Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[HighRiser]

Jabba has already admitted he has no such evidence. He still thinks he's right. This is why he relies on the thought experiment. He seems to think it's ambiguous and hypothetical enough to sneak in straw-man alternations he needs for H to look and feel like it should include a soul but doesn't. Unfortunately H is pretty straightforward in the thought experiment, which leaves Jabba with little recourse but stubborn, insistent question-begging.

And that seems to me to be an unreasonable position to argue from. Plainly, painfully, obviously, and unbelievably so.

 

[Hokulele]

- Yeah. But would YOU be brought back to life. That's my basic claim -- that "perfect" replica would be missing something.

Let's say we make a perfect copy of you, and then immediately destroy the original without telling the copy.

Would the copy think anything is wrong, or would it going on its merry way thinking it is the original Jabba? How would it know it's a copy under H?

 

[John Jones]

- Yeah. But would YOU be brought back to life. That's my basic claim -- that "perfect" replica would be missing something.

You have a lot of claims that you call your basic claim at one time or another.

This time your basic claim includes resurrection, but you can't provide any evidence or logic to support it beyond yada yada yada.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

"You know when you're sat in your volkswagen and you can see through the wind screens of all the identical volkswagens? That's what convinces me there is an internal soul"

 

[Mojo]

- Yeah. But would YOU be brought back to life. That's my basic claim -- that "perfect" replica would be missing something.

You have a lot of claims that you call your basic claim at one time or another.

This time your basic claim includes resurrection, but you can't provide any evidence or logic to support it beyond yada yada yada.

Jabba's "basic claim" here is, as usual, what he's trying to prove.

 

[sackett]

Infinite Jabbas typing on infinite keyboards

We have got to set that up.

Heck, that's all we've been doing for years.

 

[John Jones]

Wake up! It's time for another fringe reset!

 

[Jabba]

But the engine in the duplicate Volkswagen is not the same engine as in the original Volkswagen. So the duplicate Volkswagen is missing the original engine. So the two Volkswagens are different.

Right?

- Not the way that the selves are.
- The emergent property of consciousness produces a kind of identity that the VW's don't have.

 

[Jabba]

No. An identical, perfect copy of a living person (if that technology was possible) would have an identical sense of self. Both the original and the copy would believe themselves to be the original.

A person's sense of self is a process which arises from the brain. The physical structure of the brain is shaped by the combined effect of every experience in every moment of time and space that the person has undergone from conception to the current moment. An identical copy of a person would have that identical structure - every neural connection in just the same configuration.

The sense of self is entirely traceable.

- But, would YOU be brought back to life?

 

[theprestige]

- Not the way that the selves are.
- The emergent property of consciousness produces a kind of identity that the VW's don't have.

Under H it does.

 

[Belz...]

- But, would YOU be brought back to life?

This question has been answered dozens of times yesterday, Jabba.

Under H, it's irrelevant. The copy is identical to you, down to its sense of self, but it is a separate entity, including the sense of self. So no, you wouldn't be brought back to life. That's not a flaw with H. It's entirely expected.

The only way YOU could be brought back to life is if your body were returned to the same state it was before your death, but then your "self" would still not have continuity with the previous state -- JUST LIKE IT DOESN'T NOW.

- The emergent property of consciousness produces a kind of identity that the VW's don't have.

Unsupported claim.

 

[theprestige]

- But, would YOU be brought back to life?

Equivocation. There is no 'YOU', in the sense you mean it, under H.

 

[Jabba]

Nor will the copy of you, if H is true. Unless you are specifying H as a hypothesis that includes souls, in which case ~H includes all hypotheses that don't include immortal souls.

- If H is true. But, I'm trying to show that H is not true.

 

[godless dave]

- Not the way that the selves are.
- The emergent property of consciousness produces a kind of identity that the VW's don't have.

It does? Can you describe this identity? It doesn't sound like anything that exists under H.

 

[JayUtah]

Not the way that the selves are.

Selves are not magical under H.

The emergent property of consciousness produces a kind of identity that the VW's don't have.

False. Consciousness and identity are the emergent property. They may seem subjectively profound to you, but that doesn't matter to science or reality. There is nothing more magical about a person having an identity than a Volkswagen having a color.

 

[JayUtah]

- If H is true. But, I'm trying to show that H is not true.

You must reckon P(E|H) as if H were true, whether you believe it is or not. You're reckoning P(E|H) not with H but with some pile of nonsense you're making up and calling H.

 

[JayUtah]

- But, would YOU be brought back to life?

Asked and answered. In fact, frantically asked several times every time the subject has been broached, and answered just as many times -- and just as many times ignored by you. Don't be rude.

 

[Belz...]

- If H is true. But, I'm trying to show that H is not true.

Now, that's dishonest. You're discussing a hypothesis under H. Now you're switching to a different argument and hoping no one will notice.

In order to argue for something under H, you have to assume that H is true. You tried to show that H is inconsistent but only succeeded in showing that you don't understand H or what it implies.

 

[Agatha]

- But, would YOU be brought back to life?

If I were alive when the copy was made, then there would be two identical entities, both with an identical-but-separate sense of self. Both would have all my memories, thoughts, feelings and personality; both would firmly believe themselves to be the original. Every neural connection, every physical structure and every atom would be replicated exactly.

If I were dead when the copy was made, then the copy would be equally dead, for the same reason. The physical structure of the brain and body and the connections in the neurosystem would be breaking down from the moment of death.

Bringing a dead person back to life is some kind of red herring in this discussion; we were talking about replicating a living person.

You contend there is a difference between the sense of self of the original and the sense of self of the copy (because you are trying to squeeze the concept of a soul into H). Everybody else is pointing out that there would be no difference. Both the original and the copy would be identical-but-separate yous, or mes, or whoever had undergone this replication process.

 

[jond]

If I were alive when the copy was made, then there would be two identical entities, both with an identical-but-separate sense of self. Both would have all my memories, thoughts, feelings and personality; both would firmly believe themselves to be the original. Every neural connection, every physical structure and every atom would be replicated exactly.

If I were dead when the copy was made, then the copy would be equally dead, for the same reason. The physical structure of the brain and body and the connections in the neurosystem would be breaking down from the moment of death.

Bringing a dead person back to life is some kind of red herring in this discussion; we were talking about replicating a living person.

You contend there is a difference between the sense of self of the original and the sense of self of the copy (because you are trying to squeeze the concept of a soul into H). Everybody else is pointing out that there would be no difference. Both the original and the copy would be identical-but-separate yous, or mes, or whoever had undergone this replication process.

Indeed, and it is here that his whole thought experiment fails. If H is correct, the duplicate would have an identical sense of self to the original. If H is incorrect, the duplicate would have a different sense of self. But he has already agreed that the duplicate would be identical, so...