his troops into Prague hardly made an alliance with the Western powers attractive. Also Hitler never offered such a deal in 1938, at that time he was still trying to get the Poles onside against the USSR. Chamberlain handed Hitler a victory in 1938 and condemned Britain to fight the Germans on far less favourable terms in 1939.

 

[ddt]

It's not as simple as that. What is a fact is that Stalin signed a pact with Hitler in 1939 whereby he could have a land grab of Eastern Poland. He didn't seem all that interested in helping out the Czechs, even in 1938:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592299908406124?src=recsys

Did you actually read the article? It says:

Was Stalin willing to assist the Prague government unilaterally, that is, without France? I present decisive evidence that the answer is 'no'

Highlighting mine. It doesn't begin to touch the question whether Stalin would have assisted CS if France had stood by its ally. Daladier was actually willing to do so, but was talked out of it by Chamberlain, and a vote on Munich was passed in French parliament with the narrowest possible majority.

 

[jimbob]

I made this point back in post #448

Yes,

Dave Rogers explained the reason iin the following post

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=12190823&postcount=682

 

[Degeneve]

And his latest 'idea' is that the USSR signing the M-R pact in 1939 is somehow an argument in favour of Munich is bizarre to say the least. That the British and French sold out the Czechs, and then did nothing when Hitler reneged on the deal and marched his troops into Prague hardly made an alliance with the Western powers attractive. Also Hitler never offered such a deal in 1938, at that time he was still trying to get the Poles onside against the USSR. Chamberlain handed Hitler a victory in 1938 and condemned Britain to fight the Germans on far less favourable terms in 1939.

If I remember well it's precisely the Munich agreements which decided one year later Staline to sign the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact as he feared to be left alone against nazi Germany by the Western powers.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Partially. I think at the time Stalin had a bit more of a problem with the Japanese, and needed to move a lot of tanks there as a show of force. The Khalkhin Gol incident was in fact just escalating at the time, and it had been since the beginning of May 1939.

Which I think was a MUCH more pressing concern than Germany. Germany might attack at some point in the future, but Japan was escalating on the Mongolian border RIGHT NAO. Even if Stalin had been twice as stark raving mad as he actually was, he could recognize the difference between a future threat and an imminent threat unfolding right now.

The Soviet army was still building up, and although by '39 you'd think they'd have enough tanks for both fronts, they really didn't have that many functional tank divisions. And I don't just mean that their army was MUCH smaller in '39. All the way between 39 and '41, the Soviet army was basically growing faster than its equipment and logistics for it allowed.

For example, even as late as '41, a lot of tank divisions didn't have trucks for either their logistics or their supposed motorized infantry. In fact, a lot of supposed "motorized" divisions and brigades were actually LESS mobile than ordinary infantry, because foot infantry had horses, while the supposedly "motorized" guys didn't have Jack Schitt. Best they could do was push their artillery themselves, but that only went so far.

Ammo, supplies and spare parts were also a MAJOR problem for tanks and motorized divisions, so basically they could only use so many divisions at a time.

What I'm saying is that the USSR was really in no position whatsoever to even think of a two front war in '39. It needed to secure peace on one front or the other real quick, and really on the eastern front in '39 it was clear that the Japanese aren't giving up any time soon, unless you give them a hard enough smack on the snout to make them think twice.

You get the idea.


Which kinda brings me to the idea that "OMG, Munich made the RM pact possible." Well, I'm not a proper historian, but I think it was likely to happen anyway. As I was saying, Stalin needed to secure peace on his western border no matter what. And I don't think England and France were going to grant the borders of the USSR at that point, for the obvious ideological reasons. Poland also probably wasn't going to get friendly with the USSR, and also didn't really have the army to prevent an attack from the west for long. The Czech fortifications were good, their tanks were good, but they really only protected a small sector, and wouldn't do all that great if they had to shift an army to defend the USSR. Just not enough of them.

So now what? Stalin needed to make a treaty with SOMEONE, ANYONE to secure peace on his western border while he deals with the Japanese. I think the only realistic choice there was Germany. Not just for the size of the army, but add giving the Soviets SOME technology and trade deals, and suddenly Germany is the best option for a deal (if you don't foresee what that's going to help them with.) So basically the pact would have happened with or without Munich. IMHO.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Personally, I think Chamberlain knew full well that Stalin was in for an invasion by Germany, even if Stalin thought Britain would be defeated.

There is an interesting criticism of Churchill's 'strategic genius' at this website. It stands up for General Brooke:

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1993/04/08/how-wrong-was-churchill/

For some reason that website has suddenly been censored, or doesn't link to this forum. There is another website which might not be entirely true about Churchill's military strategy:

https://www.quora.com/Was-Winston-Churchill-considered-a-good-military-strategist

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is another interesting criticism of Churchill's military strategy at this website, which again might not be entirely true, and which is relevant to appeasement:

http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2015/02/05/churchill-as-war-leader-myths-and-realities/

Most of the time, Churchill regarded aircraft as dominant platforms and was not routinely attentive to ground equipment, except as demonstrations of British productivity and exports to Allies. Even ahead of D-Day, he doubted that tanks would be of any use against artillery; he fancied that bombers would shock defenders to such an extent that they would not resist an invasion of France. In the end, the war was won by ground invasions, while his faith in strategic bombing proved strategically and ethically misplaced.

Churchill was more responsible than any other Briton for the direction of a war that ended later and more expensively than needed, leaving most of Europe under the heel of one of the two great autocracies that had started the war in the first place (the Soviet Union), and leaving Britain bankrupt and beholden to allied and imperial creditors.

 

[jimbob]

Er... Henri, I suggest you look at what several posters in this thread have said about "the soft underbelly of Europe"

A clue - they aren't that impressed with the strategic thinking behind it. However that is somewhat different to the specific question about Munich. Did Munich help Nazi Germany more than it helped the British?
It certainly seems to have done so. Regardless of Germany's military power (far less in 1938 compared to September 1939) there was also the very real chance that Hitler could have been overthrown in a coup if Britain and France had stood with Czechoslovakia.