Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[Dancing David]

Dave,
- But consciousness is special. Consciousness brings with it a specific personal awareness -- a self.

Assertion of your conclusion, undemonstrated as of yet

 

[JayUtah]

But you and me (our selves) are not physically recreatable...

Equivocation. Under H, the self is not a physical entity. It is a process that occurs in a physical entity. You and me are physical entities, organisms. As such, each of us exhibits a sense of self, along with many other properties. If, under H, you physically create or recreate the organism, it will exhibit the properties that belong to the organism.

...we cannot be brought back to life, even if we were physically, perfectly, reproduced.

As goes the thought experiment under H: if you physically reproduce the organism perfectly, it will exhibit an identical sense of self. If you do it while the original organism is still alive, both will think they are the original. If you do it after the original has died, the reproduction will think he is the original and will have no sense or memory of having died. His sense of self would carry on from the point of reference from the original.

"Bringing back to life" is not really a concept that has much meaning under H. Once again you're simply pointing to necessarily ordinality and pretending it has some magical property that fixes your argument.

 

[Belz...]

- But you and me (our selves) are not physically recreatable; we cannot be brought back to life, even if we were physically, perfectly, reproduced.

The two are not the same. To recreate something is not bringing it back. It creates a copy. You know this because you've been told dozens of times.

 

[Loss Leader]

- But you and me (our selves) are not physically recreatable; we cannot be brought back to life, even if we were physically, perfectly, reproduced.

"Please agree to my conclusion without evidence because it's the only thing I have that supports my conclusion. P.S. Remember when I pretended I just wanted to discuss the material universe with respect to one piece of a Bayesian equation? Well, we're throwing that all out the window now."

 

[Jabba]

- But you and me (our selves) are not physically recreatable; we cannot be brought back to life, even if we were physically, perfectly, reproduced.

Why would you expect us to be if the self is physical?

- I wouldn't expect us to be.
- I'm just trying to show why I think that we can treat the likelihood of the current existence of our specific personal selves as totally random -- this aspect of what we call our selves is apparently not determined by of our DNA. We have no idea how to recreate this aspect.

 

[Belz...]

- I wouldn't expect us to be.

Why not? Under H everything is physical and causal.

I'm just trying to show why I think that we can treat the likelihood of the current existence of our specific personal selves as totally random

Yes, and you're failing. Time to drop this.

 

[godless dave]

- I wouldn't expect us to be.

So what's difficult to understand about the self being physical?

- I'm just trying to show why I think that we can treat the likelihood of the current existence of our specific personal selves as totally random -- this aspect of what we call our selves is apparently not determined by of our DNA.

But you haven't given any reason to think it's random. In the physicalist model, everything about the self is determined by the brain, and everything about the brain is determined by the events that result in its existence and development.

We have no idea how to recreate this aspect.

We know how to duplicate it: by creating a perfectly identical brain. The fact that a separate, identical brain would exhibit a separate, identical self is exactly what we would expect if physicalism is true.

 

[Steve]

- I wouldn't expect us to be.
- I'm just trying to show why I think that we can treat the likelihood of the current existence of our specific personal selves as totally random -- this aspect of what we call our selves is apparently not determined by of our DNA. We have no idea how to recreate this aspect.

How is this apparent?

 

[Hokulele]

-- this aspect of what we call our selves is apparently not determined by of our DNA.

Evidence?

 

[Belz...]

Notice how liberally jabba uses the word "apparently". It means "in my opinion".

 

[MRC_Hans]

- But you and me (our selves) are not physically recreatable; we cannot be brought back to life, even if we were physically, perfectly, reproduced.

Yes, we can. You have been told this often enough. Unfortunately, you have the extreme rudeness to ignore it.

Hans

 

[JayUtah]

I'm just trying to show why I think that we can treat the likelihood of the current existence of our specific personal selves as totally random --

Under H it's not random. It's determined by the brain. And the brain itself is determined by factors that are certainly chaotic but not random. (Remember when we tried to teach you chaos theory?)

Let's not mince words. You've already concluded your probabilities. What you're doing now is scrambling to find some pseudo-intellectual justification for it. So you're grasping at every straw, regardless of whether it makes sense. Under H the sense of self is a property of the physical brain. That's about a simple concept as there can be, yet you insist on obfuscating it to make it seem like more.

this aspect of what we call our selves is apparently not determined by of our DNA.

Nor by "chemistry," or by any of the straw men you've thrown out there. DNA and prevailing developmental factors determine the brain. These are complex and chaotic, but deterministic -- the same way many factors go into creating Mt Ranier. The processes of the brain are affected by outside stimulus, and can retain information over time. Those processes then dictate behaviors others can observe. We experience this process subjectively as the sense of self. But in all cases it is cause-and-effect traceable to the factors that produced, or are embodied in, the brain. You have failed to account for the self as an ongoing process, not a "thing." You've shown zero evidence of any aspect of the self that cannot be traced to the operation of a functioning brain. In fact, at one time you admitted there wasn't any, but that we should just be more "holistic" in our thinking and we'd see what you mean.

We have no idea how to recreate this aspect.

Equivocation. Under H, we know what it would take to recreate it -- a replication of the physical brain at some point in its existence. We don't have the technical skill to accomplish it, though. That's why we talk about it as a thought experiment. You're trying to equivocate between the impracticality of the thought experiment and some inherent irreproducibility of the fruits of that labor. There's a difference between "it can't be done" and "we don't know how to do it." Your theory relies on the former, but your critics are conceding only the latter. It would be nice if you stopped frantically equivocating and started paying attention to your critics.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- It appears that a certain physical state (whatever the hell it is) produces consciousness. It then appears that consciousness naturally invokes(?) a brand new "self."
- Here's where words seem to fail us...
- As best I can formulate thus far, I claim that we cannot physically recreate this self... And, this means that this "self" is not cause and effect traceable or predictable, and the likelihood of its current existence is totally random.
- How would you describe/explain this situation/wreckage differently?

Jabba, what you are arguing is that if souls exist your current existence is impossible. Do you really not understand why this argument cannot disprove hypotheses under which souls don't exist?

 

[Jabba]

So what's difficult to understand about the self being physical?



But you haven't given any reason to think it's random. In the physicalist model, everything about the self is determined by the brain, and everything about the brain is determined by the events that result in its existence and development.



We know how to duplicate it: by creating a perfectly identical brain. The fact that a separate, identical brain would exhibit a separate, identical self is exactly what we would expect if physicalism is true.

Dave,

1. Unfortunately, we can mean different things by the word "self."
2. Though you disagree with reincarnationists about the nature, and destiny of the self to which they're referring, I think that you you do know the meaning to which they're referring.
3. That's the meaning of self to which I'm referring.
4. Though difficult to "pin down" -- to effectively describe and to make sure that we're talking about the same thing -- the "self" is a real experience, event.
5. And whatever that thing or process is, scientifically speaking, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life).

- Where in the above do we diverge?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

1. Unfortunately, we can mean different things by the word "self."
2. Though you disagree with reincarnationists about the nature, and destiny of the self to which they're referring, I think that you you do know the meaning to which they're referring.
3. That's the meaning of self to which I'm referring.
4. Though difficult to "pin down" -- to effectively describe and to make sure that we're talking about the same thing -- the "self" is a real experience, event.
5. And whatever that thing or process is, scientifically speaking, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life).

- Where in the above do we diverge?

I think what you're calling the "self" is entirely physical. As such, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life), just like everything else physical.

 

[jond]

How is the self any different from the particular green of a leaf of grass?

 

[MRC_Hans]

Dave,

1. Unfortunately, we can mean different things by the word "self."
2. Though you disagree with reincarnationists about the nature, and destiny of the self to which they're referring, I think that you you do know the meaning to which they're referring.
3. That's the meaning of self to which I'm referring.

It does not matter what you or reincarnationists mean. The hypothesis H which you are trying to disprove does not refer to such a concept.

4. Though difficult to "pin down" -- to effectively describe and to make sure that we're talking about the same thing -- the "self" is a real experience, event.

It is not an event. It is a process.

5. And whatever that thing or process is, scientifically speaking, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life).

Yes, it can.

- Where in the above do we diverge?

In the fact that you systematically ignore the answers you are given, even from those posters you deign to answer.

Hans

 

[JayUtah]

Unfortunately, we can mean different things by the word "self."

And in fact we do. Under H the self refers to a certain concept. Under your beliefs -- or let's say, under the reincarnationists' beliefs -- the self is an entirely different concept. You insist on conflating the two.

If H is the scientific hypothesis -- or, materialism, since we've finally put a useful name on it -- one reckons P(E|H) using the definition of self from H. If K is the reincarnationist's hypothesis, you would reckon P(E|K) according to the concept of self in K.

You're cherry-picking concepts from K and trying to pin them onto H to create a straw man.

Though you disagree with reincarnationists about the nature, and destiny of the self to which they're referring, I think that you you do know the meaning to which they're referring.

Yes, we do. It's called a soul. And what the reincarnationists believe has nothing to do with H. There is no concept of a soul in H, nor any need for one.

That's the meaning of self to which I'm referring.

We've understood for years what you mean by self. But you can't foist it onto H and say that's what materialism also means by it. When examining P(E|H) you must use H as it is actually formulated, including its definitions and assumptions.

Though difficult to "pin down" -- to effectively describe and to make sure that we're talking about the same thing -- the "self" is a real experience, event.

When considering P(E|H) the self we're talking about is as formulated in H. Whatever pseudo-poetic language you want to dress that up in is utterly irrelevant. Accepting H as formulated is what you have to do when you consider probabilities conditioned on H being true. You haven't figured that part out yet. Or rather, you have and you're just avoiding it.

And whatever that thing or process is, scientifically speaking, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life).

Under H the self is a process, not a thing. Do not continue to equivocate. Scientifically speaking, it could be reproduced by reproducing the organism. There -- see how easy that is?

Where in the above do we diverge?

In your longstanding unwillingness to properly condition P(E|H) on H. You're trying to condition P(E|H) on ~H or elements of K. Shall we count how many dozen times this has been explained to you? Quit asking what's wrong with your argument. There are hundreds of pages of people volunteering their time to tell you. Avail yourself of it.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,

1. Unfortunately, we can mean different things by the word "self."

Unfortunately for you, we know exactly what you mean by the word "self"; you mean the soul, but you prefer not to call it that because it makes it too obvious that you are begging the question. It hasn't made any difference, it is obvious to everyone that you are begging the question.

2. Though you disagree with reincarnationists about the nature, and destiny of the self to which they're referring, I think that you you do know the meaning to which they're referring.

The only disagreement is that they think it exists, and Dave doesn't.

3. That's the meaning of self to which I'm referring.

Yes, we know; you mean the soul.

4. Though difficult to "pin down" -- to effectively describe and to make sure that we're talking about the same thing -- the "self" is a real experience, event.

It is an emergent property of a functioning brain; something the brain does.

5. And whatever that thing or process is, scientifically speaking, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life).

Consciousness is a property of the brain, entirely dependent on and determined by the physical brain. As such, if we could perfectly reproduce a brain we would perfectly reproduce all of that brain's properties, including its consciousness, but it would not be the same brain. It would be a second, identical brain. Remember, if you have two identical things there is more than one of them.

- Where in the above do we diverge?

Seriously?

 

[Belz...]

1. Unfortunately, we can mean different things by the word "self."

4. Though difficult to "pin down" -- to effectively describe and to make sure that we're talking about the same thing -- the "self" is a real experience, event.

Well at least you didn't call it a thing. Yes, it's a real event. We've been telling you this for years.

5. And whatever that thing or process is, scientifically speaking, it cannot be physically repeated (in the sense of being brought back to life).

The you from one second ago isn't the same you from now, so that's a given. But the point is that you can create an exact copy, so it is recreatable.