Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[jsfisher]

For reference, the electrical wire example:
Let H be "I touched an electrical wire which is live".
Let ~H be "I touched an electrical wire which is not live".
Let E be "I exist (survived touching the wire)".

Let P(E | H) << P(E | ~H). Then E (my own existence) is evidence for the wire not being live.

Your E refers to you being alive after some potentially fatal event. There is no question about your existence pre-event.

In Jabba's usage, there is also no question about his existence at the start, either, but his hypothesis is about reality, itself, not some event that may alter his existence. His pre- and post-existence are the same thing. His P(E) is necessarily 1.

 

[jt512]

It's a game of your creation. And Jabba's.

No. It is a game of Jabba's creation alone. That's the point.

 

[marplots]

New, independent data from the same population is as good as the population it comes from. If you observed a correlation between obesity and chicken consumption in US boys age 9 to 17, and you wanted to test the hypothesis that chicken causes obesity in that population, then a new, independent sample from that population would be ideal. If you wanted to test that the hypothesis generalizes to a wider population, then a sample from that population would be inadequate.

I find that difficult to believe. But maybe I misunderstand.

It sounds like you are saying that a new sampling of old data is evidence for a model created from the same pool of old data.

Here is a plot I grabbed off the net.

Now, suppose I use that to make a model/hypothesis that margarine causes divorces (in Maine). If I then go back to the well and fill in divorce rates (say by adding every six months instead of yearly), and the data still fits, I should be more confident about my hypothesis?

To me, it seems like I'm just revisiting the same overall data set, the one I used to construct my model.

 

[abaddon]

No. It is a game of Jabba's creation alone. That's the point.

And you are playing it. Why? Who knows.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Dave,
- Given that explanation for my current existence, my current existence is totally unlikely.

*Sighs* Fine Jabba you've convinced me. It's amazingly unlikely that you exist it's a goshdarn genu-wine math-ey-matical paradox it is, sure be it for sure for realzies. By golly Jee you've cracked the code. Jolly good case there Holmes.

So you don't exist. Therefore you're not here to waste everyones's time with this nonsensical non-argument.

 

[jt512]

And you are playing it. Why? Who knows.

No. For the final time, I'm refusing to play Jabba's game. And, from this point on, I am refusing to play your game, as well.

It's back to Internet basics: Don't feed the trolls.

 

[jt512]

I find that difficult to believe. But maybe I misunderstand.

It sounds like you are saying that a new sampling of old data is evidence for a model created from the same pool of old data.

No. You're confusing samples from populations with the populations themselves. I'm saying that if I develop a hypothesis by observing a relationship between variables A and B in a sample from a particular population, and I want to test that hypothesis in that population, then the ideal sample is an independent sample from the same population.

Here is a plot I grabbed off the net.
[qimg]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/picture.php?albumid=1148&pictureid=11097[/qimg]

Now, suppose I use that to make a model/hypothesis that margarine causes divorces (in Maine). If I then go back to the well and fill in divorce rates (say by adding every six months instead of yearly), and the data still fits, I should be more confident about my hypothesis?

To me, it seems like I'm just revisiting the same overall data set, the one I used to construct my model.

There are too many problems with that data to use it as an example. They are annual statistics, so you can't "fill in" anything, and due to ecologic fallacy, the data are totally inappropriate for a hypothesis about a protective effect of margarine on marriage.

 

[aleCcowaN]

On the contrary, the relationship is given by Bayes' Theorem.

Stop your screeching-chalk-on-blackboard concert at once!

You don't have any idea of what you're talking about: you think any propositional relationship is a probabilistic relationship just because you can find room for it in a bare formula.

I suppose that, in the Anglosphere, people who do really study Probability Theory, they get a lot of nice examples of no-noes regarding Bayes in the shape of double entendres (I'm sure any of you with a minimal education in this matter will jump soon in this thread to provide dozens of those nice examples). Mine don't work when translated into English, but it is like, roughly, saying: P(the broad dates you/you are handsome) = P(you are handsome/the broad dates you)*P(the broad dates you)/[1 - P(you are Shrek)]

The uselessness of Bayes for royal flushes and cheaters, even more patent uselessness when "immor(t)ality" is discussed, is reveal by you handwaving «on the contrary, the relationship is given by Bayes' theorem».

 

[aleCcowaN]

I find that difficult to believe. But maybe I misunderstand.

It sounds like you are saying that a new sampling of old data is evidence for a model created from the same pool of old data.

No. You're confusing samples from populations with the populations themselves. I'm saying that if I develop a hypothesis by observing a relationship between variables A and B in a sample from a particular population, and I want to test that hypothesis in that population, then the ideal sample is an independent sample from the same population.

You're ability to play dumb is amazing. Marplots got you, now you're entangled in your own sophistry.

Here is a plot I grabbed off the net.

Now, suppose I use that to make a model/hypothesis that margarine causes divorces (in Maine). If I then go back to the well and fill in divorce rates (say by adding every six months instead of yearly), and the data still fits, I should be more confident about my hypothesis?

To me, it seems like I'm just revisiting the same overall data set, the one I used to construct my model.

There are too many problems with that data to use it as an example. They are annual statistics, so you can't "fill in" anything, and due to ecologic fallacy, the data are totally inappropriate for a hypothesis about a protective effect of margarine on marriage.

You're improvising again, jt512, by speechifying about the very mistake you were caught making (something in the trick bag of every sophist). Are you a French speaker or a Spanish speaker? because it's ecological fallacy in English. Also because you have a mélange of falacia de composición and falacia de división.

 

[Jabba]

Mojo,
- The "new data" I'm using is the scientific supposition(s) of how a "self" (or the process/illusion of a self) comes about. This aspect of the surrounding data has not been taken into account (as far as I can tell) by Scientific consideration re the prior probability of OOFLam.

The "scientific supposition" is that consciousness is the result of brain processes, and that once your body exists whatever consciousness it happens to be producing is your consciousness.

You are trying to beg the question by foisting an infinite number of "potential selves" in the hypothesis you oppose. That is a strawman argument, and it makes your argument irrelevant to the actual hypothesis.

Mojo,

- I wasn't very clear...

- It's how the particular self comes about -- not selves in general -- to which I was referring.

- Also, it's that ineffable kind of self, rather than the self identified by his/her characteristics -- the self (perhaps, illusional) described by Susan Blackmore.
Who – or what – am I? Answers such as ‘I am my body’ or ‘I am my brain’ are unsatisfactory because I don’t feel like a body or a brain. I feel like someone who owns this body and brain. But who could it be who feels as though she lives inside this head and looks out through the eyes? Who is it who seems to be living this life and having these experiences?
Blackmore, Susan. Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Locations 1064-1067). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

- More about that later.

- But, most importantly, this particular self is brand new -- the offspring/result of a particular bit of consciousness, and no more limited than the number of consciousnesses possible. We're like recycled yellow Volkswagons, each of us having our own (new) VIN #.

 

[Belz...]

- It's how the particular self comes about -- not selves in general -- to which I was referring.

...what's the difference?

- Also, it's that ineffable kind of self

Doesn't seem ineffable to me.

Answers such as ‘I am my body’ or ‘I am my brain’ are unsatisfactory because I don’t feel like a body or a brain.

Uh-huh. So your feelings trump facts?

How about your feeling of fear at something entirely innocuous? Does the feeling trump the fact there? Feelings are more often wrong than right. It'd be high time for you to realise this.

 

[Hokulele]

Jabba, what you do not understand about your analogy is that you are the yellow, not the Volkswagon.

If we are the VIN, answer me this: If we were to clone you tomorrow, when you woke up after the process, would you know if you were the original, or the clone?

 

[Belz...]

- But, most importantly, this particular self is brand new -- the offspring/result of a particular bit of consciousness, and no more limited than the number of consciousnesses possible. We're like recycled yellow Volkswagons, each of us having our own (new) VIN #.

What in the blue hell are you on about?

 

[godless dave]

Human beings don't have VINs.

The self identified by its characteristics is the only self that exists under H. If you're talking about some other kind of self, you're not talking about H.

 

[Belz...]

Human beings don't have VINs.

Some do, but they closed the concentration camps a while ago.

 

[marplots]

No. You're confusing samples from populations with the populations themselves. I'm saying that if I develop a hypothesis by observing a relationship between variables A and B in a sample from a particular population, and I want to test that hypothesis in that population, then the ideal sample is an independent sample from the same population.

But that's the same population I used to construct my model to match. In my view, matching is not enough. To count as a useful model, it should have explanatory power as well. And, by explanatory power, I mean it suggests different connections and outcomes from those we used to construct the model in the first place.

I'll try one more example to see if we can agree.
Suppose I sample (using good random technique) the natural numbers. I take a sufficiently large sample (say a few million) and find that about half are evenly divisible by two. I now suggest that the entire population of natural numbers (if infinity bothers us here, we can set some very high limit instead) has this property.

I sample again and get the same results (within some acceptable margin of error).

Now, you seem to be saying the second sampling confirms my hypothesis in some way. I'm saying that it adds no new information, since one of the characteristics of my first sampling was that it represents the entire population fairly. The best I might say is I have demonstrated good sampling technique, not that my hypothesis is anything more than a restatement of the results of my sampling.

If that's misleading or wrong, perhaps you could give an example which illustrates your point - because I suspect we are talking at cross purposes here.

 

[caveman1917]

P(A | B) ≢P(A | A, B) = 1 .

How does this qualify as a response?

 

[marplots]

Some do, but they closed the concentration camps a while ago.

Was it Victim Identification Number?

 

[caveman1917]

Your E refers to you being alive after some potentially fatal event. There is no question about your existence pre-event.

In Jabba's usage, there is also no question about his existence at the start, either, but his hypothesis is about reality, itself, not some event that may alter his existence. His pre- and post-existence are the same thing. His P(E) is necessarily 1.

Irrelevant.

Let H be "my parents have met".
Let ~H be "my parents have not met".
Let E be "I exist".

Let P(E | H) >> P(E | ~H). Then I conclude that E (my own existence) is evidence for my parents having met.

If we're following this reasoning of "you're conditioning on your own existence therefor it should be P(E | E, H) = P(E | E, ~H) = 1" then my existence would not be evidence for my parents having met. Besides, this reasoning can be seen to be erroneous by failing to reduce to classical deductive logic in the limit where the probabilities go to {0, 1}

 

[JayUtah]

It's how the particular self comes about -- not selves in general -- to which I was referring.

And that is explicitly and exactly the Texas sharpshooter's fallacy.

Also, it's that ineffable kind of self, rather than the self identified by his/her characteristics...

Irrelevant. If the self you are speaking of doesn't have articulable characteristics of its own, it simply does not exist in any addressable way. You as the claimant are responsible for defining the characteristics of the thing you imagine exists, and proving by valid and controlled tests of those characteristics that it does exist. Blackmore's pseudo-mystical mumbo-jumbo doesn't cut it in science. This is why she abandoned science and publishes for the mush-headed popular audience now.

But, most importantly, this particular self is brand new

Irrelevant. We discussed this with the thought experiment of the hypothetically perfect clone, which you still cannot wrap your mind around.

and no more limited than the number of consciousnesses possible.

Asked and answered. In the scientific model, consciousness does not have cardinality.

each of us having our own (new) VIN #.

A VIN is a testable characteristic of a car that has its own well-defined rules. You identify nothing remotely like that as a characteristic of your soul. In fact, you explicitly disavow such things above when you attempt to invoke Blackmore. Improper analogy.