Proof of Immortality, VI

[Filippo Lippi]

I believe we are seeing evidence that this may have already happened

 

[John Jones]

- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life. The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

Why? That wouldn't prove immortality. Stop wasting time.

 

[Mojo]

- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life. The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

Unfortunately for you, "because I say so" is not a convincing argument.

 

[Jabba]

And you still haven't explained why they wouldn't be cause and effect traceable. A copy of my brain would produce a copy of my self. Everything about the self would be determined by the brain. What would be untraceable? Why do you think two identical brains wouldn't produce two identical selves? More importantly, why do you think that's the scientific position?

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.
- But then, that hardly matters. Whatever, just like VWs and loaves of bread, there would be no limit on their numbers.
- I haven't found any 'official' statement as to how science explains the existence of different specific selves, but you and I both suspect that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self back to life. The new specific self would not be you.

 

[John Jones]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.
- But then, that hardly matters. Whatever, just like VWs and loaves of bread, there would be no limit on their numbers.
- I haven't found any 'official' statement as to how science explains the existence of different specific selves, but you and I both suspect that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self back to life. The new specific self would not be you.

You keep bringing up the highlighted, but it has never made any sense. If you were duplicated after death, you duplicate would be dead too. If it you were duplicated while alive, there would be no need to bring you back to life.

At the moment of duplication, the replicate would be identical to you in all respects including it's sense of identity.

And don't start that 'looking out of two sets of eyes' nonsense again.

 

[JoeMorgue]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.

WHHHHYYYYY????? ANSWER THE QUESTION

What factor, what quality, what objective difference would there be that would make one "you" and the other "not you?"

And I want a reason. I want a definable, objective factor not "They wouldn't be looking out from the same set of eyes" nonsense or you just restating "They wouldn't be the same" again!

I also want a million dollars and a pony and am as likely to get that.

 

[Pixel42]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be.

Absolute nonsense, we'd know exactly who they are. The duplicate consciousness would be identical to the one produced by the original brain. If that original brain was yours the duplicate consciousness would be as convinced that it is Jabba as the one that typed what I just quoted. And it would be right. It would be you "brought back to life", in so far as that phrase means anything at all.

 

[The Sparrow]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.
- But then, that hardly matters. Whatever, just like VWs and loaves of bread, there would be no limit on their numbers.
- I haven't found any 'official' statement as to how science explains the existence of different specific selves, but you and I both suspect that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self back to life. The new specific self would not be you.

Wow. I count 8 unsupported assertions. All of which have been made by you before. When will you start supporting any of them?

 

[Loss Leader]

you and I both suspect that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self back to life.

Nobody suspects this except you, Jabba. That's because it's nonsense. The phrase "specific self" has no meaning.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- None of the new copies would bring you YOUR SOUL back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves SOULS would be YOU. Each new self SOUL would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.

You mean soul, Jabba?

- But then, that hardly matters. Whatever, just like VWs and loaves of bread, there would be no limit on their numbers.

Good, you admit that there is no difference.

- I haven't found any 'official' statement as to how science explains the existence of different specific selves SOULS,

Thank you for admitting that you are prevaricating about materialism having an opinion on your made up nonsense.

but you and I both suspect

that you are lying about imagined agreement.

that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self SOUL back to life. The new specific self SOUL would not be you.

Did you mean soul? That's gibber, Jabba.

 

[godless dave]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.

We know exactly who they would be. Why do you think a copy of my brain wouldn't produce a copy of my self? Why do you think two selves can't be identical?

 

[JayUtah]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.

None of that is materialism. You're reckoning P(E|H), where H is materialism. You don't get to use concepts that aren't from materialism in order to pretend that you've refuted it. In materialism the sense of self is an emergent property of the functioning brain. If you exactly reproduce the brain, it must exhibit the same properties as before. That is how it must be cause-and-effect traceable. That's what materialism literally means.

I haven't found any 'official' statement as to how science explains the existence of different specific selves...

Yes, you have. The answer is that science doesn't reckon "specific selves" as entities the way you're trying to foist it. Your statement is like saying, "Professional bakers haven't made any official statement about the fairies I claim are what makes bread rise."

...but you and I both suspect that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self back to life. The new specific self would not be you.

Please stop rudely cramming your words into someone else's mouth.

 

[JayUtah]

Wow. I count 8 unsupported assertions. All of which have been made by you before. When will you start supporting any of them?

All of which were made yesterday, the day before, and so forth. I gather from Jabba's admissions that posting here on this subject is something of a hobby for him. Having returned from his flounce telling us he just can't stay away, however, you'd think he'd require something a bit more substantive than simply repeating the same debate every single day.

 

[Agatha]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life.

Every new copy would be another, identical-but separate YOU.

IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU.

Yes, they would.

Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.

No, this is incorrect.

- But then, that hardly matters. Whatever, just like VWs and loaves of bread, there would be no limit on their numbers.

So what?

- I haven't found any 'official' statement as to how science explains the existence of different specific selves,

Perhaps that's because "specific selves" is not a scientific concept; you are referring to the quasi-religious idea of souls.

Consciousness is a process and the persistence of self is illusory. In reality, the 'self' stops and starts during sleep and periods of unconsciousness, and continues to change every nanosecond of your waking life.

but you and I both suspect that a perfect physical copy of your brain would not bring your specific self back to life. The new specific self would not be you.

No, the only person suspecting that is you, and you are wrong. It is dishonest to misrepresent another person's argument by assuming that they agree with you when they clearly do not.

 

[JesseCuster]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU. Each new self would be someone else; and, we would have no idea WHO they would be. That's how they would be untraceable.

You know exactly who the self would be. It would be a duplicate of the self of the original person who was replicated.

That's who it would be.

What on earth are you talking about? It almost seems that you think that duplicates of a person, because it somehow doesn't have the same instance of self that the original did (the flaws in that thinking notwithstanding), that therefore the new person gets populated with a random self from some ill-defined pool of potential selves, and is therefore somehow not subject to the chain of cause and effect that causes selves to emerge as emergent properties of working brains.

You're not making any sense at all.

 

[Belz...]

- None of the new copies would bring you back to life. IOW, none of the new specific selves would be YOU.

Is it a new you if you go into cardiac arrest for a minute and then come back from temporary death?

 

[The Sparrow]

All of which were made yesterday, the day before, and so forth. I gather from Jabba's admissions that posting here on this subject is something of a hobby for him. Having returned from his flounce telling us he just can't stay away, however, you'd think he'd require something a bit more substantive than simply repeating the same debate every single day.

It would be amusing to respond to his posts only with links back to the response already given earlier in the thread. (he doesn't read the responses anyway) but it would be far too much work.

 

[Jabba]

We know exactly who they would be. Why do you think a copy of my brain wouldn't produce a copy of my self? Why do you think two selves can't be identical?

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

 

[abaddon]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

If it wasn't the same it wouldn't be a copy

Sent from my SM-A520F using Tapatalk

 

[godless dave]

- A copy of your brain would produce a copy of your self. It just wouldn't bring you back to life -- IOW, the new specific self would not be YOU. In that sense, the new self would not be identical to the old self.

I don't see how it wouldn't be identical. A copy is always separate from the original. That's what "copy" means.