Proof of Immortality, VI

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I think, other than Jabba, we all agree that two is more than one and that a copy is separate from the original.
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

If you are creating an artificial duplicate, how could you bring something 'back' to a place it never had been?
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

You asked this question several times before and have your answers already.
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

We all disagree.

There is no "particular" in the notion of the sense of self as a process, just as there is no "particular" in the notion of the process of going 60 miles per hour. Under materialism, the sense of self is a property, not an entity. You ignored pages and pages of discussion trying to get you to face that fact. Don't insult your critics by asking again.
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.

You don't accept that. The rest of us do, but you don't. If you did, this thread would have been over before it began. What happens to a process, any process, when the components that give rise to it stop?

2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

If a "particular sense of self" is a process, your question here makes no sense.

You still, after all these years, cannot grasp the concept of identical but separate. You still, after all these years, refuse to identify any difference between two identical Jabbas who both think they are Jabba. But you still, after all these years, think there is some magical difference. It's almost like you have no interest in actually learning anything.
 
- Accepting that
One of these:
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
Is not like the other:
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
A process isn't "particular" nor does it have a "life" to be brought back.
- Anyone disagree?
Only everyone. I don't think you're capable of distinguishing a process from a thing when it comes to your concept of souls.
 
When you slow the bus below 60 mph* and then speed back up, is it the same particular 60 mph?

*Assuming Keneau Reeves can stop the bomb from detonating.
 
The chance of a conjunctive being true is necessarily less than the chance of either thing being true on its own.

Let's get the straight once and for all, since the same misstatement gets made over and over again. It's not "less than"; it's "less than or equal to."
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

Chapeau.

It really takes some effort to be so fractally wrong. Well done.
 
We really need to determine which the following concepts is the one Jabba is having problems with:

1. Two is a larger number than one.
2. Processes can stop.
3. Processes can stop and start again.
4. An exact duplicate of a thing would be... well an exact duplicate of a thing.
 
We really need to determine which the following concepts is the one Jabba is having problems with:

1. Two is a larger number than one.
2. Processes can stop.
3. Processes can stop and start again.
4. An exact duplicate of a thing would be... well an exact duplicate of a thing.

I suspect that Jabba's misconception is that if something is capable of thought and, further, capable of forming the concept of "me", then it must necessarily be unique.

What I can't understand is why he thinks that.
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

1: true.
2: false.

Are we really still there?

Hans
 
Let's get the straight once and for all, since the same misstatement gets made over and over again. It's not "less than"; it's "less than or equal to."


I gladly cede your superior knowledge on this point.
 
- Accepting that
1. The sense of self is a process of the brain.
2. A particular sense of self cannot be brought back to life by a perfect physical, chemical, biological replica of that brain.
- Anyone disagree?

Even in the context of your body of work, Jabba, this stands out as an incoherent mess.
 
Let's get the straight once and for all, since the same misstatement gets made over and over again. It's not "less than"; it's "less than or equal to."
I don't understand. How can two items be equal to one item by itself? 1 = 1 but 1 + x = 1 doesn't make sense, unless x is zero which means in this context, it doesn't exist.
 
1: true.
2: false.

Are we really still there?

Hans

Why do you think (2) is false? Myself (the self that I am) is a particular "sense of self". If you perfectly replicate me, you have not replicated my particular sense of self that is me. You've merely made a copy. It's the transporter problem.
 
Why do you think (2) is false? Myself (the self that I am) is a particular "sense of self". If you perfectly replicate me, you have not replicated my particular sense of self that is me. You've merely made a copy. It's the transporter problem.

In what way would it be different?
 
Your particular sense of self is not separate from your biological being. Thus, of you copy one, you copy rhe other.

Hans
 
I don't understand. How can two items be equal to one item by itself? 1 = 1 but 1 + x = 1 doesn't make sense, unless x is zero which means in this context, it doesn't exist.


If one of them is certain to happen the likelihood of both happening is equal to the likelihood of the other one happening.
 
I don't understand. How can two items be equal to one item by itself? 1 = 1 but 1 + x = 1 doesn't make sense, unless x is zero which means in this context, it doesn't exist.


It's not a case of adding numbers, but of multiplying probabilities. We have two events, A and B, and we want to compare the probability of A, P(A), with the probability of A and B, P(A ∩ B). We can write

P(A ∩ B) = P(A)P(B|A),

where the last term means "the probability of B given that A has occurred."

If P(B|A) = 1, then P(A ∩ B) = P(A). So, when the occurrence of event A guarantees the occurrence of event B, P(A ∩ B) = P(A).
 
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