Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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This might be a good time to consider actually reading the many responses you've had in this thread. Including the ones that point out that "thing" and "process" are not the same.


Including the ones you just quoted, Jabba.
 
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Dave,

- In other words, there is a "thing," or process, that is exhibited in you that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of you (see 232-239, above).

A perfect copy of me would exhibit a perfect copy of that process.


- In most humans, this process "cares, and it "senses, or imagines, a continuation that it would like to continue. You seem to be saying that such care is just an illusion and nothing to be concerned about -- i.e., it needn't be considered in our ethics.

I haven't said anything like that. What I've said is that what cares, senses, and imagines is part of your physical brain.
 
In other words...

No, don't put words in his mouth.

...there is a "thing," or process...

No, it is a process, not a thing. Do not equivocate.

that is exhibited in you...

No, exhibited by the organism. Don't attempt to sneak your incarnation preconception under the radar. The scientific hypothesis does not consider that properties exist independently of the entities that exhibit them. The sense of self is not something that lives inside an organism any more than "going 60 mph" lives inside of an automobile.

that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of you (see 232-239, above). I've been calling that your particular self-awareness.

An identical sense of self would be exhibited were you able to perfectly recreate the organism. You want this to be "particular" in a specific way that simply makes no sense under the scientific hypothesis. And to hype up the semblance of justification for that fanciful particularity, you constantly equivocate among the concepts of cardinality, identity, and separation. Your critics have a very clear understanding of what these concepts are, and they are attempting to educate you. You seem more interested in maintaining an obfuscation.

Do you have a name for it?

A soul. And it has no business being talked about under the auspices of P(E|H). What you're describing is not something that exists in the scientific hypothesis. It is a concept you made up and are trying, by various dishonest means, to get people to agree is part of their hypothesis when it is not.

In most humans, this process "cares, and it "senses, or imagines, a continuation that it would like to continue. You seem to be saying that such care is just an illusion and nothing to be concerned about -- i.e., it needn't be considered in our ethics.

Ethics is not part of the proof of the existence of a soul. Do not attempt to muddy the waters of what the scientific hypothesis says the sense of self is, as opposed to what consequences follow from its existence.
 
I agree. I'd challenge anyone who sticks to this Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy explanation to explain what is wrong with the following argument (or any other such argument) where I condition on my own existence in the second statement:

If my parents hadn't met then I wouldn't exist.
I exist.
Therefor, my parents have met.


Consider this cartoon drawing of the joint hypothesis–sample space, where E is the event "I, Jabba, exist," and H and ~H are two hypotheses about how Jabba came to exist. If I could draw the cartoon to scale, the oval representing E would be invisibly small, at least on the side of the cartoon representing the so-called scientific, or random, hypothesis.

[imgw=300]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/imagehosting/5305557c62d342a7d0.png[/imgw]​

But if Jabba is conditioning on his own existence, then his joint space is reduced to the oval:

[imgw=300]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/imagehosting/5305557c62d344927e.png[/imgw]​

Conditioned on his own existence, the probability of his existence is 1 under either hypothesis. Hence, the observation that he exists is not evidence for either hypothesis over the other.

These cartoons also illustrate the connection between conditioning on E and the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. All the events outside of the oval—the target—are ignored.
 
Consider this cartoon drawing of the joint hypothesis–sample space, where E is the event "I, Jabba, exist," and H and ~H are two hypotheses about how Jabba came to exist. If I could draw the cartoon to scale, the oval representing E would be invisibly small, at least on the side of the cartoon representing the so-called scientific, or random, hypothesis.

[imgw=300]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/imagehosting/5305557c62d342a7d0.png[/imgw]​

But if Jabba is conditioning on his own existence, then his joint space is reduced to the oval:

[imgw=300]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/imagehosting/5305557c62d344927e.png[/imgw]​

Conditioned on his own existence, the probability of his existence is 1 under either hypothesis. Hence, the observation that he exists is not evidence for either hypothesis over the other.

Only because H|E = ~H|E in your diagram. Please do it again but this time draw it such that H|E >> ~H|E and you will see the error with your reasoning (the highlighted "hence") here. Yes, the observation that he exists is not evidence for either hypothesis over the other but it is not because conditioned on his own existence the probability of his existence is 1.

These cartoons also illustrate the connection between conditioning on E and the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. All the events outside of the oval—the target—are ignored.

There is no connection, you're mixing several different things together which only happen to play out this way because you've considered the special case where H|E = ~H|E.
 
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Only because H|E = ~H|E in your diagram. Please do it again but this time draw it such that H|E >> ~H|E and you will see the error with your reasoning (the highlighted "hence") here. Yes, the observation that he exists is not evidence for either hypothesis over the other but it is not because conditioned on his own existence the probability of his existence is 1.


I should have been clearer. I am not saying that P(H|E) = P(~H|E). I'm just a lousy graphic artist; the vertical line is in the middle of the oval only because that was the easiest place to put it. What I'm saying is that P(E|H,E) = P(E|~H,E) = 1. Hence, the evidence does not discriminate between H and ~H, and therefore the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses equal their prior probabilities.
 
I should have been clearer. I am not saying that P(H|E) = P(~H|E).

Then your argument is certainly incorrect. Let's refer back to my parents having met:

Let H be "my parents have met"
Let ~H be "my parents have not met"
Let E be "I exist"
Let P(H|E) = 0.9999[*]
Let P(~H|E) = 0.0001[*]

Let's go through your statements one by one:

What I'm saying is that P(E|H,E) = P(E|~H,E) = 1.

P(E|H,E) = P(E|~H,E) = 1. Or in words, the probability that I exist given that my parents have met and that I exist equals the probability that I exist given that my parents have not met and that I exist, both of which equal 1. This is true - trivially so in fact, the probability of an event conditioned on itself is always 1 irrespective of the event being "I exist" or anything else.

Hence, the evidence does not discriminate between H and ~H

Hence, the evidence that I exist does not discriminate between my parents having met and my parents not having met. Clearly this argument is starting to go wrong here.

and therefore the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses equal their prior probabilities.

And therefor the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses, about my parents having met or not, equal their prior probabilities. Nope, this is not a correct conclusion.

Are you seeing the error you are making?

* I'd rather put 1 and 0 but then we'd get a division by zero error in P(E|~H,E), so let the small discrepancy stand for the possibility of artificial insemination from an anonymous sperm bank or something.
 
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Then your argument is certainly incorrect. Let's refer back to my parents having met:

Let H be "my parents have met"
Let ~H be "my parents have not met"
Let E be "I exist"
Let P(H|E) = 0.9999[*]
Let P(~H|E) = 0.0001[*]

Let's go through your statements one by one:



P(E|H,E) = P(E|~H,E) = 1. Or in words, the probability that I exist given that my parents have met and that I exist equals the probability that I exist given that my parents have not met and that I exist, both of which equal 1. This is true - trivially so in fact, the probability of an event conditioned on itself is always 1 irrespective of the event being "I exist" or anything else.



Hence, the evidence that I exist does not discriminate between my parents having met and my parents not having met. Clearly this argument is starting to go wrong here.



And therefor the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses, about my parents having met or not, equal their prior probabilities. Nope, this is not a correct conclusion.

Are you seeing the error you are making?


No.

* I'd rather put 1 and 0 but then we'd get a division by zero error in P(E|~H,E), so let the small discrepancy stand for the possibility of artificial insemination from an anonymous sperm bank or something.


Exactly. The mere fact that you exist does not discriminate between different hypotheses with non-zero probabilities about how you came to exist.
 

There should be a "speechless" emoticon on this forum.

Exactly. The mere fact that you exist does not discriminate between different hypotheses with non-zero probabilities about how you came to exist.

There are two persons, person1 and person2. Let H be "person1 and person2 have met". Can you give an estimate of the prior P(H)? And remember that you can not use the information that I exist as the child of person1 and person2 in constructing your estimate, that information will only come later.
 
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- In other words, there is a "thing," or process, that is exhibited in you that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of you

At the instant of the cloning were complete, both entities would have the identical "sense of self". That "sense of self" is a process continually evolving in response to, among other things, input from the environment, so after that brief instance of being identical, the two would accumulate a growing number of differences as time moved on.

They would be different. However, at no point would it be possible to identify one as the original and the other as the copy.
 
There should be a "speechless" emoticon on this forum.


There are two persons, person1 and person2. Let H be "person1 and person2 have met". Can you give an estimate of the prior P(H)? And remember that you can not use the information that I exist as the child of person1 and person2 in constructing your estimate, that information will only come later.


Describe the joint sample–hypothesis space of the experiment you have in mind.

In the meantime here is a thought experiment. Almost all pennies that are found lying on the ground got there by somebody dropping them. But one penny in 1 million lying on the ground was beamed into position by aliens from the planet Xenu. Now I go for my morning walk, and I find a penny on the ground. How does my finding that penny on the ground alter the probabilities of how it got there?
 
- In other words, there is a "thing," or process, that is exhibited in you that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of you (see 232-239, above).


Wrong, Jabba. Wrong. Consciousness is not a thing, whether you put it in quotes or really near the word process. That's like saying Amy Adams is a "refrigerator" or actress.


i.e., it needn't be considered in our ethics.


Whoa! What??? At no time has anyone anywhere in this thread broached the subject of morality or ethics. Your backwards argument is apparent: If you don't agree with Jabba, then you think murder should be legal. That's just ... nonsense.
 
Describe the joint sample–hypothesis space of the experiment you have in mind.

H = "my parents have met"
E = "I exist"

Here's a visual diagram (approximately to scale):
picture.php
 
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H = "my parents have met"
E = "I exist"

Here's a visual diagram (approximately to scale):
[qimg]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/picture.php?albumid=1305&pictureid=11185[/qimg]


Jesus, it took me a whole afternoon to do my graphics, and I still couldn't get the line off center. I'm about to have dinner. I'll get back to this.
 
Jesus, it took me a whole afternoon to do my graphics, and I still couldn't get the line off center. I'm about to have dinner. I'll get back to this.

I just used Paint (on windows), draw a rectangle and draw an ellipse, takes less than a minute in total. Anyway, enjoy the dinner.
 
H = "my parents have met"
E = "I exist"

Here's a visual diagram (approximately to scale):
[qimg]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/picture.php?albumid=1305&pictureid=11185[/qimg]


Actually, I can comment on this now. If that's your sample space, then you're not committing the fallacy of conditioning on the observation.
 
I just used Paint (on windows), draw a rectangle and draw an ellipse, takes less than a minute in total. Anyway, enjoy the dinner.


For better or worse, I did mine in R using programming statements. I guess there's a reason that graphic artists don't work using the command line.
 
It's the same sample space as yours above but with E moved a bit to the side to account for my earlier objection:


No. You've missed my point. My point is that Jabba's observation of his existence is not in the unconditional sample space*; it's in the restricted sample space that is conditioned on his existence—i.e., where his existence is a given.

*If you think it is, then what is the probability that he would have observed his nonexistence?
 
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Dave,
- In other words, there is a "thing," or process, that is exhibited in you that would not be exhibited in a perfect copy of you (see 232-239, above)...
- Am I wrong about that?
 
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