“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[LarryS]

Possibly, though I wonder what advantage is achieved. One still has to give a clear definition of "physical" that distinguishes it from supernatural, or else be subject to the same claim of meaninglessness.

The term 'supernatural' has no meaning - it's usually used as an insult in these forums.

The Materialist and Idealist frameworks are usually defined in terms of each other . . . and, since consciousness is primary to our experience, we usually define material in terms of consciousness. 'Material' is that which is independent of consciousness. 'Material' is an assertion because we have not found any substance that is independent of our being aware of it. 'Material' is a useful assertion for designing and building steam engines and etc.

 

[tsig]

Clearly they are materiel. are you claiming that things made of matter cannot think?

I think that even a casual reading will show I made no such claim.

I merely pointed out that either minds are material or not. If they are material, then the universe is not external to them and if not, then materialism is false.

I wonder why you cannot distinguish a conditional statement from a positive assertion that the antecedent is true.

ETA: Actually, the highlighted part read, "But if minds are material...". How one gets from that statement to the conclusion I'm claiming minds are *not* material is really beyond me. Perhaps, Tsig, you should learn a thing or two from philosophy about reading one's words carefully in order to understand what the author is saying.

I didn't say you claimed minds are not materiel I asked you if think that things made of matter cannot think.

Seems like you should learn a thing or two from philosophy about reading one's words carefully in order to understand what the author is saying.


ETA: It's tsig not Tsig maybe you should pay more attention.

 

[Nonpareil]

The Materialist and Idealist frameworks are usually defined in terms of each other . . .

No.

and, since consciousness is primary to our experience, we usually define material in terms of consciousness.

No.

'Material' is an assertion because we have not found any substance that is independent of our being aware of it.

Except literally every substance that we have ever found.

Any argument to the contrary is just playing semantic games.

 

[theprestige]

I will try my best, but please keep in mind that I have not read anything about this topic aside from the OP.

I presume there are many different theses called materialism, but when I referred to the foundational claim in science, I meant something like this: All concepts appearing in scientific theories must be essentially material in nature. This is, roughly, the restriction which prohibits scientific theories involving miracles and the like.

The philosophical question is whether this claim is meaningful. You probably have already balked, since I used the term "material" without defining it. As I understand it, the difficulty of clearly defining this term is the very heart of Mouline's argument that the thesis is meaningless.

One may ask whether this is, in fact, a claim at the foundation of science at all. Perhaps it is not, in which case Mouline's point that it is meaningless is irrelevant to philosophy of science, but it does seem to me quite common that people (philosophers, scientists, skeptics, etc.) do claim that science is restricted to material causes, effects, etc. quite commonly and that if Mouline is right, such claims are regrettable since they are meaningless.

Take everything I said above with a grain of salt, since I'm not educated on this subject. I'm taking my best shot at interpreting a second-hand summary of the article. (I think that Mouline was not just talking about the foundation of science thesis, by the way, but materialism in various other contexts as well, but I chose to focus on so-called scientific materialism.)

I hope that helps. Obviously, I'm not one to speak with any authority on this article.

Thanks! That helps immensely. Salt grains taken with, in bulk.

Regarding the foundational claim, "[a]ll concepts appearing in scientific theories must be essentially material in nature", I dunno. I'm not a scientist nor a philosopher of science, but it seems to me a more accurate claim might be, "all concepts appearing in scientific theories must be related to observable phenomena".

 

[phiwum]

Any sort of philosophical position about what the universe "really" is. Materialism, idealism, physicalism, naturalism, solipsism, dualism, neutral monism, pluralism, and so forth.

And "trivial by definition" is just what I have been saying for the duration of this thread: they are labels, not explanatory models. They possess no ability to explain anything in and of themselves. The only requirement for an ontological position to be valid is that it be coherent. Past that point, the only discussion to be had is one of semantics.

Actually, pretty much all of it is semantics.

If that's the case, then there is surely no reason to think that materialism is true and idealism false. After all, they are both coherent.

And, indeed, idealism could be presented in exactly the same terms as realism. The term "idea" means "that which exists", from which it follows that nothing exists but ideas.

I think that reducing materialism to the tautology "Nothing exists except for that which exists," is not really the best defense of the thesis.

 

[phiwum]

I didn't say you claimed minds are not materiel I asked you if think that things made of matter cannot think.

Very well. I don't understand why you ask that question. It is a non-sequitur.

ETA: And it's not a question I think I should bother addressing at present, because its irrelevance will only distract us from the topic at hand and because I don't have a convincing argument to support whichever answer I give. So, if I don't require an opinion to carry on this conversation, then I won't give an opinion.

Seems like you should learn a thing or two from philosophy about reading one's words carefully in order to understand what the author is saying.


ETA: It's tsig not Tsig maybe you should pay more attention.

My apologies for capitalizing your name. It's a habit.

 

[phiwum]

Thanks! That helps immensely. Salt grains taken with, in bulk.

Regarding the foundational claim, "[a]ll concepts appearing in scientific theories must be essentially material in nature", I dunno. I'm not a scientist nor a philosopher of science, but it seems to me a more accurate claim might be, "all concepts appearing in scientific theories must be related to observable phenomena".

Let me see if I can explain why your more accurate claim isn't quite sufficient.

First, we note that "observable" here must be taken to include "indirectly observable", or else we have to banish atoms, magnetic fields, and all the other things that we do not directly observe, but whose effects (on instruments, perhaps) we observe.

But once we allow indirect observations, without banishing non-material explanations, we've lost the ability to reject theories involving holy chariots pulling the sun across the sky each day, since the proponent may say that we see not the chariot, but the effect of the chariot. Or little pixies that are responsible for causing ice to form in the right conditions, since again we see the crystals they produce.

Of course, we might reject these theories for other reasons (parsimony, i.e., Ockham's razor, for instance), but I think that most people believe that even if other simpler theories were not available to explain the phenomena, the error occurs when we introduce supernatural elements in a scientific explanation. (Sorry, I can't think of a better example where Ockham's razor doesn't apply right now.)

Anyway, that's how I understand the draw of the materialist assumption in science.

 

[David Mo]

I will try my best, but please keep in mind that I have not read anything about this topic aside from the OP.

I presume there are many different theses called materialism, but when I referred to the foundational claim in science, I meant something like this: All concepts appearing in scientific theories must be essentially material in nature. This is, roughly, the restriction which prohibits scientific theories involving miracles and the like.

The philosophical question is whether this claim is meaningful. You probably have already balked, since I used the term "material" without defining it. As I understand it, the difficulty of clearly defining this term is the very heart of Mouline's argument that the thesis is meaningless.

One may ask whether this is, in fact, a claim at the foundation of science at all. Perhaps it is not, in which case Mouline's point that it is meaningless is irrelevant to philosophy of science, but it does seem to me quite common that people (philosophers, scientists, skeptics, etc.) do claim that science is restricted to material causes, effects, etc. quite commonly and that if Mouline is right, such claims are regrettable since they are meaningless.

Take everything I said above with a grain of salt, since I'm not educated on this subject. I'm taking my best shot at interpreting a second-hand summary of the article. (I think that Mouline was not just talking about the foundation of science thesis, by the way, but materialism in various other contexts as well, but I chose to focus on so-called scientific materialism.)

I hope that helps. Obviously, I'm not one to speak with any authority on this article.

But you have perfectly summarized Moulines' point of view!

 

[David Mo]

I'm confused. Is the topic of this thread an attack on science, for not having a sufficiently philosophical definition of matter?

Or is it an attack on materialism, for attempting a philosophy of matter for which there is no complete scientific definition?

Or is it an attempt to back door paranormal phenomena, on the basis, if forces then maybe The Force?

None.
It is a critic against metaphysical materialism that supposes that some thing called "matter" exists and only matter exists. Moulines thinks this materialism provides no operative definition of "matter" and it has not any sense.

Moulines defends the materialism as a vital attitude. He is not very precise on this point.

 

[David Mo]

If you want to attack the position of Moulines you should start by giving an operational definition of matter. That is, a definition that may be useful to distinguish what is from what is not matter (spirit, god, ghost or whatever else).

If this definition of matter is operative in science, should provide a rule that allows reject as extra-scientific what is not matter .

I see that those who are against Moulines in this thread have not done anything like that. Maybe I have been lost.

 

[David Mo]

Regarding the foundational claim, "[a]ll concepts appearing in scientific theories must be essentially material in nature", I dunno. I'm not a scientist nor a philosopher of science, but it seems to me a more accurate claim might be, "all concepts appearing in scientific theories must be related to observable phenomena".

This don’t exclude ghosts, because ghosts have terrifying appearances. Paranormal entities would be material in concept.

Anyway, a word already exists for observable phenomena: "empirical".

 

[phiwum]

But you have perfectly summarized Moulines' point of view!

Well, that's a lovely coincidence.

Thanks!

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Any body of theoretical work that has no immediate use in practical, daily life, is nothing but a bunch of semantic games, which serve no other purpose than philosophical masturbation.

And just for the record, there ain't nothing wrong with masturbation. It's all fun and stuff. Enjoy it. But don't even think for a minute that it accomplishes anything other than self pleasure.

 

[Dancing David]

This is partly why I think the term "physicalism" works better than "materialism". The idea is that whatever exists in the universe operates according to physical laws rather than supernatural ones.

I am a naturalist, so I think that clarifies things and gets past the semantic baggage of the ancient philosophers.

However in a recent thread (that was derailed by Nick227) I stated that I believe naturalism (that things are as they appear) becomes materialism. In that the universe appears to made of energy/matter.

 

[Dancing David]

Possibly, though I wonder what advantage is achieved. One still has to give a clear definition of "physical" that distinguishes it from supernatural, or else be subject to the same claim of meaninglessness.

Not really 'supernatural' depends upon the person using the term, when someone describes a supernatural phenomena then it can be discussed by their usage.

Then the discussion of if it is a form of dualism or not.

 

[phiwum]

Any body of theoretical work that has no immediate use in practical, daily life, is nothing but a bunch of semantic games, which serve no other purpose than philosophical masturbation.

And just for the record, there ain't nothing wrong with masturbation. It's all fun and stuff. Enjoy it. But don't even think for a minute that it accomplishes anything other than self pleasure.

That includes, of course, a rather large body of mathematics.

In fact, as stated, it includes a rather large part of science. Cosmology, for instance, has no immediate use in practical, daily life.

I don't regard mathematics or science as "semantic games". Nor do I consider philosophy (done right) a "semantic game", though I won't argue for its practical utility generally speaking. (That said, much philosophical logic has been adapted by computer scientists, however. I ran across tense logics in computer science today, and tense logic was introduced by philosophers.)

As far as I'm concerned, certain topics are interesting, whether mathematical or philosophical. I won't argue that I'm contributing to the lives of average folks around the world, because it really isn't what I set out to do.

 

[Nonpareil]

If that's the case, then there is surely no reason to think that materialism is true and idealism false. After all, they are both coherent.

No, they aren't. Ontological idealism states that the universe is a form of thought or consciousness. In order to make this work, it has to stretch the definition of the word so far that it becomes worthless and ceases to describe anything that would actually be considered consciousness.

It is gramatically worthless. That the statement can be made at all is due only to the inherent weakness of language and the fact that there are no alarms that go off when someone chooses to abuse it.

I think that reducing materialism to the tautology "Nothing exists except for that which exists," is not really the best defense of the thesis.

There is no other defense possible, because that is essentially what materialism is. It's what all functional ontological positions are, at their core. Again, they are trivial by definition, and barely more than semantics even if they function.

Let me see if I can explain why your more accurate claim isn't quite sufficient.

First, we note that "observable" here must be taken to include "indirectly observable", or else we have to banish atoms, magnetic fields, and all the other things that we do not directly observe, but whose effects (on instruments, perhaps) we observe.

But once we allow indirect observations, without banishing non-material explanations, we've lost the ability to reject theories involving holy chariots pulling the sun across the sky each day, since the proponent may say that we see not the chariot, but the effect of the chariot. Or little pixies that are responsible for causing ice to form in the right conditions, since again we see the crystals they produce.

Gravity leprechauns are the equivalent of garage dragons.

Garage dragons do not exist, by definition. It has nothing to do with materialism, or even science; an entity that is by definition undetectable simply fails to meet the definition of "exists".

If you want to attack the position of Moulines you should start by giving an operational definition of matter.

Again, ontological positions are inherently little more than semantic in nature. Moulines is quite right in stating that materialism is largely empty, because it simply labels whatever the universe is made out of as "matter". This is admittedly true.

The actual error with Moulines' position - well, one of a handful, but the most important one - is his assertion that pluralism possesses more explanatory power than materialism. It does not. It is every bit as semantic in nature as materialism, and possesses precisely no explanatory power on its own.

 

[phiwum]

No, they aren't. Ontological idealism states that the universe is a form of thought or consciousness. In order to make this work, it has to stretch the definition of the word so far that it becomes worthless and ceases to describe anything that would actually be considered consciousness.

It is gramatically worthless. That the statement can be made at all is due only to the inherent weakness of language and the fact that there are no alarms that go off when someone chooses to abuse it.

But you haven't offered *any* definition of matter aside from "that which exists". You've made no claim at all regarding what sort of stuff exists.

The idealist can play exactly the same game, and end with exactly the same pointless result: nothing exists other than stuff which exists.

There is no other defense possible, because that is essentially what materialism is. It's what all functional ontological positions are, at their core. Again, they are trivial by definition, and barely more than semantics even if they function.

Then the materialist thesis is just as empty as Moulines says. It is a dull tautology.

Gravity leprechauns are the equivalent of garage dragons.

Garage dragons do not exist, by definition. It has nothing to do with materialism, or even science; an entity that is by definition undetectable simply fails to meet the definition of "exists".

This is not clear at all. I suppose you mean that to exist is to be perceptible (in principle, at least), but I can't imagine why anyone (other than idealists!) would think this is the case.

We can say that there are good reasons to presume that which cannot be perceived does not exist, namely because imperceptible stuff doesn't alter our experiences and hence can be ignored. But these are heuristic reasons. There is nothing at all that I know that entails to exist is to be perceptible.

Again, ontological positions are inherently little more than semantic in nature. Moulines is quite right in stating that materialism is largely empty, because it simply labels whatever the universe is made out of as "matter". This is admittedly true.

The actual error with Moulines' position - well, one of a handful, but the most important one - is his assertion that pluralism possesses more explanatory power than materialism. It does not. It is every bit as semantic in nature as materialism, and possesses precisely no explanatory power on its own.

I won't defend his claims for pluralism.

So long as you concede that the "thesis" that nothing exists except stuff that exists is a pointless, empty thesis, we have no disagreement.

 

[tsig]

I didn't say you claimed minds are not materiel I asked you if think that things made of matter cannot think.

.

Very well. I don't understand why you ask that question. It is a non-sequitur.

ETA: And it's not a question I think I should bother addressing at present, because its irrelevance will only distract us from the topic at hand and because I don't have a convincing argument to support whichever answer I give. So, if I don't require an opinion to carry on this conversation, then I won't give an opinion.



My apologies for capitalizing your name. It's a habit.

I see you have again dodged the question and have declared it null and void yet it seems to be at the core of the arguments here.

Can matter produce thoughts or is there something else needed?


If you say matter is sufficient to account for consciousness then there is no more argument, if you disagree then you have to account for what that 'other' is.

 

[phiwum]

I see you have again dodged the question and have declared it null and void yet it seems to be at the core of the arguments here.

Can matter produce thoughts or is there something else needed?


If you say matter is sufficient to account for consciousness then there is no more argument, if you disagree then you have to account for what that 'other' is.

This is utterly distinct from the argument that materialism is an empty thesis (a claim, by the way, that seems plausible to me but I certainly don't hold any strong opinions).

If the answer is no, matter cannot think (and evidently you and I are capable of thinking), then materialism is of course false.

If the answer is yes, matter can think, then materialism is not inconsistent with this fact, though it is not obviously true.

Mouline's concern is considerably more fundamental. The word "matter" is undefined in the materialist thesis (and also, of course, in your question regarding thinking). If this is so, your question is utterly irrelevant, as well as fundamentally meaningless.

Thus, I see no reason to offer a half-thought answer to your question, given that it is simply beside the point. You have evidently misread the thread to the point that you think the question is, "Can matter think?" This is not Mouline's concern.