...{I}t is an indisputable application of jurisprudence that, in the presence of such grounds for annulment, pertaining to the deficiency in reasoning, the referral judge is responsible for the examination of the entire body of evidence, that he is expected to review in complete freedom to form judgments, without any type of constraints, being only required to produce motivations devoid of deficiencies of obvious lack of logic or patent contradictoriness that had caused the annulment of the first appeal verdict. In the jurisprudence of this Court of Legitimacy {the CSC}, in fact, the assertion is repeated according to: “following an annulment for deficiency of reasoning, the referral judge is not bound by founding the new verdict on the same arguments considered illogical or deficient by the Supreme Court of Cassation, but is free to arrive at, based on different arguments from those rejected in the Court of Legitimacy or rather integrating and completing those already carried out, to the same decision of the annulled pronouncement. That because it is the judge of the lower court who is expected to have the task of reconstructing the facts emerging from the results of the trial and to appreciate the significance and value of the various sources of evidence (amongst others, Section 4, n. 30422 of 21/06/2005, Poggi, Rv. 232019; Section 4, n. 48352 of 29/04/2009, Savoretti, Rv. 245775).
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All of this is at the basis of the recurring lesson of this Judge of Legitimacy, on the consolidated point constituting ius receptum [established law], according to which the powers of the referral judge differ depending on whether the annulment was pronounced because of violation or erroneous application of penal law, or due to a patent lack of logic in the reasoning, since in the first case the judge is bound by the principle of law expressed by the Court, subject however that the evaluation of the ascertained facts remain unaltered in the appealed sentence; in the second case they can proceed with a new assessment of the body of evidence, with the limit of not repeating the motivational faults of the sentence that has been annulled. (Inter alia Section 3 n 7882, of 10/1/2012, Montali Rv. 252333).
3.1. As we will see, the judge a quo [of the trial from which this appeal is being heard], in further points, remains conditioned by the prospect of the factual profile unexpectedly included in the annulled sentence; such that the stringent and analytical evaluation of the Supreme Court might unavoidably become forced towards affirming the guilt of the two accused. Misguided by this basic misunderstanding, the same judge is drawn into logical inconsistencies and obvious errores in iudicando [errors in judgment] that are here reported.