Proof of Immortality, VI

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What? The "self", as you're calling it, is a process of a functioning brain. Remember when you admitted that it was a process?

I don't think he actually did. He referred to the self as the result of a process, adding the usual additional level of abstraction to avoid admitting that the self is simply the process.

Dave

ETA: Just checking:

- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.

Still a bit of wiggle rule here, in that he's referring to the sense of self, rather than the self.
 
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- No. There's an important difference.
- The second loaf is completely cause and effect traceable. The second self -- intrinsic to the particular consciousness -- is not.

As you have been told many times, many ways, by many different posters: you are wrong.

Asked several times before and ignored every time:
- do you think the time your father told you to never give up is part of your “self”?

- do you think all the times you’ve ignored JayUtah’s fatal flaws post is part of your self?

- if not, why not?
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

How about this? You aren't trying a dishonest bait and switch, are you?
 
- One point is that I haven't been successful at defining the process -- so instead, I've tried to denote it, 'point' to it.
- And, I'm pretty sure that you recognize the experience I'm pointing to. I'm pretty sure that we have the same experience/process in mind.
- Then, both H and ~H are addressing that process. H claims that it is mortal; ~H claims that it's not. That is the issue being addressed in the formula.

Does this ring any bells? You've repeatedly referred to the "self" as a process. I'm sure it's just an oversight on your part that you occasionally act like you're referring to an entity. You're fortunate to have so many people helpfully remind you if you continue to make that error.
 
- No. There's an important difference.
- The second loaf is completely cause and effect traceable. The second self -- intrinsic to the particular consciousness -- is not.


You know, Jabba, it's kind of rude to pretend you agree with something just to demonstrate a few posts later that you never did.

In any case, your argument above assumes the consequent. You're assuming the soul is immaterial (and qualitatively different from any other material thing) in order to argue that the soul is immaterial.
 
Because Jabba still think the problem is he's just not "wording" it correctly.

He doesn't understand self as a process or emergent properties. He's just parroting those words back to us thinking we'll agree with him because he used our language.
 
This Initialism is not A&F.

Full Time Full Year

or

first-time first-year

or

Otherwise?:confused:

Funny. Possibly the poster who uses most privately invented acronyms is complaining when others use acronyms. Is there no end to this hypocrisy?

Hans
 
- No. There's an important difference.
- The second loaf is completely cause and effect traceable. The second self -- intrinsic to the particular consciousness -- is not.

Scientifically speaking, it is. It's just as traceable as the loaf of bread.

It's only not cause and effect traceable if you're talking about a soul that is not entirely the product of the physical body. If that's what you're talking about then you're wasting time trying to find a scientific explanation for such a thing. Scientists will either tell you it's outside the realm of science because it can't be observed or that as far as science is concerned such a thing doesn't exist. The latter is my position.
Dave,
- I must have said this before, but it still makes sense to me -- your current sense of self (whatever it is) -- would not be reproduced by a perfect copy of your brain. Meanwhile, there is nothing analogous between the bread and its copy.
 
Dave,
- I must have said this before, but it still makes sense to me -- your current sense of self (whatever it is) -- would not be reproduced by a perfect copy of your brain. Meanwhile, there is nothing analogous between the bread and its copy.

If my Volkswagen is going 60 mph (whatever that is) today and I go 60 mph tomorrow, is it really a perfect reproduction of the previous 60 mph?
 
I must have said this before, but it still makes sense to me -- your current sense of self (whatever it is) -- would not be reproduced by a perfect copy of your brain.

You "must" have said it before? It's all you've ever said before, and -- as usual -- without anything to support it in terms of materialism. You remain consummately arrogant in believing you can just ascribe to materialism doctrines it specifically rejects, just so you can pretend to have a basis for refuting it. And that it's your critics' failure of "understanding" when they rightly don't let you do this.

The whole point of materialism is that a perfect copy of the brain must exhibit the same sense of self, because there can be nothing under materialism that doesn't arise from the matter. This is the prime directive of materialism. You don't get to just handwave it away because it doesn't behave the way you want it to. That's a very immature approach to proving a point.

Meanwhile, there is nothing analogous between the bread and its copy.

Wrong. You desperately need there to be a substantive difference, but as your critics have eloquently pointed out, there is no substantive difference except for that desperate wish on your part. It's different, you say, because you say it's different. That's all your argument amounts to, all it has ever amounted to, and it's clear at this point it's all it will ever amount to. You have no argument that isn't simply various ways of cajoling and tricking your critics into appearing to accept any of several begged questions.

What you were supposed to learn from that bread-loaf analogy about materialism is that properties you personally hold in such awe and wonderment -- consciousness and the subjective impression of an individual self -- simply do not occupy an equivalently noble and special place in materialism such that they are a wholly different kind of property than any other you could name. There is nothing about consciousness as a property of a functioning human organism that is of a different class of nobility or cause-and-effect traceability than the property of the fragrance from a freshly baked loaf, or the crinkle of a properly formed crust. Those are ordinary properties of bread, and they will necessarily arise any time the bread is prepared. Similarly, consciousness is an ordinary property of the human organism and will necessarily arise any time the organism exists.
 
- I must have said this before, but it still makes sense to me -- your current sense of self (whatever it is) -- would not be reproduced by a perfect copy of your brain.


Why? What would make the copy different?
 
Dave,
- I must have said this before, but it still makes sense to me -- your current sense of self (whatever it is) -- would not be reproduced by a perfect copy of your brain. Meanwhile, there is nothing analogous between the bread and its copy.

It's exactly analogous:

Dave,
- There would be a difference -- in that the atoms of the two loaves would be separate atoms. In that sense, they would not be the same atoms -- they would be the same kind of atoms. They would have the same characteristics.

The new self would be different from the original self in exactly the same way the second loaf of bread would be different from the original loaf of bread. It would be made of different atoms but they would be the same kind of atoms.

Just as following the recipe the second time "reproduced" the original loaf of bread, making a copy of my brain would "reproduce" my sense of self. They would be identical in exactly the same way the two loaves of bread would be identical.
 
What? The "self", as you're calling it, is a process of a functioning brain. Remember when you admitted that it was a process?

Explain how it is that you're now referring to it as if it were a separate entity, a thing. You seem to be gibbering.

Ooh! I know!

It's because Jabba will contradict himself 3 times in two sentences if he thinks he can shoplift a moment's credibility.
 
Because Jabba still think the problem is he's just not "wording" it correctly.

He doesn't understand self as a process or emergent properties. He's just parroting those words back to us thinking we'll agree with him because he used our language.

Don't forget all the equivocation, where he uses ambiguous definitions of terms to trick his critics into agreeing with him.

It's never worked here, but he trots it out with some regularity.

Jabba, you do know that we've been watching your clown show all these years, don't you?
 
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