Here's my thinking on the matter.
We know your thinking. You repeat it at least once a day, and have done that and little else for a number of years. Please stop simply repeating what you believe and start addressing the statements by which your critics are demonstrating that your thinking is wrong. That is what separates debate from a lecture.
There is no pool of potential selves.
Under H this is correct, largely because the concept of "potential selves" doesn't exist in H, in pools, sets, abstract entities, or what have you. However, in the past you've used this as a justification for saying the number of "potential selves" must be infinite -- i.e., because it's not limited to a (finite) pool. If this is going to continue to be your argument, state it up front so that all the agreement you're getting on this point doesn't improperly translate to agreement to the inappropriate and incorrect conclusion you have previously drawn on it.
A certain physical situation brings about a bit of consciousness.
Under H this is correct, the physical situation being the formation and maturity of a functioning physical organism complete with nervous system.
Each bit of consciousness "feels" a particular sense of self.
No. Under H the consciousness and the sense of self are synonymous. There is no separation such that you can treat them differently or talk about what generates the other.
Scientifically speaking, this new sense of self is "brand" new -- no one else has ever had this particular sense of self, and no one else ever will.
No. Under scientific materialism this statement is pure gibberish. You're trying to style the sense of self as a separate entity at attach your desired properties to it. It is itself a property of the physical organism.
If, hypothetically, you could manufacture exact copies of the organism, the properties the organism would exhibit would not differ from specimen to specimen.
5. IOW, each new bit of consciousness sprouts a brand new particular sense of self.
6. ISOW, there is no limit on the number of different senses of self.
6. There is no limit on new bits of consciousness.
No. All this misconception arises from you continuing to treat the sense of self as if it were a separate enumerable entity, one example of infinite such allegedly discrete entities. In the materialism it is nothing of the kind, but is instead an ongoing process, the process being a property of the organism. Trying to count it is as stupid as trying to count "going 60 mph." A specimen of proper character will exhibit the expected properties. That is what it means to be a property. Since you're trying to reckon P(E|H), you must use H as it is formulated. Making your own stuff up and attaching it to H is improper in your proposed method.
