Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."
- I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me that wouldn't bring ME back to life. That's probably the best I can do towards arguing my conclusion that the physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.

But you haven't been able to describe that difference. A copy of something is always separate from the original. You seem to be saying you expect everything about the copy to be separate from the original except the sense of self. How does that make sense?
 
Hans,
- The ME that is not brought back to life is not defined by my physical existence.
--- Jabba


Therefore it doesn't exist under H, and claims that it exists have no place in an calculation of the likelihood of your existence under H.
 
- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."
- I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me that wouldn't bring ME back to life. That's probably the best I can do towards arguing my conclusion that the physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.


Things that you imagine have no place there either.
 
- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."

Under H there is no difference. A perfect copy of the organism, under H, must demonstrate the same properties.

I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me...

What you imagine or suppose has absolutely nothing to do with H. If you're trying to falsify H by reckoning P(E|H) as very small, you must use H as it is, not as you imagine.

That's probably the best I can do...

We know it's the best you can do because it appears to be all you can do. And you've been told several times why it's not good enough. It's not good enough because it blatantly begs the question. Since you have no answer for that rebuttal, and since you've admitted you have no better argument, the only rational thing for you to do now is concede defeat once and for all. Do you have the courage to do that?
 
All I seem able to do here is repeat myself.

Yes, and it's very annoying. Stop it.

I either recognize, or imagine, a direct line of deductive reasoning in the claim that if the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something.

There's no reasoning, deductive or otherwise, in that statement. It's a naked claim for which you provide no evidence or discussion. You can't define or describe what would be missing. You simply insist it must somehow exist.

IMO, there is a particular sense of self that is missing.

Not under H.

It seems to be a different kind of difference than you guys are including.

Your critics are properly describing what happens under H. Under H there is not and cannot be any difference between the original and its copy. It follows from the theory. All your vain repetition is simply trying very very hard to paste onto H concepts it doesn't embody, and then trick people into agreeing with you. It's playground debate, not actual debate.
 
Agatha,

#1
- All I seem able to do here is repeat myself.
- I either recognize, or imagine, a direct line of deductive reasoning in the claim that if the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something... IMO, there is a particular sense of self that is missing.
- It seems to be a different kind of difference than you guys are including.

#2
- I think I agree.

If you agree with 2, why do you insist that 1 should be part of H? It's not, and until you stop trying to put things into H that don't belong you are going to keep repeating yourself. Now would be a good time to stop that.
 
- I either recognize, or imagine, a direct line of deductive reasoning in the claim that if the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something... IMO, there is a particular sense of self that is missing.

1. This is the part where I need some help. You have stated clearly above that there is a direct line of deductive reasoning to support your conclusion that something is missing. I have even start the framework here.

<Here is> a direct line of deductive reasoning

Insert reasoning here

<To support> the claim that if the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something.


Hans,
- The ME that is not brought back to life is not defined by my physical existence.
--- Jabba

2. Then help me please, what IS it defined by? According to current scientific theory the conscious process IS defined by the physical existence and accumulation of experiences.

3. Also what are your thoughts on other intelligent but less evolved creatures and their copies, is something missing in them as well. Why or why not?
 
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Without absolving Jabba of answering your questions, let me add some insight that I think may be helpful.

You have stated clearly above that there is a direct line of deductive reasoning to support your conclusion that something is missing.

Ah, but read carefully. Jabba is playing one of his standard word games that other critics have characterized as boiling down to, "Do you agree that if I had evidence and a valid line of reasoning, I will have proven my case?" Naturally someone agrees to this -- because it does logically hold -- and Jabba pivots that agreement to mean agreement that he has evidence and a valid line of reasoning, at which point he hops around with glee -- it's the "gotcha" moment he's been playing for for years. Don't fall for it; it's one of his more disingenuous deceptions.

In the line of reasoning

If the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something.​

"ME" is unclear. Jabba has never defined it except as whatever would be missing from an otherwise perfect copy. "Bring back to life" is unclear. Jabba has never defined it except as what wouldn't happen even if a perfect copy were made. Since his definitions are blatantly circular, we say his claim fails immediately (see below). But we can infer plausible (if unevidenced) meanings such that the line of reasoning is valid. If a process of duplication in some detectable way fails to produce an identical copy -- as insinuated by "bring ME back to life" -- then you can validly argue something is missing. (Something may have been added to the copy, but the gist of the line of reasoning is still operative.)

The abstract defensibility of such a cause and effect relationship, given reasonable meaning for the undefined elements, is utterly irrelevant to whether some enclosing reasoning purports those causes or observes those effects. Jabba wants you to agree that a certain conclusion would follow from a certain premise as a trick to avoid having to prove the premise.

Here the intentional ambiguity in his wording is meant to trick you into accepting the line of reasoning under the unstated premise that meanings reasonable under H are intended by "ME" and "bring back to life." Only after you expressly do what I suggest above -- evaluate the syllogism with provisional meanings -- will you find out that "ME" means soul and "bring back to life" means some form of spiritual (re)incarnation. Your agreement would give him the desired toehold from which to argue that you've also agree those things are part of H.

Then help me please, what IS it defined by? According to current scientific theory the conscious process IS defined by the physical existence and accumulation of experiences.

I don't have to belabor that Jabba is drawing the line of reasoning not from materialism but from a fairly obvious straw man. In materialism all observable properties flow from the material as time-dependent functions. As such it is impossible under H (materialism) to reproduce the material exactly without also reproducing the properties exactly. Jabba believes otherwise, of course, but has deliberately insulated himself from the elephant in the room: he cannot apply those beliefs to H as a means of falsifying it via Bayes' theorem.
 
Jabba, 1)why do you think that a perfect copy of a person would have any ongoing connection with the original - why would Waterman and Xaterman both say "blue and red?

2)Under H, the one in the blue room would say blue, and the one in the red room would say red. Under H, the original and the perfect copy would both have identical-but-separate senses of self.

Agatha,

#1
- All I seem able to do here is repeat myself.
- I either recognize, or imagine, a direct line of deductive reasoning in the claim that if the copy doesn't bring ME back to life, it's missing something... IMO, there is a particular sense of self that is missing.
- It seems to be a different kind of difference than you guys are including.

#2
- I think I agree.


Jabba, you can't agree with 2) if you also claim that there would be something missing from the copy that was present in the original. These positions are inconsistent.
 
- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."
- I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me that wouldn't bring ME back to life. That's probably the best I can do towards arguing my conclusion that the physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.

That's the best you've been able to do the last 5 years, and it's not good enough to prove immortality. LOOK AT THE SUBJECT LINE!
 
- I guess I'll have to go back to "difference."
- I recognize, or imagine, a deductive difference between me and a copy of me that wouldn't bring ME back to life. That's probably the best I can do towards arguing my conclusion that the physically perfect copy would not be a totally perfect copy.

But you haven't been able to describe that difference. A copy of something is always separate from the original. You seem to be saying you expect everything about the copy to be separate from the original except the sense of self. How does that make sense?
Dave,
- I've been trying -- but, for whatever reason, nothing seems to communicate. Once again, it's the thing or process that you would say cannot be reincarnated.
 
I've been trying -- but, for whatever reason, nothing seems to communicate.

Not for "whatever" reason. We've been telling you the reason your explanation doesn't "communicate." It's a circular non-explanation. And look, here's another example of your circular reasoning:

Once again, it's the thing or process that you would say cannot be reincarnated.
 
Hans,
- The ME that is not brought back to life is not defined by my physical existence.
--- Jabba

Therefore it doesn't exist under H, and claims that it exists have no place in an calculation of the likelihood of your existence under H.
Mojo,
- H accepts the existence of a specific sense of self that will not be "reincarnated." Consequently, H seems to be talking about the same thing that I think might be reincarnated.
- Everyone seems to understand what the thing or process is to which reincarnation refers. H accepts that the specific sense of self to which reincarnation refers does exist -- but according to H, this specific sense of self just can't be reincarnated...
 
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