Proof of Immortality III

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Dave,
- I'm just asking you to assume that OOFLam might be wrong.

Why would I assume OOFLam might be wrong when evaluating P(E|OOFLam)? P(E|OOFLam) is based on OOFLam being correct. P(E|~OOFLam) is based on OOFLam being wrong.
 
Dave,

- They would not be the same observer.

- Which leads to my conclusion that the likelihood of my (and, your) current existence -- given OOFLam -- is virtually zero. Then, using that as P(E|H), and accepting that there is some reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong, I conclude that P(H|E) is also virtually zero...
- I understand that you do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong -- but, if you did believe it might be wrong, would you agree with my conclusion?

"If you agreed with my conclusion, would you agree with my conclusion?" Jabba, why would anyone conclude that the system is rigged when it's working exactly the way we'd expect it?
LL,
- If you agreed with that particular premise, would you agree with my conclusion? IOW, do you agree with the rest of my premises?
 
They would not be the same observer.

They would be two identical observers, for all the purposes that apply to the scientific model. You seem unable to grasp that, and it's clear why. In your hypothesis, the properties of observation are vested in a soul, which you insinuate cannot be divided or duplicated.

But the scientific model labors under no such provision. In the scientific model all of what you ascribe to the self is an emergent property of the organism. Two identical organisms mean it emerges identically from each, until they naturally begin to diverge from the point of creation. There is no magical indivisible property in the scientific model from which the properties of the self arise, and therefore no problem with having two identical selves.

Cardinality is a red herring. Stop trying to make something out of it. It's only a problem for your hypothesis. It's not a problem at all for the scientific hypothesis because the scientific hypothesis doesn't require a soul and all the problems associated with it for the hypothetical duplication. You're assuming your desired conclusion is true for the purpose of trying to falsify the null hypothesis. Your assuming that the limitations of your hypothetical soul should also apply as a premise to reasoning about where the self lies in the scientific model.

Which leads to my conclusion that the likelihood of my (and, your) current existence -- given OOFLam -- is virtually zero.

Your conclusion is based on a circular argument. It's based on the same circular argument your critics have been pointing out to you for months if not literally years. Your inability or unwillingness to see the circularity in your argument does not make it go away.

Your low estimate for the ability of the scientific model to produce a given self is based on your inappropriate pasting-on of elements of your hypothesis and the subsequent assumption that they must be true.

I understand that you do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong -- but, if you did believe it might be wrong, would you agree with my conclusion?

And we're back to you simply begging other people to believe you "maybe just a little bit." This entire last paragraph is highly inappropriate coming from someone who has frankly admitted that he is too emotionally entrenched in his belief to consider an alternative. You owe us an assurance that you will dispassionately approach your proposed proof and accept in good faith the criticism you solicit by posting it in public, and that your critics are not just wasting their time on someone who is too religiously devoted to consider the possibility of his own error.

Can you do that? Are you bold enough to answer that question?

Your conclusion is wrong for the reasons stated: it is a circular argument. Fix the reasons; don't beg people to overlook your chronic mistakes.
 
LL,
- If you agreed with that particular premise, would you agree with my conclusion? IOW, do you agree with the rest of my premises?

Do not beg people to accept a circular argument.

Your critics have been explicit and comprehensive in the reasons for which they do not accept your argument. If you are unwilling to address those reasons, you have no business pleading with people to overlook your errors.
 
LL,
- If you agreed with that particular premise, would you agree with my conclusion? IOW, do you agree with the rest of my premises?
No. Not at all. Zero percent. Nein, nyet, lo, non, negative, no.go,, nil, etc.
 
I'm just asking you to assume that OOFLam might be wrong.

Yes, and we know why. You're trying once again to transform the abstract suspension of disbelief in a soul -- which is necessary even to allow you to present your argument and have it critiqued -- into some operative agreement that your belief is probabilistically true to some extent. I have explained at length how you may not do that. You predictably ignored that explanation.

This is nothing more than a shameful attempt at the same rhetorical trickery that you get caught doing every time you try.

Shame on you, Jabba. Argue like an adult and stop this incessant equivocation.
 
The die could have landed on an edge, and a die has twice as many edges as faces, so there were 2:1 odds against it landing with one of its faces up. Yet it did!

Don't forget the 8 corners.


Moreover, the die has 8 corners, making the odds against it landing face-up 20:6. This concludes the virtual proof that dice have immortal souls.
 
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You are groveling for consensus again.

Specifically he's trying to establish a necessary premise for his argument by dishonest means.

Bob goes into his local debating society and announces, "I think I can prove mathematically that nargles exist." He receives looks that range from astonished to bemused.

"Go ahead," says the society president. "We'll accept -- for the sake of argument -- that it's possible nargles may exist, although none of us here has seen any evidence that they do. Hence we don't believe they do, and won't until the evidence recommends that conclusion."

"Great; thanks," says Bob. "I'm going to attempt a statistical proof. If you accept arguendo that they may exist, then you would accept that they may be responsible for certain observations." The members look around at each other and nod in general agreement. "Okay, you've heard how some people hear voices when no one else is around. I put it to you that those are nargles speaking in their ears, and that nargles are invisible."

"Hold on now," says the president. "There's a scientific explanation. Auditory hallucinations are nothing new to science. Those theories explain the observations without having to resort to hypotheses for which there is little if any separate evidence."

"Sure, but hear me out." Bob is just getting started. "Those scientific explanations don't explain how people are actually able to hear those sounds. Something has to create the sound waves that their ears interpret as voices. Since the scientific explanation doesn't include anything that does that, it's less probable an explanation."

The president holds his finger up as the other society members raise their palms to their faces. "Now hold on a second," the president objects. "The scientific explanation works by an entirely different mechanism. You're borrowing constraints and assumptions that attend your hypothesis -- i.e., the mechanism -- and trying to apply them universally."

"I don't understand," says Bob. "The people are hearing voices, and my hypothesis accounts for an observation not explained by the scientific theory, which I'll call H. Therefore I estimate that if a person hears voices -- let's call that E -- then the likelihood P(E|H) is very very low."

A member pipes up. "No, sir, your proposal involves a hypothesis as to both cause and mechanism, whereby the scientific theory involves an entirely separate hypothesis as to cause, and also a separate hypothesis as to mechanism. You may not logically conflate the two as you have done."

Bob is obviously flustered. "But if nargles exists, albeit invisibly, and they are actual entities, then we can easily assume they have the ability to create sound waves and thus also possibly speech. If you agree that these are reasonable assumptions, can you deny that nargles could be responsible for people hearing voices?"

"That's not the point," says the member. "You are trying to falsify the scientific hypothesis by saying it fails to duplicate the mechanism you argue is reasonably the case for nargles. It doesn't matter whether nargles can or cannot speak. It matters that the scientific hypothesis operates by a different mechanism -- not by sound waves -- and is not bound by the constraints endemic to yours. You may not falsify one hypothesis by arguments that don't apply to it. You may not require the scientific hypothesis to involve sound waves when it doesn't, then say it's an unlikely explanation for lack of those same sound waves."

"Hear, hear!" the other members agree. The president continues, "Do you see now that your reasoning is unsound?"

"Don't forget that proving the prevailing scientific theory false doesn't prove nargles true," shouts a member from the back.

"We'll get to that," says the president. "Let's try to make our visitor understand the straw man aspect of his argument."

"I still don't see it," says Bob. "My theory proves it's very unlikely for the scientific theory to explain why people hear voices, and I've explained that it's because the mind alone cannot generate sound waves."

"Our kind member here has explained why that alleged unlikelihood simply does not hold. I'm afraid we cannot accept your proof as valid." The president then moves to usher Bob out.

"But I don't understand," says Bob. "I can see where you might dispute such things as the assumption that nargles can speak or make sound waves. After all, no one really knows what nargles can or can't do. But would you agree that if my premise holds and that nargles can speak, I will have proved my point?"

"No!" exclaim the members in unision. The president signals for silence. "You see, it's not so much the strength of your premise that fails your argument as its application in the logical structure of it."

Again the voice from the back. "What about the false dilemma!"

"Yes, yes," the president acknowledges. "We'll get to that, but our visitor is still unclear. Our member has explained it adequately. You can't assume the constraints or consequents of your hypothesis -- which you're trying to prove true by proving false what you think is its opposite --"

"False dilemma!"

"--Yes, please be patient. You can't assume the properties of the hypothesis in a proof that's trying to prove the hypothesis true."

"I see where this is going," says Bob. "You just don't want to believe in nargles. If you were more open-minded and considered things other that dry logic, you'd see how my proof works."

"But my friend," says the president, "that's not at all the issue. It's not that it's difficult to believe in nargles, or in anything for which no proof has been shown. It's that you proposed a mathematical proof. Those proofs rely on the ability to very precisely and carefully delineate what you mean and don't mean, and what applies and doesn't apply, and upon facts and defensible computations from those facts. If your 'computation' for the low likelihood of the scientific theory relies upon the incorrect assumption that it would work the same way as nargles, then you must graciously accept defeat when that error is revealed to you."

"But my argument is sound." Bob is frustrated, clearly. "It follows very precisely and logically from its premises and I have conceded that there is room in the initial assumptions. But even given that room, and assuming a low initial probability that nargles exist, my argument is still structurally valid. All I'm asking is that you agree that my conclusion would follow from the premises, given favorable assumptions."

"I'm sorry, it's simply isn't."

"How can you say that?" protests Bob. "You haven't explained to me, in terms I can understand, what's wrong with my argument. You said it yourself at the beginning -- none of you believes in nargles and you won't until you see the proof. I've just shown you the proof, and you don't accept it." The room erupts in laughter. "Laugh all you want. You guys don't know anything. Science doesn't have the power to prove the existence or non-existence of nargles because their invisible and otherwise undetectabe, and you rely on some paultry theory of voice-hearing that doesn't even involve sound waves."

"I'm sorry you feel that way, sir," says the president with genuine sympathy. "But the logic is quite clear."

"Does any of you agree with my premise? Does anyone agree that if my premise is true, my conclusion would follow?"

"False dilemma!" The wag from the back has grown impatient. "No, sir, even if you were granted every question you've begged, your argument is still a false dilemma. Your conclusion does not follow, and your argument is wrong for several reasons, each of which is a fatal blow."

"Here, let me repeat my argument so you can see how it works..."

I wonder how long it will be before Jabba tries to warp this analogy so it doesn't represent his argument.
 
LL,
- Do you agree with any of my premises?
No. Your argument is so borked that I wouldn't agree with you if you said water was wet.

It is impossible for (materialism + souls) to be a better answer than materialism alone UNLESS we observe phenomina that cannot be explained without souls. And even then you'd need a working definition of what a soul actually is and what it does.

Phlogistan was a great idea except when iron was burned it gained weight. So, we had to rework that idea. What is it about life in this universe that isn't working according to our understanding of it?


ETA: JU's story of the scientific society meeting is perfect. I suggest reading it a dozen times.
 
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Why would I assume OOFLam might be wrong when evaluating P(E|OOFLam)? P(E|OOFLam) is based on OOFLam being correct. P(E|~OOFLam) is based on OOFLam being wrong.
Dave,
- I think that the answer is, "That's how Bayesian statistics works."
- We're trying to figure out the posterior probability of OOFLam (given that E has occurred). In other words, we are calculating the probability that an hypothesis (a theory, not a fact) is true based upon relevant info that was not previously taken into account when estimating the prior probability of the hypothesis. In effect, we have new, relevant info.
- In still other words, we don't know that OOFLam is true -- it's just that the likelihood of E occurring if OOFLam is true has mathematical implications upon the probability of OOFLam being true...
 
Dave,
- I think that the answer is, "That's how Bayesian statistics works."
- We're trying to figure out the posterior probability of OOFLam (given that E has occurred). In other words, we are calculating the probability that an hypothesis (a theory, not a fact) is true based upon relevant info that was not previously taken into account when estimating the prior probability of the hypothesis. In effect, we have new, relevant info.
- In still other words, we don't know that OOFLam is true -- it's just that the likelihood of E occurring if OOFLam is true has mathematical implications upon the probability of OOFLam being true...

Right, so when you calculate the likelihood of E occurring if OOFLam is true you do it based on the givens of OOFLam.
 
ETA: JU's story of the scientific society meeting is perfect. I suggest reading it a dozen times.

Thanks; I sadly left out an important point -- the difference between the society's initial suspension of disbelief and an argument he might make later in desperation:


"Look folks," says Bob, attempting placation. "I'm just asking you to believe that nargles may exist."

"We did that," responds the president. "At the beginning we stipulated arguendo that nargles may exist. It would be unreasonable and useless to allow you to present your case otherwise. The only reasonable footing on which to entertain a proof of something is with the understanding that it is abstractly possible for the thing to be true even if we presently don't believe it is in fact true."

"Well then," says Bob with a shrug, "if you admit that nargles may exist, then my proof needs only that to show that nargles are the most probable cause of hearing voices."

"How so?" asks the president.

"As I said before," repeats Bob, "I use a statistical method to show how even a small probability that nargles exist turns into a very large probability under certain observations. Let's say the probability is 1 percent that nargles exist. When I apply Bayes' theorem with my estimates of likelihood that I derived from the observation of people hearing voices, the scientific explanation turns out to be so very improbable."

"I have a problem with your one percent," yells yet another wag from the back.

"Not to worry," Bob assures him. "Just tell me what number I should use. It makes little difference in how the equation comes out."

"Well I have a separate problem with that," drones the wag, "but the problem I'm referring to is not what number you chose, but your need to have a stipulation expressed as a probability."

"I'm not following you," says Bob.

"We stipulated that nargles may exist, just to preclude any silly dismissals based on there yet being no evidence for them. We didn't say to what degree, if any, we thought it probable they do exist."

"That's what I was getting at," interrupts the president. "The stipulation of the proposition being not impossible is the abstract axiom of any reasoned debate. If the proposition cannot be true, then no proof of it can be valid."

"But it's not an operative probability," the wag continues from the back. "It's not a quantification of uncertainty in a belief."

Bob shakes his head. "But that can't be true. If it's possible for nargles to exist, then there has to be a non-zero probability they exist. Your stipulation quantifies it as something other than zero. So what number should I use?"

"Non-zero for the sake of argument," says the president. "That's the part you keep forgetting. 'For the sake of argument' simply means you have leave to present your proof, and if your proof requires a numerical probability that isn't factually known or derivable or rationally estimated, the fact that its not-being-zero was stipulated doesn't reconcile our members' objection."

The wag pipes up again. "Yeah, I have no problem saying nargles may exist as a reasonable framework for evaluating your proof, but I also have no problem saying they don't exist until someone shows me evidence they do. All this fancy footwork you're doing is taking our good graces in entertaining your obviously invalid proof and trying to make it seem like we agreed in advance to something. What we agreed to is to let you try. That leave doesn't come in percentages or probabilities."

We suspended our disbelief in an immortal soul because it's the only rational way to entertain Jabba's attempt to prove it. To assert that belief as fact would be illogical and would preclude any proof to the contrary. It would be tantamount to arguing Tom murdered Dick when Dick is very much alive; given that fact, no case against Tom for that crime would be valid, no matter how otherwise convincing. This is why we stipulate.

Stipulating that Dick is not known to be alive gives some life to a case against Tom for murder, but it doesn't absolve the prosecutor of first having to prove a death occurred. That necessary element of the crime can't be established by the prosecutor turning to the jury and saying, "I'm just asking you to believe Dick may be dead." Yeah, he may be, but that doesn't prove he is or lessen the burden of proof.
 
I think that the answer is, "That's how Bayesian statistics works."

How it works is that if you are trying to compute or estimate P(E|H) you can't incorporate elements that apply only to ~H and not to H. But you do that. You try to make H behave in some ways like ~H, improperly, for the sake of pretending H is improbable. It's only improbable under the constraints you wrongly apply from ~H.
 
Why would I assume OOFLam might be wrong when evaluating P(E|OOFLam)? P(E|OOFLam) is based on OOFLam being correct. P(E|~OOFLam) is based on OOFLam being wrong.

Dave,
- I think that the answer is, "That's how Bayesian statistics works."
- We're trying to figure out the posterior probability of OOFLam (given that E has occurred). In other words, we are calculating the probability that an hypothesis (a theory, not a fact) is true based upon relevant info that was not previously taken into account when estimating the prior probability of the hypothesis. In effect, we have new, relevant info.
- In still other words, we don't know tha OOFLam is true -- it's just that the likelihood of E occurring if OOFLam is true htas mathematical implications upon the probability of OOFLam being true...

Right, so when you calculate the likelihood of E occurring if OOFLam is true you do it based on the givens of OOFLam.
Dave,
- Maybe this can clear things up. We aren't talking about the givens (note the s) of OOFLam, we're talking about the likelihood of something when OOFlam is given.
 
We aren't talking about the givens (note the s) of OOFLam, we're talking about the likelihood of something when OOFlam is given.

For heaven's sake, Jabba, read what I wrote and stop embarrassing yourself.

We are talking about the givens of a theory, as in what conditions would have to be (or may likely be) the case for that theory to be the operative process that produces observations. In your hypothesis the soul produces the effects you attribute to it according to a certain mechanism. In the scientific hypothesis the brain produces the effects, but according to a completely different mechanism. There is no one mechanism that applies to both, nor is it proper to assume the mechanisms of one must necessarily be or not be the mechanisms of the other.

You are trying to apply the givens of your soul theory -- i.e., the ways in which it may or would have to operate -- as if they also applied to the scientific theory, specifically as if they limited the scientific theory in ways that make it improbable. You're trying to make the scientific method obey the same rules as your soul theory, even if those rules don't apply.

Neither I nor Dave is talking about the likelihood ratio in your formulation. So please stop trying to change the subject.
 
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Dave,
- Maybe this can clear things up. We aren't talking about the givens (note the s) of OOFLam, we're talking about the likelihood of something when OOFlam is given.

I was using those to mean the same thing.

If we're talking about the likelihood of something when OOFlam is given, we're basing that likelihood on OOFLam being correct.
 
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