Proof of Immortality III

[JayUtah]

My current existence is much more likely if that hypothesis is not true.

No, it isn't. Your current existence is less likely if that hypothesis is true because it requires two things to happen, whereas the null hypothesis requires only one. This has been explained to you ad nauseam but you're too ideologically entrenched to grasp it.

 

[caveman1917]

No, it isn't. Your current existence is less likely if that hypothesis is true because it requires two things to happen, whereas the null hypothesis requires only one. This has been explained to you ad nauseam but you're too ideologically entrenched to grasp it.

This doesn't follow.

Assume that H1 is "two 6-sided dice were rolled" and H2 is "one million-sided die was rolled". Suppose E is "the resulting roll is 12". Then P(E | H1) > P(E | H2) even though two things had to happen (two dice each rolling 6) rather than one thing (one die rolling 12).

What you probably meant was that one hypothesis is a subset of another, but then it still doesn't follow. Suppose E is "I am still alive after having gone see a person". Suppose H1 is "the person I went to see is male" and H2 is "the person I went to see is male and not a murderer". The P(E | H1) < P(E | H2) even though H2 is a subset of H1.

And even if it did follow, in Jabba's case the hypotheses are distinct, not one being a subset of another. You can see this by H and ~H necessarily being distinct. H is that his brain exists and that his soul is produced by his brain, ~H is that his brain exists and that his soul is not produced by his brain.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Okay just everyone forget the damn made up equations for a second.

We have two possible scenarios.

Our minds are either wholly biological. Or our minds are biological and spiritual. So we either have one factor or two.

Two factors is only more likely if the one factor can't explain all the variables.

And a biological mind can explain all the variables. There's no need to bring in a second cause to explain anything so it's complicating the scenario for no reason which is by definition less likely.

 

[caveman1917]

Okay just everyone forget the damn made up equations for a second.

We have two possible scenarios.

Our minds are either wholly biological. Or our minds are biological and spiritual. So we either have one factor or two.

Two factors is only more likely if the one factor can't explain all the variables.

And a biological mind can explain all the variables. There's no need to bring in a second cause to explain anything so it's complicating the scenario for no reason which is by definition less likely.

I think you are confusing the prior probabilities with the likelihoods. You could make that argument for the prior probabilities, but not for the likelihoods as JayUtah is doing. The prior probability that I went to see a male who is also not a murderer is smaller than that I went to see a male (subset - superset), yet the likelihood of my survival given that I went to see a male who is not a murderer is higher than the likelihood of my survival given that I went to see a male.

 

[JoeMorgue]

I think you are confusing the prior probabilities with the likelihoods.

No I'm not confusing anything.

Jabba has spent the last half decade trying to convolute a simple question by trying to turn it into a page long equation, he doesn't need an apprentice.

Jabba is starting at the conclusion that he's immortal because he's special and working backwards. It's not about probability or likelihoods or statistics it's about intellectual honesty.

Jabba isn't immortal. You can't math our way your into or out of that.

 

[jt512]

Let me get my 2¢ in here about the conjunction fallacy. In this problem, not only does it not apply to the llikelihoods, it doesn't apply to the priors either.

In Bayesian inference all of the information not included in the new data (E, in Jabba's notation) must be included in the background information that the priors are based on. Since Jabba's data, E, is merely his own existence, then everything else we know about the universe must be background information that informs the priors. Despite all the verbosity and window dressing, Jabba's hypothesis H is that we're just bodies, while his hypothesis ~H is that we're bodies + immortal souls. But we know we have bodies—that's part of the background information under both hypotheses. Therefore, Jabba's ~H and H simplify to "we have souls" and "we don't have souls," respectively.

Now, in principle, the probability that we have a soul could be any number between 0 and 1. IMHO, based on everything we know about the universe, it is pretty crazy to believe that we have souls; the probability is practically 0. But, in principle, that needn't be the case. We can imagine a world in which everybody routinely communicated with their dead relatives, and you had to wear earplugs at night to block out the constant din of harp music emanating from the sky. In such a world it would be pretty crazy not to think we had souls; the probability would be nearly 1.

So, in this problem, the prior probability that we have a body and a soul can, at least in principle, be greater than the prior probability that we have a body only. It's not a conjunction fallacy.

 

[Mojo]

Let me get my 2¢ in here about the conjunction fallacy. In this problem, not only does it not apply to the llikelihoods, it doesn't apply to the priors either.

In Bayesian inference all of the information not included in the new data (E, in Jabba's notation) must be included in the background information that the priors are based on. Since Jabba's data, E, is merely his own existence, then everything else we know about the universe must be background information that informs the priors. Despite all the verbosity and window dressing, Jabba's hypothesis H is that we're just bodies, while his hypothesis ~H is that we're bodies + immortal souls. But we know we have bodies—that's part of the background information under both hypotheses. Therefore, Jabba's ~H and H simplify to "we have souls" and "we don't have souls," respectively.

Now, in principle, the probability that we have a soul could be any number between 0 and 1. IMHO, based on everything we know about the universe, it is pretty crazy to believe that we have souls; the probability is practically 0. But, in principle, that needn't be the case. We can imagine a world in which everybody routinely communicated with their dead relatives, and you had to wear earplugs at night to block out the constant din of harp music emanating from the sky. In such a world it would be pretty crazy not to think we had souls; the probability would be nearly 1.

It isn't going to be greater than 1, though, is it?

So, in this problem, the prior probability that we have a body and a soul can, at least in principle, be greater than the prior probability that we have a body only. It's not a conjunction fallacy.

Nope. Jabba's existence would still require his body to exist.

 

[Loss Leader]

Let me get my 2¢ in here about the conjunction fallacy. In this problem, not only does it not apply to the llikelihoods, it doesn't apply to the priors either.

....
So, in this problem, the prior probability that we have a body and a soul can, at least in principle, be greater than the prior probability that we have a body only. It's not a conjunction fallacy.

Respectfully, Jabba is using the odds of his physical existence to calculate the odds of his physical plus spiritual existence. That's the conjunction fallacy.

 

[Mojo]

If Jabba wants to propose some hypothesis under which it is certain, or very likely, that his body exists, he is welcome. But then he'll lose his false dilemma, and we'll be able to discuss the likelihood of his preferred hypothesis being true.

 

[caveman1917]

So, in this problem, the prior probability that we have a body and a soul can, at least in principle, be greater than the prior probability that we have a body only. It's not a conjunction fallacy.

I highlighted the important bit here. And yes, I agree, I withdraw my previous claim about the conjunction fallacy. I thought people used it regarding his prior probabilities, but apparently they're using it regarding his likelihoods - the conjunction fallacy never applies to likelihoods. But you're right that in this case it wouldn't even apply to the priors either, and even if it did Jabba isn't using it. I checked and he has as priors P(H) > P(~H).

There seems to be a minor difference in terminology here though. I've been using "soul" in general, ie we all have a soul (the subjective "I") but it can either be mortal or immortal. Apparently "soul" here is only used for the immortal subjective "I", but then what are we using for the mortal subjective "I" - that which, under what JayUtah calls the null hypothesis, is the emergent property of the brain?

 

[caveman1917]

No I'm not confusing anything.

Jabba has spent the last half decade trying to convolute a simple question by trying to turn it into a page long equation, he doesn't need an apprentice.

Jabba is starting at the conclusion that he's immortal because he's special and working backwards. It's not about probability or likelihoods or statistics it's about intellectual honesty.

Jabba isn't immortal. You can't math our way your into or out of that.

Evidence?

 

[JoeMorgue]

Jabba isn't immortal.

Evidence?

*Headdesk* For God's sake.

 

[caveman1917]

*Headdesk* For God's sake.

I'll take that as "no evidence".

 

[JoeMorgue]

I'll take that as "no evidence".

Take it however you want. I'm not going to waste my time explaining to you the same concepts of burden of proof and standards of evidence we've spent the last half decade explaining to Jabba.

 

[caveman1917]

Take it however you want. I'm not going to waste my time explaining to you the same concepts of burden of proof and standards of evidence we've spent the last half decade explaining to Jabba.

I'm guessing you are completely missing the irony in that statement.

 

[Mojo]

Let me get my 2¢ in here about the conjunction fallacy. In this problem, not only does it not apply to the llikelihoods, it doesn't apply to the priors either.

In Bayesian inference all of the information not included in the new data (E, in Jabba's notation) must be included in the background information that the priors are based on. Since Jabba's data, E, is merely his own existence, then everything else we know about the universe must be background information that informs the priors. Despite all the verbosity and window dressing, Jabba's hypothesis H is that we're just bodies, while his hypothesis ~H is that we're bodies + immortal souls. But we know we have bodies—that's part of the background information under both hypotheses. Therefore, Jabba's ~H and H simplify to "we have souls" and "we don't have souls," respectively.

But what Jabba is relying on as the event that he claims makes H very unlikely is not the existence of bodies in general: it is his specific existence. Under H this just requires the existence of his specific body. Under the hypothesis that he has an immortal soul this requires the existence of his specific body and his specific soul. He claims that H must be wrong because his specific existence is more likely under the latter scenario than under the former.

Now, in principle, the probability that we have a soul could be any number between 0 and 1. IMHO, based on everything we know about the universe, it is pretty crazy to believe that we have souls; the probability is practically 0. But, in principle, that needn't be the case. We can imagine a world in which everybody routinely communicated with their dead relatives, and you had to wear earplugs at night to block out the constant din of harp music emanating from the sky. In such a world it would be pretty crazy not to think we had souls; the probability would be nearly 1.

Jabba is not proposing such a world.

 

[caveman1917]

But what Jabba is relying on as the event that he claims makes H very unlikely is not the existence of bodies in general: it is his specific existence. Under H this just requires the existence of his specific body. Under the hypothesis that he has an immortal soul this requires the existence of his specific body and his specific soul. He claims that H must be wrong because his specific existence is more likely under the latter scenario than under the former.

H requires more than just the existence of his specific body, it is the existence of his specific body and that his body is the cause of his soul. H is not a superset of ~H.

 

[Garrette]

H requires more than just the existence of his specific body, it is the existence of his specific body and that his body is the cause of his soul. H is not a superset of ~H.

I don't follow this part. Why, if H is OOFLAM or the current scientific model which does not posit a soul, does it require the highlighted part?

That would seem to be necessary under ~H. Surely if this were not something Bayesian but rather an attempt merely to explain H without reference to anything else there would be no mention (or need of mention) of body-as-cause-of-soul?

 

[caveman1917]

I don't follow this part. Why, if H is OOFLAM or the current scientific model which does not posit a soul, does it require the highlighted part?

That would seem to be necessary under ~H. Surely if this were not something Bayesian but rather an attempt merely to explain H without reference to anything else there would be no mention (or need of mention) of body-as-cause-of-soul?

I'm using soul here in the sense of "subjective experience" or "mind" or whatever you want to call it - ie that which is the emergent property of the brain under the current scientific model.

 

[Garrette]

I'm using soul here in the sense of "subjective experience" or "mind" or whatever you want to call it - ie that which is the emergent property of the brain under the current scientific model.

Then this is where I would take exception.

Even as an emergent property it is still a complete description under H and an incomplete description under ~H.