Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[MRC_Hans]

Prestige says he agrees.

If people say "You are right" or "I agree on this point", or something similar, then you can assume they agree. But then you don't have to ask.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- How about this? H and ~H are talking about the same experience of "identity" -- H thinks it's an illusion, ~H thinks it's real.

No, H does not claim it is an illusion. It says the experience of identity is real and is a product of a functioning brain. It not only thinks so, it can provide evidence.


Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- My claim is that if I'm not brought back to life, my copy isn't perfect.

The difference is in your definition of being brought back to life, which is taylor-made to try and exclude materialism.

The materialistic definition is that you feel and act alive and recognize your own identity. Under that definition you are brought back to life.

But it is irrelevant. Your task is to prove H wrong, not to speculate about definitions.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Hans,
- If my copy did't bring ME back to life, it would not involve my particular sense of self -- there would be something missing. The old VW had no sense of self to be missing in its perfect copy.

The copy would bring YOU back to life. There would be no way (expect by observation of the copy process) to distinguish YOU before and YOU after.

Hans

 

[theprestige]

Prestige says he agrees.

No, I don't. I don't agree, and I don't say I agree.

However, there is a point of potential agreement between us. I have described that point clearly. As long as you refuse to describe that point with equal clarity, you and I absolutely do not agree.

I gave you an opportunity for clear agreement in my last reply to you. You repaid me by ignoring the opportunity and lying about my position.

 

[The Norseman]

- What are the Volk's emergent properties?

Going 60 mph, for one.

Or the sound of the running engine (a thought which had occurred to me way back). Every functioning VW would make a unique engine sound while running and if that VW were perfectly copied, it'd make the exact same engine sound as the original. Just like people.

- My claim is that if I'm not brought back to life, my copy isn't perfect.

Are you the same person waking as you were before falling asleep?

It would be the exact same experience under your "brought back to life" concept. Right now, every single night, you go to sleep and your consciousness ends. You become aware again (conscious) upon waking. You have no knowledge or experiences during the time when you are not conscious -- which includes things like general anesthesia and so on.

Your current 'me' would cease to exist and the perfect copy would then be 'me'. 'You' would experience nothing different than as if 'you' had gone to sleep and then woken up.

To anyone: am I making sense here?

 

[JesseCuster]

Hans,
- If my copy did't bring ME back to life, it would not involve my particular sense of self -- there would be something missing. The old VW had no sense of self to be missing in its perfect copy.

1. A perfect copy of you would have its own sense of self identical to yours. It wouldn't be "missing" any sense of self. You're begging the question that your sense of self is special and that a duplicate of you that had its own identical sense of self is therefore missing something. It isn't.

2. You're special pleading that a sense of self is something special that makes humans stand out from everything else in the universe, and that therefore analogies with other objects with their own emergent properties don't work because those emergent properties aren't the sense of self that you think is special and different to other emergent properties. Under H, there's nothing special about our sense of self as opposed to other emergent properties.

3. Volkswagens have their own properties like shape or gas mileage. You can duplicate perfectly a VW and it will have it's own shape and gas mileage that's identical to the original. The duplicate VW is no more "missing" the shape or the original or the gas mileage of the original any more than a duplicate of you is "missing" your sense of self.

This is all just question begging and special pleading about your sense of self, simply asserting its specialness because you believe so, that it's different to all other emergent properties and therefore plays by its own rules that means you can conclude all sorts of things about it, that aren't justified at all, other than you simply assert and believe them to be true.

 

[The Norseman]

1. A perfect copy of you would have its own sense of self identical to yours. It wouldn't be "missing" any sense of self. You're begging the question that your sense of self is special and that a duplicate of you that had its own identical sense of self is therefore missing something. It isn't.

2. You're special pleading that a sense of self is something special that makes humans stand out from everything else in the universe, and that therefore analogies with other objects with their own emergent properties don't work because those emergent properties aren't the sense of self that you think is special and different to other emergent properties. Under H, there's nothing special about our sense of self as opposed to other emergent properties.

3. Volkswagens have their own properties like shape or gas mileage. You can duplicate perfectly a VW and it will have it's own shape and gas mileage that's identical to the original. The duplicate VW is no more "missing" the shape or the original or the gas mileage of the original any more than a duplicate of you is "missing" your sense of self.

This is all just question begging and special pleading about your sense of self, simply asserting its specialness because you believe so, that it's different to all other emergent properties and therefore plays by its own rules that means you can conclude all sorts of things about it, that aren't justified at all, other than you simply assert and believe them to be true.

Yes, exactly.

If I were to guess, I'd say that, once someone agreed that this sense of self were unique, he'd immediately equivocate that sense of self to the soul and then... voilá!

THE SOUL EXISTS THEREFORE GOD (and immortality all in one!)

 

[Toontown]

The difference is in your definition of being brought back to life, which is taylor-made to try and exclude materialism.

The materialistic definition is that you feel and act alive and recognize your own identity. Under that definition you are brought back to life.

Hmm. It seems that something is missing from that definition.

I currently fit that definition. I have been brought to life. I feel and act alive and recognize my own identity. But the definition seems somehow superfluous.

OK, I see the problem. There is no way to tell the difference between being brought to life and being brought back to life, because there is no difference.

It isn't that something is missing from your definition, it is that something has been superfluously added - the word "back".

Being brought to life and being brought back to life are the same. You wake up. You're there. You might be a bear, but whatever you are, it's you.

OTOH, if an exact copy of a dead you wakes up, you're not there, and it's not you.

But it is irrelevant. Your task is to prove H wrong, not to speculate about definitions.

Which makes your task ridiculously easy. Too easy. You should be made to dig a ditch or something, to compensate for your self-appointed task being far too easy.

And Jabba's task...well, I'll just say next to impossible. It's kind of boring. Like watching a game of "king of the hill" where the "hill" is a sheer cliff, and you're sitting at the top of the cliff waiting for Jabba to impossibly scale it, occasionally yelling down to Jabba that' he's never going to make it.

Even if Jabba were to somehow prove H wrong (about a possibility of immortality), I confidently assert that you would fail to understand the proof, automatically deny it, and no one would be the wiser.

 

[The Norseman]

Hmm. It seems that something is missing from that definition.

I currently fit that definition. I have been brought to life. I feel and act alive and recognize my own identity. But the definition seems somehow superfluous.

OK, I see the problem. There is no way to tell the difference between being brought to life and being brought back to life, because there is no difference.

It isn't that something is missing from your definition, it is that something has been superfluously added - the word "back".

Being brought to life and being brought back to life are the same. You wake up. You're there. You might be a bear, but whatever you are, it's you.

OTOH, if an exact copy of a dead you wakes up, you're not there, and it's not you.

How so?

Which makes your task ridiculously easy. Too easy. You should be made to dig a ditch or something, to compensate for your self-appointed task being far too easy.

Why are you personalizing this? Recall it was Jabba who claims he has proof of immortality. His claim, his burden. MRC_Hans has no burden, self-appointed or not, so I fail to see why you're insulting him (with this and the rest of your post).

 

[Toontown]

How so?

How is what so?

I was just saying that whatever fits MRC_Hans definition of you is you, irrespective of what form it takes. Even if it's a bear.

But something that is not you is not you, even if it is physically identical to some dead former you.

This is tautological.

Why are you personalizing this?

Because I'm a cranky bastard, and this balderdash

The copy would bring YOU back to life. There would be no way (expect by observation of the copy process) to distinguish YOU before and YOU after.

should require a ditch to be dug.

 

[John Jones]

No, I don't. I don't agree, and I don't say I agree.

However, there is a point of potential agreement between us. I have described that point clearly. As long as you refuse to describe that point with equal clarity, you and I absolutely do not agree.

I gave you an opportunity for clear agreement in my last reply to you. You repaid me by ignoring the opportunity and lying about my position.

Jabba bees that way most times.

 

[John Jones]

How is what so?

I was just saying that whatever fits MRC_Hans definition of you is you, irrespective of what form it takes. Even if it's a bear.

But something that is not you is not you, even if it is physically identical to some dead former you.

This is tautological.



Because I'm a cranky bastard, and this balderdash



should require a ditch to be dug.

Want to borrow a shovel?

 

[Loss Leader]

jond,
- That there are two necessary conditions at the top level of cause and effect under ~H, and only one under H, does not make H more likely than ~H.

Yes it does, so long as one condition isn't the direct cause of the other.


Ex.

1. John is a new lawyer and John has brown hair.

There's a chance that John is a new lawyer. There's a chance he has brown hair. The chance of both being true is lower than the chance that only one of them is.

2. John is a new lawyer and John graduated law school.

In this case, the only way to become a new lawyer is to graduate law school. All new lawyers must graduate law school. The chance that John is a new lawyer and that he graduated law school is the same as the chance that he's a new lawyer.

You are giving two conditions: Jabba came into existence out of an infinite pool and Jabba was ensouled with a soul specific to Jabba that is seperable from him.

They're two different things. The fact that you exist is far more likely than the fact that you exist with an immortal soul.

 

[Mojo]

You are giving two conditions: Jabba came into existence out of an infinite pool and Jabba was ensouled with a soul specific to Jabba that is seperable from him.

They're two different things. The fact that you exist is far more likely than the fact that you exist with an immortal soul.

Which is why Jabba is claiming that the latter condition is "a given" under ~H but virtually impossible under H.

ETA: ...and, of course, why Jabba continues to insist that the existence and selection of his particular immaterial soul is a requirement for his existence under an hypothesis in which immaterial souls don't exist.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Hmm. It seems that something is missing from that definition.

No, it works fine for the purpose of the discussion with Jabba.

I currently fit that definition. I have been brought to life. I feel and act alive and recognize my own identity.

Congratulations.

But the definition seems somehow superfluous.

OK, I see the problem. There is no way to tell the difference between being brought to life and being brought back to life, because there is no difference.

And that is exactly the idea.

It isn't that something is missing from your definition, it is that something has been superfluously added - the word "back".

The purpose was exactly to show that "back" is not something special.

Being brought to life and being brought back to life are the same. You wake up. You're there. You might be a bear, but whatever you are, it's you.

Congratulations, you understood.

OTOH, if an exact copy of a dead you wakes up, you're not there, and it's not you.

Well, since a dead person does not wake up (if they do, they weren't dead), that would be correct. And irrelevant.

Which makes your task ridiculously easy. Too easy. You should be made to dig a ditch or something, to compensate for your self-appointed task being far too easy.

Or I could write long wordy posts saying very little.

And Jabba's task...well, I'll just say next to impossible. It's kind of boring. Like watching a game of "king of the hill" where the "hill" is a sheer cliff, and you're sitting at the top of the cliff waiting for Jabba to impossibly scale it, occasionally yelling down to Jabba that' he's never going to make it.

Correct. Perhaps you can explain it to him.

Even if Jabba were to somehow prove H wrong (about a possibility of immortality), I confidently assert that you would fail to understand the proof, automatically deny it, and no one would be the wiser.

Well, since the probability of that happening is something over infinity, you can have your assertion in peace.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

I was just saying that whatever fits MRC_Hans definition of you is you, irrespective of what form it takes. Even if it's a bear.

Under Jabba's "H", yes.

But something that is not you is not you, even if it is physically identical to some dead former you.

If the copy was made before you died, then it will be you.

This is tautological.

No. It is rather obvious, but that is something else.

Hans

 

[Belz...]

Argumemnon,
- Read that again. The experience does exist under H. The interpretation of the experience is what differs between the two hypotheses.

Who cares? Interpretations aren't things. Are you going to make a substantive argument at some point? Because so far all you're doing is playing with words, re-stating your definitions and beliefs, and avoiding hard truths.

 

[Belz...]

- That under H my current existence is virtually zero and that I'm a legitimate target.

Stop repeating your claim. Demonstrate why you think your "odds" have any relation to reality.

Start with this: why do you think that the "self" is a different property from a VW's colour?

 

[The Sparrow]

...
To anyone: am I making sense here?

Yes. Love the engine running analogy too.