Up to this point, we agree, especially the last statement.
And this is where we disagree. Putting myself in the same place, I see no reason to be shocked that I exist rather than someone very much like me but in some significant ways different.
Assuming the prevailing materialistic explanation of your existence:
You shouldn't see any reason to be shocked that you exist
rather than someone else. You should, however, be shocked that
you exist
at all.
You should not, however, be shocked that other equally unlikely things exist, unless the existence of the universe shocks you.
The fact that one of those immensely unlikely things is "you" gives you a specific perspective, which gives rise to probabilistic significance.
Suppose you were transported to an alternate universe where the only difference was, say, that I preferred cheddar to other kinds of cheese; would that be a more, less, or equally likely probability universe than the one we live in?
If you don't think your specific body is the only one that could be you, then you are repeatable, therefore immortal in a sense.
If you do think that body is the only body that could be you, then the probability of an alternate universe in which
you exist is zero. That specific body is part of this universe and no other.
I would submit that it would be roughly the same probability, therefore there is no particular reason why one should have been preferred over another.
See above. The probability that your specific body could be in another place, time, or universe is zero. A specific body is part and parcel of the specific universe that gave rise to it.
By extension, none of the other possible variations on who I could have been are particularly more or less likely, so there's no reason to be surprised that I ended up as this particular "me."
If other bodies can be "you", then you can exist more than once. If we are part of an eternally inflating multiverse, as existing theory suggests, then you would be essentially immortal - again, if other bodies can be "you".
If you believe no other body could ever be "you", then you should be shocked that "you" exist at all.
That, I think, is the gist of what Jabba is trying to get at with his infinite pool of potential selves; the question of "Why did I end up as this specific self?" The answer to this is, quite simply, "Why not?"
Dave
If you believe that, then you are flirting with immortality yourself.
