Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

Status
Not open for further replies.
No, you're trying to claim that independently existing souls exist under H but not under ~H, so you can beg the question and stack the deck at the same time.
Mojo,
Unfortunately, I don't understand what you're saying...
 
- My claim is that if I'm not brought back to life, my copy isn't perfect.

Your claim simply insists on the ambiguous language "brought back to life" to avoid the exactitude of the counterarguments you're being presented with. H specifically describes what would happen via copies or reanimation, and these descriptions have been entirely ignored by you in favor of special pleading. You have simply created a new concept analogous to a soul that you say doesn't happen by being "brought back to life."
 
- My claim is that if I'm not brought back to life, my copy isn't perfect.

If the copy thinks it is you, has all your memories and sense of self, how exactly is that different from you being brought back to life?
 
- Seems to me that the identity that doesn't exist under H is the ~H interpretation of the experience. H and ~H are referring to the same experience, they just interpret it differently. Here, we're trying to determine which is interpreting correctly.

What evidence do you have that H doesn't interpret it correctly?
- That under H my current existence is virtually zero and that I'm a legitimate target.
 
If you "basically agree" then you must know that H is far more likely than ~H. And yet you refuse to even acknowledge the posts that demonstrate this basic fact.
jond,
- That there are two necessary conditions at the top level of cause and effect under ~H, and only one under H, does not make H more likely than ~H.
 
Both wrong, and neither is evidence.

Jabba already admitted he doesn't have any evidence for the element of his proposed concept of identity that H allegedly cannot explain. That's when he asserts that the evidence must be there, but science is somehow blind to it.
 
jond,
- That there are two necessary conditions at the top level of cause and effect under ~H, and only one under H, does not make H more likely than ~H.

Under H, your brain is all that is required to explain E. Under your ~H, you need to account for the existsence of the brain and the something else, and their connection. You KNOW this, and you've been shown the math that proves you wrong, and yet you continue to ignore it and pretend it has never been brought to your attention.
 
jond,
- That there are two necessary conditions at the top level of cause and effect under ~H, and only one under H, does not make H more likely than ~H.

That's not an accurate picture of the problem. It's not just that one consequent has two antecedents and the other consequent has only one antecedent. It's that the more complex consequent has as one of its antecedents the same antecedent as the simple outcome. It can never be more probable than the simple consequent following from the shared antecedent.

This was explained to you in excruciating detail. You never resolved it. You just went off into befuddlement mode and left it in silence.
 
Last edited:
No, the copy would not be missing anything, but obviously, it would still be a copy. So the copy would be able to continue your life without itself or anybody else noticing a difference.

But if the original died, it would stay dead.

Just like the VW: If you make a perfect copy a VW (including wear and tear and dents) and scrap the original, you would have a VW just like before, but the original would still be scrapped. But you would not notice.

So for all practical purposes, both you and the VW would be resurrected.

Hans
Hans,
- If my copy did't bring ME back to life, it would not involve my particular sense of self -- there would be something missing. The old VW had no sense of self to be missing in its perfect copy.
 
If my copy did't bring ME back to life, it would not involve my particular sense of self -- there would be something missing.

"Bring back to life" is ambiguous. You haven't defined it non-circularly. Today, "bring me back to life" is just your bugbear for a soul. You've shown no evidence of anything other H that would not be exactly reproduced.

The old VW had no sense of self to be missing in its perfect copy.

It has other emergent properties that would be identically reproduced. Under H the sense of self does not have any of the magical qualities you insinuate.
 
Hans,
- If my copy did't bring ME back to life, it would not involve my particular sense of self -- there would be something missing. The old VW had no sense of self to be missing in its perfect copy.

Nothing would be missing because the copy's sense of self would be exactly the same as the original sense of self.
 
jond,
- That there are two necessary conditions at the top level of cause and effect under ~H, and only one under H, does not make H more likely than ~H.

It does if the common condition between the two scenarios has the same probability under both. In that case adding a second condition can never raise the overall probability, it can only leave it the same or lower it.
 
Mojo,
- Couple of problems here.
- The die could be loaded.
- But I have already proven that the sides are indeed numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6...


Neither of those is relevant to the question which, in case you need to be reminded, is this:

A three has been thrown. What is the likelihood of this event if H (the hypothesis that the die has a three on each side) is true?
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom