- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
Then you really have two claims.
First, that mind-body dualism is real; there is an aspect of the human self that is nonphysical.
Second, that that nonphysical self is immortal.
Dave,
- I have numerous claims and sub-claims, but those
are central.
- At the top(?) of my syllogism, I claim that
1. There is a
reasonable possibility that the human self is
not physical -- not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.
2. The likelihood of an event occurring -- given a particular hypothesis -- has mathematical implications (albeit indefinite) regarding the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. The likelihood of the current existence of my "self" -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 10
-100.
4. For that to be an appropriate element in judging the probability of OOFLam, my current existence needs to be set apart from most other selves in a way that is relevant to OOFLam.
5. My self is thusly set apart.
6. If I am correct so far, the posterior probability of OOFLam is extremely small.
- Underlying the "top" are numerous other claims/premises. For instance,
1. For the likelihood of my current existence to be an appropriate element in the relevant formula, my particular existence does not need to be pre-specified as appropriate. My particular current existence does not need to be specified as a legitimate “target” prior to my existence.
2. There are other characteristics of an event that can identify its likelihood as an appropriate element, as a legitimate target, in judging the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. “Targetness” is complex, and exists in degrees.
- That’s just the beginning.
- I will try to outline
all my different premises. I will then ask you to point out all your disagreements.
- I hope to then introduce our debate to a (new) jury of our peers and present our further cases.