Continuation Part 20: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito

[LondonJohn]

I don't think it is fair for you to target Stefanoni. She and her team wanted to carry on their first forensic stint. Mignini ordered them to finish up. With over 500 samples of evidence, Stefanoni realised the bra clasp was missing and this was because it was under the body and they were shoo-ed out to make way for Lalli.

Stefanoni had to make an application to Mignini and justify it, as to why she needed to return.

It's unkind to assume everything is done in malice. Nine times out of ten, it is human error and has nothing to do with competence. Everybody is allowed to make a mistake.

Planigale was not talking about the incompetent delay in the collection of the bra clasp (shocking and inept as that was). Rather, she was referring to the incompetent and entirely improper way in which not-a-real-doctor Stefanoni stored the now-recovered-and-tested bra clasp in a sealed plastic vial immersed in a liquid buffer solution. Which caused it to rust and become entirely useless for any further examination.

This is a concrete and blatant exhibition of Stefanoni's serious shortcomings and failures as a forensic lab scientist working on crime exhibits. It is a routine and important part of such individuals' jobs to ensure that all items they are given to examine are subsequently stored properly and appropriately, such that they will be preserved in the optimum condition - at least until the end of any trial process in which they may be relevant, and usually well beyond that point too.

And there are two other examples that immediately spring to mind in this area also. Firstly - as Planigale also pointed out - there's no doubt (photographic evidence) that the blood-soaked towels were viable potential sources of evidence at the time they were collected from the crime scene. It's also manifestly true that only Stefanoni can have caused them to rot and decay to the point where they became useless for analysis - if those towels had been collected the day after the murder (or even two days after), and then carefully dried out in sterile conditions, they would have effectively lasted indefinitely for examination purposes (notwithstanding the ludicrously incorrect claim that dried blood quickly becomes useless for any analytical purposes.....). The towels could in fact have been significantly helpful in this case - either to the prosecution or the defence - had Stefanoni treated them properly. But now we'll never now, thanks to Stefanoni's incompetence (coupled perhaps, in this case, with the incompetence of others).

And we must not also forget the comical (if it hadn't been so shocking and potentially serious) sight - captured on video - of Stefanoni wrapping a mop that was going to be taken for analysis in wrapping paper that was found within the girls' cottage! It's hard to know how to express just how fundamental a breach of standard practices that was. It could have had serious ramifications.

So yep, Stefanoni was serially incompetent at even a basic operating level in the investigation into the Kercher murder. Many of her errors would embarrass a 1st year forensic science student.

 

[LondonJohn]

Mike has a very good point about cases that could fall under CPP Art. 530.1.

In my opinion, to deliver a verdict in a reasonable way, the judge must evaluate the prosecution case and its evidence. If the evidence does not meet the standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the judge must acquit. It doesn't matter whether the amount of reasonable doubt is small or large or overwhelming; there must be an evaluation of the evidence. This suggests to me that CPP Art. 530.2 is universally applicable, while 530.1 is redundant.

My suspicion or hypothesis is that CPP Art. 530.1 is a survivor from the inquisitorial system of justice that Italy had prior to the reforms of 1988 - 2006. The BARD concept was only introduced into Italian law starting in 1988, and was only "completely" part of law with the Italian parliament enacting a law that resulted in CPP Art. 533.1.

So CPP 530.1 is, in my hypothesis, the standard for acquittal that Italian law used during the inquisitorial system period, when a defendant was obligated to prove innocence and was otherwise considered guilty.

Without identifying the paragraph numbers specifically, in Gialuz's essay on Italian law in Gialuz, Gialuz states that in 1988, the CPP was modified for the purpose of advancing to the adversarial system of law. The exact wording of Gialuz is as follows:



My interpretation of Gialuz's statement quoted above: The new wording introduced in 1988 clearly went into CPP Article 530.2. Prior to that reform, apparently the defendant had to prove innocence by some profound measure, in accordance with the absolute wording of CPP Article 530.1, or the judge apparently could evaluate the prosecution evidence and find it insufficient. Otherwise, apparently the only verdict available was that the defendant was guilty (although perhaps some other acquittal by Article 530.1, such as the crime did not occur, might have been available).

My hypothesis is the persons in Italy of a certain age may recall that defendants prior to the complete change to the adversarial system had to prove their innocence, and therefore find verdicts of acquittal based on failure to prove guilt BARD unsatisfactory. There is certainly a large section in the Hellmann court MR devoted to a justification of the use of BARD and includes considerable legal and judicial history (CSC court decisions) relating to its adoption in Italy. The Massei court MR (annulled by the Hellmann court verdict) used probabilistic arguments or supremacy of prosecution arguments norms to reach it a verdict of guilty, an apparent survival of the inquisitorial system in the Knox - Sollecito case.

This is pretty much exactly my own interpretation and opinion. And I strongly suspect that (as per the failings of the Massei court in particular) various courts and judges in Italy - and perhaps a certain section of the Italian population themselves (who also sit on judicial panels) - have certain inbuilt conceptual difficulties in adapting to a different set of standards in the application of criminal justice.

And, as you suggest, I think that there's still a large overhang in the system (and again, perhaps also in Italian public perception) of "if you're charged and tried, then you'd better be able to prove you didn't do it, otherwise you're going down" - a form of the "no smoke without fire" mantra.

 

[LondonJohn]

I don't know why this needs to be repeated so very often, but I'll bold it to make it more visible: 530.1 and 530.2 are, in practice, outdated clauses which are meaningless in respect of the final finding of the court (guilt or non-guilt). There are no longer any degrees of acquittal in Italian criminal courts. That section of the code needs to be either rewritten or struck out entirely. But while it's still there, and while judges are required to refer to it in their motivations, the adopted convention appears to be that they employ 530.1 where there is clear-cut innocence on the part of the accused or where it was judged that no crime was ever even committed, and 530.2 for every other type of acquittal on the facts.​

Erm...... which part of this says (or even implies) that "it really wasn't a law"?

What the above (which I wrote) states is that 530.1 and 530.2 clearly ARE part of the law (but, once again, the criminal code is not, strictly speaking, the law......), and that acquitting judges are still required in law to state which paragraph of 530 has been employed. But that 530 is now effectively moot in practice, since one can only be pronounced "guilty" or "not guilty", and that it ought therefore to be either extensively rewritten or scrapped.

Keep those strawmen coming though. It's quite entertaining

 

[Machiavelli]

Planigale, you raise a good point about what procedural law applies to the statute of limitations dismissals. The Italian legal language as translated in Gialuz uses "exinguishment" to mean "time-barred by statute of limitations".

The CPP has Article 531 Declaration of extinguishment of the offense

1. Without prejudice to the provision of Article 129.2, if the offense is extinguished, the judge shall deliver a judgment of non-prosecution, mentioning the cause in the operative part.
2. The judge shall follow the same procedure if there are doubts regarding the cause for extinguishing an offense.

However, the Marasca CSC panel in their verdict properly cited CPP Article 620 (A) to annul without referral Charge B (carrying a knife) which was time-barred. I posted this article earlier, here is a summary:

CPP Article 620 Annulment without referral

1. ...the CSC shall deliver a judgment of annulment without referral:
(A)...if the offence is extinguished....

One point - some here, such as Vixen, and IIRC Mach, have stated that the CSC are not allowed to use Art. 530. Of course, this is absurd.

What those posters fail to acknowledge is that the CSC used Art. 620 (L) with Art. 530. Article 620 (L) gives the CSC wide lattitude to "take the decisions necessary" which may of course include using Article 530, as it did in this case.

Interestingly, Vixen's literature citation (A. Bull's book) shows how over the years the CSC many times used an "insufficient evidence" acquittal (probably Art. 530). It was not unique to the Knox - Sollecito case.

Art. 620 only refers to the sub-species "without remand" option (not to the reasons for annulment themselves).
This however does not make the B/M decision become legal or legitimate. It is illegal and fraudolent on multiple grounds.
There is one thing however that is adamant and agreed upon by jurisprudence: the Cassazione does *not* assess evidence. It does not make any finding/assessment about guilt or innocence, nor on evidence, not even findings that evidence is insufficient.
Whether a 530.2 decision comes as a consequence of annulment, the annulment is anyway an assessment about the lower courts job, and an only be a decision in point of law, not an assessment or a finding about the existence/non existenc/quality of evidence. The SC cannot assess evidence, and cannot see evidence. It does not access the evidence file. Even when the assessment has to do with reasoning and assessment about evidence, the assessment by Cassazione is never on the evidence.

 

[acbytesla]

Art. 620 only refers to the sub-species "without remand" option (not to the reasons for annulment themselves).
This however does not make the B/M decision become legal or legitimate. It is illegal and fraudolent on multiple grounds. There is one thing however that is adamant and agreed upon by jurisprudence: the Cassazione does *not* assess evidence. It does not make any finding/assessment about guilt or innocence, nor on evidence, not even findings that evidence is insufficient.
Whether a 530.2 decision comes as a consequence of annulment, the annulment is anyway an assessment about the lower courts job, and an only be a decision in point of law, not an assessment or a finding about the existence/non existenc/quality of evidence. The SC cannot assess evidence, and cannot see evidence. It does not access the evidence file. Even when the assessment has to do with reasoning and assessment about evidence, the assessment by Cassazione is never on the evidence.

Apparently you are wrong.

 

[Bill Williams]

Art. 620 only refers to the sub-species "without remand" option (not to the reasons for annulment themselves).
This however does not make the B/M decision become legal or legitimate. It is illegal and fraudolent on multiple grounds. There is one thing however that is adamant and agreed upon by jurisprudence: the Cassazione does *not* assess evidence. It does not make any finding/assessment about guilt or innocence, nor on evidence, not even findings that evidence is insufficient.
Whether a 530.2 decision comes as a consequence of annulment, the annulment is anyway an assessment about the lower courts job, and an only be a decision in point of law, not an assessment or a finding about the existence/non existenc/quality of evidence. The SC cannot assess evidence, and cannot see evidence. It does not access the evidence file. Even when the assessment has to do with reasoning and assessment about evidence, the assessment by Cassazione is never on the evidence.

M/B here said that the evidence before Nencini should never have led to a conviction. M/B was clear that judges cannot substitute their own sense of logic for a lack of evidence, such lack which should not lead to a conviction.

On the matter highlighted - can you provide a link to any court or other official body which has ruled - or even proposed, that the M/B ruling is illegal and fraudulent. Thanks.

 

[Numbers]

CPP Article 530 Judgment of acquittal

1. If the criminal act did not occur, the accused did not commit it, the act is not deemed an offence by law or it has been committed by a person who cannot be accused or punished for a different reason, the judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal, mentioning the cause in the operative part of the judgment.

2. The judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal also in case of insufficient, contradictory or lacking proof that the criminal act occurred, the accused committed it, the act is deemed an offence by law, the offence was committed by a person with mental capacity.

3. The judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal under paragraph 1 if there is proof that the underlying causes of the committed act are either a reason for justification or a personal reason for exemption from punishment or there is a doubt on the existence of such reasons.

4. By means of the judgment of acquittal, the judge shall apply the security measures, in the cases provided for by law.​

(1) I read that 530.3 is for self defense. (2) 530.4 is for security service people - maybe police or undercover people but it has never been clear to me.

(3) Under two where do you get "the accused did not commit the act" for a .2? The wording is I/C/L the accused committed it.

(4) The fact that under 3 there is clearly a different legal status than a .1 or .2 when for "personal reason" (mental) and even within .3 a different outcome for self defense. Where is the different outcome for mental specified?

I regret if I put too many words in one paragraph of explanation.

Let me walk you through it slowly and gently.

I have numbered your questions/comments (numbers in parentheses) for ease of reference.

(1) Indeed Art. 530.3 is for self-defense. But note that 530.3 begins with the words "The judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal under paragraph 1" if the specification called out in 530.3 is pertinent.

That means self-defense, or other reason for justification for the act, or even some reasonable doubt favoring the accused that there was such a reason, is cited under Article 530.1. I have no idea why the Italian parliament set up this round-about citation procedure. But there it is.

(2) No offense intended, but I believe you should read 530.4 more carefully. It states "By means of the judgment of acquittal, the judge shall apply the security measures". And "security measures" is not a typo or error. It refers to imprisonment or other detention, including house arrest, throughout the CPP.

Why would there be "security measures" for someone who has been acquitted? I can only believe that this would be for an accused who had been acquitted because of a deficit in mental capacity - that is, insanity or mental illness - and who may pose a continuing danger to himself or others.

There is a provision, CPP Article 286, Precautionary detention in a healthcare centre, that states that a judge may order a person who is subject to precautionary detention but suffers from a mental illness to be held in a prison psychiatric hospital, until such time as the person recovers from the mental illness. I have not found a similar article with specific information for hospitalization of an accused acquitted because of a deficit in mental capacity or mental illness, although there are CPP Article 656 Enforcement of custodial penalties and Article 658 Enforcement of security measures ordered by judgment.

(3) The wording in CPP Article 530.2 is: "The judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal also in case of insufficient, contradictory or lacking proof that ... the accused committed it [the criminal act]."

The legal (and ordinary) meaning of these words is that since the accused is acquitted, the accused is not guilty. The definition of acquit:

to discharge completely (as from an obligation or accusation) <the court acquitted the prisoner> {www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/acquit}

Free (someone) from a criminal charge by a verdict of not guilty: she was acquitted on all counts the jury acquitted him of murder {http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/acquit}

To set free, release or discharge as from an obligation, burden or accusation. To absolve one from an obligation or a liability; or to legally certify the innocence of one charged with a crime. {http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/acquit}

When a person accused of a crime is legally freed by a court generally as a result of lack of evidence. {http://thelawdictionary.org/acquit/}

So for this part of 530.2, the meaning is clear that the court (judge) has declared, by the acquittal, the person has, in LEGAL terms, not committed the criminal act.

(4) The different outcome for civil and administrative damages for an accused acquitted on the basis of a deficit of mental capacity (mental illness) may be inferred from the fact that acquittal specification is omitted from the list of acquittal specifications in CPP Article 652, while acquittal specifications for the criminal act did not occur, the accused did not commit it, and that the act was carried out to perform a duty or to exercise a legal right are each included.

I am assuming that that last acquittal specification, to perform a duty or to exercise a legal right, includes self-defense.

 

[bagels]

The SC cannot assess evidence, and cannot see evidence. It does not access the evidence file. Even when the assessment has to do with reasoning and assessment about evidence, the assessment by Cassazione is never on the evidence.

Chieffi disproved this utterly. You have a dysfunctional judicial system. Sorry.

 

[Numbers]

Erm...... which part of this says (or even implies) that "it really wasn't a law"?

What the above (which I wrote) states is that 530.1 and 530.2 clearly ARE part of the law (but, once again, the criminal code is not, strictly speaking, the law......), and that acquitting judges are still required in law to state which paragraph of 530 has been employed. But that 530 is now effectively moot in practice, since one can only be pronounced "guilty" or "not guilty", and that it ought therefore to be either extensively rewritten or scrapped.

Keep those strawmen coming though. It's quite entertaining

An apparent typo: the subject is the Code of Criminal Procedure, not the Criminal Code, which is the body of law dealing with the definitions of crimes and their punishments.

The Code of Criminal Procedure describes the procedural laws used by the Italian police and judiciary in cases where crimes are alleged and describes the measures adopted legally with witnesses, suspects and/or accused persons, and procedures such as questioning, arrests, detentions, and trials.

CPP Article 530 deals with various acquittal specifications besides acquittal for failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That may be one reason it was not eliminated when CPP Article 533.1 was reformed to make BARD the legal standard in 2006.

 

[Machiavelli]

M/B here said that the evidence before Nencini should never have led to a conviction.

B/M cannot assess evidence, and cannot even see it.
B/M also said a number of things that you don't like to accept, like that it is a proven fact that Knox was at the murder and heard Meredith's scream, that she washed her hands from Meredith's blood, that it is incontrovertible that she is guilty of voluntarily accusing an innocent and that there are multiple murderers and so on.

M/B was clear that judges cannot substitute their own sense of logic for a lack of evidence, such lack which should not lead to a conviction.

See above. B/M cannot assess evidence - and what they declared to be certain is not something you like.

On the matter highlighted - can you provide a link to any court or other official body which has ruled - or even proposed, that the M/B ruling is illegal and fraudulent. Thanks.

Not yet (except for Chieffi, which is valid and definitive, or jurisprudence).
We need to be patient for that.
Nevertheless, I could well point out things that B/M states that are factually false and/or manifestly contrary to the law.

 

[Grinder]

I regret if I put too many words in one paragraph of explanation.

Let me walk you through it slowly tediously and gently inaccurately.

FIFY

I have numbered your questions/comments (numbers in parentheses) for ease of reference.

(1) Indeed Art. 530.3 is for self-defense. But note that 530.3 begins with the words "The judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal under paragraph 1" if the specification called out in 530.3 is pertinent.

That means self-defense, or other reason for justification for the act, or even some reasonable doubt favoring the accused that there was such a reason, is cited under Article 530.1. I have no idea why the Italian parliament set up this round-about citation procedure. But there it is.

Gee why would they call out a .1? Why not a .2 since they are the same? Hmmm since a .3 means the person is not only not guilty but innocent that makes sense.

(2) No offense intended, but I believe you should read 530.4 more carefully. It states "By means of the judgment of acquittal, the judge shall apply the security measures". And "security measures" is not a typo or error. It refers to imprisonment or other detention, including house arrest, throughout the CPP.

Why would there be "security measures" for someone who has been acquitted? I can only believe that this would be for an accused who had been acquitted because of a deficit in mental capacity - that is, insanity or mental illness - and who may pose a continuing danger to himself or others.

As I said it wasn't clear to me and your explanation makes sense. I don't see anything in .4 that indicates mental issues while .3 says personal reasons for acquittal which I thought could be the mental cases.

(3) The wording in CPP Article 530.2 is: "The judge shall deliver a judgment of acquittal also in case of insufficient, contradictory or lacking proof that ... the accused committed it [the criminal act]."

The legal (and ordinary) meaning of these words is that since the accused is acquitted, the accused is not guilty. The definition of acquit:

to discharge completely (as from an obligation or accusation) <the court acquitted the prisoner> {www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/acquit}

Free (someone) from a criminal charge by a verdict of not guilty: she was acquitted on all counts the jury acquitted him of murder {http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/acquit}

Didn't you read Vixen's warning about what dictionaries to use? Declaring someone not guilty is not the same as declaring them innocent. One here says it is impossible to declare the kids innocent. .2 is like not proven whether PIPs like it or not.

So for this part of 530.2, the meaning is clear that the court (judge) has declared, by the acquittal, the person has, in LEGAL terms, not committed the criminal act.

Yes they were acquitted but not declared innocent and the MR makes clear it was not a no doubt acquittal. 530 may be stupid. It may a leftover from another system. It may need improvement or elimination. But it is a law and from my reading has meaning to the Italian people.

It is not, substantially, a new or “revolutionary” principle, but only the
formalisation, with an aspect of recognition, of a rule of judgment already present in
our country’s judicial experience and, moreover, already positivizzata [applied in
practice], having been formally introduced as a precondition for conviction, given
the pre-existing rule of Article 530, section 2 of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that the defendant must be acquitted when the evidence
is insufficient or contradictory
The intrinsically contradictory ensemble of the body of evidence, whose
objective uncertainty is already emphasised by the previously highlighted wavering
progress of the proceedings, does not therefore allow [us] to be satisfied to the
standard of [beyond a] reasonable doubt, whose establishment is an achievement of
legal culture that must, always and in any case, be upheld since it is the expression
of fundamental constitutional values, centered around the key role of the human
being in the judicial system, whose protection in the context of a trial is also
exercised by the principle of presumption of innocence until the definitive decision
[verdict], as per Article 27, section 2 of the Constitution.

In other words, the use of logic and
intuition cannot, in any way, compensate for the lack of evidence or the inefficiency
of the investigations. Faced with missing, insufficient or contradictory evidence, the
judge should simply accept it and issue a verdict of acquittal, according to Article
530, section 2 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, even if he is really
convinced of the guilt of the defendant.

​

 

[bagels]

B/M cannot assess evidence, and cannot even see it.

I was told this before. Then Chieffi happened. Then I stopped believing it. And you should to.

 

[Grinder]

M/B here said that the evidence before Nencini should never have led to a conviction. M/B was clear that judges cannot substitute their own sense of logic for a lack of evidence, such lack which should not lead to a conviction.

Not sense of logic - whatever that means. Use of logic and intuition...

In other words, the use of logic and
intuition cannot, in any way, compensate for the lack of evidence or the inefficiency
of the investigations. Faced with missing, insufficient or contradictory evidence, the
judge should simply accept it and issue a verdict of acquittal, according to Article
530, section 2 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, even if he is really
convinced of the guilt of the defendant.

 

[Numbers]

Art. 620 only refers to the sub-species "without remand" option (not to the reasons for annulment themselves).
This however does not make the B/M decision become legal or legitimate. It is illegal and fraudolent on multiple grounds.
There is one thing however that is adamant and agreed upon by jurisprudence: the Cassazione does *not* assess evidence. It does not make any finding/assessment about guilt or innocence, nor on evidence, not even findings that evidence is insufficient.
Whether a 530.2 decision comes as a consequence of annulment, the annulment is anyway an assessment about the lower courts job, and an only be a decision in point of law, not an assessment or a finding about the existence/non existenc/quality of evidence. The SC cannot assess evidence, and cannot see evidence. It does not access the evidence file. Even when the assessment has to do with reasoning and assessment about evidence, the assessment by Cassazione is never on the evidence.

Good to hear from you, Mach.

You are totally wrong on a number of points in your post quoted above, as you can confirm by carefully reading the CPP.

CPP Article 620 authorizes the CSC to deliver a judgment of annulment without referral and gives the reasons for annulment without referral.

The reasons for annulment without referral are provided under letters (A) through (L), 10 different reasons in all. The last one, (L), is quite broad; it states:

CPP Article 620 Annulment without referral

1. In addition to the cases specifically provided for by the law, the CSC shall deliver a judgment of annulment without referral:
(L) in any other case in which the CSC believes the referral is superfluous or may proceed to the determination of the sentence or take the necessary decisions.

And with respect to the CSC evaluating evidence, we have had this discussion before. You are wrong, in that the CSC is specifically empowered to evaluate whether decisive evidence has been gathered and whether the grounds of a judgment, including how evidence was evaluated, was logical. It is correct that the CSC does not evaluate new evidence. Here is an extract from the relevant CPP article:

CPP Article 606 Cases of appeal to the Court of Cassation (CSC)

1. The appeal to the CSC may be lodged if it is based on the following arguments:

(D) decisive evidence is not gathered, when a party has requested its gathering also during the trial evidentiary hearing, exclusively in the cases provided for in Article 495, paragraph 2;

(E) the grounds of the judgment are lacking, contradictory or manifestly illogical, when the defect results from the text of the appealed decision or from other documents of the proceedings specified in the arguments for the appeal to the CSC.*

* Note: The CSC thus has the legal authority to review the way the evidence gathered in the lower courts was analyzed by those courts in reaching the appealed decision. This would include whether the evidence and its analysis was lacking, contradictory, or manifestly illogical.

CPP Article 495 Judge's decisions on evidence

2. The accused has the right to the admission of pieces of evidence in his defence on the facts in issue presented against him. The Public Prosecutor has the same right regarding the pieces of evidence against the accused on the facts in issue presented in defence of the accused.

CPP Article 609 Cognisance of the CSC

1. The appeal to the CSC assigns cognisance of the proceedings to the CSC, exclusively with regard to the arguments raised.
2. The CSC shall also decide on the issues raised ex officio at any stage and instance of the proceedings and on those issues which could not have been raised at the appeal stage.

 

[bagels]

The PGP really act as if Hellmann didn't happen. It's actually kind of weird.

Oh the kids were fully acquitted in a year long trial that examined the key evidence and heard all the witnesses? *whistles like nothing happened* How about that M&B reversing Nencini?

 

[acbytesla]

B/M cannot assess evidence, and cannot even see it.
B/M also said a number of things that you don't like to accept, like that it is a proven fact that Knox was at the murder and heard Meredith's scream, that she washed her hands from Meredith's blood, that it is incontrovertible that she is guilty of voluntarily accusing an innocent and that there are multiple murderers and so on.

See above. B/M cannot assess evidence - and what they declared to be certain is not something you like.

Not yet (except for Chieffi, which is valid and definitive, or jurisprudence).
We need to be patient for that.
Nevertheless, I could well point out things that B/M states that are factually false and/or manifestly contrary to the law.

I know 2 things about this case.
1. I do not understand Italian jurisprudence.
and
2. Neither do you.

I will gladly retract this statement when MB's decision is rescinded or that they are censured for this decision.
In the meantime, it is clear that you are as clueless as I am on this subject.

 

[Grinder]

What the above (which I wrote) states is that 530.1 and 530.2 clearly ARE part of the law (but, once again, the criminal code is not, strictly speaking, the law......), and that acquitting judges are still required in law to state which paragraph of 530 has been employed. But that 530 is now effectively moot in practice, since one can only be pronounced "guilty" or "not guilty", and that it ought therefore to be either extensively rewritten or scrapped.

Criminal code is not the law. Funny sure seems they can still declare someone innocent. What exactly does effectively moot mean?

 

[Numbers]

....

So for this part of 530.2, the meaning is clear that the court (judge) has declared, by the acquittal, the person has, in LEGAL terms, not committed the criminal act.

Yes they were acquitted but not declared innocent and the MR makes clear it was not a no doubt acquittal. ...

You may be coming close to understanding some of the issues.

Acquitted means found LEGALLY NOT GUILTY which means THEY DID NOT COMMIT THE CRIME based upon a LEGAL DECISION.

Innocent is a word you like to beat upon. That is you particular issue. Not necessarily that of anyone else. Acquittals are LEGAL decisions, not some absolute magical assurance that an acquitted person has not committed a crime, but a decision based on human reasoning, the evaluation of evidence, and legal principles.

Note that one dictionary definition of acquit was:

When a person accused of a crime is legally freed by a court generally as a result of LACK of evidence. {http://thelawdictionary.org/acquit/}

That dictionary claims to incorporate Black's law dictionary, which I believe has a good reputation among lawyers

 

[Machiavelli]

An apparent typo: the subject is the Code of Criminal Procedure, not the Criminal Code, which is the body of law dealing with the definitions of crimes and their punishments.

The Code of Criminal Procedure describes the procedural laws used by the Italian police and judiciary in cases where crimes are alleged and describes the measures adopted legally with witnesses, suspects and/or accused persons, and procedures such as questioning, arrests, detentions, and trials.

CPP Article 530 deals with various acquittal specifications besides acquittal for failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That may be one reason it was not eliminated when CPP Article 533.1 was reformed to make BARD the legal standard in 2006.

There is a little guessing an confusion on the point here. The wording "BARD" was added in 2006, but as for jurisprudence this was not a reform of the standard.
The standard remained the same - albeit Hellmann is one who appears to try to make an argument about this - that was the previous acquittal formula "on insuficient proof" that was abolished in 1988, that was just the old wording for "reasonable doubt". Nothing changed in its definition.

Why the words were added in 2006? Many legal scholars expressed the opinion the "change" was merely stylish and futile.
Once could speculate that maybe was the situation of the code, perceived by some as ambiguous after the disappearence of the old formula what prompted some politicians to insert the words "BARD" maybe in order to emphasize that cases that would have the old "insufficient proof" formula should be all conflated under the 530 umbrella, or in practice, in order to forge some kind of modern-looking wording that could work as an expedient to help politicians who hope to get off in corruption and mafia trials.

But the point is that art. 533 has actually little or nothing to do with 530 and its "reform". There is no link between the two.
And srt. 530 already established that all cases specified under it are legally considered acquittals that must be under one of its five formulas. The 530.2 paragraph is *not* an additional formula - this is important to make clear: "reasonable doubt" ("insufficient proof") is *not* a formula, it is instead a condition, like another coordinate, that can be added to the formulas like two coordinates of a point in a plain would tell you the information about its position. An acquittal on "insufficient proof" (530.2) is legally either within the area "not having committed the fact" or of another formula (like "crime was not committed"). This is valid, however, only in Penal law. The positions of 530.1 and 530.2 have very different status as for their effects in civil law.

 

[Machiavelli]

Good to hear from you, Mach.

You are totally wrong on a number of points in your post quoted above, as you can confirm by carefully reading the CPP.

CPP Article 620 authorizes the CSC to deliver a judgment of annulment without referral and gives the reasons for annulment without referral.

The reasons for annulment without referral are provided under letters (A) through (L), 10 different reasons in all. The last one, (L), is quite broad; it states:

CPP Article 620 Annulment without referral

1. In addition to the cases specifically provided for by the law, the CSC shall deliver a judgment of annulment without referral:
(L) in any other case in which the CSC believes the referral is superfluous or may proceed to the determination of the sentence or take the necessary decisions.

This is nothing more than a quoting of CPP. It adds nothing to what I said, and doesn't refute anything.

And with respect to the CSC evaluating evidence, we have had this discussion before. You are wrong, in that the CSC is specifically empowered to evaluate whether decisive evidence has been gathered and whether the grounds of a judgment, including how evidence was evaluated, was logical. It is correct that the CSC does not evaluate new evidence. Here is an extract from the relevant CPP article:

You are the wrong one, and I am right.
The Cassazione does cannot assess trial evidence. Period.
By "trial evidence" I mean the "old" case evidence. A re-assessment by SC of evidence already assessed is absolutely prohibited by jurisprudence. Evidence assessing is *exclusive* power of the courts of merits. The SC has wide powers, but those are powers that extend to the sphere of legitimacy; they never deal with the merits of the case.

It's not me who needs to explain this. Chieffi (p.54-56) itself has a paragraph on the power of the SC, explains it by reporting established jurisprudence:

1 ‐ Preliminary remarks on the limits of the authority of this Court

1.1 ‐ The body of evidence gathered and drawn up in the two stages of judgment on the murder of the young English student is without a doubt circumstantial in nature; since no one directly saw or recorded it, there is no description of how the crime was carried out. This does not mean that so‐called circumstantial evidence has less validity than direct evidence, since circumstantial evidence is qualified by its content and by its degree of significance. What is noteworthy is the logical procedure through which, [starting] from certain premises, the existence of further facts is affirmed “to the standard of rules of probability with reference to a possible, likely connection of events, whose sequence and recurrence can be verified according to the rules of common experience” (section 1 civ. 13.11.1996, no 9961) [Sez. Un. Civ. 13.11.1996, n.9961]: as has been cited in a recent ruling of this Court (section 1, 20.12.2011, no 47250), article 192 c2 introduced the civil trial standard regarding those elements which cannot be recognised as having the same persuasive value as evidence.

Living law has devised strong evaluation guidelines (which are) in complete
accordance on the subject of circumstantial evidence trials, which require the trial judge to carry out a twofold operation: first of all, the trial judge must proceed with the evaluation of the piece of circumstantial evidence on its own, to establish its probative value, which is usually in terms of mere possibility. Then it is necessary to carry out a global examination of all the pieces of circumstantial evidence, in order to determine whether the margins of ambiguity, inevitably connected to each one (if demonstrative uncertainties were not present one would be dealing with outright proof), may be overcome “with a unitary vision, so as to allow for the attribution of the illicit deed to the accused, even in the absence of direct proof of guilt, on the basis of a totality of facts which, fitting together among themselves without gaps or leaps of logic, necessarily lead to such an outcome as the strict consequential result” (section 1, 9.6.2010, no 30448, section 1, 4.2.1992, no 6682).

1.2 ‐ The purview of legitimacy of this Court with respect to the logical procedure followed to arrive at the judgment of attribution of fact through the use of inferences or rules of experience consists of verifying whether the court judge has indicated the reasons for his conviction and whether these are plausible: the verification must be carried out in terms of ascertaining whether the judge took into [40] consideration all the relevant information present in the court files, thus respecting the principle of completeness; whether the conclusions reached can be said to be consistent with the material received and prove themselves to be founded on inferential criteria and logical deductions (that are) beyond criticism from the perspective of respecting the principles of the non‐contradiction and of the logical consistency of the reasoning. The object of the Supreme Court judge’s scrutiny is therefore the probative reasoning, (and) accordingly, the method used to assess the evidence, digressing in the reappraisal of the circumstantial evidence not being permitted. It has in fact been underscored how article 606, c 1, letter e of the Criminal Procedure Code precludes the (Supreme Court) judge from reappraisal but does not at all prevent him from verifying whether the appraisal was carried out according to logical criteria “whether, that is, the criteria of inference used by the court judge can be held to be plausible, or whether different ones can be allowed, capable of leading to different solutions [which are] equally plausible” (section IV, 12.11.2009, no 48320). It has been noted that this task had already been entrusted to the Supreme Court judge before the intervening reform introduced in letter e of article 606 of the Criminal Procedure Code with law 46/2006 and that with the amendment the flaw of misinterpretation of the evidence was placed in the category of the flaw of explanation, thus not reformulating the ambit of the scrutiny entrusted to the Supreme Court judge, (and) furthermore allowing the Court of Cassation to assess the trial records, this assessment being limited to their explanatory value and not their evaluation, when their contents are such as to undermine the conclusions reached by the trial judges.

Let's repeat the part with the limiting rule:

[The Cassazione's judgemet consists in] verifying whether the court judge has indicated the reasons for his conviction and whether these are plausible: the verification must be carried out in terms of ascertaining whether the judge took into [40] consideration all the relevant information present in the court files, thus respecting the principle of completeness; whether the conclusions reached can be said to be consistent with the material received and prove themselves to be founded on inferential criteria and logical deductions (that are) beyond criticism from the perspective of respecting the principles of the non‐contradiction and of the logical consistency of the reasoning. The object of the Supreme Court judge’s scrutiny is therefore the probative reasoning, (and) accordingly, the method used to assess the evidence, digressing in the reappraisal of the circumstantial evidence not being permitted.

The Cassazione verifies the method used to assess the evidence, in terms of consistency with logic and law, not the evidence; the Cassazione Panel is not permitted to assess the evidence.

The Cassazione can obviously verify consistency between the judge's writing and the trial evidence, but this hapens only on those single bits of the trial documents that are cited and submitted by the parties themselves in their recourse to the Supreme Court. The Cassazione does *not* access the trial file. It also cannot make its own assessment or digression on the validity or meaning of the bits of evidence themselves.

(...)
* Note: The CSC thus has the legal authority to review the way the evidence gathered in the lower courts was analyzed by those courts in reaching the appealed decision. This would include whether the evidence and its analysis was lacking, contradictory, or manifestly illogical.

No. It is as Chieffi says: not the evidence, but instead only its "analysis" (that s its reporting correctly of it, its using it within a reasoning and explaining the reasons for its use).

CPP Article 495 Judge's decisions on evidence

2. The accused has the right to the admission of pieces of evidence in his defence on the facts in issue presented against him. The Public Prosecutor has the same right regarding the pieces of evidence against the accused on the facts in issue presented in defence of the accused.

This has nothing to do with the point.

CPP Article 609 Cognisance of the CSC

1. The appeal to the CSC assigns cognisance of the proceedings to the CSC, exclusively with regard to the arguments raised.
2. The CSC shall also decide on the issues raised ex officio at any stage and instance of the proceedings and on those issues which could not have been raised at the appeal stage.

§1 of the above only points at the jurisprudence I am referring to. The SC cannot have cognissance of the documentation excapt for those points that are assigned and limited to those documents that are attached in the appeals. There is established jurisprudence on this matter however. The principle is that: the SC does not make "research" into the files, does not find out documentation not addressed by appeals, and does not find facts.
§ 2 refers to issues raised ex officio at different stages or instances that could not have been risen, so it's not what we are talking about.