Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
Irony alert.
And in the next ******** post, no less:
A classic example.
Dave
And in the next ******** post, no less:
A classic example.
Dave
Proof of Immortality, VI
- Thread starter jond
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The Sparrow
Graduate Poster
Jabba, before you again claim that language is inadequate...
Can you at least answer this question first?
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND THE EXACT COPY WOULD BE_______
Don't say 'you wouldn't be bought BACK to life'. The BACK makes no sense as the experiment does not specify anyone's death.
Oh you might also address my previous post. I believe when you say "bought back to life" you are referring to that sense of continuity of self.
Please explain why neither copy would continue to experience that sense of continuity of self.
Can you at least answer this question first?
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND THE EXACT COPY WOULD BE_______
Don't say 'you wouldn't be bought BACK to life'. The BACK makes no sense as the experiment does not specify anyone's death.
Oh you might also address my previous post. I believe when you say "bought back to life" you are referring to that sense of continuity of self.
Please explain why neither copy would continue to experience that sense of continuity of self.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
Wrong. Under materialism the copy would be just as much you as the original. Despite repeated questioning over several years, you've been unable to identify what, under materialism, would be distinguishable between them except for there being two specimens instead of one -- mere "separateness."
"Brought back to life" is a phrase that has meaning only in your hypothesis. In terms of how materialism defines life -- an emergent property of animate beings -- the copy would be just as much alive as the original, in ever discernible way. By definition there can be no properties in materialism that are not the result simply of material. Duplicate the material and you must necessarily have all the properties, including being alive.
You really have no idea what properties are, but that deficiency does not mean you get to be right.
Not for any reason you're able to articulate beyond mere separation, so no. You're simply declaring what you need to be the case, regardless of what the facts are. How is that not simply a delusion?
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
His two pet phrases, "bring ME back to life," and "looking out through two sets of eyes," are apparently intended to cover both cases. The former applies if the copy is created from a dead original, and the latter applies if the original and the copy coexist as living organisms. Both have problems under dualism, and Jabba wants us to accept that both would also have problems under materialism. Specifically, he wants the effects and consequences of dualism to be part of E -- the data in his model under which both hypotheses are to be evaluated. Naturally materialism isn't the least bothered by this thought experiment, regardless of whether the original is living or dead.
It sticks in his craw that materialism isn't actually the fragile thing he needs it to be, that would be stymied by the need to provide a soul. So the best he's been able to come up with is to keep repeating the mantra of these two hackneyed phrases and suggest that he can't understand how anyone else could think otherwise.
I've said the above, and am still waiting for a reply. You must calculate the probability of you existing in H as if H were correct. Since, in H, there is nothing special about a sense of self as it is just an emergent property of the brain your argument would apply equally to things without this property.
Under H while there are of course physical differences between a rock and a living human being those differences are, in the grand scheme of things, trivial. Calculating likelihood of a specific clump of matter is the same whether that matter is a person, a giraffe, a redwood, or a rock. Therefore if your argument is that under H you are unlikely to exist, I can apply this same logic to any particular clump of matter.
By your own argument, this would then imply that rocks are immortal. You haven't responded to this except to say, essentially, nuh-uh.
I already answered this and you didn't reply to me. If I have two identical snowglobes, one of which I just bought at Walmart and one of which you were given by the love of your life in a little cafe in Vienna after a whirlwind adventure through Europe and these two snowglobes were physically identical down to the last molecule, then they would be identical for all real purposes.
You would assign way more meaning to one of them because the one you were given has sentimental value, but if I swapped them when you weren't looking you would be none the wiser and would take the "wrong" snowglobe home. Now you would assign that added value to the one I bought at Walmart because no instrument in the universe could ever tell the two apart.
That's because sentimental value isn't a tangible thing. Likewise, you feel that two identical people would nonetheless be different in some way. All that would actually be different, however, is the value that you assign to them. So you would *feel* differently about them but in actual practice there is no difference and you wouldn't be able to tell them apart if you mixed them up. (On a related note, I wonder how many identical twins have accidentally switched names some time after birth because their parents lost track of which was which...)
If you were wondering, Jabba, I agree with that too. You avoid clear questions, and then ask if we agree on things we've already said we agree on. It's a very wasteful use of your limited time here.
We've all said a bunch of times that we disagree with you on this. As above, this is equivalent to sentimental value. You feel like you are special and so you wouldn't lend the same value to a copy. That copy also wouldn't lend the same value to you. But objectively, scientifically, under H there is no difference. And since your argument requires that you calculate the odds under H you must do this calculation as if H were correct. That means you CANNOT include your sentimental value into the equation.
In a hypothetical scenario where we could make a perfect copy of your physical body, it would be a perfect copy of you - because under H the physical body is all that exists. Saying otherwise is to include ~H in H which obviously screws up your formula really badly.
You're assigning special value to the *I* in that sentence, which is perfectly natural and understandable. It's the teleporter problem, this has been done to death. But from a materialistic point of view there's no difference. Just like sentimental value, it's a perceived difference but not an actual one.
I'd like to try something, I really hope you will respond to this. I think it would be very helpful to move this argument along. I'm going to list off some things, and I want you to give a yes/no answer - just yes/no - for each of them. If you respond with a whole paragraph we're probably going to just go into another stupid loop, so I really am begging you to answer all of the below with a yes or a no.
Assuming a physically perfect copy could be made, is there a difference between two completely identical:
1. Jabbas?
2. Other, non-Jabba people?
3. Dead bodies?
4. Plants?
5. Dogs?
6. Bacteria?
7. Rocks?
8. Snowglobes?
9. Snowglobes where one of them was a gift from a loved one and one wasn't, but in all physical ways they are identical?
If you could answer all nine of those with a YES or NO we might be able to narrow things down a bit.
Jabba
Philosopher
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- There is no difference in the usual "dimensions" (the usual "objective factors") -- but with the emergence of consciousness/self from the brain, we have a new dimension (a new factor, though maybe we can't call it "objective") that rocks and VWs do not have. And the two "persons" are different in that respect/dimension.
- Also, the H model acknowledges that dimension. H and ~H just disagree about the nature of that dimension.
[- To brag some, I flew what we called an H model -- in Vietnam, a UH-1H.]
godless dave
Great Dalmuti
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H does not recognize self or consciousness as a new dimension. H does not hold that duplicating a sense of self works any differently than duplicating anything else.
It's pretty clear that you do not understand the model you are trying to disprove (or essentially disprove).
It's pretty clear that you do not understand the model you are trying to disprove (or essentially disprove).
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The Sparrow
Graduate Poster
In what way are they different? Renaming the attribute (again) doesn't help you.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IDENTICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE _______
John Jones
Penultimate Amazing
What are the properties of this so-called dimension? How can you distinguish one from another?
jond
Illuminator
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- No, the H model does not in any way acknowledge that dimension. H is purported to be the materialistic model. Under the materialistic model, both the duplicate and the original think they are Jabba. And you have acknowledged that there is no way to tell any difference between them. Which means there is no difference between them. It is this "dimension" (soul) that you are tacking onto H that does not belong.
- Under H, consciousness is an emergent property of a functioning brain. It does not exist as a separate thing, or a separate dimension, or a separate entity in any way. Thus, according to H, your self only exists so long as your brain is functioning normally. If you wish to disprove that, you need to demonstrate the existence of this other "dimension", but as you are aware your statistical meandering won't do it because as you know, the materialistic model is far more likely than your model.
Belz...
Fiend God
No, they are not.
H precludes the idea of you "coming back to life". So stop bringing it up when we're talking about H.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
No. Properties, emergent or otherwise, can certainly be taxonomized according to whether they are orthogonal or not. To the extent they are, they can be considered dimensions in the taxonomy. In fact, such a taxonomy can be applied to almost anything. But that is the nature of taxonomies, not something that applies philosophically, empirically, or exegetically here. Orthogonality does not imply priority.
Two functioning Volkswagens can exhibit the property of color, i.e., one "is yellow" and the other "is red." One functioning red Volkswagen can exhibit, under the proper circumstances, the property "is going 60 mph." A non-functioning red Volkswagen cannot. In these two examples, color and movement may be considered orthogonal properties. Each of the three specimens (or four, to be scrupulous) occupies a different point in the space created by "dimensions" of orthogonal properties.
However, there is no priority, order, or significance to those dimensions. You may subjectively apply importance, such as in one case where you're looking for a red car to photograph or in another case where you're shopping for a functioning automobile. But those are criteria you bring to the problem. In the linear algebraic terms you have tried to apply, that is a projection of the space, not the space itself. "Usual dimensions" is not a concept that is part of materialism. There is no "usuality" to emergent properties under H such that you can distinguish them the way you're trying to do. You're just using new language to beg the question that the emergent property of consciousness must be considered special enough under H to be equivalent to a soul -- of course without calling it that. You are epistemologically projecting your desired outcome on the data, and you are algebraically projecting a desired view upon the data by not understanding the linear algebra terms you have now tried to interpolate into the conversation.
Don't bring a projection to an affine fight.
No, they absolutely are not different under materialism. The "specialness" factor doesn't help you here because under materialism self-awareness -- no matter how fancy you think it is -- is a product of the organism. Duplicate the organism and you'd have a sense of self that is just as special in the copy as it is in the original. Even with your misapplication of a subjective projection, you get the same projected space because the similarity is in affine space.
Yes, if you project one affine space of one order into a lower-order space, and you project another affine space of lower order into lower-order space, you will end up (except in the degenerate case) with unequal projections. But again, that's a factor of subjectivity. It is not an error or an insufficiency in the affine space. The projections matter only if, ahead of time, a certain kind of property was what you were looking for. The projection you're proposing -- and suggesting is part of affine space, not projective space -- is simply the linear-algebra version of begging the question.
Yes, you can come up with ways in which organisms differ from rocks. You can come up with ways in which some rocks differ from other rocks. You can come up with ways in which humans differ from other humans. These are all different ways of projecting the data such that some factors appear more important than others. But these are not ways that are inherent to the problem. These are ways in which one can apply preconceptions of significance to the data and see what effect they have one it. By ignorantly invoking linear algebra, you really shoot yourself in the foot here. You've essentially proven mathematically that you're begging the question.
Equivocation. H acknowledges that there exists a sense of self, or of self-awareness, or that some organisms are conscious, or any of the ways you've tried to slice this concept differently to create a soul. However, materialism does not accept today's latest tack-on that self-awareness is any sort of different kind of property than any other emergent property, or one that has an inherently "special" perspective that matters in your proof. You've frankly admitted that you have to apply a special perspective in order to get the data to look like what you want. Materialism treats emergent properties properly as having an affine relationship. Your theory requires a projection that you're arguing materialism must apply too.
Asked and answered. You're equivocating "nature of that dimension" to try to justify your implication that E must include elements of duality, in this case by applying a projection that seems to say so. Some weeks ago I identified this as one of several flaws in your argument, each of which are individually fatal. Specifically, you do not properly differentiate between E, H, and ~H in your model. To a lesser extent, you do not properly differentiate between P(H) -- either as a prior or as a posterior probability -- and P(E|H), which is a conditional probability. You know this list exists and properly refutes your claim. You do not seem to care to address it, which means you have to concede that your argument has been properly refuted for some time.
Belz...
Fiend God
Not so befuddled when he's trying to manipulate words, is he?
*Slams head on the desk. Without looking I reach into the desk drawer and pull out a huge jug of "Uncle Bucky's Budget Whiskey (Contains not more than 50% Paint Thinner)." Still without looking I pour a glass full, spilling most on the desk.*
(Voice muffled by desk) Anybody else want some?
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JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
I appreciate the gesture, but in my old age I've adopted the maxim that life is too short to drink cheap whiskey. *Reaches for the Glenfidditch...*
The frustration is part of Jabba's overall plan. Quite a number of his critics have flounced, citing their inability to make even the slightest indentation in Jabba's stubborn recitation of claims. On a few occasions Jabba has celebrated these departures as wins for him. From that we deduce that part of this whole plan -- which, in case it's not obvious, is merely to cement Jabba's position as among the world's greatest philosophical and mathematical minds -- involves self-congratulation on staying the course, sticking to one's guns, and "prevailing" out of sheer dogged determination. If you accept this construction of Jabba's case, then every time we express exasperation -- perfectly justified exasperation nonetheless -- Jabba smiles a little inside and considers himself one step closer to a claimable victory.
If that's what the label says, you may well be drinking cheap whiskey, rather than single malt whisky.
Key word highlighted. Jabba is simply wrong; the fact that he persists in being wrong, in the teeth of ample corrections, doesn't make him right.
Monza
Alta Viro
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Monza
Alta Viro
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That is the definition of copy. The copy is not the original. It is the same with anything, be it VWs, bananas, or people. The original is the original and the copy is the copy. Why is this so difficult?
godless dave
Great Dalmuti
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I noticed that too.
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