John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
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- Re #2: I'm not saying you're necessarily wrong, but I can't find anything on Google making that claim.
I can't find anything on Google supporting your claims about immortality. /thread.
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- Re #2: I'm not saying you're necessarily wrong, but I can't find anything on Google making that claim.
- Re #2: I can't find anything on Google discussing the chemistry of specific self-awareness. No one talks about the chemistry of ME, or YOU.
Ah, you forget the claimed army of silent, lurking supporters Jabba claims to have. What effect will this have on those?
You shouldn't see any reason to be shocked that you exist rather than someone else. You should, however, be shocked that you exist at all.
The fact that one of those immensely unlikely things is "you" gives you a specific perspective, which gives rise to probabilistic significance.
If you don't think your specific body is the only one that could be you, then you are repeatable, therefore immortal in a sense.
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- Re #3: The different books on consciousness that I have read all say something to the effect that nothing in modern physics actually explains consciousness. It's a mystery!
Dave,
- Re #1: OK.
- Re #2: I can't find anything on Google discussing the chemistry of specific self-awareness. No one talks about the chemistry of ME, or YOU.
- Re #3: The different books on consciousness that I have read all say something to the effect that nothing in modern physics actually explains consciousness. It's a mystery!
No it doesn't.- So anyway.
1. I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination.
No it isn't.Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
Nobody cares what you do or don't accept.2. Though, I still don't accept that model myself.
What seems to you and what is actually the case are two very different things.3. Then, it seems to me that what is being described as that model is more like the model I've suggested -- that a certain physical state produces (or "receives"), as an emergent property, what we call "consciousness," which naturally involves a brand new, and specific self-awareness
-- nowhere is it suggested that a perfect copy of my brain would produce ME (my particular self-awareness).
If by "I" you mean your consciousness, it's an emergent property of your brain.Where did I come from?
- So anyway.
1. I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination. Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
2. Though, I still don't accept that model myself.
3. Then, it seems to me that what is being described as that model is more like the model I've suggested -- that a certain physical state produces (or "receives"), as an emergent property, what we call "consciousness," which naturally involves a brand new, and specific self-awareness -- nowhere is it suggested that a perfect copy of my brain would produce ME (my particular self-awareness). Where did I come from?
I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination.
Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
Though, I still don't accept that model myself.
that a certain physical state produces (or "receives")...
...which naturally involves a brand new, and specific self-awareness...
Where did I come from?
And if you had honestly stopped here, you would have been fine.- So anyway.
1. I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness
But you keep dishonestly adding foolishness such as the above.that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination. Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
You have to treat it as if it is correct if that's the model you're trying to falsify. Nobody really cares whether you accept it or not.2. Though, I still don't accept that model myself.
No, that's just stupid. The materialist model sees the sense of self as an emergent property. You still want to treat it as a separate thing. It only "seems" like it's closer to the materialist model because you've dishonestly tacked on a bunch of crap that doesn't belong to the materialist model.3. Then, it seems to me that what is being described as that model is more like the model I've suggested -- that a certain physical state produces (or "receives"), as an emergent property
No, you're trotting out your immortal lie again. You will always be called on it so you may as well stop doing it. You don't need to try to redefine the materialist model to include a soul.what we call "consciousness," which naturally involves a brand new, and specific self-awareness
Why do you persist in your immortal lie of referring to what's you've called a process as "particular"?-- nowhere is it suggested that a perfect copy of my brain would produceMEMY SOUL (my particular self-awareness).
Ask an eight year old. They likely will be able to tell you.Where did I come from?
- So anyway.
1. I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination.
Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
2. Though, I still don't accept that model myself.
3. Then, it seems to me that what is being described as that model is more like the model I've suggested -- that a certain physical state produces (or "receives"), as an emergent property, what we call "consciousness," which naturally involves a brand new, and specific self-awareness -- nowhere is it suggested that a perfect copy of my brain would produce ME (my particular self-awareness).
Where did I come from?
- So anyway.
I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination. Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
Though, I still don't accept that model myself.
3. Then, it seems to me that what is being described as that model is more like the model I've suggested -- that a certain physical state produces (or "receives"), as an emergent property, what we call "consciousness," which naturally involves a brand new, and specific self-awareness -- nowhere is it suggested that a perfect copy of my brain would produce ME (my particular self-awareness). Where did I come from?
- So anyway.
1. I'm happy to use the materialist model of self-awareness that depends entirely upon the particular sperm-ovum combination.
Whatever, the likelihood of the current existence of my particular self-awareness is still less than 1/10100.
You are the music playing on the orchestra of your body and brain, the result of a program running on your organic computer, a process that is self aware when it's running, thinks it's continuous but isn't.Where did I come from?
You are the music playing on the orchestra of your body and brain, the result of a program running on your organic computer, a process that is self aware when it's running, thinks it's continuous but isn't.
Your self awareness isn't a thing at all. Like music or the output of a computer program it is the result of a process wholly dependent on the physical things that generate it. The orchestra doesn't "receive" the music from anywhere when it starts playing, and the music doesn't continue when the orchestra stops playing.
According to materialism, "You" are a process. An incredibly complex intermittently self-aware process, but nonetheless just a process that is completely generated by and dependent on your body and brain.
No, I shouldn't; that would be a prima facie example of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. But in any case that's irrelevant, because it's not Jabba's argument; his entire "infinite pool of selves" concept is intended to address the fact that he exists rather than someone else.
No, it doesn't. To go back to your Putin analogy, "People whom Vladimir Putin want dead" is an a priori specification, and "people who are me" an a posteriori specification, when discussing the probability of there being a person who is me. Probabilistic significance requires an a priori specification.
And this is stretching definitions beyond breaking point. "Immortal" does not mean "capable of being reproduced," it means that the process of the self does not terminate. If your argument is based on redefining words then it's no more valid than if you redefined "Immortal" to mean "a pale shade of purple grey."
Dave
JABBABOT said:- Okay so you agree that the process/entity/<VAR%> is attached to a specific <RAND (sperm-ova,brain,person)> then, correct?