The only problem you have is not being able to admit you are wrong.
The more delicate contours of that problem might be that Jabba may think we need his admission of error in order for us to be confident in our judgment. This, like many fringe tactics, is a distortion of a common human behavior. When confronted with our own errors, before admitting them we want not only to see the proof of error, but to reason for ourselves how it happened. If we can't do that -- specifically if we don't have the wherewithal to see how we erred -- we hold out hope to still be right. We figure that if it's hard for us to see how we err, it must be equally hard for others to see it and therefore we might not actually be wrong. Projecting our confusion onto others is one of several flavors of the same general class of defense mechanism.
Here, of course, there is no confusion. Jabba's argument is obviously wrong, according to a number of very simple and well-known kinds of error. We don't need his concession in order to be sure his proof doesn't work. Again, most people like to think that if they're wrong, they can only be wrong in subtle, questionable ways -- not very simple ones.
I hypothesize that you owe me a hundred thousand dollars in golden doubloons. I claim that the proof of this is that my cat will never sprout wings and fly into space. Therefore the fact that my cat hasn't sprouted wings and flown into space is evidence that you do in fact owe me a hundred thousand dollars in gold doubloons.
This is what I allude to above. If the event in question happens (or fails to happen) against the prediction of some line of reasoning, then it's
not a foregone conclusion that the line of reasoning is sound and that the hypothesis it stems from must be false because of the event. We just as often use these inferential methods to test those consequential lines of reasoning as the hypotheses. Most of the formulations of any P(X|H) sound like, "If H were true then we should [not] expect to see X." If we observe X contrary to this, we
don't get to say immediately that H must fail -- especially if we H with certainty. The connection purported between X and H is still on the table. In Jabba's argument, nothing is certain -- it's all guesswork. Thus he has no basis for knowing what part of the model is responsible for the errant observation.
This is how fringe theorists commonly use pseudo-mathematical notation to hide their assumptions and insist that others must gloss over them. Jabba's formulation of P(E|H) in his model is just such gibberish. It is, in its own way, just as absurd as your example above. Jabba just couches it in vague philosophical-sounding terms, the discussion of which he hopes we will wallow in endlessly. In easy-to-see fact, the contrary event only confirms what we know about his fantasy P(E|H) formulation. There's nothing wrong with H, but there is certainly something wrong with how Jabba says H should relate to E.