Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[caveman1917]

Moreover, in this particular problem we observe that for all x in {K, L, M}, P(x|E) ≤ P(H|E).

We observe no such thing.

All theories leading to immortality must assume at least the physical body that's observed in E, but that's all H requires.

No it doesn't, H requires that only the physical body exists (that consciousness is a property of that body). Hence your argument, which like most of the bad math in this thread you just repeat no matter how many times it gets refuted, fails because H is distinct from K and your argument relies on K being a subset of H.

Unless you want to claim that an immortal soul connected to the brain (K, L or M in your formulation) is an instance of H (the materialist position)?

The scientific position is materialism.

No it isn't. Materialism is just one of many philosophical positions which are consistent with science. You should distinguish between your personal philosophical inclinations and science. The entire science thing is a red herring anyway, the discussion is philosophical, materialism vs "immortal soul"-ism, not scientific.

 

[caveman1917]

Hey Jabba!




It seems like you're avoiding my post. Let me just make sure you understand how vital this is.

Any time you add a variable, the likelihood of a specific outcome goes down. So if we take the probability of a specific physical form and add the probability of a specific immortal self you by definition make it less likely than the materialistic explanation that just includes a body.

So the likelihood of you specifically existing is greater in a materialistic universe, which goes against how you've presented it.

Your post was in error. You're not comparing X with X * Y but comparing X * (1 - Y) with X * Y. In words, you're comparing a materialist body WITHOUT a soul with a materialist body WITH a soul (both of them have an extra condition, but you're leaving out the "without" condition on the first one). See my post above (you're basically making the same error as JayUtah).

5. So we have to look at the possibility of a materialistic explanation - no soul. We could make a big list of things about each unique person (brain configuration, DNA, whatever - again I'm not trying to put words in your mouth and the exact physical properties you do or don't count don't really matter for this part) but we don't need to do that here. We know that any one specific configuration is extremely unlikely but not zero.

{...}

7. Having a soul, on the other hand, would not remove all of the factors above.

I've highlighted the factor which it would remove.

 

[Belz...]

No it doesn't, H requires that only the physical body exists (that consciousness is a property of that body).

What's the difference?

Hence your argument, which like most of the bad math in this thread you just repeat no matter how many times it gets refuted

Refuted? Where? Certainly not by jabba.

No it isn't.

Well, if you say so.

The entire science thing is a red herring anyway, the discussion is philosophical, materialism vs "immortal soul"-ism, not scientific.

Philosophy doesn't answer factual questions. It's just mental masturbation in those cases. Science is the tool we need to answer factual questions. You can't answer "which of those two cars is faster?" with philosophy.

 

[jsfisher]

I'd have to google the exact formulation. Why would you not forget it? There are much better forms to put Bayesian inference in so as to think about it.

You have jumped from Bayes' Theorem all the way to the many forms of Bayesian inference. I'll stand by my statement.

Be that as it may, though, Jabba has yet to correct his formula or even understand that it is wrong.

 

[Jabba]

Caveman,
- Agreed. I am having difficulty nailing down a correct formula. How's this?

- Given:
...k = all background knowledge,
...P = the probability of,
...H = Hypothesis (we each have Only One Finite Lifetime at most),
...| = given,
...E = Evidence (my current existence),
...~H = Complement to H.
The formula for this probability is
...P(H|E & k) = P(E|H)P(H|k) / (P(E|H)P(H|k) + P(E|~H)P(~H|k)).

 

[Filippo Lippi]

Caveman,
- Agreed. I am having difficulty nailing down a correct formula. How's this?

- Given:
...k = all background knowledge,
...P = the probability of,
...H = Hypothesis (we each have Only One Finite Lifetime at most),
...| = given,
...E = Evidence (my current existence),
...~H = Complement to H.
The formula for this probability is
...P(H|E & k) = P(E|H)P(H|k) / (P(E|H)P(H|k) + P(E|~H)P(~H|k)).

What did the statisticians at the stats' forum think?

 

[JoeMorgue]

- Currently, my jury consists of maybe 50 devoted skeptics -- and, I'm just never going to get a fair hearing here. I sincerely doubt that I'll ever convince any of you guys that I have a reasonable case...

That's like complaining that you can't get fair trial because everyone on your jury supports in the concept of a trial by jury.

You don't want a "trial" Jabba, you just want to be right without doing any of the intellectual or argumentative legwork.

 

[JayUtah]

I am having difficulty nailing down a correct formula.

Yes. So don't blame your critics for your failures.

...H = Hypothesis (we each have Only One Finite Lifetime at most),
...~H = Complement to H.

Asked and answered. In your formulation you constantly shift which is the singular hypothesis and which is "everything else." This is how you hide your false dilemma.

 

[JayUtah]

You don't want a "trial" Jabba, you just want to be right without doing any of the intellectual or argumentative legwork.

Not entirely -- he wants his critics to be wrong. The overriding goal here is an attack on skepticism.

He revealed his animus before he arrived. His claims of external support as phrased as people who think we're wrong, not people who think he's right. He characterizes his critics as "devoted" rather than simply having arrived independently at the same conclusion. He insinuates -- but cannot prove -- that his critics must be biased against him.

He won't talk about his exploits with other statisticians because that experiment failed. He probably thought that if he could present his case among non-skeptics, he could then come back here and crow that "unbiased" authorities agreed with him, and that would serve his skeptics that skeptics reject his argument because skeptics are big, closed-minded meanies. But it didn't work; he got his head handed to him there too. So he sweeps it under the carpet and moves on to find some other ally he can exploit to try to paint skeptics as the ideological minority.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Not entirely -- he wants his critics to be wrong. The overriding goal here is an attack on skepticism.

Oh I know. Jabba's ulterior motive is a lot clearer than his arguments.

This whole thing is a subtle as a Kirk Cameron film.

 

[jond]

Jay,
- I'm developing my map for the sake of getting a mixed audience for my jury -- and consequently, getting a fair hearing...
- Currently, my jury consists of maybe 50 devoted skeptics -- and, I'm just never going to get a fair hearing here. I sincerely doubt that I'll ever convince any of you guys that I have a reasonable case...

- That's my story, and I'm stickin to it!

What on earth makes you think you haven't had a fair hearing? Everything that's been pointed out to you has been fairly considered and found seriously wanting. You, on the other hand, have never given your critics a fair hearing.

 

[Belz...]

What on earth makes you think you haven't had a fair hearing?

Because we didn't agree with him.

 

[SOdhner]

Your post was in error. You're not comparing X with X * Y but comparing X * (1 - Y) with X * Y. In words, you're comparing a materialist body WITHOUT a soul with a materialist body WITH a soul (both of them have an extra condition, but you're leaving out the "without" condition on the first one). See my post above (you're basically making the same error as JayUtah).

No. We're talking about the number of characteristics that are being checked for.

So X could be that I'm looking for a red, round, wooden block.
Y could be that I'm looking for a red, round, wooden, shiny block.

If you say I need to subtract from X because I *didn't* say shiny that time, then I need to subtract from both of them because I didn't say painted rather than stained, or has no letters on it, or came from Germany, etc.

Likewise, X is a discrete list of qualifications (DNA, brain configuration, whatever Jabba wants to define as vital characteristics of the physical self) and Y is all of that but also a soul.


EDIT: Better explanation: We're talking about the odds of getting a specific soul. In X, the odds of any soul at all is already zero so trying to take it into account is nonsense. It's like if I'm drawing a random block from a bag and none of them are blue and you're asking "what are the odds that it's blue, though?"

EDIT EDIT: To use your own formula, X * (1 - Y) but in a materialistic universe Y=0 so it's X*(1-0) which is just X.

 

[caveman1917]

You have jumped from Bayes' Theorem all the way to the many forms of Bayesian inference. I'll stand by my statement.

My point is that forgetting the exact formulation of Bayes' theorem isn't as bad as you make it out to be, given that other than for definitional purposes you wouldn't use it in that form anyway. Just like forgetting the exact formulation of the successor function doesn't stop you from thinking about arithmetic.

ETA: not that his applies to Jabba, but your comment seemed general.

 

[caveman1917]

Likewise, X is a discrete list of qualifications (DNA, brain configuration, whatever Jabba wants to define as vital characteristics of the physical self) and Y is all of that but also a soul.

In that case the conclusion is: "it is more likely that you may or may not have a soul than that you do have a soul." Note how the materialist position (ie "you do not have a soul") doesn't even come into it.

Your error (and JayUtah's when substituting H for X and K for Y) is that you first define X as "you may or may not have a soul" to derive that "you have a soul" has a smaller probability, and then at the end change the definition of X so as to be "you do not have a soul", leading you to erroneously conclude that P("you have a soul") <= P("you do not have a soul").

The correct (as well as trivial) conclusions that can be drawn from this line of argument are:
P("you have a soul") <= P("you may or may not have a soul")
P("you do not have a soul") <= P("you may or may not have a soul")

Given that the discussion here centers around comparing "you have a soul" with "you do not have a soul" (even though the skeptical position would be "you may or may not have a soul") these conclusions (and that line of argument) are also patently useless.

ETA: or in JayUtah's terms, ask yourself this: how can K be both a subset of H and a subset of ~H?

 

[HighRiser]

In that case the conclusion is: "it is more likely that you may or may not have a soul than that you do have a soul." Note how the materialist position (ie "you do not have a soul") doesn't even come into it.

Your error (and JayUtah's when substituting H for X and K for Y) is that you first define X as "you may or may not have a soul" to derive that "you have a soul" has a smaller probability, and then at the end change the definition of X so as to be "you do not have a soul", leading you to erroneously conclude that P("you have a soul") <= P("you do not have a soul").

The correct (as well as trivial) conclusions that can be drawn from this line of argument are:
P("you have a soul") <= P("you may or may not have a soul")
P("you do not have a soul") <= P("you may or may not have a soul")

Given that the discussion here centers around comparing "you have a soul" with "you do not have a soul" (even though the skeptical position would be "you may or may not have a soul") these conclusions (and that line of argument) are also patently useless.

ETA: or in JayUtah's terms, ask yourself this: how can K be both a subset of H and a subset of ~H?

Please correct me if I misunderstand.

Materialism doesn't say there are no souls. Materialism hasn't been shown evidence of souls. Therefore materialism doesn't have anything to say about souls.

Isn't the real question in this bit of Jabbanetics:
How does mathematics deal with unevidenced assertion?

 

[caveman1917]

Please correct me if I misunderstand.

Materialism doesn't say there are no souls. Materialism hasn't been shown evidence of souls. Therefore materialism doesn't have anything to say about souls.

1. Irrespective of whether H is materialism or not, it is not correct to conclude P(K | E) <= P(H | E) by the argument given.

2. H has been used to mean "materialism".

3. Materialism does say there are no souls, it is basically the assertion: "only the physical exists". If you're talking about "souls may or may not exist" then you're not talking about materialism.

Isn't the real question in this bit of Jabbanetics:
How does mathematics deal with unevidenced assertion?

No.

 

[SOdhner]

Note how the materialist position (ie "you do not have a soul") doesn't even come into it.

You're wrong. I already explained why, but you didn't quote that part.

Your error (and JayUtah's when substituting H for X and K for Y) is that you first define X as "you may or may not have a soul"

No, I didn't.

Let's try this again, from the top.

I am setting up two totally distinct experiments, in different rooms with different people. They're not the same test.

Experiment 1: I have a bag of wooden blocks. It has an equal number of square and triangular blocks. Someone pulls out a block at random. The likelihood of getting a specific possible outcome is 50% (the block is either square or triangular).

Experiment 2: I have two bags of wooden blocks. One has an equal number of square and triangular blocks. The other has an equal number of red and blue blocks. Someone pulls out a block at random from each bag. The likelihood of getting a specific possible outcome is 25% (the first block is square and the second is red, the first is square and the second is blue, the first is triangular and the second is red, or the first is triangular and the second is blue).

In one of the experiments, the possibility of getting a specific distinct outcome is more likely than the other.

Since Jabba's argument essentially boils down to "wow it's unlikely for me to exist!" it's relevant to point out that in a universe where there are less variables (Experiment 2) your specific existence is more likely.

 

[caveman1917]

You're wrong.

No I'm not.

Experiment 2: I have two bags of wooden blocks. One has an equal number of square and triangular blocks. The other has an equal number of red and blue blocks. Someone pulls out a block at random from each bag. The likelihood of getting a specific possible outcome is 25% (the first block is square and the second is red, the first is square and the second is blue, the first is triangular and the second is red, or the first is triangular and the second is blue).

Is getting the outcome "square + red" (body + soul) more or less likely than getting the outcome "square + not red" (body + not soul)? You claim that it is less likely, but by your own experiment it would seem equally likely. You should really think this through a bit.

 

[SOdhner]

Is getting the outcome "square + red" (body + soul) more or less likely than getting the outcome "square + not red" (body + not soul)?

You've misunderstood the analogy. Red would be a specific soul. Blue would also be a specific soul. Either would be equally likely, but they would both be souls.