John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
No.
Proof of Immortality, VI
- Thread starter jond
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No.
John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
Disagreed and explained to you a hundred times already.
RoboTimbo
Hostile Nanobacon
That isn't what Jabba said in his #2, though, is it? You may want to read what he did say.
Jabba
Philosopher
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- Feb 23, 2012
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Pixel,
- Don't you agree that the kind of self/process we've been talking about can exist/proceed for only one finite time?
jsfisher
ETcorngods survivor
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I certainly don't agree.
John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
You're groveling for agreement again. Have you no shame?
godless dave
Great Dalmuti
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Jabba, if I follow the same bread recipe twice, will I end up with two loaves or just one?
This is a serious question.
This is a serious question.
RoboTimbo
Hostile Nanobacon
You agree that the self is NOT immortal?
Rocks have an "igneous identity property."
Almost!
True story - This is the first thread for which I have ever used the "ignore this thread" function. I checked it 2 or 3 times that it is indeed "ignored," and yet here it is, displayed every time I refresh the forum topics page.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
I don't agree that we've been talking about the same kind of self. You're talking about a soul. Which is to say you're talking about a discrete, countable, self-existent entity. Your critics are talking about a property of a functioning brain, the result of a process that brain implements and undergoes. Nothing about that is tangible or countable. Your argument on this point consists of very little beyond begging your critics to express agreement that the two models are substantially similar when, in fact, they can't be any farther apart.
The materialist hypothesis formulates the sense of self as a property of an entity, in this case the result of a process the entity undergoes. A property has no effectual existence in any way without the existence of the entity that exhibits it. If the entity is limited in time and space, then the effects of the process will also be limited in the same time and space. The effects of a process or property are necessarily bound to the limitations of the entity that displays the property and undergoes the process. That is self-evidently correct.
We've adopted the thought experiment of exactly reproducing an organism, which we nevertheless know is not practice to do. Under the materialist hypothesis, not only would the properties of the original be exactly duplicated in the copy, they would have to be. Yes, there would be two entities, either two in simultaneous existence or two in serial existence. The entities are reckoned discretely, but the properties are not because they are not themselves discretes. Quite a number of people have instructed you eloquently on the difference between entities and properties, specifically on the point of countability. Your comically assiduous evasion of the "How many 'going 60 mph' are there?" question suggests that you probably understand the damage your critics' instruction has caused to your claim.
You steadfastly assert that there would have to be some material difference between the properties exhibited by the two otherwise identical instances of the same prototypical organism. Your critics carefully and patiently explain the relationship between entities and the properties they exhibit, only to have you bludgeon through those lines of reasoning with ham-fisted nonsense like "looking out through two sets of eyes" or "bring me back to life." The only thing those kinds of phrases illustrate is that you are utterly incapable of conceiving of the materialist model as it actually is. Your argument fails for, among many things, the dismal failure of your imagination.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
Quite right; I forgot about that part.
Loss Leader
I would save the receptionist., Moderator
Jabba -
Don't you agree that the kind of Devo CD/process we've be talking about can defenstrate/proceed for only one finite time?
Do you see what you're doing? You're pretending to accept that consciousness is a process by just adding it and then pretending that "thing" and "process" are synonyms. They are not.
If the self is anything other than a discrete, unchanging entity, your question becomes nonsense.
You must understand that what you think of as a soul is an illusion that your brain creates in order to synthesize information. It's an evolutionary coping strategy. It is not a thing.
Belz...
Fiend God
When you go at 60 mph for 6 seconds, does that 60 mph exist only for one finite time? Do you think the question makes sense when you put it that way?
Well, a duplicate of me would be numerically different, for starters. It would also occupy a difference location in space.
But let me ask you: suppose they made a duplicate of you, exact in every way. Would you be OK with terminating your life and letting the duplicate live on? Or would you consider the duplicate a separate person? I view it the latter.
Or, in other words, teleportation is suicide.
Yeah and?
If I light a match and use it to light another match we don't have a crisis of faith over which one is the "One true fire" with the original "Soul of fire" in it or debate over whether the original fire gets to keep going.
There's one, now there is two. And?
If I light a match and use it to light another match we don't have a crisis of faith over which one is the "One true fire" with the original "Soul of fire" in it or debate over whether the original fire gets to keep going.
There's one, now there is two. And?
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jsfisher
ETcorngods survivor
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Well, a duplicate of me would be numerically different, for starters. It would also occupy a difference location in space.
But let me ask you: suppose they made a duplicate of you, exact in every way. Would you be OK with terminating your life and letting the duplicate live on? Or would you consider the duplicate a separate person? I view it the latter.
Or, in other words, teleportation is suicide.
You have changed the question and tossed in a lot of straw. You said, "If you perfectly replicate me, you have not replicated my particular sense of self that is me." So the question remains, what is the difference? And just to be clear so we don't get into meaningless quibbles, assuming a replication process where neither the original, the copy, nor any observer is clued as to which is which at the moment of creation, how do we differentiate the original from the copy?
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You also have to appreciate Fudbucker how long we've been in this debate loop with Jabba.
- A new "me" would be different.
- The difference is they wouldn't be the same.
- They wouldn't be the same because they different.
- The difference is they wouldn't be the same.
20 GOTO 10.
- A new "me" would be different.
- The difference is they wouldn't be the same.
- They wouldn't be the same because they different.
- The difference is they wouldn't be the same.
20 GOTO 10.
RoboTimbo
Hostile Nanobacon
Well, a duplicate of me would be numerically different, for starters. It would also occupy a difference location in space.
But let me ask you: suppose they made a duplicate of you, exact in every way. Would you be OK with terminating your life and letting the duplicate live on? Or would you consider the duplicate a separate person? I view it the latter.
Or, in other words, teleportation is suicide.
If I slow my Volkswagen down from 60 mph to 30 mph and then speed back up to 60 mph, is it the same 60 mph? Can the original 60 mph ever be brought back?
Loss Leader
I would save the receptionist., Moderator
First of all, this is complete nonsense. Virtually everyone has been trying to teach Jabba that the sense of self is an illusion created by a functioning neurosystem. Yes, I'd mind dying while a duplicate lived on because I'm subject to the illusion. I feel as though my "self" is an integrated, unchanging personality. I'm wrong, but it's how I feel.
The earth feels flat. It's not, but it feels that way.
Second of all, of course the duplicate is a separate person. Nobody has ever argued differently except for Jabba. He has argued that an exact duplicate of a person would share his soul and see out of "two pairs of eyes." That's lunacy. Two different people are two different people.
However, none of that in any way implies or even lends any weight to the idea that an individual is an integrated, unchanging personality. It's not. It's a constantly changing process of a functioning neurosystem. It can be altered with hormones or magnets or blood sugar levels. It can even be stopped and started (as anyone coming out of surgery will attest). It changes its memories, knowledge, desires and even favorite color throughout its life. It is a process.
I get the distinct impression that you're ignoring what people are saying and responding to arguments you wish they'd made instead.
It's clear I need to read the whole thread. Jabba is using terms in very strange ways.
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