Proof of Immortality, VI

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Jabba said:
- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self. IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?
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But you agree that the sense of self is a process, not a thing. You've also agreed that there would be no difference between the original and duplicate. And you've agreed that your sense of self isn't the same from one second to the next.

So which one would think it was Jabba?
 
Jabba said:
- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self.
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No, there is no such agreement. Stop saying there is.

"Brought back to life" really has no meaning under materialism. It certainly does not have the meaning in materialism that you are desperately trying to read into it. "Brought back to life" is your equivocation for "recreates the soul." We do not agree that any such thing happens under materialism solely because the question, as you intend it, has no meaning in materialism.

Your critics have asked you to stop deliberately using your ambiguous turns of phrase. You use them only try to equivocate between what your critics actually say and what you desperately need them to say in your little scripted drama here.

IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?
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Here's a hint. If you need to start a sentence with "In other words," your critics are almost sure to rightly accuse you of putting words in their mouths. "Would not be me" does not have the meaning under materialism that you are imbuing it with here. The "me" that you allude to here is your soul, which does not exist in materialism. The only difference materialism contemplates here is what others have called "separateness." Since you are unwilling to answer directly what that difference would be, and since you have admitted this is not an observable difference, it is abundantly clear that you realize this refutes your argument and that you have no answer except to repeat yourself mindlessly.
 
dlorde said:
Souls apart, I'm wondering whether Jabba is having semantic difficulty with the distinction between the original and the copy being identical, and them having separate identities (i.e. not being the same thing).
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If by "having semantic difficulties" you mean "constantly equivocates between," you'll be accurate. Last year we discussed the difference in precise meaning among these terms, at some length. Jabba not only understands what we (and the rest of the world) intends by these words, but deliberately equivocates between them. He's really hoping someone will mistakenly agree to his use of them. Quite a lot of Jabba's argument is based entirely on foisting ambiguous words and phrases that allude to settled concepts but do not express them.
 
Jabba said:
- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self. IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?
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No.



What you're saying is that the two jabbas are not the same object. That doesn't make them different. That makes them distinct.
 
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I honestly don't remember Jabba dying in any of his scenarios. Does anyone remember where "come back to life" originated? I thought we just hypothetically copied someone, not killed them.


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carlitos said:
I honestly don't remember Jabba dying in any of his scenarios. Does anyone remember where "come back to life" originated? I thought we just hypothetically copied someone, not killed them.


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I've been here since part 1, and I don't remember Jabba dying in any of his scenarios.. Nor do I know where the 'looking out of two sets of eyes' came from either. I think he believes he's got the makings of a Gotcha! moment in those two non sequiturs.
 
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Jabba said:
Joe,
- The copy wouldn't be me. I would not be brought back to life. The original was me; the copy is not. The two are different.
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That... is... not... an.... answer. You just said "It would be different" for the billionth time.

Answer the question. Identify the objective quality or factor that one of the "Jabbas" would have that the other would not.
 
JoeBentley said:
That... is... not... an.... answer. You just said "It would be different" for the billionth time.

Answer the question. Identify the objective quality or factor that one of the "Jabbas" would have that the other would not.
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I think he's been avoiding the word "soul" for so long that he can't actually think of it anymore.
 
Jabba said:
Joe,
- The copy wouldn't be me. I would not be brought back to life. The original was me; the copy is not. The two are different.
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND THE EXACT COPY WOULD BE_______

Answer the question you were asked.
 
Jabba said:
Joe,
- The copy wouldn't be me. I would not be brought back to life. The original was me; the copy is not. The two are different.
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You said there is no difference!

Do you understand what "difference" means? Do you automatically forget or ignore the hundreds of posts that have told you the difference between "different" and "distinct"?

Stop insulting us.
 
Jabba said:
SOdhner & Waterman,
- Do you agree with Dave?
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I believe I do.

When you assume something or 'brought back to life' as in reincarnation that REQUIRES something immaterial to have existed separate fror the body. This does not exist in the materialist definition.

When you bring out the through two set of eye stuff that is again an immaterial connection that does not exist in the materialist definition.
 
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Jabba said:
Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.
- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?
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HERE the bold text is where you attempt to insert the concept of a immaterial component into the materialist definition. For something be be brought back to life in a copy it must reside separate and independent of the body.
 
Jabba said:
- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about).
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Yes it would the self is a process, as you agreed earlier, and processes can be identical if executed precisely on a precisely tuned substrate.

Jabba said:
By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life.
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Correct because that would require an immaterial component that does not exist in the materialist definition.

Jabba said:
By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...
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Correct because that would require an immaterial component that does not exist in the materialist definition.

Jabba said:
- What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness." I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.
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And that difference is?
 
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