Your hypothesis H is that the scientific model can produce consciousness. You're trying to disprove the hypothesis so that you can invoke a false dilemma and say that having disproven it, some other anonymous hypothesis ~H (what you claim, but wrongly notated) must be responsible for producing consciousness. You've assigned prior probabilities P(H) and P(~H) to each of those hypotheses, even though it's ill-formed for you to do so for P(~H). The new data in your model is E, the observation that your consciousness exists in your present form. You purport that this new data is highly unlikely to have arisen in the case of the scientific model, in other words that P(E|H) is very small. Thus you conclude that P(H|E) is also very small and that this means the posterior probability P(~H|E) must be very large. Not that this is a valid way of thinking about the problem, but it's the way you've been presenting it up until now.
What you're trying to do now is scrape together a whole bunch of speculative hogwash and pin it straw-man fashion on the scientific model, insisting it would somehow have to account for it. But the conditions you're trying to place on H actually apply only to ~H, and only via your supposition. You're making up all sorts of excuses for why the target has to be drawn around your bullet hole that try (but fail) to avoid the real reason that that's where the bullet hole is.