Proof of Immortality, VI

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Jabba said:
In a human, there is an emergent property that would be different between the original and the copy.
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No, there isn't. You keep saying that there is without telling us what it is. We've argued over and over that the two selves would be identical. Never mind looking through two sets of eyes or "you" coming back to life, as those are meaningless under H. The two selves are identical. There is no difference. If you think there's a difference, you need to tell us what it is.
 
Jabba said:
SOdhner,
- Re #1. Agreed. Given H, the current existence of my self is unimaginably small.
- Re #2. No. Unfortunately here is where it gets confusing. The fact that under H there is nothing special about the self does not mean that my argument applies equally to things without such an emergent property. We of this thread have accepted that when all of the potential results of the situation are equally likely (or unlikely), for a particular event to be appropriate as E in the Bayes formula, it needs to be "set apart" from most other potential results in a way that is relevant to H. The example I use is the lottery winner being a 2nd cousin of the lottery controller. That makes him "special." Being a second cousin puts a target on his back.
- Anyway, my claim is that this emergent property of self is what sets me apart. Rocks don't have such an emergent property.

- And to me, that's the only real issue of my 'immortality' claim. Is my self really set apart? Obviously, I think that it is.
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godless dave said:
Nobody accepts that claim.
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Dave,
- Is the part I've hilited the claim that you think no one accepts?
 
Monza said:
No. The emergent property would be an identical copy. It would be separate, but it would be identical. VWs have their own emergent properties.
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- VWs have no unifying emergent property. A particular VW has no indigenous identity. A human does.
 
Jabba said:
- Anyway, my claim is that this emergent property of self is what sets me apart. Rocks don't have such an emergent property.
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Ah, a new wrinkle. This argument suggests that it's not the fact that you have a specific sense of self, but the fact that you have a sense of self at all, that sets you apart from rocks. However, that doesn't set you apart from every other person who has a sense of self. So the whole "Would a copy of me be different to me" is irrelevant; an exact copy of you would have a sense of self, and thus would not be set apart any more or less than you specifically are.

Jabba said:
- And to me, that's the only real issue of my 'immortality' claim.
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That is, without a doubt, the most monstrous lack of self-awareness I have ever encountered here or anywhere else. You've been having multiple issues presented to you for five years, every one of which is individually fatal to your claim and none of which you have successfully addressed, yet you can seriously claim that your Texas sharpshooting is "the only real issue"? This beggars belief.

Dave
 
Jabba said:
- VWs have no unifying emergent property. A particular VW has no indigenous identity. A human does.
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You would do well to read JayUtah's detailed explanations as to why you are wrong. You might learn something.
 
godless dave said:
Not under H. Under H the emergent properties would be identical.
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- And, that's what OOFLam (H) accepts. H and ~H are still talking about the same experience. They just disagree about it's nature -- and, that's exactly what the formula claims.
- I keep repeating myself, but so does everyone else -- and, I keep saying that I don't know that I can state my case re this sub-issue any better than I already have...
 
Jabba said:
- And, that's what OOFLam (H) accepts.
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Then why do you keep repeating falsehoods, then? If you know that H doesn't include any difference between the two jabbas, why do you insist that there is one? Do you think that your insistence that a difference exists, even though you're utterly unable to tell us what it is, means that H is wrong?

- I keep repeating myself, but so does everyone else
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Of course we do. You keep repeating falsehoods, so we keep pointing them out. Adjust your argument to the evidence and we won't have to repeat ourselves.
 
Jabba said:
I don't know that I can state my case re this sub-issue any better than I already have...
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That's because changing the wording doesn't make it any less wrong. Try addressing the arguments that have had to be repeated so many times instead of pretending they don't exist.

That's simply dishonest on your part.
 
Jabba said:
- And, that's what OOFLam (H) accepts. H and ~H are still talking about the same experience. They just disagree about it's nature -- and, that's exactly what the formula claims.
- I keep repeating myself, but so does everyone else -- and, I keep saying that I don't know that I can state my case re this sub-issue any better than I already have...
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Because you keep changing your mind. Right now you're agreeing that under H, a particular sense of self is produced by a brain, so two identical brains would produce two identical senses of selves. But a few posts ago you were saying the senses of self would be different under H. So which is it?
 
Jabba said:
- Re #1. Agreed. Given H, the current existence of my self is unimaginably small.
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The specific existence of any individual thing is unimaginably small, whether or not it has a sense of self. There's a phone here next to me, and (setting aside the fact that, as with anything that exists, the likelihood of it existing is literally 100%) the odds of it existing are super duper small. So many things had to happen for this specific phone to exist with the specific apps and scratches and everything on it! Does that mean my phone is immortal?

Jabba said:
The fact that under H there is nothing special about the self does not mean that my argument applies equally to things without such an emergent property.
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It means that having or not having self awareness doesn't make a thing more or less likely to exist (under H). Agreed?

Since that is the case, and since the rest of your argument is "it's really unlikely that X exists!" your argument applies equally to rocks.

Jabba said:
We of this thread have accepted that when all of the potential results of the situation are equally likely (or unlikely), for a particular event to be appropriate as E in the Bayes formula, it needs to be "set apart" from most other potential results in a way that is relevant to H.
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Well, YOU have decided that. I haven't seen anyone else agree with the way you do that yet.

Jabba said:
Anyway, my claim is that this emergent property of self is what sets me apart. Rocks don't have such an emergent property.
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Your entire argument is "X is super unlikely". Under materialism, a sense of self is nothing special and does not make something more or less likely in any significant way. So the "X" above would apply equally to you, or a rock, or a gopher.

Furthermore, 'sense of self' is a spectrum. When you're sleeping you don't really have one. Do you stop being immortal? What about lizards? They have a sort of sense of self, but I don't think anyone would say it's the same as the one a human has. Elephants, on the other hand, are extremely similar to humans when it comes to a sense of self. So some animals have it, some don't. But it's not a hard line. It's a gradual thing, with lots of variations. You're trying to say that this one random property is somehow SUPER important, but you can't justify why. You haven't given any reason that this one property would change everything.

I literally begged you to give me nine yes/no answers. This should be really fast and easy for you, and you skipped it. I'll ask again.

SOdhner said:
Assuming a physically perfect copy could be made, is there a difference between two completely identical:

1. Jabbas?

2. Other, non-Jabba people?

3. Dead bodies?

4. Plants?

5. Dogs?

6. Bacteria?

7. Rocks?

8. Snowglobes?

9. Snowglobes where one of them was a gift from a loved one and one wasn't, but in all physical ways they are identical?
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Jabba said:
We of this thread have accepted that when all of the potential results of the situation are equally likely (or unlikely), for a particular event to be appropriate as E in the Bayes formula, it needs to be "set apart" from most other potential results in a way that is relevant to H.
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I'm pretty sure nobody in this thread accepts this. I think if you were to cite references, we would discover that you are profoundly misrepresenting the clear premises and arguments that others have offered in response to your claims.
 
Jabba said:
Re #1. Agreed. Given H, the current existence of my self is unimaginably small.
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No, no one agrees to this. And we have given reasons why, which you ignore.

Re #2. No. Unfortunately here is where it gets confusing. The fact that under H there is nothing special about the self does not mean that my argument applies equally to things without such an emergent property.
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It exactly does. "Such" an emergent property is just more language designed to create significance where none exists.

The example I use is the lottery winner being a 2nd cousin of the lottery controller. That makes him "special." Being a second cousin puts a target on his back.
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No, it doesn't. That's where you fail to understand statistical reasoning. Further, even if your example applied, you cannot provide any analogue to "cousin-ness" in your proof. You simply wax eloquent about how wonderful it is to be alive, and then pretend that has statistical significance.

Anyway, my claim is that this emergent property of self is what sets me apart. Rocks don't have such an emergent property.
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You are exactly elevating one emergent property over another as if one were inherently more significant than the other. Or worse, according to your example above, as if one had some evidence that made it more significant -- evidence you can't provide in your proof except by angsty protestation.

And to me, that's the only real issue of my 'immortality' claim. Is my self really set apart? Obviously, I think that it is.
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But you are uninterested in the reasons why that thought is wrong. Which makes your argument crackpottery instead of mathematics.
 
Jabba said:
SOdhner,
- Re #1. Agreed. Given H, the current existence of my self is unimaginably small.
- Re #2. No. Unfortunately here is where it gets confusing. The fact that under H there is nothing special about the self does not mean that my argument applies equally to things without such an emergent property. We of this thread have accepted that when all of the potential results of the situation are equally likely (or unlikely), for a particular event to be appropriate as E in the Bayes formula, it needs to be "set apart" from most other potential results in a way that is relevant to H. The example I use is the lottery winner being a 2nd cousin of the lottery controller. That makes him "special." Being a second cousin puts a target on his back.
- Anyway, my claim is that this emergent property of self is what sets me apart. Rocks don't have such an emergent property.

- And to me, that's the only real issue of my 'immortality' claim. Is my self really set apart? Obviously, I think that it is.
Click to expand...

godless dave said:
Nobody accepts that claim.
Click to expand...
- By that, do you just mean that no one accepts my answer to the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy -- or, is there something more?
 
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