And no, you did not prove anything. You stated some things. Even if those things were right, that does make your statements a proof.
You continue to confuse ideas.
And how. Buckle up, Kumar. You're about to see how a real logical analysis proceeds.
The question at hand is whether Jainism is a scientific religion, by which we mean whether pertinent claims are confirmed by mainstream findings arrived at by the hypothetico-deductive model and presented with appropriate empiricism. You, Kumar, have tried to conflate that with whether Jainism imparts subjective benefit. (You have widened this to include other religious, but as you admitted knowing little about other religions -- and demonstrated as much -- we can stipulate that any argument toward universality on this point would fail as badly as the last time you tried it, and for the same reasons. Hence we restrict the inquiry to Jainism.)
Classical logic sees three related shades of the same distractive fallacy. The first and most straightforward is known as a Red Herring fallacy, named for the historical practice of using the smell of rotting fish to mask odors and thus confuse predators. This tactic has become widespread in American politics as reported in the media. A politician who does not wish to answer a question posed to him will try to pivot, or turn the question to something else that has a more favorable answer but is only slightly related to the original question. You pivoted from the question of scientific validity to a separate question of subjective benefit. The science is where you're in over your head. Subjective value is trivially true for most religions.
The second (and third) is described by the term I applied -- loaded question. A question is "loaded" in English rhetorical terminology when it is based on an unjustified, unstated proposition. We can find a number of unstated propositions that fit your evident intent. I picked two. The first is on the Bruto just outlined -- stipulating that a religion engenders faith does not agree that that's a good thing, nor that it covers the whole experience of religion (the side-effects Bruto mentioned). Further stipulating that a religion produces euphoria, gives a person a sense of spiritual well-being, or motivates him to do good attempts to stand up these ideals as proxies for the original question (scientific validity) which they certainly are not. The false hidden premises are that faith and subjective approval are equivalent to scientific validity.
Bhagchandra made
specific claims about Jainism and science. These are not at all relevant to general allegations of subjective benefit. They are, in part, (1) Dharma is confirmed by the aetheric model of transmission, (2) plant autonomics as observed by Chandra Bain are proof of the Jain claim that plants have souls and experience human emotions, (3) vegetarian and ascetic diets have medical justification, (4) Jainism explains certain kinds of atomic bonds, (5) boiling water without killing the microbes makes it safe to drink. None of these are the least affected by vague generalities as whether Jainism compels its followers to have faith or whether it brings them good spiritual feelings to compels them toward good works. That's a complete
non sequitur.
Take a hypothetical religion whose members grow food and use it to feed hungry people who otherwise would be unable to eat. Clearly that's an objectively laudable belief. The religion may go on to believe that in performing this selfless act, they will be rewarded in some way by nature or by a deity. While it may cast a selfish shadow over their actions, it is nevertheless a defensible line of reasoning as long as one accepts
arguendo the existence of the rewarding entity. If a critic chooses not to believe in the rewarding entity, he would at least be constrained -- as you have tried to constrain your critics -- to accept that end result is not only subjectively desirable but optimistically altruistic. But if this religion also preached that the Earth was flat, that chalk was sentient, and that beer should be drunk instead of water, secular knowledge has somewhat to say on each of those items.
The shape of the earth has been observed directly. There is no legitimate controversy about it. That claim on the part of that religion would simply be factually wrong. The best we could say about chalk is that it doesn't exhibit any of the signs we have come to recognize systematically as evidence of sentience. In science, the null hypothesis would not be falsified on the question of sentient chalk, so we would be justified in rejecting the claim as at worst unproven and at best unlikely.
Drinking beer instead of water brings to mind many possible lines of reasoning. That's because "better" has to be more precisely defined, and most religions don't precisely define the relative operators in their moral calculus. In the west, drinking beer was better than water for many centuries because of the uncertainty of the water supply. Causing it to contain enough alcohol to dispatch the harmful microbes was better than dying of tainted water. But with the advent of reliable water and other methods of purification, the relative benefits of beer wane in comparison to its side effects such as excessive carbohydrate content and alcohol intoxication. Whereas before those were tolerable side effects, they may not be in all subsequent cases. This brings up a cause for a few religious proscriptions -- they once may have had a practical use, but were taught as propositional knowledge to simple people.
Now that we've seen how the spectrum of inferential knowledge can interact with claims made by religion, we introduce two steps of indirection.
Let's say a scholar in our hypothetical religion names the beliefs above and claims that mainstream science has confirmed each one.
That is a separate claim. For each doctrine, the prefix "Science has confirmed that..." is a separately testable claim, whether or not the doctrine is also testable. "Science has confirmed that the earth is flat," would be a -- pardon the pun -- flat-out lie. Science has emphatically and conclusively confirmed exactly the opposite. "Science has confirmed that chalk is sentient," would also be a lie if the claimant could provide no references, or provided only references to where scientists had observed some property of chalk that the religious scholar then separately tried to conclude must be the product of sentience. (We see this all the time in fringe argumentation -- some authority's work is held up as confirmation when it is the fringe claimant, not the authority, who draws the conclusion of confirmation.) It is vitally important, when considering alleged endorsements, whether the authority or the claimant is the one drawing the conclusion.
A related error occurs when science has a reasonably conclusive finding on a subject that is only superficially related to a doctrine. Religions will often overstate the similarities or suggest a contributive factor that just isn't true. The fallacy of limited depth is common.
"Science has confirmed that drinking beer is preferable to water," is at best a distortion. As we discussed relative to history, there once may have been a case where beer is preferable to
tainted water, but that qualification would not have arisen at a time when all water was presumed to be tainted. At best you would say that the religious commentator here had oversimplified a complex issue and was remiss in not noting science's cause-and-effect analysis of beer's detriments. Cherry-picking the science is a common way religions make this claim on issues that are less clear-cut according to present knowledge.
Here's the next step of indirection. If we investigate the origin story of the religion and discover that these doctrines were handed down to a mortal named Steve who was taken aboard a spaceship from faraway planet Kolob by the extraterrestrial Criswell and connected to an infinitely indexed memory bank, thus rendering him omniscient, it's surprising how little of the religion's doctrines are helped by that. First, it does no good to point out that Steve was born in Tampa, Florida on June 8, 1953 and played high school football at a stadium that exists. Those aren't the interesting parts of Steve's story. The interesting part is where he was abducted by aliens and magically made omniscient. Chances are, Steve's followers can tell you the story in great detail, but can't give you a scrap of evidence that it actually occurred. They sneak the controversial parts of Steve's story under your radar by burying it alongside inconsequential, verifiable facts. The reader is meant to assume they're all equally verifiable. Again this is a hallmark of American political writing too.
My earlier reference to J.R.R. Tolkien was no accident. Tolkien has amassed a gigantic mythos of the world in which he told his well-known stories. It is excruciatingly detailed and remarkably self-consistent. Many stories can be -- and have been -- told within its borders. Many people are aware of it and can exchange knowledge from it. Except, of course, that none of it is true. It's entirely made-up. This is what much of religion is like. It wants to supplant detail and common knowledge over the top of factual veracity.
And Steve's well-known but entirely unverifiable story of omniscience really doesn't do much to help the doctrines. If Steve omnisciently tells us the earth is flat, he's just wrong. His claim to omniscience is forfeit. (Jainism maintains that no amount of inferential reasoning is considered a refutation of omniscience. That's a red flag.) It doesn't really help the claim of sentient chalk. Steve may have engendered the faith of his followers to believe that chalk is sentient, and he can offer up the explanation that Criswell's infinitely-indexed memory bank told him so and that science just hasn't caught up yet. But that's not going to budge the presumption that sentient chalk is unlikely. The conviction is based on other premises that are also unproven and equally implausible. You're just trading one implausible thing for another.
As for beer, perhaps Criswell's infinitely-indexed memory bank really does know some other overriding benefit to beer that makes it superior to water in all respects. Since the science responds to the ambiguous "it's better" with "it depends," we aren't really out of the margins of rational thought here. On this point we'd have to wait until the ambiguity is resolved.
But if we consider the derivative claims, "Science has confirmed that..." we see that the allegations of omniscience are utterly refractory to the truth of those claims. There is no amount of claimed omniscience that corrects observable conditions of fact. If science is observably adamant that the world isn't flat, Criswell's magic spell over Steve can't possibly change that observation. Not the observation of the world, but the observation of what science has concluded.
Kumar, you've gone so far down the Jain rabbit hole that you have essentially denied that there can be any actual right or wrong answers.
In the Jain model of knowledge, inferential knowledge is that which combines observation with existing knowledge. If we see a fire from far away, we know propositionally that it will be hot because of our past experience with fire, but we don't have sensory knowledge of it. Someone who is close to the fire will experience the heat from it and have a sure knowledge of it. But what happens when we observe things at a distance whose properties we are unsure of? We will make educated guesses, but they risk being wrong. Only someone who has intimate proximal experience with those observed things will come closer to knowing their true nature. Dharmic omniscience is akin to that level of knowledge applied to all states of affairs.
Where Kumar errs is, analogously, in looking at a red-hot electric stove burner and vigorously telling people it's an unknown object, and that one can only determine its effect by touching it. He looks at scientific findings and assumes them to be these unknown quantities such that Bhagchandra Jain can mention them and not be refuted by anyone who doesn't have that sensory knowledge of them. And who does? No one, in Kumar's formulation. But in reality every scientist has that knowledge. It is entirely possible to have sufficient knowledge of Chandra Bose's work on plant physiology to know from afar that it doesn't support Bhagchandra's claims about it. Kumar may not know anything about it, and on that basis it would be foolish for him to rely on inferential speculation. But he doesn't get to say that because he doesn't know anything about it, no one can. Other people may have experience with red-hot stove burners and regard Kumar's demands that it must be unknowable as sounding brass and tinkling cymbals. Kumar is warping the Jain model of knowledge to appear to justify his own considerable ignorance.
If you've suffered with me this far, you deserve a beer. On Criswell.