Proof of Immortality, VI

[JayUtah]

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about).

You're equivocating "experience" to mean "soul." Under materialism, duplicating the brain would have to duplicate every observable aspect of the organism. That's the definition of materialism.

By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life.

Under materialism, duplicating the brain (the entire organism, rather, since the brain needs it to function) would make you just as alive as you were before, as materialism defines life. You're trying to say life has to be magic. Under materialism it is not; it is just a collection of emergent properties in organisms we say are living organisms. One property is not necessarily any more significant or magical under materialism than another.

You're begging the question.

By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...

Second time you've been chastised appropriately for misrepresentation. We all agree that "looking out through two sets of eyes" is meaningless twaddle through which you're trying to trump something -- anything -- that exists but which materialism can't reproduce.

What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness." I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.

You're equivocating "ME" to mean "soul." This is what we don't agree on. You're begging the question that there exists something, even under materialism, to create a "difference...more than separateness." That's contrary to materialism at the most basic level, and it's quite clearly your notion of a soul that you argue must be explained as part of the data. The problem this poses for your argument is that these equivocations and straw men are what you're using to discredit materialism via P(E|H). Since you're not using H as it is formulated but rather H as you have invented it, and since you're not using E as a neutral observation but rather E-with-a-soul, your formulation of P(E|H) is obviously wrong.

You will ignore this refutation.

 

[The Sparrow]

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about).

yes we know you are claiming.

By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life.

Do you read ANY responses here?

By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...

Yes because that would be ridiculous.

- What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness."

Right, yet you refuse to indicate what attributes would differ.

I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.

Yes because 1 + 1 = 2.

 

[godless dave]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

That kind of self doesn't exist at all under H. I highlighted what isn't part of H.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about).

What do you mean by "duplicating the experience"? Your experience isn't duplicated from one second to the next as it is.

By duplicating my brain, if I had died, I would not be brought back to life.

Define your terms. What do you mean, you wouldn't be brought back to life? Who would the duplicate think it was?

By duplicating my brain, if I was still alive, I would not be looking out two sets of eyes. I think that we all agree upon that...

By duplicating my Volkswagen, they wouldn't both be going the same 60 mph. Does that sound as idiotic as your phrase?

- What we seem not to agree upon is that the new self would be different than the old self in more than simple "separateness." I'm claiming that the new self would also not be ME. I'm claiming that such a difference is more than separateness.

Ah, so you're claiming that the duplicate would have a separate soul. Why don't you just say so?

For argument's sake, what would it be like if you could duplicate yourself and there wasn't such a thing as a soul?

 

[jond]

jond,
- We couldn't.

Which means there is no difference between the original and the copy? Good to know you agree that you're wrong.

 

[sackett]

Jabba, you're not claiming anything. You're just declaring your faith over and over.

The Tibetans do it better. They just gave the ol' prayer-wheel a spin as they go by and "Om mani padme hum" sounds through the universe.

 

[Mojo]

jond,
- We couldn't.

Then what basis do you have for saying that they are different?

 

[JoeMorgue]

jond,
- We couldn't.

Oh for the... that's it. I have actually officially lost my patience. Even for your silly game playing this is enough.

Jabba fill in the blank.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IDENTICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE _______

Fill that blank in with something, anything. I don't want to hear the words "What I'm claiming" uttered from your lips. Put some noun or adverb in that blank. I do not want to hear another word out of your mouth until you answer this question.

Everbody else do not respond to anything else until he answer this question.

 

[Loss Leader]

So we've moved on from what reincarnationists might believe without actually, you know, checking in with them for their explanations?

Sounds like a reasonable strategy. Somewhere, our poor Buddhist strawman grins with glee.

 

[The Sparrow]

Agreed.

Jabba:
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IDENTICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE _______

 

[Belz...]

- I claim that duplicating the brain would not duplicate the experience of self (that we're all talking about).

It's an exact copy. How is it not a duplicate?

 

[Belz...]

jond,
- We couldn't.

Thank you.

So you admit that there IS no difference. Glad that's out of the way.

 

[wea]

- The duplicate would think it is you. How, specifically, would you differentiate between that and you being brought back to life?

jond,
- We couldn't.

Jabba fill in the blank.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IDENTICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE _______

...

Everbody else do not respond to anything else until he answer this question.

after five years, it's getting interesting

Jabba fill in the blank.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IDENTICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE _______

 

[dlorde]

Souls apart, I'm wondering whether Jabba is having semantic difficulty with the distinction between the original and the copy being identical, and them having separate identities (i.e. not being the same thing). Perhaps the use of 'identity' to also mean what distinguishes you from others, confuses him.

Clearly, a duplicate would not have the same experiences as the original because they can not be in the same place at the same time, but the duplicate would have the same experiences (including the unfortunate experience of being Jabba) as the original would have in identical circumstances.

 

[John Jones]

Souls apart, I'm wondering whether Jabba is having semantic difficulty with the distinction between the original and the copy being identical, and them having separate identities (i.e. not being the same thing). Perhaps the use of 'identity' to also mean what distinguishes you from others, confuses him.

Clearly, a duplicate would not have the same experiences as the original because they can not be in the same place at the same time, but the duplicate would have the same experiences (including the unfortunate experience of being Jabba) as the original would have in identical circumstances.

He knows what the words mean. He has a long history of equivocation and re-defining words to try and create a counterfeit consensus.

He gets busted for it at least once a week.

In the Shroud of Turin thread, he once said "Since everyone agrees there is human blood on the shroud..." when in fact not one person agreed with him.

 

[Jabba]

Dave, SOdhner and Waterman,
- So, I'm claiming that my duplicate self would be different from my original self (me) in more than separateness -- I would not be brought back to life by the copy. The new self would not be me. That would be a big difference between the two.- It is that experience of self that I claim is unimaginably unlikely under H.
- Do you still disagree?

That kind of self doesn't exist at all under H. I highlighted what isn't part of H.

- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self. IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?

 

[godless dave]

- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self. IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?

It would not make for any difference at all.

 

[jond]

- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self. IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?

You really hate it when people show you how wrong you are, don't you?

 

[The Sparrow]

- But you agree that I would not be brought back to life in the new self. IOW, the fact that the new self would not be me, but the old self was, would not make for a difference (and a significant one) between the two selves?

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IDENTICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE _______?

 

[JoeMorgue]

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLE IS _______


Answer the questions.