Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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caveman1917 said:
No I'm not.



Is getting the outcome "square + red" (body + soul) more or less likely than getting the outcome "square + not red" (body + not soul)? You claim that it is less likely, but by your own experiment it would seem equally likely. You should really think this through a bit.
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That's not the question. The question is:

Is getting the outcome "square + red" (body + soul) more or less likely than getting the outcome "square" (body)?
 
SOdhner said:
You've misunderstood the analogy. Red would be a specific soul. Blue would also be a specific soul. Either would be equally likely, but they would both be souls.
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Then P("you have a soul") = P(square & red) + P(square & blue) = P(square), which is the same in both your experiment 1 and 2.
 
godless dave said:
That's not the question. The question is:

Is getting the outcome "square + red" (body + soul) more or less likely than getting the outcome "square" (body)?
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Of course it's less likely. Too bad that doesn't tell us anything about whether you're more or less likely to have a soul than not.
 
caveman1917 said:
Of course it's less likely. Too bad that doesn't tell us anything about whether you're more or less likely to have a soul than not.
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Even if that were true, one would still need to prove that having a soul is even possible.
 
caveman1917 said:
Then P("you have a soul") = P(square & red) + P(square & blue) = P(square), which is the same in both your experiment 1 and 2.
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Wow.

You have completely misunderstood everything I've said.

caveman1917 said:
godless dave said:
That's not the question. The question is:

Is getting the outcome "square + red" (body + soul) more or less likely than getting the outcome "square" (body)?
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Of course it's less likely. Too bad that doesn't tell us anything about whether you're more or less likely to have a soul than not.
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That's not the point!

The point is that the likelihood of (a specific body + a specific soul) is the basis of Jabba's whole argument, and therefore it is extremely relevant to point out that just (a specific body) gives you a less unlikely number.

This is about pointing out a flaw in Jabba's logic, it is NOT something that I am suggesting is a useful real world test for whether or not we have souls.
 
caveman1917 said:
Of course it's less likely. Too bad that doesn't tell us anything about whether you're more or less likely to have a soul than not.
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It's not supposed to.

Jabba is claiming to compare two models: one were humans just have bodies, and one where humans have bodies and souls.
 
godless dave said:
It's not supposed to.

Jabba is claiming to compare two models: one were humans just have bodies, and one where humans have bodies and souls.
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That might be what he claims he's doing, but what he's actually doing is comparing a model in which he is mortal and has a soul that exists independently of his body with a model in which he is immortal and has a soul that is produced by his body. He claims that under "OOFLam" once his body exists then a "self" is randomly allocated to it, but under his preferred model once his body exists then his particular "self" being associated with it is "a given".
 
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SOdhner said:
The point is that the likelihood of (a specific body + a specific soul) is the basis of Jabba's whole argument, and therefore it is extremely relevant to point out that just (a specific body) gives you a less unlikely number.

This is about pointing out a flaw in Jabba's logic, it is NOT something that I am suggesting is a useful real world test for whether or not we have souls.
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That's not a flaw in Jabba's logic. Jabba, and the rest of the thread, have defined H to mean "do not have a soul", not "may or may not have a soul".

Yes, it's true that just a specific body which may or may not have a soul is less unlikely than a specific body with a specific soul. It's also less unlikely than a specific body without a soul. And less unlikely than a specific body with a (non-specific) soul. How any of this is supposed to be relevant is beyond me.
 
godless dave said:
It's not supposed to.

Jabba is claiming to compare two models: one were humans just have bodies, and one where humans have bodies and souls.
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Just to clarify, so "humans [who] just have bodies" can have souls, right? After all we are not considering a model where "humans have bodies and not souls".
 
caveman1917 said:
Jabba, and the rest of the thread, have defined H to mean "do not have a soul", not "may or may not have a soul".
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No, Jabba has very carefully defined H as "Only One Finite Lifetime at most", and then included the existence of randomly allocated souls in his expression of the likelihood of his current existence if H is correct.
 
caveman1917 said:
Just to clarify, so "humans [who] just have bodies" can have souls, right? After all we are not considering a model where "humans have bodies and not souls".
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We are considering a model where humans have bodies and not souls. That's what "just have bodies" means.
 
caveman1917 said:
No it isn't. Materialism is just one of many philosophical positions which are consistent with science. You should distinguish between your personal philosophical inclinations and science. The entire science thing is a red herring anyway, the discussion is philosophical, materialism vs "immortal soul"-ism, not scientific.
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It most certainly is not, no matter your attempt at dictating the thread. Jabba started this thread with PROOF in the scientific sense, not a philosophical sense. Or so he thinks.



caveman1917 said:
That's not a flaw in Jabba's logic. Jabba, and the rest of the thread, have defined H to mean "do not have a soul", not "may or may not have a soul".

Yes, it's true that just a specific body which may or may not have a soul is less unlikely than a specific body with a specific soul. It's also less unlikely than a specific body without a soul. And less unlikely than a specific body with a (non-specific) soul. How any of this is supposed to be relevant is beyond me.
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It's relevant to the thread and the topic and the OP.
 
godless dave said:
I don't see an error.

I'm working with the models Jabba claims he is trying to compare.
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So you accept now that your argument does not provide a comparison between those models, (body + soul) and (body + not soul)? It only provides a comparison between (body + soul) and (body), and between (body + not soul) and (body).
 
caveman1917 said:
So you accept now that your argument does not provide a comparison between those models, (body + soul) and (body + not soul)? It only provides a comparison between (body + soul) and (body), and between (body + not soul) and (body).
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(body) and (body + not soul) are the same thing.
 
caveman1917 said:
Yes, it's true that just a specific body which may or may not have a soul is less unlikely than a specific body with a specific soul.
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Wrong. Since Jabba's definition of the 'self' and his (questionable) calculations on the likelihood of that particular self rely on individual traits it may or may not have, in a scenario where a soul is possible but not guaranteed we would treat 'born without a soul' as one of the possible outcomes and it would factor into the probability.

If instead you're suggesting that we can just throw our hands up and say "maybe they all have souls and maybe none of them do" and have that count as its own possibility, you're wrong. For evidence, I would suggest you read practically any of Jabba's explanations of his formula.

caveman1917 said:
How any of this is supposed to be relevant is beyond me.
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Because it's literally part of the foundation of Jabba's argument.
 
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