Proof of Immortality, VI

[John Jones]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula -- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

Dismiss it all you like - you're still doing it.

 

[Mojo]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula -- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

Jabba, here's a question that you haven't so far addressed, that rełates direcy to this:

If someone else existed instead of you, would your argument for immortality be valid if they presented it?

 

[godless dave]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula -- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

You haven't dismissed the Texas sharp shooter fallacy.

The possibility of H not being correct has no bearing on P(E|H).

You still have to contrast P(E|~H) with P(E|H). P(E|~H) might be as unlikely or more unlikely than P(E|H).

 

[JayUtah]

But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely...

No, because your formulation for P(E|H) is nonsensical gibberish. Further, you started with the proposition that P(E|H) was very unlikely and have simply been trying for years to find a pseudo-rational justification for what you preconcluded was true. You haven't been trying to determine what P(E|H) actually might be. See my previous writings for details.

...and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula

No, because you have not computed P(K|E) where K is your hypothesis. You've employed a false-dilemma fallacy to avoid having to compute it, or even talk about it. Nor have you dealt with the fact that since K is an additional step beyond H (i.e., incarnation requires a body, which is all H requires), P(K) can never be more than equal to P(H). See my previous writings for details. Your claim of victory is not predicated on the facts of the debate and is therefore premature.

if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

No, the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is only one of about a dozen individually fatal flaws we have identified in your argument. If you were to somehow overcome this initial one, the rest of your argument will not simply magically fall into place. Your reluctance to examine the entirely of your argument is embodied in your desire that we focus on "sub-issues" to exhaustion, which results in literal years of unproductive inertia. As a result, you never address the criticism from more than one part of your argument at a time. This leads you wrongly to boast that there is ever only one thing wrong at a time with your argument. This is why I have insisted upon a comprehensive answer this time. You need to deal soberly with the grand degree to which your argument is simply nonviable.

More to the point, you propose no repair to your argument that avoids the post-selection fallacy, Jabba. Your efforts toward that flaw have simply been to beg that it shouldn't be considered an error and promise additional defenses that you never deliver. Your critics are not obligated to overlook major flaws in your reasoning simply because you stubbornly think you're right.

 

[JayUtah]

Not necessarily. In Bayesian epistemology, probabilities of events can be assigned given certain hypotheses. Pr(E/H).

But read Jabba's statement carefully. You are correct that, for any hypothesis, we can attain a probability vis-à-vis some event. Where it is less correct is under the auspices of the false dilemma. Jabba denotes the hypotheses in play as H and ~H, which ostensibly covers the universe. Because P(H) + P(~H) = 1 is a simple law of probability (and, for some data E, P(H|E) + P(~H|E) = 1), Jabba wants to compute one and then infer the other. This is what everyone does when trying to sneak a false dilemma past his critics. The problem in Jabba's argument is that -- depending on the day -- H is a singular hypothesis and ~H is the disjunction of all other hypotheses, or ~H is the singular hypothesis and H the disjunction of all else.

One day, H is "we are mortal" and ~H is "we are immortal," but then Jabba's test for P(E|H) involves only one select theory -- scientific materialism. It does not, as it should, include all the theories that aren't materialism but don't also lead to immortality.

Other days, H is strictly materialism and ~H is everything else; Jabba purposely keeps his set of options broad because he isn't willing to nail down in exactly what way we might be immortal so that no particular hypothesis has to pass any sort of test. He considers it a strength of his argument that it includes Christian resurrection, Buddhist reincarnation, etc. That set is a disjunction. In some cases the hypotheses in it contradict each other. In the vast remnant of probability Jabba says results from subtracting 1- P(H|E), there lurks an resolved horde of possible hypotheses, not all of which mean immortality. Remember, if H is the singular hypothesis of scientific materialism then hypotheses that contradict scientific materialism but do not result in immortality live in ~H. Therefore Jabba cannot argue that ~H is composed only of all the different ways in which we can be immortal, that P(~H|E) is meaningful toward immortality because of that, and thus that P(~H|E) represents any probability regarding immortality. At best he'd have shown that materialism is improbable among all the ways in which we cannot be immortal. (Jabba tried to soften his argument by saying he would only prove immaterialism, not immortality.)

To fully fix the probability of immortality against materialism, he has to choose one or more hypotheses (I denote them K, L,...) out of ~H -- from among the ones that do result in immortality -- and compute P(K|E), P(L|E) and so forth and show that one of them is markedly more probable than P(H|E). By "the complementary hypothesis" in Jabba's statement, he means (by his notation) everything that isn't materialism, but really (by his words) immortality. This is the equivocation that everyone sees but him.

 

[Monza]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula -- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

But we can't dismiss the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy. Your logical arguments have an error and ignoring it isn't going to help.

 

[Belz...]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula

Have you any idea how many vanishingly impropable events happen around you every day?

-- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

Jabba, you can't dismiss the fallacy. It's essential to your argument and it being a fallacy makes your argument wrong.

 

[Mojo]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula -- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

But remember: if H is the hypothesis that you have a body and an immortal soul, you existence is also VERY unlikely; at least as unlikely as it is under hypotheses in which you only have a body. If your argument leads you to conclude that the hypothesis that your consciousness is produced by your body is incorrect, you must also conclude that the hypothesis that your consciousness can exist independently of your body is incorrect.

 

[theprestige]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely,

The magnitude of unlikelihood doesn't matter to the argument

and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula

Bayes doesn't work that way

-- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy,

Fallacies cannot be dismissed, only avoided

and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

It's a fallacy to assume the thing you're trying to prove.

 

[jsfisher]

Well, now, where are we? Oh, yeah, we are now 70+ posts lighter in this thread.

Things you may not have realized:
* The topic is not about debating techniques.
* The topic is not about how the discussion here might be commemorated elsewhere.
* The topic is not about copyright law, neither US nor international.

In fact, the topic is (supposed to be) about immortality and proof thereof. Most of you knew that, I am sure. This is a forum all about discussion. Please see if you can do that.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: jsfisher

 

[Fudbucker]

Not when the even has already happened. Then its probability is, and will always be, 1.

That is technically true, but if we operated that way (if Pr(E) is always just ONE), evidence would never confirm/disconfirm a belief. So we pretend and say what is likelihood of the evidence, if we tried to predict it in advance?

I don't know if the OP is a Bayesian. That could explain the quote you objected to.

 

[Fudbucker]

But read Jabba's statement carefully. You are correct that, for any hypothesis, we can attain a probability vis-à-vis some event. Where it is less correct is under the auspices of the false dilemma. Jabba denotes the hypotheses in play as H and ~H, which ostensibly covers the universe. Because P(H) + P(~H) = 1 is a simple law of probability (and, for some data E, P(H|E) + P(~H|E) = 1), Jabba wants to compute one and then infer the other. This is what everyone does when trying to sneak a false dilemma past his critics. The problem in Jabba's argument is that -- depending on the day -- H is a singular hypothesis and ~H is the disjunction of all other hypotheses, or ~H is the singular hypothesis and H the disjunction of all else.

One day, H is "we are mortal" and ~H is "we are immortal," but then Jabba's test for P(E|H) involves only one select theory -- scientific materialism. It does not, as it should, include all the theories that aren't materialism but don't also lead to immortality.

Other days, H is strictly materialism and ~H is everything else; Jabba purposely keeps his set of options broad because he isn't willing to nail down in exactly what way we might be immortal so that no particular hypothesis has to pass any sort of test. He considers it a strength of his argument that it includes Christian resurrection, Buddhist reincarnation, etc. That set is a disjunction. In some cases the hypotheses in it contradict each other. In the vast remnant of probability Jabba says results from subtracting 1- P(H|E), there lurks an resolved horde of possible hypotheses, not all of which mean immortality. Remember, if H is the singular hypothesis of scientific materialism then hypotheses that contradict scientific materialism but do not result in immortality live in ~H. Therefore Jabba cannot argue that ~H is composed only of all the different ways in which we can be immortal, that P(~H|E) is meaningful toward immortality because of that, and thus that P(~H|E) represents any probability regarding immortality. At best he'd have shown that materialism is improbable among all the ways in which we cannot be immortal. (Jabba tried to soften his argument by saying he would only prove immaterialism, not immortality.)

To fully fix the probability of immortality against materialism, he has to choose one or more hypotheses (I denote them K, L,...) out of ~H -- from among the ones that do result in immortality -- and compute P(K|E), P(L|E) and so forth and show that one of them is markedly more probable than P(H|E). By "the complementary hypothesis" in Jabba's statement, he means (by his notation) everything that isn't materialism, but really (by his words) immortality. This is the equivocation that everyone sees but him.

That's a good critique of his argument.

 

[Hokulele]

That is technically true, but if we operated that way (if Pr(E) is always just ONE), evidence would never confirm/disconfirm a belief.

Well, that is the point. You can't use Jabba's existence to discriminate between either hypothesis, as it doesn't change the probability of either one. In this specific case, the 1 is the 1 is the 1. It is easier to note it as being the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy, as most people can recognize it by description, rather than by math, but it is describing the exact same failure in logic.

So we pretend and say what is likelihood of the evidence, if we tried to predict it in advance?

Not really, as jt512 noted much earlier in the discussion, the "test" is based on the same data set that was used to determine the hypotheses. It gets us absolutely nowhere.

I don't know if the OP is a Bayesian. That could explain the quote you objected to.

It is Bayesian in form, but that is about it. Everything else in the OP is pretty much determined rectally.

 

[MarkCorrigan]

"But if we can get past my stabbing him 73 times in the chest, I'm sure I can prove I didn't murder him..."

 

[Waterman]

Not necessarily.. A being (or programmer) that only affects the world (simulation) when's no one's looking would never be discovered. That doesn't mean the effects wouldn't be there. And, of course, one-time events would be very hard to prove-disprove. For years, we wondered about rogue-waves. Suppose there's a phenomena that only happens once every ten thousand years? It would be very hard to discover.

If there are such rare independent phenomena that cannot be extrapolated by associated data or are at whim of omniscient intelligences then you are correct it would not be detectable. However if it is undetectable how do you know what you are positing is real and not speculation or an over active imagination.

Try to communicate with the simulation programmers? I think if it could be discovered for sure that we were in a simulation, the implications would be profound. So, on that level, it's interesting stuff.

Yes, if true, the implications would be profound. But how would you know it is nothing more than a vivid imagination. What knowledge / evidence led you to consider this as a position worth seriously exploring more than for entertainment value or mental gymnastics?

Take a look at that comic I linked to. See if you agree with it.

I looked at it and it was speculative musings of “Ifs” given infinite x, y, z… fun to think about but does not appear to be useful in arriving at any conclusions. Patterning rocks seems to be a cumbersome data management system but unless… Ah you are equating the placement of rocks as the cell states in our brains and the rock mover as the dualistic component. That does seem to be an unnecessary complication. You are saying that the brain is static unless a mover is present. How does this translate to less complex brains in living organisms. Do they have a ‘rock mover’ as well?

I partially agree, except for consciousness. It's always been a "hard problem" and will remain a "hard problem". I don't see science being able to explain why moving electrons around should give rise to subjective experience. Science can explain neuro-correlates, but not why brain-states give rise to mental-states. I'm a dualist on brain/mental states, so it allows a little wiggleroom for bizzare theories to pop up, like panpsychism, integrated-information theory, and whether there's an immaterial part of ourselves.

So are you approaching the problem consciousness believing in dualism looking to support it or after a careful review of the information you conclude dualism? This appears to be a bit of special pleading and argument form ignorance… see bolded above. As science begins to study a phenomenon to narrow down further research and often does not provide a causal explanation until much, much follow up. Despite this I am not aware of any scientific evidence that requires dualism as an explanation. There is a wide gap between knowing everything and knowing nothing.

 

[Jabba]

You haven't dismissed the Texas sharp shooter fallacy...

- From 3634 in previous 'chapter.'
- I'm still not sure, but more specifically, this is why I think we don't have to worry about any Texas Sharp Shooter.
- There are 4 variables involved in the Bayesian approach: 2 prior probabilities, and 2 likelihoods.
- In the lottery situation, if the winner can't be set apart from the crowd, we accept that the prior probability of a rigged game is essentially zero, and the fact that the specific winner had just 1 chance in, say, 10 million, doesn't carry any weight.
- In my situation, I'm not limiting my claim to myself; I'm suggesting that we are all in the same boat. Consequently, I don't want to set myself apart from the rest of you guys, and the conclusion rests entirely upon the prior probabilities.

 

[JesseCuster]

- No. But, very unlikely here is VERY unlikely, and easily wins out in the Bayesian formula -- if we can dismiss the sharp shooter fallacy, and allow a reasonable possibility that H is not correct.

You keep saying this, or variations on it. Each time I read you asking others to ignore or dismiss or try and forget about or whatever, the Texas sharpshooter fallacy that is one of the huge problems at the the core of your argument, this is what it reads like to me:

"My argument actually makes perfect sense and is logically sound, and you would all see this, if only you just would please ignore and dismiss the logical fallacies that make it nonsensical and unsound"

 

[Jabba]

...
The possibility of H not being correct has no bearing on P(E|H)...

- No. But, it does have a bearing on P(H|E).

 

[Jabba]

...
You still have to contrast P(E|~H) with P(E|H). P(E|~H) might be as unlikely or more unlikely than P(E|H).

- Please say again why you would think that.

 

[Hokulele]

So we pretend and say what is likelihood of the evidence, if we tried to predict it in advance?

Not really, as jt512 noted much earlier in the discussion, the "test" is based on the same data set that was used to determine the hypotheses. It gets us absolutely nowhere.

To expand on this a bit, we would some form of new data in order to determine which hypothesis is best supported by the evidence. For example, if we found a bunch of empty soda cans outside a school building, we could make a hypothesis regarding where one finds cans: near schools vs. near other buildings. In order to move past the initial framing, we would need new data. We can't just use the original cans by the school we based the initial hypotheses on, we would have to check near other schools and other buildings to see if which hypothesis holds up.

Ironically enough, we could change our evaluation of these hypotheses if in fact Jabba were immortal and we had evidence of Jabbas existing outside his current lifetime. Since Jabba has already claimed that his notion of "self" has absolutely no identifying or persisting characteristics outside of the body it inhabits, so can't be proven to have existed in any other time, he has basically eliminated his own best hope for turning this into an actual Bayesian proof out of the gate. He himself has closed the door on any evidence that might budge the probabilities in any direction.

It's almost as if the Texas Sharpshooter had been aiming at his own foot the entire time.