“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[phiwum]

1. Make up something.
2. Define the said thing as by definition being totally inert and impossible to judge via evidence.
3. Use 2 to prove 1.
4 (Opt) Once step 3 is accepting, start backdooring "therefore Woo."

Wow, that sounds devious.

Who's doing that?

You really aren't reading this thread, are you?

 

[phiwum]

As am I.

What's the functional, practical difference between some shadowy other realm that can never possibly interact with us, can never be proven or disproven, nay can never by definition be supported or not supported with evidence and which can never, has never, and will never have any effect on reality.... and one that doesn't exist in the first place?

Or is this just another "Neiner neiner neiner science doesn't know everything" skit?

No. I'm just pointing out that one of Nonpareil's claims is plainly false: that existence requires detectability.

No one is suggesting that we ought to believe that non-detectable things exist, because such a belief is pointless. But it doesn't follow (unless you're a pragmatist?) that such a belief is necessarily false.

There is no incoherence in the existence of non-detectable stuff, though there are good practical reasons not to believe that such stuff exists.

 

[Nonpareil]

I don't think that we need to go on, if I read you right here.

You think that the hypothesis that certain (even in principle) undetectable stuff exists is a pointless hypothesis[1], a worthless thought experiment. I may well agree.

This is part of my position, but only a part, and it is the end result rather than the cause.

Such hypotheticals are pointless because they stretch the definition of "real" to the point that it loses any meaning. It becomes, as I prefer to state it, incoherent - that is, insufficiently defined, incomplete, meaningless, not a meaningful statement. It is a pointless semantic game at its core, playing games with the meaning of words and hoping that no one will notice.

If you disagree, I am more than open to hearing of an alternative definition of "real" or "existence" which can be said to apply to these entities. As it stands, and as I have already stated at multiple points, you have been treating "real" as a wholly arbitrary and meaningless descriptor, to be applied or ignored at a whim, whereas mine applies to actual entities and only actual entities. It functions, and I have yet to hear a coherent objection to it.

I think we're getting close to "existence-as-a-predicate" here, but for my money, a concept represents something real if it corresponds to an actual object distinct from the concept itself.

And you know that it does so how?

If you cannot interact with something, how do you know that it is real?

My objection is simple: you have not shown that existence requires interaction.

This is backwards. My position is that interaction is existence; if an entity does not interact, it is indistinguishable from an entirely imaginary one, and cannot be meaningfully said to be real.

If you disagree, then perhaps you can give an example of a non-interactive entity that can be meaningfully said to exist.

Yes. So?

So there is no "meta-entity" called "the universe" that has to interact with anything else. It is equivalent to "the United States" or similar, in that when it is said to exist, what is actually there is a bunch of people, regions, institutes and so forth - that is, actual entities - who are collectively referred to.

(For that matter, and please correct me if I'm wrong, but there are distances beyond which we cannot interact with stuff in this universe, but we still suppose such stuff exists. This is only a half-thought, so I'm not resting my hat on it.)

Existence does not require that we be practically capable of interaction. Only that it be possible for something.

Wow, that sounds devious.

Who's doing that?

Nick227, in another materialism thread, is arguing that observers and selves do not exist. His argument also revolves around using incoherent definitions.

No. I'm just pointing out that one of Nonpareil's claims is plainly false: that existence requires detectability.

You have said this, yes, but you have failed to justify it.

What non-detectable entities do you claim exist, and how are they differentiable from completely imaginary ones?

This is a legitimate question, by the way. I am completely open to better means of determining existence, if they can be presented. I have simply never seen one, or heard any sort of coherent answer to this question.

 

[Dancing David]

But yeah, the heart of materialism is A) there is no being that is not bound by the laws of nature and B) this desk, whatever it ultimately is, would still stick around if every mind brain in the universe disappeared.

I would say those are consequences of observation:
1. The universe appears to behave consistently across space and time
2. Objects/aggregates of wavicles seem to persist absent direct observation by an entity

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

All philosophical differences aside, whenever comes the time to cross the street and watch out for a car hitting you, everyone is a materialist.

 

[LarryS]

All philosophical differences aside, whenever comes the time to cross the street and watch out for a car hitting you, everyone is a materialist.

and there are no atheists in foxholes either . . . avoiding obstacles is common to many frameworks, not just Materialism.

 

[phiwum]

This is part of my position, but only a part, and it is the end result rather than the cause.

Such hypotheticals are pointless because they stretch the definition of "real" to the point that it loses any meaning. It becomes, as I prefer to state it, incoherent - that is, insufficiently defined, incomplete, meaningless, not a meaningful statement. It is a pointless semantic game at its core, playing games with the meaning of words and hoping that no one will notice.

If you disagree, I am more than open to hearing of an alternative definition of "real" or "existence" which can be said to apply to these entities. As it stands, and as I have already stated at multiple points, you have been treating "real" as a wholly arbitrary and meaningless descriptor, to be applied or ignored at a whim, whereas mine applies to actual entities and only actual entities. It functions, and I have yet to hear a coherent objection to it.



And you know that it does so how?

If you cannot interact with something, how do you know that it is real?



This is backwards. My position is that interaction is existence; if an entity does not interact, it is indistinguishable from an entirely imaginary one, and cannot be meaningfully said to be real.

If you disagree, then perhaps you can give an example of a non-interactive entity that can be meaningfully said to exist.



So there is no "meta-entity" called "the universe" that has to interact with anything else. It is equivalent to "the United States" or similar, in that when it is said to exist, what is actually there is a bunch of people, regions, institutes and so forth - that is, actual entities - who are collectively referred to.



Existence does not require that we be practically capable of interaction. Only that it be possible for something.



Nick227, in another materialism thread, is arguing that observers and selves do not exist. His argument also revolves around using incoherent definitions.



You have said this, yes, but you have failed to justify it.

What non-detectable entities do you claim exist, and how are they differentiable from completely imaginary ones?

This is a legitimate question, by the way. I am completely open to better means of determining existence, if they can be presented. I have simply never seen one, or heard any sort of coherent answer to this question.

I think that Fudbucker is right that you are mixing epistemological issues with the notion of existence or, more broadly, truth.

For something to be knowable, it must be true, but it is not the case that truth is the same as knowability. There are things which are true but unknowable.

For instance, it seems likely that there is a natural number n such that we cannot calculate the nth digit of pi in the remaining time of the universe. We may, in fact, choose n to be so large (and so "random", in the sense of Chaitin) that n itself cannot be represented by "writing" one digit on each piece of matter. Thus, it would be impossible to know whether the statement, "The nth digit of pi is 7," is true or not.

Nonetheless, there certainly is a truth to the matter, although we cannot know it.

Similarly, I don't pretend to have evidence of undetectable stuff. That would be a contradiction in terms. However, I'm not arguing that such stuff exists. I'm merely arguing that there is nothing literally incoherent in the statement, "There is stuff which cannot be detected, even in principle."

Your arguments establish that we cannot know that statement, but I'm not arguing that we can know that statement. I'm merely arguing that the statement itself is, so far as we know, possible, and hence that there is nothing about existence that presupposes detectability.

I hope that helps clarify. In any case, as David Mo has pointed out, we are straying from the topic here, and so perhaps we should wrap up this digression.

 

[phiwum]

All philosophical differences aside, whenever comes the time to cross the street and watch out for a car hitting you, everyone is a materialist.

I think that Berkeley would dodge the car, while still agreeing that the car exists only as an idea, because such ideas bloody well hurt.

 

[Nonpareil]

There are things which are true but unknowable.

For instance, it seems likely that there is a natural number n such that we cannot calculate the nth digit of pi in the remaining time of the universe. We may, in fact, choose n to be so large (and so "random", in the sense of Chaitin) that n itself cannot be represented by "writing" one digit on each piece of matter. Thus, it would be impossible to know whether the statement, "The nth digit of pi is 7," is true or not.

Nonetheless, there certainly is a truth to the matter, although we cannot know it.

This is true.

It is also irrelevant to the point I am making. Again, practical detectability is not the concern.

Similarly, I don't pretend to have evidence of undetectable stuff. That would be a contradiction in terms. However, I'm not arguing that such stuff exists. I'm merely arguing that there is nothing literally incoherent in the statement, "There is stuff which cannot be detected, even in principle."

Save that there is no functional definition of "is" which could be applied to that sentence.

Your arguments establish that we cannot know that statement, but I'm not arguing that we can know that statement. I'm merely arguing that the statement itself is, so far as we know, possible, and hence that there is nothing about existence that presupposes detectability.

Then what is the difference between an undetectable entity and a completely imaginary one, other than that you have arbitrarily decided to describe one as "real"?

 

[phiwum]

This is true.

It is also irrelevant to the point I am making. Again, practical detectability is not the concern.

Then it is unclear what you mean.

Again, suppose a separate universe exists. We would detect it, if only we were there. We aren't there and cannot be there.

How is that different than the claim that we would know whether the nth digit of pi is 7 if only we could calculate it, but we have not calculated it and we cannot calculate it?

Save that there is no functional definition of "is" which could be applied to that sentence.

What do you count as a functional definition of "is"?

ETA: And it is misleading to separate the word "is" there. The logical interpretation does not try to separate "there" from "is" and "there is" is, fundamentally, the existential claim.

Look, if your point is that this hypothesis falls short of a scientific claim, then I absolutely agree. Anyone hypothesizing the actual existence of undetectable things is not thereby doing science.

But there is, of course, no guarantee that science will discover every truth, or even that every true claim is "scientific" in a fairly broad sense.

Then what is the difference between an undetectable entity and a completely imaginary one, other than that you have arbitrarily decided to describe one as "real"?

I haven't decided any such thing.

What the difference would be is this: a statement alleging the existence of an undetectable entity would be true (were it true), and a statement alleging the existence of Sherlock Holmes would be false.

Again, I'm puzzled by your arguments. Can you please tell me something? What, in your opinion, is the connection between truth and knowability? Do you concede that some things may be true but unknowable?

If so, then what is it about existence claims precisely that change the situation? I'm a little loathe to introduce mathematical existence into the conversation, since you might think it's a different beast (i.e., you may be an ontological pluralist!), but it is easy enough to recast the statement about the nth digit of pi as an existential claim.

 

[Nonpareil]

Then it is unclear what you mean.

Again, suppose a separate universe exists. We would detect it, if only we were there. We aren't there and cannot be there.

How is that different than the claim that we would know whether the nth digit of pi is 7 if only we could calculate it, but we have not calculated it and we cannot calculate it?

The nth digit of pi provably exists, because pi exists and has an nth digit. Given sufficient time, we could calculate it. The obstacle is a practical one, not a theoretical one.

The hypothetical other universe does not provably exist. It is defined as not being provable. No amount of time could change this. The obstacle is insurmountable even in theory. There is no way to distinguish between this hypothetical universe and a completely imaginary entity.

What do you count as a functional definition of "is"?

ETA: And it is misleading to separate the word "is" there. The logical interpretation does not try to separate "there" from "is" and "there is" is, fundamentally, the existential claim.

In this context, it is equivalent to "exists". In others, it generally means "exhibits behavior consistent with the definition of", or something quite similar.

Your statement was "there is stuff which cannot be detected, even in principle", which is equivalent to "there exists stuff which cannot be detected, even in principle" - but you have still failed to provide any coherent means by which stuff which cannot be detected can be said to exist. You may as well have said "blue is not blue". The statement is invalid, self-contradictory, incoherent.

Again, I am open to being corrected on this front, but thus far all you have done is repeat the original point phrased in a slightly different way. If interaction-slash-detectability is not the requirement for existence, then what would you say it is, and how does this allow you to differentiate between real and imaginary non-interactive entities?

Look, if your point is that this hypothesis falls short of a scientific claim, then I absolutely agree. Anyone hypothesizing the actual existence of undetectable things is not thereby doing science.

But there is, of course, no guarantee that science will discover every truth, or even that every true claim is "scientific" in a fairly broad sense.

This isn't about the scientific validity of a claim, though they certainly aren't scientifically valid. It is a simple statement that trying to claim undetectable entities could be real makes no sense.

What the difference would be is this: a statement alleging the existence of an undetectable entity would be true (were it true), and a statement alleging the existence of Sherlock Holmes would be false.

"What is the difference between a real non-interactive entity and a non-real non-interactive entity?"

"Well, one's real."

This is not helpful.

Again, I'm puzzled by your arguments. Can you please tell me something? What, in your opinion, is the connection between truth and knowability? Do you concede that some things may be true but unknowable?

Yes, for purely practical reasons. As you said, the nth digit of pi can never be calculated simply because we lack the time. It is practically unknowable - but this is not the same as being actually unknowable. The nth digit of pi does exist. It has a value. Given sufficient time, it could be calculated.

But this is not equivalent to being actually unknowable. If something is actually unknowable - that is, in no situation could we ever state that it is true - then, in every meaningful sense, it is false. Saying otherwise is just playing games with language.

This is, ultimately, another utterly trivial statement. It serves only to dismiss nonsense like garage dragons, gravity leprechauns, electromagnetism pixies, and so on. But it is important nonetheless.

If it is wrong, then there is a coherent answer to the question Carl Sagan asked when he introduced the garage dragon concept:

"What is the difference between a garage dragon and no dragon at all?"

 

[phiwum]

The nth digit of pi provably exists, because pi exists and has an nth digit. Given sufficient time, we could calculate it. The obstacle is a practical one, not a theoretical one.

The hypothetical other universe does not provably exist. It is defined as not being provable. No amount of time could change this. The obstacle is insurmountable even in theory. There is no way to distinguish between this hypothetical universe and a completely imaginary entity.



In this context, it is equivalent to "exists". In others, it generally means "exhibits behavior consistent with the definition of", or something quite similar.

Your statement was "there is stuff which cannot be detected, even in principle", which is equivalent to "there exists stuff which cannot be detected, even in principle" - but you have still failed to provide any coherent means by which stuff which cannot be detected can be said to exist. You may as well have said "blue is not blue". The statement is invalid, self-contradictory, incoherent.

No, "blue is not blue" is an evident contradiction.

There is no similar contradiction in the claim that "undetectable stuff exists", because there is nothing in the phrase "there exists..." which entails detectability.

When you keep stressing that there's no means to "say" that such stuff exists, you are reverting to epistemology. We agree there are no grounds for concluding that such stuff exists, but there is also no reason for supposing that the only things that really exist are those which we can prove exist (even in principle).

Again, I am open to being corrected on this front, but thus far all you have done is repeat the original point phrased in a slightly different way. If interaction-slash-detectability is not the requirement for existence, then what would you say it is, and how does this allow you to differentiate between real and imaginary non-interactive entities?

Again, you revert to the question of evidence, but things may be true without evidence. You are confusing epistemological considerations with truth.

This isn't about the scientific validity of a claim, though they certainly aren't scientifically valid. It is a simple statement that trying to claim undetectable entities could be real makes no sense.



"What is the difference between a real non-interactive entity and a non-real non-interactive entity?"

"Well, one's real."

This is not helpful.

And yet, that's the issue at hand. I have no problem at all considering the possibility of alternate universes, undetectable from our own. There is no incoherence in this hypothesis. There is only incoherence if one thinks that truth requires evidence, but evidence is of consideration only for conditions of knowing, not of truth.

Yes, for purely practical reasons. As you said, the nth digit of pi can never be calculated simply because we lack the time. It is practically unknowable - but this is not the same as being actually unknowable. The nth digit of pi does exist. It has a value. Given sufficient time, it could be calculated.

But this is not equivalent to being actually unknowable. If something is actually unknowable - that is, in no situation could we ever state that it is true - then, in every meaningful sense, it is false. Saying otherwise is just playing games with language.

No, not in every meaningful sense. Otherwise, you are committed to contradictions.

Take any undecidable statement P. That is, any statement which is neither provable nor refutable "in any situation". Do you agree that there are such propositions? If so, you are committed to the claim that both P and NOT P are false. Not even an intuitionist goes that far.

This is, ultimately, another utterly trivial statement. It serves only to dismiss nonsense like garage dragons, gravity leprechauns, electromagnetism pixies, and so on. But it is important nonetheless.

If it is wrong, then there is a coherent answer to the question Carl Sagan asked when he introduced the garage dragon concept:

"What is the difference between a garage dragon and no dragon at all?"

Practically speaking, there is no difference. Nonetheless, either there is a garage dragon or there is not. Truth is not determined by purely practical considerations, unless we're committed to the pragmatic theory of truth.

Maybe you should look up that theory of truth, if you're not already familiar with it. If you find it amenable, then our conversation is surely over, since I cannot refute pragmatism. If, on the other hand, you disagree with it, then we are still at an impasse.

 

[Nonpareil]

No, "blue is not blue" is an evident contradiction.

There is no similar contradiction in the claim that "undetectable stuff exists", because there is nothing in the phrase "there exists..." which entails detectability.

You say this, but you have yet to provide any coherent means by which undetectable entities can be said to exist.

We agree there are no grounds for concluding that such stuff exists, but there is also no reason for supposing that the only things that really exist are those which we can prove exist (even in principle).

Save that there is no other coherent definition of "exists".

I am honestly curious as to what your definition of it is. How do you, personally, differentiate between real and unreal entities?

No, not in every meaningful sense. Otherwise, you are committed to contradictions.

Take any undecidable statement P. That is, any statement which is neither provable nor refutable "in any situation". Do you agree that there are such propositions? If so, you are committed to the claim that both P and NOT P are false.

What? I honestly don't understand what you are saying here. Can you rephrase?

Practically speaking, there is no difference. Nonetheless, either there is a garage dragon or there is not. Truth is not determined by purely practical considerations, unless we're committed to the pragmatic theory of truth.

Maybe you should look up that theory of truth, if you're not already familiar with it. If you find it amenable, then our conversation is surely over, since I cannot refute pragmatism. If, on the other hand, you disagree with it, then we are still at an impasse.

At first glance, it would appear to be, if not perfectly aligned with my position, rather close to it.

 

[phiwum]

You say this, but you have yet to provide any coherent means by which undetectable entities can be said to exist.

We seem to be going in circles. Once again, you talk about what "can be said" to exist (i.e., what warrants such a claim?) rather than what actually exists.

I think I'll leave the conversation here, aside from a clarification below.

Save that there is no other coherent definition of "exists".

I am honestly curious as to what your definition of it is. How do you, personally, differentiate between real and unreal entities?



What? I honestly don't understand what you are saying here. Can you rephrase?

You wrote, "If something is actually unknowable - that is, in no situation could we ever state that it is true - then, in every meaningful sense, it is false."

An undecidable statement is one which can neither be verified nor refuted. That is, a statement P is undecidable if neither P nor NOT P is knowable.

It follows from what you said above that such as statement has the property that both P and NOT P are false, i.e., that NOT P and NOT NOT P are true.

At first glance, it would appear to be, if not perfectly aligned with my position, rather close to it.

Thinking about it a bit more, positivism is somewhat close to your position, but not quite. A positivist may say that the claim, "There is undetectable stuff," is not false, but is meaningless.

 

[Nonpareil]

We seem to be going in circles. Once again, you talk about what "can be said" to exist (i.e., what warrants such a claim?) rather than what actually exists.

Yyyyes. I am unsure of what you think the distinction should be, assuming that we actually have a working definition of "exists".

You wrote, "If something is actually unknowable - that is, in no situation could we ever state that it is true - then, in every meaningful sense, it is false."

An undecidable statement is one which can neither be verified nor refuted. That is, a statement P is undecidable if neither P nor NOT P is knowable.

It follows from what you said above that such as statement has the property that both P and NOT P are false, i.e., that NOT P and NOT NOT P are true.

That is not what I said. I stated that, if neither P nor !P can be verified as true, then !P must be taken as true.

Thinking about it a bit more, positivism is somewhat close to your position, but not quite. A positivist may say that the claim, "There is undetectable stuff," is not false, but is meaningless.

Close, yes. I would state that it is both; meaningless statements must be treated as false.

But you are quite right that this derail has gone on for long enough. I don't think that either of us is going to convince the other, so for the moment - at least until a more appropriate thread appears - I will let the matter lie.

 

[phiwum]

Yyyyes. I am unsure of what you think the distinction should be, assuming that we actually have a working definition of "exists".



That is not what I said. I stated that, if neither P nor !P can be verified as true, then !P must be taken as true.

From which a similar conclusion follows.

If neither P nor NOT P can be verified, then NOT P "must be taken as" true.

If neither P nor NOT P can be verified, then neither NOT NOT P nor NOT P can be verified, and hence NOT NOT P "must be taken as" true.

Hence, if neither P nor NOT P can be verified, then both NOT P and NOT NOT P must be taken as true.

Close, yes. I would state that it is both; meaningless statements must be treated as false.

But you are quite right that this derail has gone on for long enough. I don't think that either of us is going to convince the other, so for the moment - at least until a more appropriate thread appears - I will let the matter lie.

 

[Nonpareil]

From which a similar conclusion follows.

If neither P nor NOT P can be verified, then NOT P "must be taken as" true.

If neither P nor NOT P can be verified, then neither NOT NOT P nor NOT P can be verified, and hence NOT NOT P "must be taken as" true.

I have absolutely no idea how you reach the highlighted. It has nothing to do with what I said or any laws of logical calculus that I can think of. Can you explain?

EDIT: Or perhaps not, since I literally just said I would let this lie. Damn my lack of willpower.

 

[phiwum]

I have absolutely no idea how you reach the highlighted. It has nothing to do with what I said or any laws of logical calculus that I can think of. Can you explain?

EDIT: Or perhaps not, since I literally just said I would let this lie. Damn my lack of willpower.

I'd be happy to explain.

Let's take the principle you suggested:

If neither P nor NOT P is verifiable, then we must take NOT P to be true.​

Right?

Okay, now just to make things a little clearer, let's use a different variable. Let Q be such that neither Q nor NOT Q is verifiable. From the above (plugging in Q for P), we see that we must take NOT Q to be true.

Now, you agree that if Q is not verifiable, then NOT NOT Q is not verifiable, right? (Intuitionists might balk at this step, but I presume there are none in the audience.)

So, if neither Q nor NOT Q is verifiable, then neither NOT Q nor NOT NOT Q is verifiable. Plug in NOT Q for P above, and we get

If neither NOT Q nor NOT (NOT Q) is verifiable, then we must take NOT (NOT Q) to be true.
​

Hence, for any undecidable proposition Q, using your principle, we conclude that both NOT Q and NOT NOT Q are true, an obvious contradiction.

 

[David Mo]

That depends on what you mean by "new forms of existence" and how strictly you define your specific form of monism.

Semantic arguments tend to be rather silly that way.

II don't know what you mean with "semantic argument", because I don't know how you use these words. This is a semantic problem.

The problem of the definition of any word is semantic. If I say that a word is meaningless this is semantics.
Materialism begins with a problem of semantics. Of course.

"New forms of existence": Science is in continuous progress ( sorry, Mr. Kuhn).
If I define "materialism" on the bases of what the science thinks about the ultimate components of "matter" in a particular time new discoveries in the future can invalidate this concept. This was the case with atomistic materialism in the nineteeth century, for example. A pluralist thinker considers the possibility of diverse kinds of things, open to new knowledges. Moulines doen't say what are the limits of this pluralism and this is a problem because without setting the limits of a word this word is meaningless.

I have my own answer to this problem. I will put it here if I have a little time.

 

[Aridas]

I invite others to weigh in and see which of us has odd intuitions here. It might, I suppose, be me, but I would honestly be surprised.

Him. Nonpareil's treatment of the subject only works if one accepts that the objective is dependent upon the subjective, rather than the opposite, which is given lip service, but firmly disagreed with by him in practice. For example, when he talks about existence...

If the multi-worlds interpretation is ever accepted, it will be because of actual evidence that these other worlds exist.

That is, because there is an interaction between them and us.

And that's true enough, in and of itself. That doesn't mean that people accepting it makes it any more or less real/accurate than it actually is or is not, though, which is the only available way for it to be being used in context, other than irrelevance. Many other, likely better, examples could easily be pointed at in this thread, but I'm going to be lazy about it. Either way, Nonpareil still seems to have difficulty with understanding that there is, in fact, a difference between the issues of whether something is real or not, whether it can be determined to be real, and what conclusions are actually logically valid related to such. Employing his own special definitions of "is," "exists," and the like seems to be how he justifies invoking fallacious logic, either way.

But, that's enough from me for this thread. Nonpareil and I have gone down that path before and it probably should be OT for this thread.