“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[phiwum]

Well since I don't exist I guess none.

Wait since you don't exist how did I read that? I couldn't have "observed" it since that would make me an observer and observers don't exist because of... philosophy I guess.

Man this makes me nostalgic for being out beyond the event horizon of the formless.

I have never seen anyone argue that they do not exist, in this thread or otherwise.

I suppose that's a good thing. The only ones who argue that they don't exist seem to be correct.

 

[JoeMorgue]

So that's all this is? "Let's all imagine a mystical other universe totally disconnected from ours in a way that any information exchange between them is impossible."

That's not "hypothesizing." That's literally "Just making stuff up." That's daydreaming.

 

[JoeMorgue]

I have never seen anyone argue that they do not exist, in this thread or otherwise.

Yes they do. They hide it behind pretentious word salad, between distinctions without difference, among purposeful obtuseness, and nestled in-between semantics, and my God do they love to label everyone in the conversation with their favorite philosophical fan clubs but that's what they are saying.

"Oh I see. You're a post modernist reductionist Calvinist materalist teamster. Well how do you explain the a priori knowledge of the qualia of the duality of the observer in a brain in a jar?"

 

[Fudbucker]

There really is absolutely no incoherence in imagining a second universe (or a disconnected piece of this universe, if you prefer), perhaps populated by intelligent beings. I'm stunned that you think this is the least bit paradoxical.

I just don't have anything more to say on this, I suppose. Your pronouncements that existence presupposes interactions (with every single part of that which also exists, I suppose) just comes out of nowhere, near as I can figger.




This is still consistent with the hypothesis that the universe consists of distinct, disconnected partitions, incapable of interacting with one another.



I see that you say this, but I see no reason to think that it is true.

I invite others to weigh in and see which of us has odd intuitions here. It might, I suppose, be me, but I would honestly be surprised.




The universe as a whole exists, but does not interact with anything else, right? Obviously, bits of the universe interact with other bits, but not with anything else.

Now, imagine that the universe has two distinct parts, disconnected and incapable of interacting with one another. The bits in the first part interact with other bits in that part, and the same with the second. If we can agree that the one-part universe exists, then surely there is no reason at all to suppose that this two-part universe is an incoherent concept.

Of course, from the perspective of the people in Part A of the two-part universe, there is no reason to take seriously the possibility that Part B exists, but there is no incoherence in doing so. It would be a perfectly undecidable proposition which has no predictive or explanatory value at all, but it is not an incoherent proposition.

I cannot see any problem with this hypothetical situation.

I have never heard a cosmologist (or MWI-ist of QM) ever question the existence of other universes because of a lack of interaction (either with us, or other universes). Quite the opposite, in fact. Interaction is not a necessary condition of existence, and the claim that it is is nonsensical.

I think Nonpareil is conflating the epistemological claim that a universe we can't interact with might as well not exist, from our point of view, with an ontological claim that universes that don't interact with us (or other universes) don't exist, at all.

 

[Fudbucker]

Yes they do. They hide it behind pretentious word salad, between distinctions without difference, among purposeful obtuseness, and nestled in-between semantics, and my God do they love to label everyone in the conversation with their favorite philosophical fan clubs but that's what they are saying.

"Oh I see. You're a post modernist reductionist Calvinist materalist teamster. Well how do you explain the a priori knowledge of the qualia of the duality of the observer in a brain in a jar?"

Do you have an example of anyone claiming they don't exist?

 

[Nonpareil]

There really is absolutely no incoherence in imagining a second universe (or a disconnected piece of this universe, if you prefer), perhaps populated by intelligent beings. I'm stunned that you think this is the least bit paradoxical.

Paradoxical, no. Meaningless semantic games that stretch "real" until it becomes worthless, yes.

I just don't have anything more to say on this, I suppose. Your pronouncements that existence presupposes interactions (with every single part of that which also exists, I suppose) just comes out of nowhere, near as I can figger.

What is the difference between a real thing and an imaginary one?

That you can actually interact with the real one.

This is still consistent with the hypothesis that the universe consists of distinct, disconnected partitions, incapable of interacting with one another.

I ask again: what is the difference between these hypothetical other universes and completely imaginary entities?

I see that you say this, but I see no reason to think that it is true.

I invite others to weigh in and see which of us has odd intuitions here. It might, I suppose, be me, but I would honestly be surprised.

I am not particularly concerned with what anyone does or does not find "odd". If they have coherent objections, I am more than open to them, but as of yet I have not found any.

The universe as a whole exists

As a set. A collection of other entities.

The universe is the sum total of its parts.

Now, imagine that the universe has two distinct parts, disconnected and incapable of interacting with one another.

If they do not interact, they are not part of the same universe.

 

[Nonpareil]

I have never heard a cosmologist (or MWI-ist of QM) ever question the existence of other universes because of a lack of interaction (either with us, or other universes). Quite the opposite, in fact. Interaction is not a necessary condition of existence, and the claim that it is is nonsensical.

If the multi-worlds interpretation is ever accepted, it will be because of actual evidence that these other worlds exist.

That is, because there is an interaction between them and us.

I think Nonpareil is conflating the epistemological claim that a universe we can't interact with might as well not exist, from our point of view, with an ontological claim that universes that don't interact with us (or other universes) don't exist, at all.

I am still waiting for any sort of coherent distinction between these hypothetical other universes and completely imaginary ones, other than that one is arbitrarily labeled as "real" and the other is not.

 

[JoeMorgue]

1. Make up something.
2. Define the said thing as by definition being totally inert and impossible to judge via evidence.
3. Use 2 to prove 1.
4 (Opt) Once step 3 is accepting, start backdooring "therefore Woo."

 

[JoeMorgue]

I am still waiting for any sort of coherent distinction between these hypothetical other universes and completely imaginary ones, other than that one is arbitrarily labeled as "real" and the other is not.

As am I.

What's the functional, practical difference between some shadowy other realm that can never possibly interact with us, can never be proven or disproven, nay can never by definition be supported or not supported with evidence and which can never, has never, and will never have any effect on reality.... and one that doesn't exist in the first place?

Or is this just another "Neiner neiner neiner science doesn't know everything" skit?

 

[tsig]

As am I.

What's the functional, practical difference between some shadowy other realm that can never possibly interact with us, can never be proven or disproven, nay can never by definition be supported or not supported with evidence and which can never, has never, and will never have any effect on reality.... and one that doesn't exist in the first place?

Or is this just another "Neiner neiner neiner science doesn't know everything" skit?

Looks like it.

"Science can't lift itself by it's own bootstraps* so it's bogus therefore my woo is true"


*subject to change as needed

Same song, different verse, a little bit louder and a little bit worse.

 

[tsig]

Well since I don't exist I guess none.

Wait since you don't exist how did I read that? I couldn't have "observed" it since that would make me an observer and observers don't exist because of... philosophy I guess.

Man this makes me nostalgic for being out beyond the event horizon of the formless.

The ineffability of infinity is starting to look good.

 

[David Mo]

If that's the case, then there is surely no reason to think that materialism is true and idealism false. After all, they are both coherent.

Moulines says that idealism is as empty as materialism if not worse.

I add: the problem with idealism is the coherence with the innate conviction of the externality of the world. In reality, even bishop Berkeley believed in the existence of something out of his mind: God. I think that God is less likely that matter. More difficult to prove, certainly.

 

[David Mo]

Any body of theoretical work that has no immediate use in practical, daily life, is nothing but a bunch of semantic games, which serve no other purpose than philosophical masturbation.

That includes, of course, a rather large body of mathematics.

And that includes also a good amount of philosophical masturbation about the value of philosophy and sciences. This kind of masturbation is called Philosophy of Science.

 

[David Mo]

Gravity leprechauns are the equivalent of garage dragons.

Garage dragons do not exist, by definition. It has nothing to do with materialism, or even science; an entity that is by definition undetectable simply fails to meet the definition of "exists".

In science and in common thinking you can infer the existence of a thing by conclusive traces. Philo Vance infers the presence of someone in the room from the smoke of a cigar on the table. In science the method is a little more complex: the hypothetico-deductive method. If the dragon in the garage left something detectable (the unmisstakable bad smell of dragons, for example) the invisible dragons would not be an example of mythical entities and Carl Sagan wouldn't have lost his time with this trifle.

 

[David Mo]

The actual error with Moulines' position - well, one of a handful, but the most important one - is his assertion that pluralism possesses more explanatory power than materialism. It does not. It is every bit as semantic in nature as materialism, and possesses precisely no explanatory power on its own.

I am not sure because he doesn't explain what exactly understands by pluralism. I suppose he is defending that it is easier to speak of different components of matter (energy and mass, for example) that a single one all-inclusive. Pluralism is not contradictory with the discovery of new forms of existence. Monism, yes.

 

[David Mo]

I've always understood materialism as a claim that reality consists of mind-independent and god-independent stuff. We have some basic descriptors for some of this stuff (elementary particles, fields, energy, etc.) and how it behaves, while other stuff remains a mystery (dark energy/matter, undiscovered fundamental particles, possible supersymmetrical particles, etc.), but even the mysterious stuff is still mind and god independent.

Don't confuse materialism with ontological realism.Ontological realism: something exists out of my mind. Pluralism is a kind of ontological realism. Materialism is other different kind of realism. Objective idealism affirms that reality is made with ideas. This is other form of realism.

I think this thread is escaping from the initial subject: materialism. NOte that materialism is not the unique opponent to the subjective idealism.

 

[Nonpareil]

In science and in common thinking you can infer the existence of a thing by conclusive traces. Philo Vance infers the presence of someone in the room from the smoke of a cigar on the table. In science the method is a little more complex: the hypothetico-deductive method. If the dragon in the garage left something detectable (the unmisstakable bad smell of dragons, for example) the invisible dragons would not be an example of mythical entities and Carl Sagan wouldn't have lost his time with this trifle.

Exactly. In either case, there is an interaction, and thus the entity in question is not a garage dragon.

I am not sure because he doesn't explain what exactly understands by pluralism. I suppose he is defending that it is easier to speak of different components of matter (energy and mass, for example) that a single one all-inclusive.

Again, exactly. It's just semantics, and solves none of the problems that he claims materialism has.

Pluralism is not contradictory with the discovery of new forms of existence. Monism, yes.

That depends on what you mean by "new forms of existence" and how strictly you define your specific form of monism.

Semantic arguments tend to be rather silly that way.

 

[phiwum]

So that's all this is? "Let's all imagine a mystical other universe totally disconnected from ours in a way that any information exchange between them is impossible."

That's not "hypothesizing." That's literally "Just making stuff up." That's daydreaming.

My point is merely that there is no inconsistency in supposing that this is the situation. I make this point only because Nonpareil has made the rather odd (to me) claim that existence requires interaction which can be detected, and I see no reason for this.

Nowhere did I suggest that this possibility is a fruitful theory that ought to be explored.

 

[phiwum]

Yes they do. They hide it behind pretentious word salad, between distinctions without difference, among purposeful obtuseness, and nestled in-between semantics, and my God do they love to label everyone in the conversation with their favorite philosophical fan clubs but that's what they are saying.

"Oh I see. You're a post modernist reductionist Calvinist materalist teamster. Well how do you explain the a priori knowledge of the qualia of the duality of the observer in a brain in a jar?"

You may complain that philosophy is useless, that it is needlessly complicated, that they make up pointless jargon. I might agree with the first of these claims and sometimes even the second and third.

But all of this has ****-all to do with what you said, namely that we were arguing we don't exist right here in this thread.

Now, if I may make a suggestion. If you don't like philosophical discussions, please don't feel compelled to enter every philosophy thread and say so. We get it. You think it's pointless.

Leave us to our pointless discussion in peace, then.

 

[phiwum]

Paradoxical, no. Meaningless semantic games that stretch "real" until it becomes worthless, yes.

I don't think that we need to go on, if I read you right here.

You think that the hypothesis that certain (even in principle) undetectable stuff exists is a pointless hypothesis[1], a worthless thought experiment. I may well agree.

However, the claim that it is a worthless thought experiment is not the claim that it is an incoherent concept, that the very definition of existence requires interaction. So, do we disagree or not?

What is the difference between a real thing and an imaginary one?

That you can actually interact with the real one.

I think we're getting close to "existence-as-a-predicate" here, but for my money, a concept represents something real if it corresponds to an actual object distinct from the concept itself.

Non-real things can't interact physically with me, but that doesn't entail that I can interact physically with whatever is real.

I ask again: what is the difference between these hypothetical other universes and completely imaginary entities?



I am not particularly concerned with what anyone does or does not find "odd". If they have coherent objections, I am more than open to them, but as of yet I have not found any.

My objection is simple: you have not shown that existence requires interaction.

As a set. A collection of other entities.

The universe is the sum total of its parts.

Yes. So?

If they do not interact, they are not part of the same universe.

I don't want to argue whether these things are parts of one universe or two distinct universes. The point is the same: there is not anything literally incoherent about the existence of something that is undetectable for us.

(For that matter, and please correct me if I'm wrong, but there are distances beyond which we cannot interact with stuff in this universe, but we still suppose such stuff exists. This is only a half-thought, so I'm not resting my hat on it.)


[1] I'm at a loss why you call it a "semantic" game. It isn't.