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“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

II don't know what you mean with "semantic argument", because I don't know how you use these words. This is a semantic problem.

Ontological positions are inherently semantic in nature. They are a means of assigning a name and pretty much nothing else, so any argument about which one is "better" just tends to boil down to which name you prefer.

Him. Nonpareil's treatment of the subject only works if one accepts that the objective is dependent upon the subjective

This is flatly untrue. I have repeatedly made it clear that practical detectability is not the issue.

Either way, Nonpareil still seems to have difficulty with understanding that there is, in fact, a difference between the issues of whether something is real or not, whether it can be determined to be real, and what conclusions are actually logically valid related to such.

I ask again: if there is a difference between real undetectable entities and unreal undetectable entities, one that makes one real and the other not, what is it?

It's a simple question, and despite all the unsupported accusations of fallacious logic and so forth, no one has actually been able to answer it. "Real" is simply being treated as a completely arbitrary label that can be slapped onto anything for no apparent reason, and rather than having any actual, defined meaning, it becomes a nebulous semi-magical concept rather similar to the soul.

But, that's enough from me for this thread. Nonpareil and I have gone down that path before and it probably should be OT for this thread.

Fair enough, though I'm starting to think that we should just start a new thread on garage dragons and have done.
 
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II don't know what you mean with "semantic argument", because I don't know how you use these words. This is a semantic problem.

The problem of the definition of any word is semantic. If I say that a word is meaningless this is semantics.
Materialism begins with a problem of semantics. Of course.

"New forms of existence": Science is in continuous progress ( sorry, Mr. Kuhn).
If I define "materialism" on the bases of what the science thinks about the ultimate components of "matter" in a particular time new discoveries in the future can invalidate this concept. This was the case with atomistic materialism in the nineteeth century, for example. A pluralist thinker considers the possibility of diverse kinds of things, open to new knowledges. Moulines doen't say what are the limits of this pluralism and this is a problem because without setting the limits of a word this word is meaningless.

I have my own answer to this problem. I will put it here if I have a little time.

Hmm,
I just take that as a given in the usage of language.
Language is a self referencing set of idiomatic meanings that change over time and are highly dependent upon the usage of communicants.

I think the main issue that happen here in R&P regards 'materialism' is the intersection of changing science set and philosophical sets of usage. Add to that the ontological arguments and things get very confusing.

Materialism as used by most of the sciencey posters here is taken to be a form of naturalism, it manes that those things that can be observed, measured and given metrics have a high level of validity in expressing theoretical models of the way the universe behaves.

This runs right into the ancients lines of reasoning and expressed semantics of philosophy and there is mis-communication.


Now I am not sure about the pluralism argument and will have to read some more...

I would just says that language, theories and thoughts are all approximate models any how.
 
BTW, do you (or anyone) think that 'ontological arguments' / Metaphysics has had any new discoveries or thinking in the past 2500 years? I don't mean 2500 years literally.
 
BTW, do you (or anyone) think that 'ontological arguments' / Metaphysics has had any new discoveries or thinking in the past 2500 years? I don't mean 2500 years literally.

I don't do metaphysics or ontology, and have no idea what the current discussion is like there.

But, for those who are used to scientific progress, the sputters, starts and stops and reversals of philosophical opinion, together with a fairly common lack of consensus, will look abysmal. Philosophy just doesn't progress in the same way, one must honestly admit.

Here's a quote from Russell that I think is fairly forthright and appropriate.

Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. There are many questions—and among them those that are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual life—which, so far as we can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge.

[...]

The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.

I can certainly understand why many people are uninterested in philosophy. It can seem like a fool's game. I like it because I find the questions and the arguments interesting, and because I am deeply attracted to logical, analytic reasoning.

But if you're looking for a list of undeniable discoveries and a sense of determinate progress, then you are mostly barking up the wrong tree.
 
I can certainly understand why many people are uninterested in philosophy. It can seem like a fool's game. I like it because I find the questions and the arguments interesting, and because I am deeply attracted to logical, analytic reasoning.


Uninterested is one thing…but the indifference, antipathy, and even antagonism…shown towards philosophy, while sometimes merited, is typically nothing more than ignorance.

Has anyone yet provided any alternative?

The simple fact is…human beings exist as something called meaning that we have the capacity to form into intellectual models (words and concepts). All of these quantities have some variety of phenomenological existence. These quantities form the foundation not just of science, but of a very significant part of our individual and collective lives and identities.

They ….matter. A lot!

Something is required to formally adjudicate this phenomena (intellectual meaning). That ‘something’ is called philosophy (there is no formal science that even comes close to any capacity to deal with it and there won’t be until the brain is understood…a development that currently isn’t even on the most remote horizon). That it struggles to definitively resolve many of the issues it grapples with is as much a reflection of the massive complexity of the issues as much as any shortcomings inherent in the process.

Anyone wondering whether there is anything to actually resolve need look no further than the dubious arguments earlier in this thread regarding what is real or not. The conventions of syntax and semantics generate certain paradigms. There are consequences when those paradigms are disregarded (examples are not hard to find). Contradictions, confusion, and chaos.

So….for those who continue to labor under the conviction that philosophy-is-the-stupid….what alternative do you propose?
 
Ontological positions are inherently semantic in nature. They are a means of assigning a name and pretty much nothing else, so any argument about which one is "better" just tends to boil down to which name you prefer.

Discussions of all kind are frequently questions of names and meanings. To analize and to dissolve this kind of confusions is useful. This is what Moulines was doing with greater or lesser success.
 
Hmm,

Materialism as used by most of the sciencey posters here is taken to be a form of naturalism, it manes that those things that can be observed, measured and given metrics have a high level of validity in expressing theoretical models of the way the universe behaves.

If I understand well this "materialism" is the same thing that "positivism".I see some problems:
(a) It doesn't include the class of materialists who are not positivists.
(b) This concept of "matter" doesn´t include mental entities that are neither measurable nor observable. It opens the door to dualism.
(c) If any concept of matter can be extracted from this definition it will be indefinite and in continuous evolution. So any sustancious conclusion cannot be drawn about the nature of "matter" on these bases. (This objection would be not valid for a non-ontological materialism).
 
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Hitherto, I have summarized Moulines’ position. Now my own position:

When I read Moulines’ article I was puzzled. I considered myself to be a materialist, but Moulines’ objections to materialism seem to be strong. In short, I didn’t find any compelling answer. Therefore, I can consider myself a classic materialist no more, this is to say, someone that affirms that the universe is only composed by matter, being matter something clearly defined by a set of precise characteristics. I had to question myself about what kind of materialist I was -If I was-.

My method was to divide materialism in different fields.

(a) Ontology. Realism: Physical reality is not into my mind.
(b) Epistemology. Knowledge is reason plus experience. The model of factual knowledge is science. But not the unique form of knowledge. The limits of my knowledge are space and time.
(c) Psychology. Mind is a product of the brain. There is no mind without brain.
(d) History and philosophy. The material conditions of life determine (at last instance) the cultural forms.

Therefore, I consider myself as a pluralist materialist, because matter means to me different things in different contexts. And I call “materialist” someone who maintains all or some of the points above. Something similar to Moulines' "vital attitude".

(NOTE: more explanation of the points (a) to (d) would be excessive for this thread.
 
I can certainly understand why many people are uninterested in philosophy. It can seem like a fool's game. I like it because I find the questions and the arguments interesting, and because I am deeply attracted to logical, analytic reasoning.

But if you're looking for a list of undeniable discoveries and a sense of determinate progress, then you are mostly barking up the wrong tree.

The problem is that even those that violently reject the philosophy have some kind of philosophy. Physicalism is a philosophical project not a scientific solution. I think that philosophy can teach us methodological caution (moderate scepticism) and analytic capacity. And nothing more.
 
This is an interesting discussion but it begs a question if the limits of materialism are the 4 fields described above, how does one account for innovation and creative pursuits such as art and music or in fact fundamental research which takes our knowledge to a new level and provides new experiences. Therefore the limits of our present knowledge might be creativity or innovative capacity, how does materialism account for the thought and action processes of an Einstein, Mozart or a Da Vinci.
 
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As Einstein noted himself, the secret to creativity is to hide sources. Also I am lead to believe that if it was not Einstein doing the math it would be someone else sooner or later, building on shoulders of giants. Not sure about Mozart.

There are in my opinion two extremes, rejecting philosophy and devoting it time and energy it does not deserve. Its interesting and all but for real answers ...
 
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Discussions of all kind are frequently questions of names and meanings. To analize and to dissolve this kind of confusions is useful. This is what Moulines was doing with greater or lesser success.

Quite. Which is why I have never said that I have an issue with philosophy.

My issue is, and always has been, with nonsense, philosophical or otherwise. It just happens that quite a lot of philosophy fits that category.

This concept of "matter" doesn´t include mental entities that are neither measurable nor observable. It opens the door to dualism.

As no one has ever demonstrated that non-measurable, non-observable entities, mental or otherwise, can even be said to exist, this is not particularly concerning.

I considered myself to be a materialist, but Moulines’ objections to materialism seem to be strong.

Which objections would those be? The category errors, or the ones that apply to all ontological positions, materialist or otherwise?

Therefore, I can consider myself a classic materialist no more, this is to say, someone that affirms that the universe is only composed by matter, being matter something clearly defined by a set of precise characteristics.

So the universe is not defined by a set of characteristics?

What is your alternative position?
 
TQUOTE=Nonpareil;11091499]



So the universe is not defined by a set of characteristics?

What is your alternative position?[/QUOTE]

The universe is not defined by a set of characteristics. For example, if we said that snow is white and cold, then it can't be either of those two distinct characteristics - snow is not merely 'white' nor merely 'cold' - because cold and white is not cold. Snow then has to be a unification of these characteristics, and we would need to discover a unity or relation between or within these two characteristics.
We could say snow 'has' whiteness and cold, but then we would then need to define 'has' . . . and still we haven't gotten anywhere because we are trying to get at the 'snow' that 'has' these properties.
 
Quite. Which is why I have never said that I have an issue with philosophy.

My issue is, and always has been, with nonsense, philosophical or otherwise. It just happens that quite a lot of philosophy fits that category.



As no one has ever demonstrated that non-measurable, non-observable entities, mental or otherwise, can even be said to exist, this is not particularly concerning.

If you will continue to misrepresent the situation, I feel compelled to reply.

Let's return to your claim: to exist is to interact.

Obviously, the things in our universe interact with one another, and hence satisfy this condition. Were there a distinct, disconnected universe, the things in that universe would also interact with other things in that universe. Hence, they would satisfy the criteria that you have suggested (without any real justification, aside from epistemological).

Therefore, we see that if it is coherent for one universe to exist, there is no obvious contradiction with your own criteria that a separate universe also exists.

(Other of your principles led to clear and explicit contradictions, but I haven't heard any disavowal of those principles, by the way.)
 
cold and white is not cold.

What?

Snow then has to be a unification of these characteristics

No. Snow is an entity defined as the sum total of all of its properties.

Let's return to your claim: to exist is to interact.

Allow me to clarify: to exist is to interact with things in our universe.

My apologies; looking back on my posts in this thread, I failed to make it clear.

Obviously, the things in our universe interact with one another, and hence satisfy this condition. Were there a distinct, disconnected universe, the things in that universe would also interact with other things in that universe. Hence, they would satisfy the criteria that you have suggested (without any real justification, aside from epistemological).

And this is why the clarification is necessary.

There is still no means of distinguishing between this hypothetical other universe and a completely imaginary entity.

(Other of your principles led to clear and explicit contradictions, but I haven't heard any disavowal of those principles, by the way.)

Which principles are those?
 
Allow me to clarify: to exist is to interact with things in our universe.

My apologies; looking back on my posts in this thread, I failed to make it clear.

Well, that sure makes your conclusion easy.

But, of course, your characterization of existence is purely your own. You've "proved" that nothing exists outside our universe by stipulating that existence involves our universe. It is begging the question in quite an explicit way.

And this is why the clarification is necessary.

There is still no means of distinguishing between this hypothetical other universe and a completely imaginary entity.

Again, you are using an epistemological standard that has nothing to do with the issue.

Is there any inconsistency in the notion of undetectable stuff? Evidently not.

Could we confirm the existence of undetectable stuff? Of course not.

Prediction: once again you will reply, "But how could we say such stuff exists?" and once again I will point out that this question of justification in asserting existence is epistemological in nature, and does not show any contradiction in the concept of an undetectable thing.

Which principles are those?

The principle that

If neither P nor NOT P is verifiable, then we must take NOT P to be true,​
leads to the conclusion that, whenever Q is undecidable "we must take" both NOT Q and NOT NOT Q to be false, which of course entails taking both NOT NOT Q and NOT NOT NOT Q to be true (by definition of NOT) and this is a contradiction.

Obviously, classically, this amounts to "taking" both Q and NOT Q to be true. Clearly, your principle leads to contradictory commitments.

You do remember asking for clarification on my argument, which I provided, yes? If you replied, I sure seem to have missed it.
 
What?



No. Snow is an entity defined as the sum total of all of its properties.


A thing can not be any one of its properties, nor a unity of its properties, because there is no unity relation between or within properties.
 
"Language isn't perfectly consistent across all levels of argument and esoteric concepts, therefore I can make up anything I want."
 
That sentence adds exactly as much intellectual weight to the argument as you are, it just did it in fewer words.

You're mistaking wordiness for content. There's 3 separate threads all full of people trying to add enough word salad fluff to "Reality doesn't exist" to make it slip under intellectual radar and not one of them has actually said of context that can be distilled down to "Watch me play with the language to get the answer I want."

If semantics, distinctions without difference, word games, and the ponderous "Lookit me I'm the wise old man on the mountain" routines are what you think adds to discussions, then no I will not be adding to this discussion.
 
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