JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
That's a terrible analogy.
Good grief, yes, I have to agree. Especially since Jabba has already tried to use the oft-employed dualist analogy to which you allude: that the soul is like radio waves and the body or brain is like a radio, and that it takes the two together to make music.
In that analogy there's no proof "radio waves" (i.e., the soul) exists. Second, radio waves can be detected by instruments other than radios, and in a manner that doesn't produce music. Dualists can present no other evidence for the operation of the alleged soul than through its purported interaction with the body. Jabba has frankly told us science can't possibly detect the soul, for ... reasons.
That's where the dualist claim runs afoul of parsimony. In order to have the property they want -- immortality -- they have to invent a phenomenon that magically has the property of immortality yet has no other observable properties that aren't connected with causes science already knows produces the other purported effects of the soul: the sense of self. That is, we can already explain the sense of self by means of causes for which there is already evidence, and we can strongly correlate the observations to the presence or absence of those causes alone. Since we don't need there to be a soul to explain observations, it's not a component of the model.
I frequently see non-scientists struggle with parsimony. It's an important requirement of a scientific model to include no more than what is required to explain the observations, because to do otherwise purports causality for which there is no evidence and which would lead to incorrect predictions. Non-scientists, and especially the fringe, translate this into a belief that science cannot allow extraneous causes for some particular effect, and they argue this is irrational.
A parsimonious model is sufficient. That is, if the goal is to explain some phenomenon such as the sense of self, a parsimonious model contains all the causes that are necessary to explain the entire phenomenon. If a newcomer argues that a new cause should be added to the mix, then he has to show the existing model is insufficient without it. He has to show phenomena that the model doesn't explain. Then, in a following step, he has to show that his purported cause explains the missing phenomena, and therefore that the model is sufficient only if it includes his proffered cause.
Without that exercise it's useless for a fringe claimant to beg skeptics to stipulate arguendo that a soul exists. So what if it does? The goal is to show that it exists and that it explains some phenomena. You can't do that to an already-sufficient model.
To say that the same thing happens to the running of an engine when it blows a gasket as happens when a radio is switched off, would mean that "running" is some thing that is independent of an engine...
Indeed, as is common to so many of Jabba's arguments, he wants to equivocate -- in this case, over what it means to be a property of something. He struggles ever so hard to make it seem as if the self must necessarily be an external item.