Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[Mojo]

Assuming co existence it would be occupying separate points in spacetime and therefore having different frames of reference
Something mono zygotic twins [ which are the closest example of a carbon copy that exists in actual reality ] also experience

That is not the sort of difference that Jabba claims there is, or the sort of copy, equivocate though he may. He's talking about a perfect replica, not a twin that has experienced a different environment, and he claims that there would be a difference in nature between him and the replica, despite them being materially identical.

He has completely failed to explain what that difference would be, or how and why it would arise.

 

[Jabba]

1. What, exactly, is a potential self?

2. In what form does it exist?

3. Why do you think it exists?

4. Do things in general exist in potential form before they actually exist, or are selves some sort of exception?

5. If the answer to question 4 is that things in general do exist in potentiality, then does your reasoning that selves are immortal extend to everything else?

Jesse,
- Good questions -- but, very difficult to answer. And, I should probably try to answer them one at a time...
#1. What exactly is a potential self?
- Seemingly impossible to confidently communicate. Try this:
- Start by taking every human sperm cell that has ever existed and combine it with every human ovum that has ever existed. These are all potential humans and potential selves.
- Add to that, all the potential combinations of sperm and ovum from all the potential humans who never actually did exist.
- This can go on and on.

- But then, it's my opinion that a perfect physical copy of a human would not produce the same self, and if we were able to combine a sperm cell and ovum twice, we would get two different selves...

 

[Mojo]

- But then, it's my opinion that a perfect physical copy of a human would not produce the same self, and if we were able to combine a sperm cell and ovum twice, we would get two different selves...

And you are equivocating again. These are two different situations. Sure, identical twins have different consciousnesses, because they have had different environments.

But under materialism, an identical copy of a person would have an identical consciousness. Why would it not? And what would the difference be?

 

[JesseCuster]

Jesse,
- Good questions -- but, very difficult to answer. And, I should probably try to answer them one at a time...
#1. What exactly is a potential self?
- Seemingly impossible to confidently communicate. Try this:
- Start by taking every human sperm cell that has ever existed and combine it with every human ovum that has ever existed. These are all potential humans and potential selves.
- Add to that, all the potential combinations of sperm and ovum from all the potential humans who never actually did exist.

But those things don't exist.

When a human being comes into existence with a functioning brain, it doesn't get populated with one of these imaginary 'potential selves', for a multitude reasons, not least of which is because those things are just concepts in your mind, they're not anything that actually exists in some 'pool' out there from which they are picked to populate a body.

These 'potential selves' you've just described here are entirely meaningless and irrelevant to anything in the real world, so you can't use them to construct any sort of odds from which you can conclude that your current existence has a probability of existing of zero.

Do other things or concepts or processes exist in potential form similar to the way you imagine that selves exist in potential form? If not, then why not? If so, then does your argument about the immortality of selves extend to other things that exist in potentiality?

- But then, it's my opinion that a perfect physical copy of a human would not produce the same self, and if we were able to combine a sperm cell and ovum twice, we would get two different selves...

So what? You keep saying this, but I fail to see how it's relevant to anything at all. What conclusion are you drawing from this claim you keep repeating?

 

[Jabba]

And you are equivocating again. These are two different situations. Sure, identical twins have different consciousnesses, because they have had different environments.

But under materialism, an identical copy of a person would have an identical consciousness. Why would it not? And what would the difference be?

Mojo,
- You seem to be accepting that Identical twins are not identical copies?

 

[Jabba]

But those things don't exist.

When a human being comes into existence with a functioning brain, it doesn't get populated with one of these imaginary 'potential selves', for a multitude reasons, not least of which is because those things are just concepts in your mind, they're not anything that actually exists in some 'pool' out there from which they are picked to populate a body.

These 'potential selves' you've just described here are entirely meaningless and irrelevant to anything in the real world, so you can't use them to construct any sort of odds from which you can conclude that your current existence has a probability of existing of zero.

Do other things or concepts or processes exist in potential form similar to the way you imagine that selves exist in potential form? If not, then why not? If so, then does your argument about the immortality of selves extend to other things that exist in potentiality?

So what? You keep saying this, but I fail to see how it's relevant to anything at all. What conclusion are you drawing from this claim you keep repeating?

Jesse,
- My major conclusion here is that there is an infinity of potential selves.

 

[zooterkin]

Mojo,
- You seem to be accepting that Identical twins are not identical copies?

What do you mean by 'accepting'?

Who has suggested that identical twins are identical copies?

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- You seem to be accepting that Identical twins are not identical copies?

Yes, because they have had different environments. When we are talking about an identical copy of a person, we are talking about a materially identical copy, not a genetically identical individual who has experienced a different environment.

Can you provide a reason, valid if materialism is true, that two materially identical people would have different consciousnesses? And can you say what that difference would be?

 

[Jabba]

1. What, exactly, is a potential self?

2. In what form does it exist?

3. Why do you think it exists?

4. Do things in general exist in potential form before they actually exist, or are selves some sort of exception?

5. If the answer to question 4 is that things in general do exist in potentiality, then does your reasoning that selves are immortal extend to everything else?

#2. In what form does it exist?
- Jesse,
- It doesn't "exist" in any normal sense. It very likely won't even exist in the future -- though, it might.

 

[godless dave]

- But then, it's my opinion that a perfect physical copy of a human would not produce the same self, and if we were able to combine a sperm cell and ovum twice, we would get two different selves...

1+1 always equals 2. 1+1 never equals 1.

Several people, myself included, have asked you what would be different about the two selves in a situation where we had two perfectly identical bodies. Mojo asked you earlier today. What would be different about them?

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,
- You seem to be accepting that Identical twins are not identical copies?

I have never argued otherwise, by the way.

 

[Mojo]

1+1 always equals 2. 1+1 never equals 1.

Several people, myself included, have asked you what would be different about the two selves in a situation where we had two perfectly identical bodies. Mojo asked you earlier today. What would be different about them?

Actually, it was a question that Agatha asked while she was LCP recently. Asking it seems to have deprived her of this status.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Jesse,
- My major conclusion here is that there is an infinity of potential selves .

My Dear Mr. Savage:

Though you ignore me, yet will I gently correct you.

This is not a "conclusion", but an unsupported assertion.

I remain, empirically yours &ct.

 

[John Jones]

- Could be that "insult" is the wrong word. Could be that a claim shouldn't be considered an insult if it's true. And you guys believe that every thing that Jay says is true.
- So, I'll switch over to "impugn." I claim that Jay is constantly impugning me.
-[...]

You are wrong again. JayUtah is constantly impugning every rotten argument you have ever presented. He is correct in doing so, and you are wrong for complaining about it. That's the risk you take when presenting fallacious arguments to a skeptical audience.

Remember: Your credibility is not a boomerang. If you throw it away, it's not coming back.

 

[jond]

Jesse,
- My major conclusion here is that there is an infinity of potential selves.

Is there anything anyone could say to you to change your mind from this poisition? Because facts certainly don't seem to matter, nor does reason or any sort of rational argument.

 

[Hokulele]

- Could be that "insult" is the wrong word. Could be that a claim shouldn't be considered an insult if it's true. And you guys believe that every thing that Jay says is true.
- So, I'll switch over to "impugn." I claim that Jay is constantly impugning me.

All this says is that you cannot admit you were wrong.

Interesting...

 

[John Jones]

Jesse,
- Good questions -- but, very difficult to answer. And, I should probably try to answer them one at a time...
#1. What exactly is a potential self?
- Seemingly impossible to confidently communicate. Try this: [...]

Everyone here is perfectly capable of understanding what you keep saying. Your frequent complaints about difficulty explaining your points are obvious attempts to portray your interlocutors as being 'too dumb' to keep up.

Pick a better tactic. We understand better than you give us credit for.

 

[JayUtah]

It doesn't "exist" in any normal sense.

The question was in what sense does it exist. Can you define this sense of existence and give evidence of its reality that would be acceptable under H? Remember, you're using this formulation to show that P(E|H) must be very small. You can't use anything that's not in H.

 

[JayUtah]

My major conclusion here is that there is an infinity of potential selves.

It's not a conclusion. It's an unestablished premise. You've shown no evidence or argument other than pretty-please that there exists such a thing. There is certainly no such thing in H, so you may not use it to help you reckon P(E|H).

 

[JayUtah]

Start by taking every human sperm cell that has ever existed and combine it with every human ovum that has ever existed. These are all potential humans and potential selves.

Under H each such viable organism will exhibit the property of a sense of self. A property is not an entity that has separate existence.

But then, it's my opinion that a perfect physical copy of a human would not produce the same self, and if we were able to combine a sperm cell and ovum twice, we would get two different selves...

Under H that's not what happens. You may not rewrite H in order to try to show that P(E|H) must be very small. You must use H as it is formulated.