Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[Steve]

The beautiful thing is that "now" isn't even the same "now" as when Jabba wrote that.

Or even when you read this.






Or even now, when you read this.

Whooaaaa man!! My brain can't handle this. Soooo heavy! You must be really trippin'. How many souls do I really have? I just can't..........
.

 

[Jabba]

But the engine in the duplicate Volkswagen is not the same engine as in the original Volkswagen. So the duplicate Volkswagen is missing the original engine. So the two Volkswagens are different.

Right?

- Not the way that the selves are.
- The emergent property of consciousness produces a kind of identity that the VW's don't have.

It does? Can you describe this identity? It doesn't sound like anything that exists under H.

Dave,

- This is where our words have failed us...
- I'll see if I can do better this time...

- Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.
- Surely, it is recognized by H.
- So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H -- it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- This is where our words have failed us...
- I'll see if I can do better this time...

- Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.
- Surely, it is recognized by H. So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H -- it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

The particular sense of self under H is something a particular brain experiences. If you have specified a brain, then you have specified a sense of self. Everything about the sense of self is determined by the brain. If you know which brain it is, you know which sense of self it is. You don't need an identity property to know which self is which, any more than you need one to know which brain is which. If you somehow perfectly duplicated a human body, you would perfectly duplicate their sense of self. Nothing in the copy would be missing. It would be just like duplicating a Volkswagen in that respect.

 

[Hokulele]

Dave,

- This is where our words have failed us...
- I'll see if I can do better this time...

- Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.
- Surely, it is recognized by H.
- So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H -- it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

But the reality is that it doesn't exist under H. That is where you keep failing.

 

[JayUtah]

This is where our words have failed us...

You keep saying this, but as soon as the nomenclature is worked out and defined, you come up with a new word that means, effectively, a soul. Stop doing that and we'll wind this up rather quickly.

That said, your problem lately has more to do with your inability to maintain the distinction among H, ~H, and E.

Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.

That experience is E.

Surely, it is recognized by H.

H not only recognizes it, it offers an explanation for it. The sense of self that we all experience is a property of our functioning brain and nervous system.

~H also recognizes it but has a different explanation for it. It says that sense of self is your immortal soul.

Your proposal is that ~H is a better explanation for E than H is. You further propose that we can determine this in part by computing P(E|H)/P(E|~H). Unfortunately you fail at properly doing so, so your proposal fails.

So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H--

No, once again you're confusing E and H. The experience is E. It exists both in the numerator and the denominator of your likelihood ratio. It has to, and it has to be the same thing in each case. You tend to muddle things up by assuming E has to pull in various things from H and/or ~H.

...it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

Only if by that you mean that H and ~H disagree over what causes it. When you evaluate P(E|H) you have to assume arguendo the cause that's given by H. You don't do that; when you evaluate P(E|H) you're mistakenly incorporating elements from ~H into E. That's one of the many errors you commit in this proof. You're saying in effect that H must fail because it doesn't explain concepts from ~H (and elsewhere). That begs ~H.

 

[Belz...]

It does? Can you describe this identity? It doesn't sound like anything that exists under H.

Dave,

- This is where our words have failed us...
- I'll see if I can do better this time...

- Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.
- Surely, it is recognized by H.
- So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H -- it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

Aaaand... you didn't answer his question. How shocking.

 

[Jabba]

The particular sense of self under H is something a particular brain experiences. If you have specified a brain, then you have specified a sense of self. Everything about the sense of self is determined by the brain. If you know which brain it is, you know which sense of self it is. You don't need an identity property to know which self is which, any more than you need one to know which brain is which. If you somehow perfectly duplicated a human body, you would perfectly duplicate their sense of self. Nothing in the copy would be missing. It would be just like duplicating a Volkswagen in that respect.

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

 

[Loss Leader]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

As far as the copy was concerned, yes.

 

[jsfisher]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

Why do you persist in asking this question which has no meaning under H?

 

[godless dave]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

You already know my answer to this. I suggest reading my post again.

A perfect copy of you would be a perfect copy of you, just like a perfect copy of a Volkswagen would be a perfect copy of a Volkswagen.

If you'll remember, we got to this point because you claimed that somehow a Volkswagen can be perfectly duplicated in a way that a human cannot. But then you couldn't support that claim.

 

[John Jones]

Dave,

- This is where our words have failed us...
- I'll see if I can do better this time...

- Maybe, the best description of this "identity" is the particular "sense of self" that we all experience.
- Surely, it is recognized by H.
- So, my claim is that it isn't that this identity doesn't exist under H -- it's just that H and ~H disagree as to what, exactly, this experience is.

We know what you are saying. It's not language that fails to support your ideas. It's evidence and logic that fail you because you haven't presented any.

Pardon me for the annoying formatting. I won't do it again.

 

[JayUtah]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

Such desperation...

 

[The Norseman]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

When you wake up, are you the same person you were when you went to sleep?

 

[Loss Leader]

When you wake up, are you the same person you were when you went to sleep?

What about the minute before and the minute after your child is born?

 

[Pixel42]

I've read SF stories in which the protagonist uploads copies of his consciousness into robots or clones and sends them out to fight and die, and been struck by the fact that each individual consciousness has its own separate sense of self which will cease even though the original continues, so it's not as if the point which so energises Jabba is not being understood. But his argument (or at least this part of it) hinges on his belief that there is something special about the property of consciousness which does apply equally to any other property (the speed of a car, the yellowness of a banana). He still has not even attempted to show this, he just assumes it because it seems obvious. But lots of things that seemed obvious turned out not to be true so he really does need to justify it.

 

[Belz...]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

How many times must this be answered before you stop asking?

 

[Filippo Lippi]

I've read SF stories in which the protagonist uploads copies of his consciousness into robots or clones and sends them out to fight and die, and been struck by the fact that each individual consciousness has its own separate sense of self which will cease even though the original continues, so it's not as if the point which so energises Jabba is not being understood. But his argument (or at least this part of it) hinges on his belief that there is something special about the property of consciousness which does apply equally to any other property (the speed of a car, the yellowness of a banana). He still has not even attempted to show this, he just assumes it because it seems obvious. But lots of things that seemed obvious turned out not to be true so he really does need to justify it.

He assumes it because it helps him reach his desired conclusion

 

[Mojo]

He assumes it because it helps him reach his desired conclusion

Did you notice that when I asked him a question about P(E|H) in a hypothetical situation his response was to ignore the question and try to make the hypothetical E more likely under the hypothesis that I had hypothetically assigned to him?

 

[Jabba]

- But Dave, if a perfect copy of my brain were made, would I be brought back to life?

How many times must this be answered before you stop asking?

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

 

[JayUtah]

- I thought that Dave had told me that I would not be brought back to life -- and, that would mean that the copy of me would have something left out -- whereas, the copy of the VW would not.

Dave didn't fall for your latest equivocation attempt. "Brought back to life" doesn't really have much meaning under H, Jabba. You have been warned to use precise language.