Who killed Meredith Kercher? part 23

[Machiavelli]

The trial documents include Stefanoni's own film of the Dec collection of the bra clasp. When cross-examined about it she could neither confirm nor deny that she herself had touched the clasp with obviously dirty gloves.

That alone was enoughto acquit RS on the grounds of what the ISC said in its 2015 acquittal.

The 1st chambers SC, as well as Nencini's court, made the contrary point.

They said that the fact that the item (bra clasp) is dirty, itself is not a reason for assuming that Sollecito's DNA is a likely result of contamination.

The SC had also stated (and this is res iudicata in the Meredith case) that the fact that pieces of evidence are imperfect, itself not an argument sufficient to dismiss the evidence, since their number, sitematicity and agreement logically overcomes their shortcomings.

So the clasp is dirty but this is not a sufficient reason to dismiss the piece of circumstantial evidence because in order to do that you would need to bring stronger evidence that Sollecito's DNA is the product of that contamination - so the SC 1st chambers said.

Which is why it is bizarre when some invoke the trial record as a reason why they should have been convicted.

The above statements by the 1st chambers are final findings as by the law, they may be an example of why the trial records are quite important.

 

[Machiavelli]

Wrong. Res judicata requires a final judgment. Chieffi was not a final judgment, obviously.

Chieffi is indeed a final judgement.

 

[toto]

Yes I say utter bias and nonsensical. I will not even go into medical literature now: the utter bias and nonsense of a theory may be evident at first even simply from a "logical" level that has to do with alternatives. You know the conspiracy 9-11 theorists who belive "controlled demolition" they have an array of quite convincing argumentations when we come to the technical aspects that lead them to suspect that it must have been a controlled demolition. But the theory has a massive failure on a more macroscopic "logical" aspect, that is to actually consider the plausibility of this specific part of the conspiracy if you were to perform it. Imagine what you would have to do - like in the previous weeks - the magnitude technical operations in order to actually demolish a building of that size. And imagine the risks of being detected while planting such massive explosive network of devices, and the almost non-existent political advantage compared to carrying on a 'conspiracy that doesn't include such a complicate detail as controlled demolition but it would be equally effective politically as a terrorist act.

So the nonsensical and biased nature suspicion about the ELISA test is not the consequence of medical considerations, it is the consequence of logical implications of the conspiracy itself.
Without considering the fact that Knox lies in her book - because a prison guard cannot be in the doctor's room when the doctor speaks to the patient.
What are the advantages of lying about a medical test? What are the purposes? Who masterminds the conspiracy, and who are those who execute it?
Everything is nonsensical. There is no logic. It serves no purpose. There is not even a structure of people who could obey to such an order (because the doctors don't obey to prison guards or prosecutors, they all depend from another authority). And there is not even anything in Knox's diary that could make somebody think that a doctor has lied to her, the doctor even reassured her and told her immediately that it was a likely false positive - there is not even a report in her diary that anyone would ever ask her about a "list of sexual partners", and there is no reason to assume that a list of previous, non-occasional partners would have any interest to the investigation at all (at best a person of interests of the investigators could some most recent unknown occasional partner, certainly not a friend she would call to tell him that she's positive to HIV), and there is no way anyone could anticipate she would write a list of sexua lpartners in her prison diary, and there is no reason to believe her list is truthful.
So a conspiracy theory about HIV test is at first nonsensical, before any medical consideration.

Presumably you meant to write "no reason to believe her list is NOT truthful"?

 

[Bill Williams]

The 1st chambers SC, as well as Nencini's court, made the contrary point.

They said that the fact that the item (bra clasp) is dirty, itself is not a reason for assuming that Sollecito's DNA is a likely result of contamination.

The SC had also stated (and this is res iudicata in the Meredith case) that the fact that pieces of evidence are imperfect, itself not an argument sufficient to dismiss the evidence, since their number, sitematicity and agreement logically overcomes their shortcomings.

So the clasp is dirty but this is not a sufficient reason to dismiss the piece of circumstantial evidence because in order to do that you would need to bring stronger evidence that Sollecito's DNA is the product of that contamination - so the SC 1st chambers said.



The above statements by the 1st chambers are final findings as by the law, they may be an example of why the trial records are quite important.

Who said they weren't. The point is that the 2015 ISC annulled because of the trial record. Aside from the fact that you have just admitted that the ISC has access to the trial record when it suits them to say something about the bra clasp....

All of what you say is subsumed by the 2015 decision unless you want to keep advancing a conspiracy....

 

[Numbers]

Wrong. Res judicata requires a final judgment. Chieffi was not a final judgment, obviously.

The Chieffi CSC panel confirmation of the conviction by the Hellmann appeal court of Knox for "simple" calunnia against Lumumba was the only res judicata of that CSC panel.

Otherwise the Chieffi CSC panel annulled the Hellmann appeal court's verdict of acquittal and referred the case to the Nencini appeal court. Thus, there was no res judicata relating to the referred case.

CPP Article 627.3 provides that the referral judge shall conform to the judgment of the CSC as regards any issue of law it has decided upon. It is unstated in Article 627.3 whether that includes the interpretation of evidence, but contrary to such an interpretation of Article 627.3, CPP Article 627.2 states that the referral judge shall decide exercising the same powers of the judge whose judgment has been annulled, without prejudice to the limitations established by law, and that new evidence may be admitted if relevant for the decision.

 

[bagels]

It's funny to see pro-Knoxes like you asking this question. I find it funny as the question comes from people who openly declare they are not interested in facts. There is something interesting in the start scenario: some of us must be drowning in delusion and bias. Who? Is it us or is it you?
It's sound interesting. It titillates curiousity. Kind of goads to try find it out. Because it's a question about ourselves, after all. There might be something about our ways of understanding reality. Out about our beliefs.

But - here comes what I find curious - it appears the most vocal pro-Knox advocates actually don't want to find out.

More or less they openly declare they are not interested. The best interaction I may get is "I don't believe you". They believe something else.

Mostly do not actually try to challenge or find out factual points. They manifestly disregard their existence.

The only way of discovering who is biased or deluded would be to approach facts as close as possible, to challenge the other side's facts and our personal arguments as neutrally and critically as possible.


Then, another aspect. Think about how we deal with incomplete information. I look at LJ's approach to Sollecito's Cluedo's photoshopped cover. Could we define his skeptical attitude as "even-sided"? I don't think so. Is it reasonable to assume, as a default position, a following scenario: journalist Selvaggia Lucarelli would tell a lie reporting that it was Sollecito who posted the cover while this not being true; and at the same time also dismiss that Sollecito declared that Amanda is insane by saying "go call 118"; while also considering that she would have lied about something that someone else could have verified and falsified; and also considering that at the same time Sollecito responded and his response did not object to Lucarelli's reporting the he was the one who posted the picture; and also considering that had she made a false report about him, she would be liable by the law, as well as be liable of a disproval resulting as an attack on her reputation.
It is possible to believe that this happened, but is it reasonable to assume it as a default position, just on the basis that the newspaper page may not show all the full screenshots?
And it is reasonable to suspect that "someone else" (who is not Italian) created the picture based on the fact that the picture backgrownd is not from an Italian cover, but not ask ourselves why a non-Italian would place those Italian murderers on it?
I don't believe such positions are neutral. Their logic is profoundly slanted. I think they are unreasonable and utterly biased.

But I also think it would be useful to check our reasoning in purely abstract and hypothetical ways. On points of incomplete information like this one, it might be a good practice to also ask ourselves: and what if the opposite was true? Drawing implication from that, just as a purely hypothetical picture.
LJ might ask himself: what would the implication on my thinking, if I found out that it is actually true that Raffaele Sollecito created or posted this photoshopped Cluedo cover?
What if it's him? How would I have to adjust my worldview if that detail was indeed that way?

Imagine if you had to re-assess, to adjust an array, a long series of details, in that direction. Imagine if - in the abstract - you found out that all your ideas about each of those details requires to be reviewed, if you found out the direction of many details of your beliefs needed to be changed.
How would this affect the system of your view of reality?

Now this is what I'm talking bout right here, we're finally getting somewhere.

I think that it is human nature to defend a position once it is reached, and indeed this is the pitfall that one has to watch out for once you find yourself holding a particular position. And I would say you are correct that the PIP is not always innocent of avoiding this trap. The classic example is after the Chieffi court clearly rejected every single acquitting point which they had the procedural ability to reject - coming down against the acquittal as hard as procedurally possible - there was still sentiment among the PIP crowd that it was a minor clerical issue or somesuch and the acquittal was still intact. Clearly this was a belief born of bias and wishful thinking.

But it seems ignoring certain facts is only half of the issue. There is also the other side of that - inventing new facts out of thin air. One example of this from the PIP is at one point it was alleged Rudy was a police informant, but no evidence was given to support this. Now I would say you are guilty of this on several points. One is that the Hellmann court was bribed to reach their result, as were the appointed experts C&V. From my point of view this is a false fact manufactured by yourself based only on your desire for it to be true. And in fact it almost has to be true to sustain a belief in a solid case, because if the Hellmann court was at all genuine, even if one were to disagree with some of its conclusions, its very result would tend to raise reasonable doubt by the very nature of a fair court concluding there was no evidence of guilt - difficult to get from there to another conviction.

It seems the Hellmann verdict being the result of corruption is self evident to you because when you read the motivation report you find it incomprehensible and illogical and cannot explain it otherwise. But this leads us right back to the original question, because if one were biased and delusioned to believe utterly in guilt it would appear that way wouldn't it? And the Massei report certainly appears that way from a PIP perspective.

Are we at an impasse, is meaningful discussion between the two sides possible? I do not know. I think there could be other cues we could look to for support. It's certainly an interesting idea.

 

[Numbers]

What some may be missing is that the cognisance of the CSC includes not only the those elements of the proceedings which are subject of the appeal to the CSC (CPP Article 609.1) but also to issues that which could not have been raised at the appeal stage (CPP Article 609.2), which means, it would appear, that issues of law decided by a CSC panel in an annulment with referral could be reversed by another CSC panel in its review of the referral verdict.

 

[Numbers]

Wrong. Res judicata requires a final judgment. Chieffi was not a final judgment, obviously.

The Chieffi CSC panel confirmation of the conviction by the Hellmann appeal court of Knox for "simple" calunnia against Lumumba was the only res judicata of that CSC panel.

Otherwise the Chieffi CSC panel annulled the Hellmann appeal court's verdict of acquittal and referred the case to the Nencini appeal court. Thus, there was no res judicata relating to the referred case.

CPP Article 627.3 provides that the referral judge shall conform to the judgment of the CSC as regards any issue of law it has decided upon. It is unstated in Article 627.3 whether that includes the interpretation of evidence, but contrary to such an interpretation of Article 627.3, CPP Article 627.2 states that the referral judge shall decide exercising the same powers of the judge whose judgment has been annulled, without prejudice to the limitations established by law, and that new evidence may be admitted if relevant for the decision.

What some may be missing is that the cognisance of the CSC includes not only the those elements of the proceedings which are subject of the appeal to the CSC (CPP Article 609.1) but also to issues that which could not have been raised at the appeal stage (CPP Article 609.2), which means, it would appear, that issues of law decided by a CSC panel in an annulment with referral could be reversed by another CSC panel in its review of the referral verdict.

An explanation based on Italian procedural law of why the Marasca CSC panel motivation report and verdict may legally contradict anything stated in the Chieffi CSC panel annulment with referral. The res judicata of the Chieffi CSC panel - that is, the conviction of Knox for "simple" calunnia - cannot be appealed in the ordinary way, but can only be changed by a revision trial*.

*These three legal measures apply:

CPP Article 648.1, judgments delivered at trial which are not subject to appellate remedy other than revision are final;

CPP Article 629, the revision of judgments of conviction may be performed at any time;

Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011, revision may be requested when it is necessary to reopen proceedings to comply with a final judgment of the ECHR. (In addition to those reasons for request of revision allowed in CPP Article 630.)

 

[acbytesla]

It's taking you PGP so much longer to accept what the ISC can and cannot do. We got over Chieffi within a year

In all fairness bagels, the PGP have to deal with the fact that it is over and is final. We knew Chieffi wasn't the end of the story.

 

[Numbers]

The Italian judicial ruling (with the force of law) - an interpretation of the Italian Constitution and treaty requirements - allowing the request of a revision trial when it is necessary to reopen proceedings in order to comply with a final judgment of the ECHR is (Supreme) Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011. This cause for revision is not among the valid reasons for requesting revision listed in CPP Article 630, the law passed by Parliament.

The Constitutional Court decided that to accommodate Italy's treaty obligations under its Constitution, the limitations of Article 630 were unconstitutional in not including requests based upon ECHR judgments, and affirmed that since Parliament had not yet indicated any other mechanism, the revision procedure was the method to satisfy reopening of proceedings required by a final ECHR judgment.

The text of this judgment is available in English as well as Italian from the Constitutional Court's website, for the English text (PDF):

http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionJudgment.do.

The judgment is 16 pages long (including title page) and is written clearly, a pleasant surprise for an Italian court judgment. (Note that the two supreme courts, the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation [CSC], are separate and distinct courts.)

Here are some relevant excerpts from Constitutional Court judgment 113 of 2011; I have put the "On Those Grounds" section first, although it is actually the last section of the document. Note that the Constitutional Court recognizes that the goal of the revision must meet those of the ECHR judgment, including restoring the victim of the violation of rights to his or her condition prior to the violation.

ON THOSE GROUNDS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
declares that Article 630 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional insofar as it does not provide for a different ground for the review of a judgment or conviction in order to enable a trial to be reopened when this is necessary, pursuant to Article 46(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in order to comply with a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.

Decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta, on 4 April 2011.

....

Starting from judgments no. 348 and no. 349 of 2007, the case law of this Court has been settled in ruling that the provisions of the ECHR – as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, specifically established in order to interpret and apply the Convention (Article 32(1) of the Convention) – supplement the constitutional principle laid down under Article 117(1) of the Constitution as “interposed rules” by requiring that national legislation comply with the requirements resulting from “international law obligations. ...” [p. 11]

..., {T}he Strasbourg Court considers, according to case law that is now settled, that the obligation to comply with its final judgments incumbent upon the contracting Parties under Article 46(1) ECHR also entails the commitment for the contracting States to allow trials to be reopened, if requested by the interested party, whenever this may appear necessary in order to grant full redress to that person in cases in which the guarantees recognised by the Convention have been violated, particularly the right to a fair trial.

This interpretation cannot be deemed to contrast with the relevant protections offered by the Constitution. In particular – without prejudice to the undoubted relevance of the values represented by the certainty and stability of a res iudicata – the provision for the setting aside of the related exclusionary effects in cases involving particularly serious infringements – such as those ascertained by the Strasbourg Court, having regard to the judicial proceedings as a whole – of the guarantees relating to fundamental human rights cannot be regarded as unconstitutional. With particular reference to the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention, these guarantees are moreover largely confirmed under the current text of Article 111 of the Constitution. [p. 12 - 13]

....{R}eview {that is, revision} – which entails the reopening of the trial as an extraordinary ground for appeal of a general nature, implying a resumption of procedural activities addressing the merits of the case, including also the discovery of evidence – is that which most closely resembles the remedy which it appears necessary to introduce in order to guarantee that the national legal order complies with the principle invoked.[p. 13]

In this case, Article 630 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be ruled unconstitutional precisely because (and insofar as) it does not contemplate a “different” ground for review compared to those currently available which is aimed specifically at permitting a trial to be reopened ... when it is necessary to reopen the case pursuant to Article 46(1) ECHR in order to comply with a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.... Moreover, the concept of “trial” here is to be understood in generic terms that are also conducive to the repetition of activities already carried out and, if appropriate, of the whole case.
The need for the case to be reopened must naturally be assessed taking account of the indications contained in the judgment to be enforced, as well as in any “interpretative” judgment that may be requested from the European Court by the Committee of Ministers pursuant to Article 46(3) ECHR, as well as with reference to the objective nature of the violation ascertained.
The Court holds moreover that, should the situation considered above obtain, the court will be required to review the compatibility of the individual provisions relating to the review proceedings. Any provisions which appear to be irreconcilable in logical and legal terms with the objective pursued (that of placing the interested party in the situation in which he would have been had the violation ascertained not occurred, and not remedying an incorrect assessment by the trial court resulting from elements external to the trial) will have to be considered inapplicable....[p. 14]

...{I}n the appropriate cases, the provisions of Article 637(2) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which provide, respectively, that the acceptance of the application will inevitably entail the acquittal of the interested party, and that the court may not reach its decision exclusively on the basis of a different assessment of the evidence heard in the previous proceedings) should also be considered inapplicable.

....{T}he review court will also have to assess how the grounds for the unfairness of the trial found by the European Court translate into flaws in procedural acts under national law, and shall adopt all consequent measures in the new proceedings in order to remove them.[p. 15]

 

[Planigale]

With regards to the Machiavelli's argument the defence did not make a complaint about ill treatment in the interrogation, I recall there was a poster here RandyN who was outspoken about how ineffective he felt the defence was and he described the issues he felt they failed to address. I felt a large part of what he said was true. If the defence was timid and ineffective, this may explain why they did not complain about ill treatment at the interrogation. If the defence were unwilling to tackle issues, we can see from Machiavelli's post this has given ammunition to the PGP because they can argue along the lines of "if the the prosecution did something wrong, why did the defence not make an issue of it" which is what Machiavelli is doing with regards to the interrogation.

A barrister friend explained that in England at least and I think in other jurisdictions making a claim of ill treatment against the police is a quick way of losing the sympathy of a jury. If you are going to do this you have to be able to back it up, appeal courts may subsequently take it more seriously if raised initially but it may be better to argue the case and get your client off, then pursue the police in a separate action; always easier if the claimant is not a convicted felon.

So the defence may have been right not to pursue this issue. Equally it appears in the Italian system the lawyers have to be careful not to impune the honour of the witnesses. For instance. The defence were prevented from pursuing acoustic studies because it implied the earwitnesses were lying (a wrong opinion by the judge as it was about the interpretation by the prosecution of the witness testimony e.g. if a scream was heard (accepting the witness as truthful), was it possible the scream was that of the victim as claimed by the prosecution or must it have originated in a street nearby as argued by the defence, an entirely reasonable situation to seek an expert opinion.) In the UK or the US I suspect the defence would have pursued far more aggressively the reason why the knife was removed from its envelope and examined at the police station contrary to good practice, who and what had been through the office etc. If the knife need to be boxed for transit the unopened envelope should have been placed in the box. Steffanoni should have been far more aggressively pursued by the defence why she stated in written and verbal testimony that sample c from the knife was tested by RTPCR when quantification was by Qubit. Why she testified that there was a significant amount of DNA found when quantification showed non detectable. This was not a simple slip as Steffanoni said the sample was concentrated the only reason for concentrating a sample is because the DNA content is low (or in this case undetectable).

My suspicion is what Steffanoni did not want to say was the bald fact. "I tested sample C from the knife blade; quantification found no DNA in this sample. After concentrating with vacuum extraction but without a negative control to detect contamination I amplified and typed sample C and a low level of the victim's DNA was then found to be present. My interpretation is that an undetectable level of DNA was present in the original sample, the lack of a negative control through subsequent processing means that subsequent laboratory contamination cannot be excluded, however I believe contamination is unlikely because it is six days since another sample of the victim's DNA was processed and these are the SOP for cleaning, the records of this being carried out and the environmental sampling records for the week before and after showing no contamination, of note we tested for environmental contamination to a level of 10pg which would detect a contamination at the low level compatible with level of DNA found in sample C"

 

[Vixen]

You couldn't be more wrong.

Criminal courts issue judgements on charges. Appeal courts assess appeals against convictions (or, occasionally and in certain circumstances, acquittals). The Chieffi court referred the entirety of the murder-related charges for Knox and Sollecito back down to the appeal-level Nencini court.

Yes, the Chieffi court gave direction (and remember, the Marasca SC court correctly lambasted the Nencini court for slavishly following what it had perceived as "orders" from the Chieffi SC panel....) as to what it wanted the Nencini court to look at in particular. But you are 100% wrong to claim that every other area of the case than those points upon which the Chieffi panel gave direction to the Nencini court was somehow "settled in law" or "unchangeable" or anything similar (let alone "res judicata" - which is several types of wrong to be claiming here, since it specifically applies to settled judgements on the charges themselves).

In short, the Marasca SC panel was entirely entitled to examine matters of law related to, for example, the DNA "evidence" or the Curatolo/Quintavalle "testimony", provided they comprised points of appeal (which they did). The entire case related to each of the charges was subject to appeal: in no system can one say "you can appeal on Issue 1 related to this conviction, but not on Matter 2 relating to this conviction" (unless, of course, the court is denying an appeal on Matter 2 on the grounds that it is a manifestly poor/incorrect grounds for appeal).

You are completely wrong. An appeal court never rehears the trial all over again. All that is looked at are the specific points of law that have been allowed on appeal.

Once an issue has been appealed (on a point of law, new evidence, perversity or public interest), the same point of appeal cannot be brought up again.

That is why the Nencini appeal was restricted to the knife and bra DNA and the minor witnesses.

All Marasca had the power to dismiss was the DNA stuff as the defence did not put forward an appeal against dismissing the Aviello claims.

 

[Vixen]

What some may be missing is that the cognisance of the CSC includes not only the those elements of the proceedings which are subject of the appeal to the CSC (CPP Article 609.1) but also to issues that which could not have been raised at the appeal stage (CPP Article 609.2), which means, it would appear, that issues of law decided by a CSC panel in an annulment with referral could be reversed by another CSC panel in its review of the referral verdict.

Wrong, wrong, wrong, if a CSC disagrees with a lower courts verdict, it broadly speaking must send it back down to the same level of court to reassess the issue again. All the CSC does is rubber stamp the verdict.

Marasca astonishingly overturned two guilty findings by each of the lower courts off its own bat, completely outside of its legal powers.

 

[Vixen]

Chieffi is indeed a final judgement.

Machiavelli is right.

 

[js202]

In this instance, Chieffi is a "final judgement" in the same way that the winner of a semi-final event is the final victor of a sporting season. I have friends from Boston who are so obsessed with their team, the Patriots, that they refer to their endeavors with the pronoun "we". I'm sure they'll be happy to hear the Super Bowl is unnecessary this year.

 

[Numbers]

What some may be missing is that the cognisance of the CSC includes not only the those elements of the proceedings which are subject of the appeal to the CSC (CPP Article 609.1) but also to issues that which could not have been raised at the appeal stage (CPP Article 609.2), which means, it would appear, that issues of law decided by a CSC panel in an annulment with referral could be reversed by another CSC panel in its review of the referral verdict.

CPP Article 609 Cognisance of the Court of Cassation {CSC}

1. The appeal to the CSC assigns cognisance of the proceedings to the CSC, exclusively with regard to the arguments raised.

2. The CSC shall also decide on the issues raised ex officio at any stage and instance of the proceedings and on those issues which could not have been raised at the appeal stage.


Legal definition of cognisance (also spelled: cognizance)

1.1Law The action of taking judicial notice.

examples of use
‘Any discreet watching brief must take full cognisance of an individual's right to privacy and independence.’
‘Most international human rights instruments subsequently adopted by the United Nations have a basis in the Universal Declaration and give further definition and cognisance to those rights.’
‘The law takes no cognisance of carelessness in the abstract.’
‘It is bound, of course, to give cognisance to the fact of the order that is being enforced.’
‘Taking cognisance of the charge-sheet filed by the Delhi police, the magistrate asked them to appear before him on September 8.’

Source: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cognizance

Cognizance

The power, authority, and ability of a judge to determine a particular legal matter. A judge's decision to take note of or deal with a cause.

That which is cognizable to a judge is within the scope of his or her jurisdiction.

Source: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/cognizance

 

[Numbers]

In this instance, Chieffi is a "final judgement" in the same way that the winner of a semi-final event is the final victor of a sporting season. I have friends from Boston who are so obsessed with their team, the Patriots, that they refer to their endeavors with the pronoun "we". I'm sure they'll be happy to hear the Super Bowl is unnecessary this year.

The Chieffi CSC panel confirmation of the Hellmann appeal court verdict of conviction against Knox for calunnia against Lumumba was final. The remaining Hellmann court verdict of acquittal was annulled and the case referred to the Nencini appeal court for retrial.

Any decision on issues of interpretation of law by the Chieffi CSC panel was not subject to appeal or change in the referral court trial, that is, the Nencini appeal court trial, according to CPP Article 627.3.

However, even matters not subject to appeal before the Nencini appeal court could be addressed by the Marasca CSC panel, who reviewed the Nencini court judgment, in accordance with CPP Article 609.2.

 

[acbytesla]

Originally Posted by Machiavelli
Chieffi is indeed a final judgement.

Machiavelli is right.

We wouldn't be where we are Vixen if that was true. At some point you have to open your eyes and accept reality. Machiavelli may sound authoritive but he clearly is not.

This is textbook cognitive dissonance.

 

[bagels]

Machiavelli is right.

http://img05.deviantart.net/573d/i/2010/082/2/e/machiavelli_was_right_button_by_zekarmisama.jpg

Edited by Agatha: 

Edited for rule 5. Please do not hotlink

 

[Diocletus]

Chieffi is indeed a final judgement.

LOL. Really? I must have been confused by the fact that Chieffi remanded the matter to the lower court and then there was a subsequent supreme court decision in the very same case. So, if by "final" you mean "final except for the subsequent decision that ends the case", then yeah, I guess you're right. Otherwise, I'm afraid you're clueless.