Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[Belz...]

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

No, NOBODY told you that. We ALL told you that the copy would NOT bring YOUR instance of self back to life, but would be an IDENTICAL copy of you which, from the point of view of everybody, would be the very same person.

The only difference is that the YOU you're talking about is dead.

The only way to bring YOU back isn't through a perfect copy but by reconstructing your exact body. This, however, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, doesn't have continuity with your self NOW, just like your self NOW has no continuity with the self that started reading this post.

Can you understand and memorise this?

 

[Jabba]

I've read SF stories in which the protagonist uploads copies of his consciousness into robots or clones and sends them out to fight and die, and been struck by the fact that each individual consciousness has its own separate sense of self which will cease even though the original continues, so it's not as if the point which so energises Jabba is not being understood. But his argument (or at least this part of it) hinges on his belief that there is something special about the property of consciousness which does apply equally to any other property (the speed of a car, the yellowness of a banana). He still has not even attempted to show this, he just assumes it because it seems obvious. But lots of things that seemed obvious turned out not to be true so he really does need to justify it.

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

 

[Loss Leader]

Jesse,
- Your right. Those odds will not change.
- But, if you have more than one, finite, life, the odds of your current existence do change, and are better.

How drastically do the odds change of you have two lives instead of one? You say the odds of living are zero. Zero times two is still zero.

How many lives do you need before the odds become acceptable to you?

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

 

[godless dave]

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

I told you that you would not be brought back to life, and that does not mean the copy of you would have something left out.

 

[godless dave]

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

In H, it does not bring an identity with it. It does not have an identity any more than a Volkswagen has an identity.

 

[JayUtah]

I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy.

Under H anything that the original exhibits would have to be exhibited in the copy. That's what it means to be a property.

The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

Volkswagens have many emergent properties, as do nearly all complex entities. "Emergent property" is not just another word for soul, Jabba.

 

[Jabba]

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

No, NOBODY told you that. We ALL told you that the copy would NOT bring YOUR instance of self back to life, but would be an IDENTICAL copy of you which, from the point of view of everybody, would be the very same person.

The only difference is that the YOU you're talking about is dead.

The only way to bring YOU back isn't through a perfect copy but by reconstructing your exact body. This, however, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, doesn't have continuity with your self NOW, just like your self NOW has no continuity with the self that started reading this post.

Can you understand and memorise this?

- No.
- I think you missed the "not" in my statement above.

 

[Jabba]

In H, it does not bring an identity with it. It does not have an identity any more than a Volkswagen has an identity.

- Correct.
- But does H recognize the particular experience that I'm alluding to and calling "identity"?

 

[JayUtah]

- Correct.
- But does H recognize the particular experience that I'm alluding to and calling "identity"?

I answered that question yesterday, Jabba.

 

[godless dave]

- Correct.
- But does H recognize the particular experience that I'm alluding to and calling "identity"?

I answered this yesterday, and you replied to the answer:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=11835043#post11835043

 

[Jabba]

How drastically do the odds change of you have two lives instead of one? You say the odds of living are zero. Zero times two is still zero.

How many lives do you need before the odds become acceptable to you?

Sent from my SM-G930V using Tapatalk

LL,
- How about an infinity of, or an infinite life, or "now" isn't what we think it is, or...?

 

[Pixel42]

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

The VW copy has an identical, but different, instance of yellowness in exactly the same way that the Jabba copy would have an identical, but different, instance of consciousness/identity. If you think otherwise you need to give a good reason.

 

[Belz...]

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

Why do you distinguish the Volk's emergent properties from yours?

 

[Belz...]

- No.
- I think you missed the "not" in my statement above.

You misunderstand: NO ONE told you that something would be missing. That is entirely your own argument based on nothing but your contention that the "self" is somehow different from any other property, something you have not demonstrated.

 

[Monza]

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

No, consciousness doesn't bring anything with it. The particular identity (or sense of self) is the emergent property.

The only thing that differs from the copy to the original is the fact that the copy is not the original. That's it. Your perfect copy is not 'you' in the sense that 'you' are the original. This is no different than the perfect copy of the VW is not the original VW.

 

[godless dave]

And after just repeating yesterday's discussion, he's gone.

 

[Belz...]

And after just repeating yesterday's discussion, he's gone.

godless dave,
- He'll be back.

 

[Jabba]

It does? Can you describe this identity? It doesn't sound like anything that exists under H.

Dave,
- This is where our words have failed us...
- I'll see if I can do better this time...
- Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.
- Surely, it is recognized by H.
- So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H -- it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

The particular sense of self under H is something a particular brain experiences. If you have specified a brain, then you have specified a sense of self. Everything about the sense of self is determined by the brain. If you know which brain it is, you know which sense of self it is. You don't need an identity property to know which self is which, any more than you need one to know which brain is which. If you somehow perfectly duplicated a human body, you would perfectly duplicate their sense of self. Nothing in the copy would be missing. It would be just like duplicating a Volkswagen in that respect.

In H, it does not bring an identity with it. It does not have an identity any more than a Volkswagen has an identity.

- Correct.
- But does H recognize the particular experience that I'm alluding to and calling "identity"?

I answered this yesterday, and you replied to the answer:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=11835043#post11835043

The particular sense of self under H is something a particular brain experiences. If you have specified a brain, then you have specified a sense of self. Everything about the sense of self is determined by the brain. If you know which brain it is, you know which sense of self it is. You don't need an identity property to know which self is which, any more than you need one to know which brain is which. If you somehow perfectly duplicated a human body, you would perfectly duplicate their sense of self. Nothing in the copy would be missing. It would be just like duplicating a Volkswagen in that respect.

Dave,
- A ways above, you say that the "identity" I was alluding to doesn't sound like anything that exists under H. I then asked if H recognizes the "identity" to which I was alluding. My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.
- I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

 

[Belz...]

Dave,
- A ways above, you say that the "identity" I was alluding to doesn't sound like anything that exists under H. I then asked if H recognizes the "identity" to which I was alluding. My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.
- I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

Why do you distinguish the Volk's emergent properties from yours?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- A ways above, you say that the "identity" I was alluding to doesn't sound like anything that exists under H. I then asked if H recognizes the "identity" to which I was alluding. My claim is that if H recognizes that identity, that identity is something that exists under H.
- I don't see how the immediately above answers that objection.

This is the identity that doesn't exist under H:

Pixel,
- I think that my answer is that my consciousness is an emergent property which brings with it a particular identity which would be different in the consciousness of my "perfect" copy. The VW copy has no emergent property or particular identity that differs from the original.

This is the identity that does:

the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.