• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Proof of Immortality, VI

Status
Not open for further replies.
- Yeah, but it's the emergent property (of the specific self) that I'm claiming is not cause and effect traceable.
That's gibber, Jabba. The "self", as you're calling it, is the emergent property. You're dishonestly trying to make it an entity again.

- I think you've agreed
And I think you know that's a lie.

that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring YOU back to life.
YOU meaning your soul? That's gibber, Jabba.

It's that YOU that I'm calling your "specific self."
You mean "soul".

The new specific self soul would not be YOU your soul. And, scientifically speaking he would be a brand new WHO soul, and totally untraceable.
Why are you bringing your laughable concept of what science thinks into your metaphysical argument about souls? Just be honest for a change and say soul when you mean soul. I've FTFY above.
 
- Yeah, but it's the emergent property (of the specific self) that I'm claiming is not cause and effect traceable.
- I think you've agreed that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring YOU back to life. It's that YOU that I'm calling your "specific self." The new specific self would not be YOU. And, scientifically speaking he would be a brand new WHO, and totally untraceable.

1 Of course it's cause and effect traceable.
2 You're putting words in other peoples mouth and claiming agreement where none exists.
3 You've no spokesperson for science.

Now about this proof of immortality. Where is it?
 
- Yeah, but it's the emergent property (of the specific self) that I'm claiming is not cause and effect traceable.
- I think you've agreed that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring YOU back to life. It's that YOU that I'm calling your "specific self." The new specific self would not be YOU. And, scientifically speaking he would be a brand new WHO, and totally untraceable.

Could you at least say 'speculatively speaking' unless you have some scientific evidence regarding identical brains and how their processes operate?
 
Dave,
- Do you accept that the brain yields an emergent property that has no analog in a loaf of bread?

Yes, but nothing that would change the definitions of "reproduce", "copy", "same", or "different".

- Yeah, but it's the emergent property (of the specific self) that I'm claiming is not cause and effect traceable.
- I think you've agreed that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring YOU back to life. It's that YOU that I'm calling your "specific self." The new specific self would not be YOU. And, scientifically speaking he would be a brand new WHO, and totally untraceable.

But you haven't explained why it wouldn't be.



Scientifically speaking it would be traceable. You accept that every emergent property of each load of bread would be traceable. There's no reason the emergent properties of brains wouldn't be.

- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life. The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.
 
The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

Equivocation ahoy!

They would all be separate, but identical, copies of YOU. They wouldn't be bringing you back, they would be duplicating you.
 
- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves SOULS. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME MY SOUL back to life.
Who would it bring back then? Who would the exact duplicate think it was?

The specific self SOUL produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves SOULS should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self SOUL must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves SOULS. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.
Above, I've had to fix your gibber, Jabba. Do you mean to say souls?
 
- Yeah, but it's the emergent property (of the specific self) that I'm claiming is not cause and effect traceable.

You keep claiming it, yes. We know this. We've known this for years. Stop repeating it. You have no basis for saying that it's not causal, so stop making the claim.

- I think you've agreed that a perfect copy of your brain would not bring YOU back to life.

That's really the only thing that matters to you, and you don't mind lying and twisting words to reach that conclusion.

As I told you and you ignored, people's "selves" can cease to exist because of cardial arrest and be booted up again. Does that mean that their "self" is not the same person?

It's that YOU that I'm calling your "specific self." The new specific self would not be YOU. And, scientifically speaking he would be a brand new WHO, and totally untraceable.

Stop trying to tell us what's scientific. You have no idea what that means.
 
- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves.

No, that's not what you're doing at all. You're trying to claim that copies would be missing an important element. Showing why you think there would be potential selves is what I've been asking you to do for a year now, and you've not done that.

As for copies and missing elements, you agreed not long ago that the "self" is an emergent property of the brain. Ergo, the copy and the original "you" would both have identical, but separate, selves. Both are causally traceable to the body and its functions, and both are there. They are identical. No, you don't see through both sets of eyes because they are separate and souls don't exist under materialism.
 
And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

Is each time my Volkswagen goes 60 mph brand new - in a sense, "out of nowhere"? Out of an infinity of going 60 mph, what are the chances that my Volkswagen would go that specific 60 mph yesterday at 2:45 pm on the Belt Line?

Jabba, do you believe going 60 mph has a soul or that my Volkswagen is immortal?
 
Is each time my Volkswagen goes 60 mph brand new - in a sense, "out of nowhere"? Out of an infinity of going 60 mph, what are the chances that my Volkswagen would go that specific 60 mph yesterday at 2:45 pm on the Belt Line?

Jabba, do you believe going 60 mph has a soul or that my Volkswagen is immortal?

I don't think the 60 mph analogy is getting through to Jabba. He simply sees the "self" as a separate class. That's why I think we should proceed with the cardiac arrest "loss of self" angle. It's closer to home and more obviously contradictory if he doesn't think waking up from a 2 minute full stop creates a new "you".
 
Jabba, I think we agree that if everybody agrees to agree that what you want to believe is true, it still isn't true.

Put another way, no matter how much you want to believe something, it still doesn't have to be true.

Put still another way, if you really were convinced of the truth of what you want to believe, you wouldn't keep hammering the walls of your echo chamber with all these vapid repetitions of your

same

old

stuff.

Such is my belief, anyway.
 
Last edited:
- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life. The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

No, cause and effect is traceable, just not practical. As you know and continue to ignore, the self is an ongoing process and every experience the brain has counties to alter the sense of self. That is the cause and effect. Like when your father told you to never give up, or JayUtah’s post of fatal flaws that you’ve read and ignored. They are part of your “self.”

Oh, and once again: if the duplicate has all your thoughts and memories and has had all your experiences, and therefore thinks it is Jabba, how exactly is it different from you?
 
- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life. The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.


Jabba, even assuming this is true, why would immortality make you more likely to exist than immortality?

If there are an infinite number of potential souls, then the chance that you would come to exist is 1/inf. - that's zero.

If there are an infinite number of immortal potential souls, then the chance that you would come to exist is 1/inf. - still zero.

How does any of this help your argument for immortality?
 
- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves.

The only reason you're doing that is to try to prove that P(E|H) has an infinite denominator so that you can say it's nigh unto impossible. Except that H is materialsim, so you have to reckon P(E|H) as if H -- materialism -- were true. Materialism has no concept of "potential" selves. It has been amply shown to you why, even if such a model of potentiality could exist, it would render everything equally impossible. Materialism has no concept of "specific selves." The sense of self under materialism is an emergent property of a functioning brain. It makes no more sense to talk about specific selves that it does to talk about specific "goes 60 mph" or specific "smells like bread." You're not talking about materialism. You're talking about something you've drawn up yourself and are trying to trick your critics into agreeing is materialism.

I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life.

And your assumption falls flat under materialism. ME in this sentence is obviously referring to a soul, which doesn't exist under materialism. You're exactly assuming the thing you're supposed to be proving.

The specific self produced by the copy would not be me.

But you can't explain why not. You just insist it wouldn't be. Under materialism, everything that could possibly be any form of you is a product of the matter of your organism. Duplicate that and you duplicate all that is you. Really, that's the central tenet of materialism. If you're reckoning P(E|H) you must accept arguendo everything that's part of E -- especially and including its central tenet.

And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new...

Under materialism there is no "specific self" any more than there is a specific "going 60 mph." What you're proposing is not and cannot be true under materialism, and there's really no question about it.

-- in a sense, "out of nowhere"

You don't describe what arises ex nihilo. You just say it must be whatever isn't reproduced in the copy -- a circular definition. You don't explain how something that arises ex nihilo can somehow be countable in that state of non-existence. You're just making stuff up as you go.

Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

Except that it is. Under materialism a vast amount of evidence traces the sense of self to the operation of the physical brain -- and to nothing else, known or unknown.

You know, I have quite a bit more success conveying concepts to my dog than I do to you. Talking to you is like talking to a particularly rude wall. Since your posts today are no different from your posts yesterday, last week, last month, or last year, you really owe an explanation for why a thinking person should pay attention to you. We aren't the only audience who has told you that you simply spew, withing giving any indication that anyone else is speaking.

Fix that.
 
- At this point, I'm trying to show why there should be an infinity of potential specific selves. I assume that an exact copy of my brain would not bring ME back to life. The specific self produced by the copy would not be me. If we kept making exact physical copies of my brain, none of the resultant specific selves should ever be me. And, if that's true, each specific self must be brand new -- in a sense, "out of nowhere" -- and only one of an infinity of potential selves. Not to mention, cause and effect untraceable.

And you still haven't explained why they wouldn't be cause and effect traceable. A copy of my brain would produce a copy of my self. Everything about the self would be determined by the brain. What would be untraceable? Why do you think two identical brains wouldn't produce two identical selves? More importantly, why do you think that's the scientific position?
 
....
If there are an infinite number of immortal potential souls, then the chance that you would come to exist is 1/inf. - still zero.

How does any of this help your argument for immortality?

I can field this one.

Because, as you correctly point out, the chance he would come to exist is zero, and he DOES exist, then the denominator must be wrong. There must be a finite number of souls. Apparently (ok magically) a small enough number that necessitates the re-using of souls to provide enough for all the folks who are living and who have lived and died.

If souls are re-used, that means immortality.

It'a rubbish but I think that's his thinking.
 
But that requires Jabba to drop the facade that he isn't obviously just arguing for a soul, which he isn't going to do.
 
I can field this one.

Because, as you correctly point out, the chance he would come to exist is zero, and he DOES exist, then the denominator must be wrong. There must be a finite number of souls. Apparently (ok magically) a small enough number that necessitates the re-using of souls to provide enough for all the folks who are living and who have lived and died.

If souls are re-used, that means immortality.

It'a rubbish but I think that's his thinking.


You're probably right that this is his thinking. It makes no sense, so it must be.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom