Proof of Immortality, VI

[godless dave]

- I'm currentlylooking for the scientific explanation for what I'm calling the "self."

You've already said that what you're calling the self involves magic. Science doesn't try to explain it because as far as science can tell it doesn't exist.

What are the physical factors that determine a "who" that can never be recreated?

The same physical factors that determine a rock that can never be recreated. If you made an exact copy of a rock it would be separate from the original rock. That's it. That's the whole answer. As I've said before, it's inconceivable that you don't understand this, otherwise you would get into an argument with the cashier every time you tried to buy two of the same kind of candy bar.

Previously you said something about the difference between selves and rocks being that rocks don't have an "indigenous identity property". But selves don't either. As far as I know, nothing has an indigenous identity property.

 

[Loss Leader]

So why should we assume that this lifetime ends at some point?

Nobody is saying we should. What people in this thread have consistently argued, however, is that there is no reason to assume immateriality in order to explain anything we can observe. There are two possibilities: either 1) we each are composed of working bodies; or 2) we are each composed of working bodies AND something else.

All observable phenomena can be explained by number 1. The odds of number 2 must necessarily be less than those of 1.

I have an ice cream cone. Which is more likely? 1) I bought an ice cream cone; or 2) I bought an ice cream come AND a copy of Newsweek?

Nobody is saying we should assume I only bought an ice cream cone and nothing else. Almost everybody is saying there is no reason to assume that I bought anything else. And even the proposition that I bought the ice cream - as opposed to catching it from the sky - could be tested.

Please, do yourself a favor and read the thread. All of these issues have been discussed to death (and then, ironically, reanimated and discussed some more).

 

[Kumar]

You've already said that what you're calling the self involves magic. Science doesn't try to explain it because as far as science can tell it doesn't exist.



The same physical factors that determine a rock that can never be recreated. If you made an exact copy of a rock it would be separate from the original rock. That's it. That's the whole answer. As I've said before, it's inconceivable that you don't understand this, otherwise you would get into an argument with the cashier every time you tried to buy two of the same kind of candy bar.

Previously you said something about the difference between selves and rocks being that rocks don't have an "indigenous identity property". But selves don't either. As far as I know, nothing has an indigenous identity property.

Your post tell lot of relevant thing. Are we just confusing between basic & gross on topic subject?

 

[Kumar]

Nonsense. It's the Christian soul.



Modern science has no evidence that your model of the soul is what constitutes the self. Your question presupposes your model is not patently absurd.
.

So felt: Color is the spirit of substance. A photo can express identity of an object/individual.

 

[Fudbucker]

Nobody is saying we should. What people in this thread have consistently argued, however, is that there is no reason to assume immateriality in order to explain anything we can observe. There are two possibilities: either 1) we each are composed of working bodies; or 2) we are each composed of working bodies AND something else.

Of course there's a third possibility that Berkeley suggested: there aren't bodies at all. Idealism, in other words.

All observable phenomena can be explained by number 1. The odds of number 2 must necessarily be less than those of 1.

How are you assigning these odds?

I have an ice cream cone. Which is more likely? 1) I bought an ice cream cone; or 2) I bought an ice cream come AND a copy of Newsweek?

Without knowing anything else, they are both equally likely. If you told me you bought an ice cream cone, I would believe you just as much as I would believe you if you told me you bought an ice cream cone AND a magazine. Adding the purchase of the magazine doesn't affect the odds in any way.

Nobody is saying we should assume I only bought an ice cream cone and nothing else. Almost everybody is saying there is no reason to assume that I bought anything else.

There is no reason to assume you didn't buy it either.

And even the proposition that I bought the ice cream - as opposed to catching it from the sky - could be tested.

Please, do yourself a favor and read the thread. All of these issues have been discussed to death (and then, ironically, reanimated and discussed some more).

I probably should.

 

[theprestige]

Of course there's a third possibility that Berkeley suggested: there aren't bodies at all. Idealism, in other words.

No bodies is functionally identical to only bodies.

 

[theprestige]

Without knowing anything else, they are both equally likely.

Nope. He has an ice cream cone. The probability that he has an ice cream cone is already observed to be 1.

The probability that he has some other unobserved thing must be less than 1. Thus the probability that he has both the observed thing and the hypothetical unobserved thing must also be less than 1.

I've cleaned up the wording a bit to clarify the point being discussed. If you still want to quibble over has/bought, I can only assume you're being obtuse on purpose.

 

[Kumar]

I think something with zero characteristics also has zero chance of being true.

Chance to reach to Absolute Zero?

 

[Filippo Lippi]

You're just trolling now

 

[Kumar]

You're just trolling now

How? Whether absoloute zero beyond zero is erong?

 

[Loss Leader]

Without knowing anything else, they are both equally likely. If you told me you bought an ice cream cone, I would believe you just as much as I would believe you if you told me you bought an ice cream cone AND a magazine. Adding the purchase of the magazine doesn't affect the odds in any way.

First of all, I didn't ask you to "believe" me. I didn't ask you what the chance was that I accurately reported anything to you. I didn't mention me communicating my purchases to you in any way. The only question is whether it is more likely that I bought an ice cream cone or that I bought an ice cream come AND a magazine.

I'm going to explain this in a way that highlights your error. Bob is holding a six-sided die. Lets work out the chance that he rolls a 4. It's 1/6. There's only one 4 on the die, they're all equally likely. That's 1 out of 6.

Now, what's the chance that he rolls a 4 AND THEN a 6? The chance for the 4 is 1/6. In only one out of every six cases does it even matter if he rolls again. If he does, there's only a 1/6 chance that he rolls the 6. The chance of first rolling a 4 and then a 6 is 1/6 of 1/6 or 1/36.

As it turns out 1/36 is less than 1/6.

What does this mean? The chance of a conjunctive being true is necessarily less than the chance of either thing being true on its own.

The chance that Jabba has a functioning neurosystem is greater than that he has a functioning neurosystem AND an immaterial soul.

 

[sackett]

Newsweek no longer publishes in hard copy.

So all you can do is have a copy of its SOUL.

Yay! Jabba wins and we can close this thread for all eternity!

Now you feel better, don't you?

 

[Loss Leader]

Newsweek no longer publishes in hard copy.

D'oh!

 

[theprestige]

Well that puts the probability of an ice cream and a Newsweek considerably lower than the probability of just an ice cream.

 

[MetalPig]

The chance that Jabba has a functioning neurosystem is greater than that he has a functioning neurosystem AND an immaterial soul.

That's only true if the two are independent, like the dice rolls, right?

 

[Jabba]

- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

 

[Thermal]

- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

We don't know. Experimenting on reanimation and/or creating biologically accurate duplicates of brains is not exactly a well researched field.

So yeah, disagreed.

 

[jsfisher]

- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

Many of us disagree, but how would it be helpful to you if we didn't?

 

[Loss Leader]

That's only true if the two are independent, like the dice rolls, right?

Independence, I believe, only counts for how you calculate the odds of each. The conjunction is always less likely, though (so long as the words aren't synonyms). The chance that Steve is a person is the same as the chance that Steve is a person and a human. They generally mean the same thing.

The chance that Steve is a person and that Steve has a human heart, though, is lower. Certainly being a person wildly increases the chance that one is possessed of a human heart. Still, some people live without hearts for at least as long as it takes to put a new one in. At some point every day 11 people are both alive and missing their hearts.

I'm starting to get out of my depth, though. If someone with more formal training were to check my work, I'd be grateful.

 

[Pixel42]

- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

Everybody disagrees.

You've accepted that consciousness is a process and then, by using phrases like "bring back to life", carried right on talking about it as if it's an object instead of a process.

Stop it.