Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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I've been claiming forever that the self to which I'm referring is what reincarnationists think returns after death.

Fine, but that has nothing to do with H, P(H), or P(E|H). If you're trying to evaluate any of those, you have to use the materialist defintion.

Also, it is the self that would be looking out two sets of eyes if it was perfectly reproduced.

Not under H. Each brain looks through the eyes attached to it. The self is a property of the brain. Each brain exhibits the property.

To me, that is the kind of self I'm trying to talk about. I don't know why it doesn't communicate...

Because you're trying to make that kind of self the self that H (materialism) is talking about. It's not that your critics don't understand how you're trying to define the self. It's that they understand it doesn't apply to H. You don't get to define what the self is under H. H already does that.

Whatever, I assume that that self could not be physically reproduced.

Under H it can be -- theoretically.

My own self awareness (self) would not be brought back to life, or doubled. That's how any reproduction would be different than the original.

And under H none of that is true. If you're trying to reason about P(E|H) you don't get to impose your private definitions and assumptions.
 
Mojo,
...
- Also, it is the self that would be looking out two sets of eyes if it was perfectly reproduced.

You've never claimed that before. This does not at all follow from "what reincarnationists think returns after death."

- To me, that is the kind of self I'm trying to talk about. I don't know why it doesn't communicate...

It doesn't communicate because you originally called H the scientific model of consciousness. We assumed you understood that in the scientific model of consciousness it would be impossible for one self to look out of two sets of eyes, because under scientific models the self is physical. Two brains cannot share a self because they are not physically connected to each other. In order to see out of a pair of eyes, a self has to be connected to those eyes by nerves.

- Whatever, I assume that that self could not be physically reproduced. My own self awareness (self) would not be brought back to life, or doubled. That's how any reproduction would be different than the original.

"Brought back to life" and "doubled" are different things. If we could make a perfect copy of your brain, your awareness would be doubled. There would be two Jabbas, each looking out of their own pair of eyes and hearing with their own ears. They would be separate but not different.
 
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I only have so much time...

So do your critics. That's why it's important not to make them have to repeat their questions so many times before getting an answer.

...and I'm slow anyway.

It's not how much time you have, but how you use the time you have. You send a message when you waste your supposedly precious online time just repeating what you said already several times.
 
Mojo,
- I've been claiming forever that the self to which I'm referring is what reincarnationists think returns after death.
We've noticed. The name for this hypothetical entity is 'soul.' We've also noticed that neither you nor any reincarnationist has ever defined what characteristics this hypothetical entity has. It's just the thing that you desperately hope exists, even though you can give no good reason to think so.

- Also, it is the self that would be looking out two sets of eyes if it was perfectly reproduced.
Simultaneously?

- To me, that is the kind of self I'm trying to talk about. I don't know why it doesn't communicate...
It does. What makes you think it doesn't? The fact that we think the concept is drivel isn't because you aren't communicating it, it's because it's drivel.

- Whatever, I assume that that self could not be physically reproduced.
Why not? As you're unable to define or describe the characteristics of a soul you have no basis for assuming that reproducibility isn't one of them.

My own self awareness (self) would not be brought back to life, or doubled. That's how any reproduction would be different than the original.
Again: how do you know? You can't even describe its characteristics.
 
Jim,
- I can't be sure we're talking about the same self -- it isn't something we can point at.
- If this was done before I died, would I find myself looking out two sets of eyes?

You are trying to convince everyone that a certain "instance" of your consciousness and sense of self are somehow special and different from other properties. You think that that the you that died was instance #1, and the you that woke up after the procedure was instance #2, and therefore they are somehow special separate "things" that don't follow the rules of materialism.

They aren't. Under our current understanding of materialism, a functioning brain produces a consciousness, a part of which is an individual's sense of self. In this scenario, the odds a sense of self would appear are virtually 100%.

And also under this scenario, since the sense of self is a process it isn't necessarily continuous. Under materialism, not only aren't you immortal, there's reason to believe you're not even the same person you were when you went to bed last night.

And yes, when I say "the same person" I'm talking about exactly same thing you are when you say "the part that believers in reincarnation think get's reincarnated". It's the me that think's of itself as me, the one looking out my eyes right now, the one whose internal dialog is wondering what I'm going to have for lunch.
 
Mojo said:
Which takes us back to Agatha's question, which you completely failed to address when you replied to her post: why do you think there would be a difference, and what would that difference be?

Mojo,
- I've been claiming forever that the self to which I'm referring is what reincarnationists think returns after death.


Yes, we know. You mean the soul. You just don't want to call it that because it would make it too obvious that you are begging the question.

- Also, it is the self that would be looking out two sets of eyes if it was perfectly reproduced.


You have produced no evidence to back up this claim. Under materialism, i.e. the hypothesis you are trying to disprove, perfectly reproducing a person would produce two identical consciousnesses, each looking through its own body's eyes.

- To me, that is the kind of self I'm trying to talk about. I don't know why it doesn't communicate...


It communicates well enough that everyone can see what you are talking about and where you are going wrong.

- Whatever, I assume that that self could not be physically reproduced.


Why do you assume that? NB: "because it is necessary to my argument" is not an adequate answer to this question; neither is "because it doesn't make sense that it could".

My own self awareness (self) would not be brought back to life, or doubled.


There would be another consciousness, identical to yours at the point of duplication.

That's how any reproduction would be different than the original.


That is not an explanation of how the copy would differ from you, or why the copy would differ from you. You have once again failed to address the question.

Why do you think there would be a difference between you and a perfect copy of you, and what would that difference be?
 
- To me, that is the kind of self I'm trying to talk about. I don't know why it doesn't communicate...


We know that the "kind of self" you are trying to talk about is the soul. What you are failing to communicate is any reason that, under materialism, perfectly reproducing a person's body and brain as it was at a particular moment wouldn't also perfectly reproduce that person's consciousness as it was at that particular moment. Or what the difference would be between the consciousnesses.
 
Dave,
- My claim is that a perfect copy of me would be missing something -- my self awareness; whereas, a perfect copy of your wife's Beetle, would not be missing something (it would not be missing anything).

Dear Jabba,

You have made yourself absolutely clear: You believe that there is something in us that can't be copied.

Fine! You argumentation now depends on whether you can provide evidence for that claim.

Otherwise, obviously, it is not possible to calculate anything about it's probability.

Best regards, Hans
 
Agatha,
- If we produced that perfect copy while I was still alive, would I find myself looking out two sets of eyes?

No, you would find yourself looking at yourself. ... And so would the copy.

Hans
 
Agatha,
- Good answer. That's my point.
- It seems to me that there would be something significantly different between the two copies of me, but not between the two copies of Dave's wife's VWs.

No. They would be identical, just like two VWs.

Hans
 
- No. And, I assume that I would not be looking trough two sets of eyes. Our selves would be different.

No, they would be identical. They would be two identical instances of the same self.

Hans
 
Mojo,
- I've been claiming forever that the self to which I'm referring is what reincarnationists think returns after death.
- Also, it is the self that would be looking out two sets of eyes if it was perfectly reproduced.
- To me, that is the kind of self I'm trying to talk about. I don't know why it doesn't communicate...
- Whatever, I assume that that self could not be physically reproduced. My own self awareness (self) would not be brought back to life, or doubled. That's how any reproduction would be different than the original.

Dear Jabba,

We have all understood that this is what you are assuming. But that is not the hypothesis 'H'. Under the hypothesis 'H', your assumption is wrong. Under the hypothesis 'H', the self that reincarnationists think about does not exist.

Thus you cannot include it in any probability calculation about 'H'.

I have to ask in all earnest: Do you really not understand that you cannot assign a property to 'H' that it does not have?

Best regards, Hans
 
Dear Jabba,

We have all understood that this is what you are assuming. But that is not the hypothesis 'H'. Under the hypothesis 'H', your assumption is wrong. Under the hypothesis 'H', the self that reincarnationists think about does not exist.

Thus you cannot include it in any probability calculation about 'H'.

I have to ask in all earnest: Do you really not understand that you cannot assign a property to 'H' that it does not have?

Best regards, Hans
Hans,
- H doesn't claim that this self-awareness doesn't exist, it just claims that this self-awareness is physical.
--- Jabba
 
Hans,
- H doesn't claim that this self-awareness doesn't exist, it just claims that this self-awareness is physical.
--- Jabba

Jabba,

How would it be the self that reincarnationists talk about if it is physical?


Hans
 
No, not within your stated goal. No matter how unlikely your existence may be, there is no question that the materialistic explanation is more likely than your explanation.

As you have not responded I will assume that you now accept that the materialistic H is more likely than your version in which the self (soul) is a sperate entity.
 
- But, it wouldn't bring the first self back to life.
--- Jabba

Under H, the self isn't a living entity, it is a process in the brain. There would be an identical brain which would generate an identical self, while it is operating. Same as any emergent property, such as the specific green of a given blade of grass.
 
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